Norwegian frigate - whoops!
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capnsensible
Well-Known Member
Re: Norwegian Colregs
Some interesting thoughts here:
https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com/2018/11/for-those-in-peril-on-sea-thoughts-on.html
Some interesting thoughts here:
https://thinpinstripedline.blogspot.com/2018/11/for-those-in-peril-on-sea-thoughts-on.html
Poignard
Well-Known Member
Re: Norwegian Colregs
That brings a lump to my throat. Or is it breakfast coming up?
Anyway, it's bloody good. :encouragement:
That brings a lump to my throat. Or is it breakfast coming up?
Anyway, it's bloody good. :encouragement:
Seajet
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Re: Norwegian Colregs
My god the Admiralty are harsh bastards - worse than being flogged around the fleet !
My god the Admiralty are harsh bastards - worse than being flogged around the fleet !
A1Sailor
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Re: Norwegian Colregs
I did some time on the bridge of HMS Broadsword in 1985, never getting to call Danny Boy, and the OOW always informed the Captain - 24x7.
Court Martial I would imagine, given the findings. The Navigator also and the OOW, simply for not calling for help/updating the Captain. He remained "In Command" until the following year, but bringing his broken ship home and berthing it in Portsmouth may have been part of his penance.
I did some time on the bridge of HMS Broadsword in 1985, never getting to call Danny Boy, and the OOW always informed the Captain - 24x7.
The Captain's Cabin was, I think, below the Bridge and the Wardroom and Officers' Cabins one deck below that. I never remember anybody other then the Captain being contacted, but on the rare occasion he was invited into the Wardroom I guess the Navigator might have been the first point of help for the OOW. I was always in the Wardroom on such occasions, amused at the antics of some of the others trying to score points in front of the Captain.
Seajet
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Re: Norwegian Colregs
I know Broadsword was a batch 1, still much missed from what I read, and the Batch 3's with tweaks to isolate the machinery - yes I've read Iain Ballantynes' amusing ' Hunter Killers ' - still seems hard to beat, I know whenever they are mentioned in ' Warships IFR ' there's a gnashing of teeth.
This latest incident seems horrendous in its simplicity - unthinkable but still a very available cockup.
I know Broadsword was a batch 1, still much missed from what I read, and the Batch 3's with tweaks to isolate the machinery - yes I've read Iain Ballantynes' amusing ' Hunter Killers ' - still seems hard to beat, I know whenever they are mentioned in ' Warships IFR ' there's a gnashing of teeth.
This latest incident seems horrendous in its simplicity - unthinkable but still a very available cockup.
A1Sailor
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Re: Norwegian Colregs
The Damage Control Exercises were such fun - but we knew they wouldn't let an entire intake of Medical Officers drown...
capnsensible
Well-Known Member
Re: Norwegian Colregs
Tank was better. 'Take a gooood deep breath'.
The Damage Control Exercises were such fun - but we knew they wouldn't let an entire intake of Medical Officers drown...
Tank was better. 'Take a gooood deep breath'.
A1Sailor
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Re: Norwegian Colregs
Broadsword with a gun.:encouragement:The last four ships of the class (the Batch III ships Cornwall, Cumberland, Campbeltown and Chatham) were of a greatly improved design. Reflecting lessons learned in the Falklands, the weapons fit was changed, becoming more optimised to a general warfare role; the only major weapon system shared with the previous vessels was the pair of six-cell Seawolf launchers. The ships were fitted with the 4.5" (114 mm) gun, primarily for NGS (Naval Gunfire Support for land forces). Exocet was replaced by the superior Harpoon with eight GWS 60 missile launchers fitted laterally abaft the bridge, and each ship would carry a Goalkeeper CIWS (Close-In Weapon System).
In their final form, the Type 22s were the largest frigates ever built for the Royal Navy – the follow-on Type 23 class would be appreciably smaller ships. Reflecting this, Type 22s were often deployed as flagships for NATO Task Groups.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_22_frigate
A1Sailor
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Re: Norwegian Colregs
:encouragement:
This too:Tank was better. 'Take a gooood deep breath'.
:encouragement:
Poignard
Well-Known Member
Re: Norwegian Colregs
But don't hold it too long. Otherwise someone will give you a thump in the stomach.
Tank was better. 'Take a gooood deep breath'.
But don't hold it too long. Otherwise someone will give you a thump in the stomach.
Blue Sunray
Well-Known Member
Re: Norwegian Colregs
The first time I went through I genuinely thought it was going to be really fun on the basis I'd seen John Noakes do it, it wasn't (that time).
