The sinking of HMS HOOD - on TV now

Sailfree said:
Second look

Accuracy

Hits obtained by British Battlecruisers and Battleships (BCS = Battlecruiser squadron) (BS = Battle Squadron)




Shells Fired - Hits - % Accuracy 1st and 2nd BCS

1469 - 21 - 1.43%

3rd BCS

373 - 16 - 4.49%

5th BS

1099 - 29 - 2.64%

2nd, 4th, 1st BS

1593 - 57 - 3.7%


Hits obtained by German Battlecruisers and Battleships

Shells Fired - Hits - % Accuracy

1st Scouting Group

1670 - 65 - 3.89%

Battleships

1927 - 57 - 2.96%

Nothing really conclusive
Click to expand...

But if you factor in the reality that the Grand Fleet had both more guns and bigger guns you can perhaps see why the High Sees Fleet scuttled back to the Jade. Had Scheer stayed to fight the RNs losses would have looked small by comparison.
 
Joker said:
Only because of the submarines, not because of the High Seas Fleet. Without the subs, the Brtish Merchant Navy would have had full run of the seas.

Von Scheer? A classic example of a small cruiser squadron tying down forces ten times its size. Works for about a month, and then it gets caught out. Ditto in WW II with Langsdorff, except that there wasn't a 'fleet in being' to worry about. Result was just the same.

And that was one of the functions the battlecruisers were designed for. Nothing that could beat them could catch them; nothing they could beat could out run them.
Click to expand...

Grumpybear said:
Exactly.
Click to expand...


Ok, you guys odviously don't understand the concepts... Maybe I haven't explained them well enough... It's a very interesting subject that applies to a much broader range of situations, and makes for some excellent lessons that can be passed into business as well.. I rarely nowadays get a chance to explain or discuss this sort of thing, but I did spend six years studying strategic studies at a post graduate level.... Its my academic background...

If you really want to understand what went on, and why, then I would suggest that you look first at some of the basic concepts of sea denial, and sea control, as well as the idea of a fleet in being..... Even Wikipedia has a pretty good stab at explaining it...

These basic considerations lie at the centre of the actions of the royal navy from Nelson to the suez crisis...

I have no doubt if you are keen that you will find interesting the actions of Admiral Spee and Craddocks actions in response, that lead up to the Battle of coronel and the subsequent battle of the Falklands... Coronel being the first defeat of a British Squadron since the war of 1812...
Though this is a bit more nuts and bolts stuff...

What I am relating here is pretty basic naval strategy stuff... And accepted historic fact.... And if you study it a bit more it will give you a much better understanding of the battle of jutland, Cunninghams campaign in the med, nelsons actions, and even the situation off of somolia....

Once you move past the focus on tactical and technical aspects... You begin to understand the overriding principles and actually learn something usefull from history... These basic overriding principles never really change... And are as relevent today as they were in 1914....

All intended in good grace as I am sure that as you guys seem to be keen you will enjoy the exercise and learn some things that will suprise you.

:)
 
photodog said:
Ok, you guys odviously don't understand the concepts... Maybe I haven't explained them well enough... It's a very interesting subject that applies to a much broader range of situations, and makes for some excellent lessons that can be passed into business as well.. I rarely nowadays get a chance to explain or discuss this sort of thing, but I did spend six years studying strategic studies at a post graduate level.... Its my academic background...

If you really want to understand what went on, and why, then I would suggest that you look first at some of the basic concepts of sea denial, and sea control, as well as the idea of a fleet in being..... Even Wikipedia has a pretty good stab at explaining it...

These basic considerations lie at the centre of the actions of the royal navy from Nelson to the suez crisis...

I have no doubt if you are keen that you will find interesting the actions of Admiral Spee and Craddocks actions in response, that lead up to the Battle of coronel and the subsequent battle of the Falklands... Coronel being the first defeat of a British Squadron since the war of 1812...
Though this is a bit more nuts and bolts stuff...

What I am relating here is pretty basic naval strategy stuff... And accepted historic fact.... And if you study it a bit more it will give you a much better understanding of the battle of jutland, Cunninghams campaign in the med, nelsons actions, and even the situation off of somolia....

Once you move past the focus on tactical and technical aspects... You begin to understand the overriding principles and actually learn something usefull from history... These basic overriding principles never really change... And are as relevent today as they were in 1914....

All intended in good grace as I am sure that as you guys seem to be keen you will enjoy the exercise and learn some things that will suprise you.

:)
Click to expand...

Even so Jutland was a resounding success for the Grand Fleet because it ensured that Jellicoe never had to chance losing the war in an afternoon. Yes the High Seas Fleet was still in existance so the Grand fleet continu ed their blockade till the end of the war. Yes if the High Seas Fleet had been destroyed it would have released the Grand Fleet for other duties, but it had always been the plan that blockading the Higrh Seas Fleet was their primary task. Because the reality was that because the High Seas Fleet was contained German merchant ships were unable to transit into the north sea either so Germany starved and thus lost the war.

The High Seas Fleet gained nothing fron Jutland in the military sense and had to flee the battle site.

I still cannot see how your assertion that the High Seas Fleet won can be substantiated, they made no strategic gain, they turned and ran, and they were unwilling to stand and fight, now I was a german officer that would not do that much for my pride, hence all the claptrap about the High Seas Fleet winning.

Now I would not dispute the RN made amny very bad mistakes at Jutland but at the end they were very much the dominant force in the North Sea and the High Seas Fleet was confined to port until it's crews muntinied and in fact after the armistice the German navy had lot's of problems actually getting their ships to sail to the Forth and on to Scapa. In many respects Jutland caused both the German naval mutinies and the starvation of the German population by the end of the war.
 
Woodlouse said:
You'd be well advised to do some reading. British gunnery at Jutland was actually more accurate than the Germans. Problem was the ammunition which was far inferior and had a habit of exploding without penetrating any armour. Jellicoe knew of this problem and had tried very hard in the past to develop more effective munitions for his ships. Unfortunately it was only after he battle that the powers that be began to agree with him on that necessity.
Click to expand...

The problem was that the British shells tended to be longer for their calibre but were only tested against armour at a 90 deg angle of impact. They found at Jutland that they were badly affected when they struck armour at angles away from 90 degrees.

The British had taken the approach of designing guns with heavier shells and lower muzzle velocities than the Germans, partly to overcome problems they experienced with higher muzzle velocities causing wear, especially with the 12"/50 gun that they'd developed to replace the 12"/45 fitted to the earliest Dreadnoughts. The 12"/50 also suffered from accuracy problems as the propellant wasn't always fully burnt before the shell left the barrel.

The British then worked their way up through the 13.5"/45 and 15"/42 guns each will relatively heavy rounds for their calibre in order to get effective weapons with lower muzzle velocities. The advantage, especially at WW1 ranges, over the smaller German guns was not as big as the basic numbers suggest.

As well as improving the testing of shells at oblique angles of impact after Jutland, the British also went for the light shell approach for the 16" guns of Nelson & Rodney, which didn't work too well as the short shells caused much higher rates of barrel wear.

By WWII the British had realised they were right the first time and had come back to heavier shells and lower muzzle velocities, which worked better at longer ranges. The Americans switched to much heavier shells for WWII too, even for existing guns, whereas the Germans stuck with the light shell, higher velocity approach.
 
maxi77 said:
Even so Jutland was a resounding success for the Grand Fleet because it ensured that Jellicoe never had to chance losing the war in an afternoon. Yes the High Seas Fleet was still in existance so the Grand fleet continu ed their blockade till the end of the war. Yes if the High Seas Fleet had been destroyed it would have released the Grand Fleet for other duties, but it had always been the plan that blockading the Higrh Seas Fleet was their primary task. Because the reality was that because the High Seas Fleet was contained German merchant ships were unable to transit into the north sea either so Germany starved and thus lost the war.

The High Seas Fleet gained nothing fron Jutland in the military sense and had to flee the battle site.