This too:
:encouragement:
The first time I went through I genuinely thought it was going to be really fun on the basis I'd seen John Noakes do it, it wasn't (that time).
A1Sailor
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Re: Norwegian Colregs
It wasn't much "fun", but very useful. If I ever had the misfortune to end up in a car in/underwater it might help - arm out of the seatbelt onto a known/fixed point then undo the resultant lapstrap later...
I do remember there were six flying helmets for those of us going in the back. Five red ones and one white, which was for the weakest swimmer that the instructors would look out for.
We were all weak swimmers that day!!!!!!
The fourth dunk, in the dark, definitely wasn't fun...
It wasn't much "fun", but very useful. If I ever had the misfortune to end up in a car in/underwater it might help - arm out of the seatbelt onto a known/fixed point then undo the resultant lapstrap later...
I do remember there were six flying helmets for those of us going in the back. Five red ones and one white, which was for the weakest swimmer that the instructors would look out for.
We were all weak swimmers that day!!!!!!
The fourth dunk, in the dark, definitely wasn't fun...
pagoda
Well-Known Member
Re: Norwegian Colregs
Did a lot of inverted helicopter escape training for offshore work. It steadily got more realistic as the years progressed. Strangely enough the firefighting training went the other way -the firefighters unions said it was exposing their members to too much risk, so it went from quite realistic to dumbed down and pathetic.
I used to dive so the chopper inversion/escape wasn't that scary. The firefighting i found useful (!) once. I think it would be good for basic firefighting/rescue to be taught at 16-18 for all , before leaving school. For some it would be thought of as a waste of time, but it would save lives....
Did a lot of inverted helicopter escape training for offshore work. It steadily got more realistic as the years progressed. Strangely enough the firefighting training went the other way -the firefighters unions said it was exposing their members to too much risk, so it went from quite realistic to dumbed down and pathetic.
I used to dive so the chopper inversion/escape wasn't that scary. The firefighting i found useful (!) once. I think it would be good for basic firefighting/rescue to be taught at 16-18 for all , before leaving school. For some it would be thought of as a waste of time, but it would save lives....
[163233]
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Obvs I no nowt about these things, but, aren't warships not expected to be more tolerant of such damage?
A1Sailor
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To a degree. Like all ships they have different levels of readiness against damage depending on where they are and what they are doing - proximity to other vessels, the shore/seabed and likelihood of getting torpedoed! The highest state of readiness is every single watertight door or hatch shut, making movement around the ship very difficult indeed - so a balance is struck.
There are various states/conditions, signified I think 1, 2, 3 and x, y, z - 1x and 3z for example.
If you read the Board of Enquiry report from HMS Southampton's collision, they were hampered by a closed hatch that leaked and another hatch that would normally have been closed but they had decided to leave open. It said "Three Compartments Needlessly Flooded".
She was in Damage Control State 2 Condition Yankee (2Y) and since I left the Royal Navy in 1989 I can't remember exactly what it means - but I think it is an intermediate level.
It is all discussed in Annex B of the report at https://www.3peaks.org.uk/Downloads/HMSSOUTHAMPTONMVTORBAY3Sept1998BOIReport.pdf from page 20/31 onwards. Have a read if interested. They got a great deal of plaudits for staying afloat!:encouragement:
I suspect the Norwegian Frigate, if it had just left port, may have been in a similar "state". Belgrano when torpedoed was apparently in a pretty low NBCD state...
Uricanejack
Well-Known Member
"There but for the Grace Of God"
I am far from infallible. I have made errors and had some close calls. Fortunately for me and those who sail with me they have been minor and the chain broke before something serious occurred.
The RN has probably learnt from the events of 20 years ago. If it has been 20 years since the last RN vessel has been in a Collision. It might be because they learnt well. Or it might be because there are a lot less RN ships at sea. 20 years is a long time and hard learned lessons often get forgot with time.
If Navies hang all the officers and captains who make mistakes from the starboard yard. They will run out of officers. The Truth is everyone makes errors. Both these ships made errors.
The RADAR video, published in Norway from I think it was VTS RADAR shows both vessels and the other nearby vessels quite clearly and their movements along with some translation of the Radio communication. There is no evidence Nav lights were not on and clearly visible. So what happened? To early to say.
SOP, Training, Experience, Familiarity with equipment all possible factors. Odds are, with most collisions. Bridge Resource Management, Particularly effective communication between bridge team members will have played a large part.