I still cannot see how your assertion that the High Seas Fleet won can bPe substantiated, they made no strategic gain, they turned and ran, and they were unwilling to stand and fight, now I was a german officer that would not do that much for my pride, hence all the claptrap about the High Seas Fleet winning.

Now I would not dispute the RN made amny very bad mistakes at Jutland but at the end they were very much the dominant force in the North Sea and the High Seas Fleet was confined to port until it's crews muntinied and in fact after the armistice the German navy had lot's of problems actually getting their ships to sail to the Forth and on to Scapa. In many respects Jutland caused both the German naval mutinies and the starvation of the German population by the end of the war.
Click to expand...

Hmmm.. We're should I start...

First off ... Ignore for the moment all the talk about who sank more.. Who ran away... And who won or lost the war... We are trying to determine which side won and which side lost the battle of Jutland...

Now, to do so we have to first look at the objectives of the opposing fleets on a wide strategic basis... Ad we have to do this in the context of the times and with the thinking of the times....

At the time there were three primary schools of thought in relation to grand naval strategy... Lead in turn by The american admiral Mahan, Julian Corbett, and from the continental school French vice admiral Castex....

Whilst there were many differences in their thinking... All of them recognised the idea that the primary role of the navy was to exercise or contest control of the sea to allow unfettered martime trade, support for land actions, scope for combined operations, and decisive offensive fleet actions in support of wider war aims.

All of the schools of thinking agreed that the defeat of the enemy fleet was central to obtaining control of the sea... And thus the prosecution of wider war aims.

All three schools also agreed that this defeat was best obtained through the "decisive battle".

Now, here is we're it gets a bit more Intersting...

Not all parties in a war require control of the seas... Or are capable of obtaining it. This may be down to one party having a weaker fleet, or geographical considerations... Or the overall wider strategic context...

In the case of both world wars... It was imperative from the uk's perspective that they have control of the seas... Or at the worst that germany did not or could not...

So the role of the grand fleet was not to blockade the high seas fleet, it was to engage in the decisive battle as doctrine of the day dictated, and destroy the German high seas fleet, thereby ensuring control.

Victory for the royal navy was victory in this decisive battle.

The role of the high seas fleet was to deny the uk the control of the sea, we think of this as the odvious meeting in the decisive battle and destruction of the enemy... However there was a other option that was also possible, And that was to not allow the decisive battle to take place.. Which would force the rn into a waiting game and blockade... The very act of which denies the rn the ability to act offensively and in support of greater and wider war aims... It takes the initiative way from the RN.

So, at Jutland the aim of the royal navy was the destruction of the high seas fleet in a decisive battle which would secure control of the seas for the rn.

The aim of the German navy was to deny the rn this victory... And thus prevent them from being a offensive force.

It's important to understand that the German navy did not have sufficient strength to exercise control of the seas such as to have ensured victory for Germany during the war... Even had they defeated the grand fleet, the combined allied fleets, in combination with Germany's poor geostrategic position in the north sea, and it's continental war aims, would have ensured that they could not exercise control of the sea such as to defeat there enemies...

So, the failure of the British at Jutland to achieve a decisive victory was a absolute failure, as it did not free up the navy to become a offensive tool, and ensured that they would be tied down and restricted in their actions by the German fleet in being.. the Germans emerged, gave the RN a bloody nose, and then went back to the heligoland to continue to tie down the rn and prevent it from taking the initiative.

So, did the RN succeed I their goals at Jutland? No they did not.

Did the Germans succeed in their goals at Jutland? Yes they did.


If the Germans had succeeded in defeating the RN decisively at
Jutland, Would they have succeed in their wider strategic goals in the war?
Probably not... As they lacked sufficient strength and position to actually control the seas.. And had no desire,need, or ability to launch offensive combined operations within their greater strategic aims..

If the RN had succeeded at decisivley defeating the German navy at Jutland, would they have accelerated or advanced their wider strategic goals in the war?

Well, once again there is no Overall answer here... I think yes.. The navy would have been able to go over to become the offensive tool that the thinking of the day called for...


So, did the RN win the battle... Well, they didn't destroy the German navy.. And that was there main aim.. and the Germans continued to tie down and deny control of the sea to the RN.. Which again was there main aim.

The aim of the German navy was not to prevent blockade of their ports... It was to prevent the RN from being a offensive weapon... The Germans did not have the strength to prevent a blockade as they didn't have the strength to exercise control... They could only deny it to others..


As the RN did not obtain control of the seas at Jutland... They did not win full stop.

Its beside the point as to who won the war... Jutland was never going to decide that... Despite the witterings of Churchill about how jellicoe was the only man who could lose the war in a afternoon...

Jellicoe was heavily criticised for not obtaining a decisive victory.. Because that was what was needed..

So, we need to look away from who sank what and who ran away.. And stop judging the battle on the tactical considerations and prejudices of the popular media... We need to judge the battle on who actually accomplished their goals on the day.

On this basis the RN did NOT win...

The failure of the wider German strategy of maintaining a fleet in being and not seeking to obtain a decisive battle victory is not really relevent within the context of the battle of Jutland... As it is actually a failure of the German war strategy in tota... And we cannot really say that Germany would have won the war if they had obtained a decisive victory at Jutland.

The failure to do so may have had unforeseen consequences... But these have no bearing on the judgement as to who was victorious at Jutland, as they are a classic accident of history...






But, as a aside... History is a living thing... And in the case of war, is generally written by the victors the first time around... Jutland was a failure for the RN.... Both strategically as they did not accomplish the doctrinal victory and change the nature of the maritime war in Europe, tactically as there ship handling was shown to be poor, their gunnery inferior, their emplyment of the their resources flawed, and they lost more ships on the day... And technically as important elements of their fleet were destroyed through technical inferiority...

But they couldn't go around saying this could they? so they painted a victory of sorts.. The Germans Ran away... Etc.. And this propoganda has prevailed... It suits our national prejudices... The same prejudices which have clouded our views about the Italian navy in WW2...


But becuase history is alive.. You and others are allowed to have different views.. And to place things into different perspectives... And these will be valid in certain contexts...
In reality there is no absolutes in history...
 
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Wow, you guys know your stuff. very interesting reading.
wish i could remember what the Seamanship instructor taught us when i joined the RN in 72, he was a gunner on big ships in WW2 and serving out his time as an instuctor.
his lessons on gunnery were very good but outdated as the biggest guns in the mob at that time were 6inch, and he was talking about 16inch, very good non the less and the principles were the same.
 
So, the failure of the British at Jutland to achieve a decisive victory was a absolute failure, as it did not free up the navy to become a offensive tool
Click to expand...
An offensive tool? Where? What other purpose would the Grand Fleet have had?
British naval strategy was to keep supplies running to the UK and prevent supplies reaching Germany. That's all. End of. Jutland was irrelevant.
 
capnsensible said:
Some might argue thats what Trident is for, deterrence.
Click to expand...

Many years ago ( time of the cold war) I went to a talk by the Royal Navy. The usual questions of the time were asked about our nuclear deterent. The RN chaps said that we would never use it first. ( one theory was that we would drop one in the Baltic to show our intention)
I stood up & pointed out that the Russian army's conventional forces would overrun our forces in europe in 9 days ( a generally accepted fact at the time) & they would not need to use nuclear weapons. However, as we would be in deep trouble then we would have to use the bomb first or be defeated very quickly. I also pointed out that an invading army would not necessarily want to use nuclear arms as it would give them nothing to invade & no one to subjugate. So once again we would have to use the nuclear arms first. If we did then we wold have a greater chance of being obliterated. As a conquered nation at least some of us would, be alive.
Hence I reasoned that a nuclear deterent was not much use to us.
I did not actually believe that, but I wanted to see the reaction

After the meeting I was collared by one of the officers & got the feeling I was not being allowed to leave. The officers asked me a number of questions. I later wonder if there was some truth in my question & if I had raised a tricky subject

So one is left wondering what roll Trident is really meant to have & if we actually have a policy re its use. I certainly do not consider it a deterent to a powerful enemy. I suspect our capabilities as an armed force are those of minor incursions & the cost of trident is diluting the ability to do that
 