Members of both teams probably made assumptions. About what other members of their team were aware of and planning what
The other vessel was going to do. Critical personnel may have been distracted. Both Vessels Made small alterations which may not have been readily apparent. Were concerns raised about what was happening.
The Pilot on the Tanker did eventually become concerned and did ask questions and in the end even demanded a course alteration by the approaching navy vessel.
Could the Pilot have done mare sooner?
The navy vessel appears to have altered to port at the last minute.
VTS and Tanker were apparently not aware of the name of the navy Vessel. Which leads to questions about when ships reported in to VTS and what information VTS passed on about vessels transiting, arriving and departing from the area.
VTS unlike ATC do not typically give direction to vessels. VTS is usually an information only service.
According to the video of the RADAR display. The Navy vessel was on a fairly steady co proceeding up the starboard side of a relatively wide deep channel. The Tanker had recently left a oil terminal and was proceeding relatively slowly with an escort tug on a nearly reciprocal co up the port side of the same channel. Head on situation. Two PD vessels. A Small fast maneuverable one and a big slow less maneuverable one. With the added complication of two other vessels on its starboard side.
Should have been simple.
Both bridge teams have a few questions to answer.
I am far from infallible. I have made errors and had some close calls. Fortunately for me and those who sail with me they have been minor and the chain broke before something serious occurred.
The RN has probably learnt from the events of 20 years ago. If it has been 20 years since the last RN vessel has been in a Collision. It might be because they learnt well. Or it might be because there are a lot less RN ships at sea. 20 years is a long time and hard learned lessons often get forgot with time.
If Navies hang all the officers and captains who make mistakes from the starboard yard. They will run out of officers. The Truth is everyone makes errors. Both these ships made errors.
The RADAR video, published in Norway from I think it was VTS RADAR shows both vessels and the other nearby vessels quite clearly and their movements along with some translation of the Radio communication. There is no evidence Nav lights were not on and clearly visible. So what happened? To early to say.
SOP, Training, Experience, Familiarity with equipment all possible factors. Odds are, with most collisions. Bridge Resource Management, Particularly effective communication between bridge team members will have played a large part.
Members of both teams probably made assumptions. About what other members of their team were aware of and planning what
The other vessel was going to do. Critical personnel may have been distracted. Both Vessels Made small alterations which may not have been readily apparent. Were concerns raised about what was happening.
The Pilot on the Tanker did eventually become concerned and did ask questions and in the end even demanded a course alteration by the approaching navy vessel.
Could the Pilot have done mare sooner?
The navy vessel appears to have altered to port at the last minute.
VTS and Tanker were apparently not aware of the name of the navy Vessel. Which leads to questions about when ships reported in to VTS and what information VTS passed on about vessels transiting, arriving and departing from the area.
VTS unlike ATC do not typically give direction to vessels. VTS is usually an information only service.
According to the video of the RADAR display. The Navy vessel was on a fairly steady co proceeding up the starboard side of a relatively wide deep channel. The Tanker had recently left a oil terminal and was proceeding relatively slowly with an escort tug on a nearly reciprocal co up the port side of the same channel. Head on situation. Two PD vessels. A Small fast maneuverable one and a big slow less maneuverable one. With the added complication of two other vessels on its starboard side.
Should have been simple.
Both bridge teams have a few questions to answer.
A1Sailor
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Might darkness have been a significant factor? In the HMS Southampton incident 30 years ago (was there another 20 years ago?) the OOW had made the same/similar rendevous to escort a ship 6 or 7 times before - but never in darkness...
Seajet
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Well close quarters manouvres can't be helped by doing it in the dark, and if it had been broad daylight it wouldn't have mattered if the frigate was trying to be smartarse stealthy or not, they'd have been able to see each other and it seems a fair bet the accident would never have happened.
I know there's still doubt as to whether the frigate was dark and Emcon or not, but for instance stealth aircraft only usually fly at night if trying to be sneaky.
I know there's still doubt as to whether the frigate was dark and Emcon or not, but for instance stealth aircraft only usually fly at night if trying to be sneaky.
Yellow Ballad
Well-Known Member
Flicking through this article (sorry if it's been posted I'm not reading 10 pages before bed, just as I've not read the article properly so may be wrong) it looks like there's been some dodgy GPS jamming from the Ruski's, or it's just an excuse.
https://www.news.com.au/technology/...story/ee28be793012e9b9e66d59ffba439242#.3hra1
https://www.news.com.au/technology/...story/ee28be793012e9b9e66d59ffba439242#.3hra1
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