Daydream believer said:
Many years ago ( time of the cold war) I went to a talk by the Royal Navy. The usual questions of the time were asked about our nuclear deterent. The RN chaps said that we would never use it first. ( one theory was that we would drop one in the Baltic to show our intention)
I stood up & pointed out that the Russian army's conventional forces would overrun our forces in europe in 9 days ( a generally accepted fact at the time) & they would not need to use nuclear weapons. However, as we would be in deep trouble then we would have to use the bomb first or be defeated very quickly. I also pointed out that an invading army would not necessarily want to use nuclear arms as it would give them nothing to invade & no one to subjugate. So once again we would have to use the nuclear arms first. If we did then we wold have a greater chance of being obliterated. As a conquered nation at least some of us would, be alive.
Hence I reasoned that a nuclear deterent was not much use to us.
I did not actually believe that, but I wanted to see the reaction

After the meeting I was collared by one of the officers & got the feeling I was not being allowed to leave. The officers asked me a number of questions. I later wonder if there was some truth in my question & if I had raised a tricky subject

So one is left wondering what roll Trident is really meant to have & if we actually have a policy re its use. I certainly do not consider it a deterent to a powerful enemy. I suspect our capabilities as an armed force are those of minor incursions & the cost of trident is diluting the ability to do that
Click to expand...


I served with the TA in 1BR Corps during the early 80's and understood that we probably would use battlefield tactical nuclear weapons first to disrupt/halt the advance. I suspect though if this situation was ever reached it would have quickly escalated.
 
Suttle said:
I served with the TA in 1BR Corps during the early 80's and understood that we probably would use battlefield tactical nuclear weapons first to disrupt/halt the advance. I suspect though if this situation was ever reached it would have quickly escalated.
Click to expand...

Yeah, they referred to the NATO conventional forces as merely a "trip-wire" IIRC.
 
photodog said:
Ok, you guys odviously don't understand the concepts... Maybe I haven't explained them well enough... It's a very interesting subject that applies to a much broader range of situations, and makes for some excellent lessons that can be passed into business as well.. I rarely nowadays get a chance to explain or discuss this sort of thing, but I did spend six years studying strategic studies at a post graduate level.... Its my academic background...

If you really want to understand what went on, and why, then I would suggest that you look first at some of the basic concepts of sea denial, and sea control, as well as the idea of a fleet in being..... Even Wikipedia has a pretty good stab at explaining it...

These basic considerations lie at the centre of the actions of the royal navy from Nelson to the suez crisis...

I have no doubt if you are keen that you will find interesting the actions of Admiral Spee and Craddocks actions in response, that lead up to the Battle of coronel and the subsequent battle of the Falklands... Coronel being the first defeat of a British Squadron since the war of 1812...
Though this is a bit more nuts and bolts stuff...

What I am relating here is pretty basic naval strategy stuff... And accepted historic fact.... And if you study it a bit more it will give you a much better understanding of the battle of jutland, Cunninghams campaign in the med, nelsons actions, and even the situation off of somolia....

Once you move past the focus on tactical and technical aspects... You begin to understand the overriding principles and actually learn something usefull from history... These basic overriding principles never really change... And are as relevent today as they were in 1914....

All intended in good grace as I am sure that as you guys seem to be keen you will enjoy the exercise and learn some things that will suprise you.

:)
Click to expand...

Actually, I do agree with, and have studied both as a naval officer for more than twenty years and as an enthusiastic civilian amateur, the basic strategic theory you expound, and I'm slightly surprised you think otherwise. Where we differ is that you draw conclusions about the role and performance of the RN in WWI from your study, as is your right, with which I fundamentally disagree, as is my right.

It is odd that you think I am focused on the nuts and bolts, unless you think that the impact of the battle of Jutland on the outcome of the war falls into that category. The effects of the battle were twofold: the British began to address as a matter of urgency the issues of command, control, technical and tactical method, and personnel training and selection which had crept up on them since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, to ensure that they would no longer run a serious risk of losing the sea control they had held since the outbreak of war; on the other hand the Germans realised that their risk fleet strategy had failed and that they would not get away with it again, and turned to U boat warfare as their only chance of avoiding defeat through starvation(including shortage of raw industrial materials) and social unrest. Fortunately, the RN's rethink eventually included the use of convoy, and the fate the Germans feared overtook them.

Also, it is not necessarily the case that your conclusions are accepted fact, except in the fora and at the time where you studied. As is always the case in healthy academic debate, there are always different perspectives and emphases to be taken into account, as well as firmly held and logically based opinion.
 
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Daydream believer said:
Many years ago ( time of the cold war) I went to a talk by the Royal Navy. The usual questions of the time were asked about our nuclear deterent. The RN chaps said that we would never use it first. ( one theory was that we would drop one in the Baltic to show our intention)
I stood up & pointed out that the Russian army's conventional forces would overrun our forces in europe in 9 days ( a generally accepted fact at the time) & they would not need to use nuclear weapons. However, as we would be in deep trouble then we would have to use the bomb first or be defeated very quickly. I also pointed out that an invading army would not necessarily want to use nuclear arms as it would give them nothing to invade & no one to subjugate. So once again we would have to use the nuclear arms first. If we did then we wold have a greater chance of being obliterated. As a conquered nation at least some of us would, be alive.
Hence I reasoned that a nuclear deterent was not much use to us.
I did not actually believe that, but I wanted to see the reaction

After the meeting I was collared by one of the officers & got the feeling I was not being allowed to leave. The officers asked me a number of questions. I later wonder if there was some truth in my question & if I had raised a tricky subject

So one is left wondering what roll Trident is really meant to have & if we actually have a policy re its use. I certainly do not consider it a deterent to a powerful enemy. I suspect our capabilities as an armed force are those of minor incursions & the cost of trident is diluting the ability to do that
Click to expand...
I thought the thinking of the time was that any Russian invasion would be accompanied by tactical nuclear strikes with the intention of lessening the inevitable nuclear retaliation.
 
Thanks for those scholarly views.

I just wonder how the junior officers and warrant officers managed to keep up their own enthusiasm and that of their men, if they knew that their strategy was not to seek out and engage the enemy.
 
BobPrell said:
Thanks for those scholarly views.

I just wonder how the junior officers and warrant officers managed to keep up their own enthusiasm and that of their men, if they knew that their strategy was not to seek out and engage the enemy.
Click to expand...

Having bottled up the German fleet so that the rest of the navy and the merchant navy could carry on doing their bit, the Grand Fleet was very focused on going for their opponents. Despite the conventional picture of the heavy ships swinging round their anchors, they actually spent a lot of time at sea (the battleships slightly more than the battlecruisers). The British intelligence advantage meant that their ships were at sea usually before the Germans left harbour, but the distances involved from either Scapa or Rosyth to the end of the German swept channels off the Danish coast meant that on almost every occasion the Germans had run for cover before they got there. Jutland was a case in point, in the days before radar: the combination of mist and twilight helped the Germans run away from an overwhelming tactical superiority, and the British distaste for night fighting helped them get away. as Photodog says, Cunningham and the people who trained his fleet before he took command would not let that happen again.

The other reason why the British kept up their morale and enthusiasm to the end, whether the political left like it or not, was the quality of their junior and middle leadership. The Germans, with no history to inspire them and a class system much more rigid than ours, did not have this, and their fine ships ended as dirty, mutinous and irrelevant.
 
Going back to some of the earlier posts, I read a paper by US Navy 1947 on the Japanese armour plate used on the Yamamoto. It was Japanese, Vickers Hardened (VH) face-hardened, non-cemented armor, same as that used on Hood!

Poster saying that she had good armour, but commented 'in the wrong place'..

Our cordite was more volatile than that used by the Germans and internal blast procedures poor by German standards. Also Holland allowing his T to be crossed was not a good start.

German optical range finders were superb, however just a few years later a our radar gunnery control outclassed them completely (Destruction of Sharnhost).
 
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