The sinking of HMS HOOD - on TV now

Anyone else been in a Gun Turret of a warship when it is shooting?

It is VERY LOUD.

Needs painting afterwards. By me, usually, on HMS Glamorgan. 1975.


I have been on the bridge of a Canadian warship in the late 80's when she fired her vickers 3/70 mk 6 twin mount.... That was impressive.

But I wasn't given a brush afterwards... Iirc it was Salisbury steak with chips and peas...
 
I have been on the bridge of a Canadian warship in the late 80's when she fired her vickers 3/70 mk 6 twin mount.... That was impressive.

But I wasn't given a brush afterwards... Iirc it was Salisbury steak with chips and peas...

4.5 inch twin. The shell and cartridge hoists are one way. On completion of the shoot, ammunition not expended must be racked up into the turret then manually handed back down to the magazine.

After a hot and sweaty livex against a towed target in tropical waters, I was involved in the pre painting striking down of live bricks. I passed a very heavy lump to the next chap who dropped it 15 feet to the magazine below.

The sound of utter silence over the next few seconds was deafening. :eek:
 
Quite right old chap after we let their shells fall on our boats and blow them up so that the resultant smokscreen would confused the nasty hun. We frightened them away by ensuring they noticed how many shells we were firing as they were landing all around them (intentional if we had wanted to hit them we would).
You'd be well advised to do some reading. British gunnery at Jutland was actually more accurate than the Germans. Problem was the ammunition which was far inferior and had a habit of exploding without penetrating any armour. Jellicoe knew of this problem and had tried very hard in the past to develop more effective munitions for his ships. Unfortunately it was only after he battle that the powers that be began to agree with him on that necessity.
 
4.5 inch twin. The shell and cartridge hoists are one way. On completion of the shoot, ammunition not expended must be racked up into the turret then manually handed back down to the magazine.

After a hot and sweaty livex against a towed target in tropical waters, I was involved in the pre painting striking down of live bricks. I passed a very heavy lump to the next chap who dropped it 15 feet to the magazine below.

The sound of utter silence over the next few seconds was deafening. :eek:


Ouch... Those rounds must weigh damn near 60 pounds....
 
You'd be well advised to do some reading. British gunnery at Jutland was actually more accurate than the Germans. Problem was the ammunition which was far inferior and had a habit of exploding without penetrating any armour. Jellicoe knew of this problem and had tried very hard in the past to develop more effective munitions for his ships. Unfortunately it was only after he battle that the powers that be began to agree with him on that necessity.

Thanks will look into that - never heard that view before
 
Once America entered the war. the outcome was inevitable..

A population of 60 million without oil resereves cannot fight a population of 200 million with oil reserves.. in the end the Vermach simply did not have enough machines, guns, fuel or men to replace those being killed on the front and back lines...

Germany had a population of 200 million? :confused:
 
You'd be well advised to do some reading. British gunnery at Jutland was actually more accurate than the Germans. Problem was the ammunition which was far inferior and had a habit of exploding without penetrating any armour. Jellicoe knew of this problem and had tried very hard in the past to develop more effective munitions for his ships. Unfortunately it was only after he battle that the powers that be began to agree with him on that necessity.

First look

British Battle Cruisers and Battleship
Shell fired = 4534
Hits=123
Percentage of hits/shell fired = 2.7128%

German Battle Cruisers and Battleship
Shell fired = 3597
Hits = 122
Percentage of hits/shell fired = 3.3912%

Source: Damage_to_major_ships_at_the_Battle_of_Jutland"
 
You'd be well advised to do some reading. British gunnery at Jutland was actually more accurate than the Germans. Problem was the ammunition which was far inferior and had a habit of exploding without penetrating any armour. Jellicoe knew of this problem and had tried very hard in the past to develop more effective munitions for his ships. Unfortunately it was only after he battle that the powers that be began to agree with him on that necessity.

Second look

Accuracy

Hits obtained by British Battlecruisers and Battleships (BCS = Battlecruiser squadron) (BS = Battle Squadron)




Shells Fired - Hits - % Accuracy 1st and 2nd BCS

1469 - 21 - 1.43%

3rd BCS

373 - 16 - 4.49%

5th BS

1099 - 29 - 2.64%

2nd, 4th, 1st BS

1593 - 57 - 3.7%


Hits obtained by German Battlecruisers and Battleships

Shells Fired - Hits - % Accuracy

1st Scouting Group

1670 - 65 - 3.89%

Battleships

1927 - 57 - 2.96%

Nothing really conclusive
 
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Please tell us which part of the world's oceans was denied to the RN after Jutland.


There are two types of naval dominance of a sea...

Sea control

Sea denial.


In the first instance a navy has the ability to do whatever it wants whenever it wants... And it's merchant fleet can operate unhindered and unmolested.
When a state has this ability it's called sea control, or other times Command of the Seas.

In the second instance a navy seeks to deny the opposition of sea control... So a navy may not have sea control... But it has denied the opposition the same...

Depending upon the strategic circumstances either may be in a particular parties interest.


sea denial can be accomplished in a number of ways... Through the use of air power...or submarines .. Or through asymetrical warfare.. ( think somoli pirates..) and classically through the existance of a "fleet in being".

This was the strategy adopted by the Germans in WW1, and again in WW2 by the Italians.

The Italian strategy of a fleet in being is what drove Cunningham to launch his raid at Taranto...

So, the German navies grand fleet denied the royal navy control of the north sea, Baltic, and north Atlantic (to a lessor extent) during ww1, which had odvious implications for the prosecution of the war.

It doesn't mean that these areas became no go ares for the royal navy, it means that the royal navy, and it's merchant fleet, could not move around and conduct operations without threat or danger... And this ties up resources, and limits their ability to operate.

This is a basic naval strategy which you can learn more about by googling the terms...

In these circumstance victory at sea is not the classic case of destroy the enemy... It may be simple survival.

Nelsons victory at trafalgar was a case not dissimular, and the Japanese attack at pearl was a preemptive strike to attempt to get free of the us navies ability to deny them control of their shipping lanes as they seized control of south east asia...
 
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Second look

Accuracy

Hits obtained by British Battlecruisers and Battleships (BCS = Battlecruiser squadron) (BS = Battle Squadron)




Shells Fired - Hits - % Accuracy 1st and 2nd BCS

1469 - 21 - 1.43%

3rd BCS

373 - 16 - 4.49%

5th BS

1099 - 29 - 2.64%

2nd, 4th, 1st BS

1593 - 57 - 3.7%


Hits obtained by German Battlecruisers and Battleships

Shells Fired - Hits - % Accuracy

1st Scouting Group

1670 - 65 - 3.89%

Battleships

1927 - 57 - 2.96%

Nothing really conclusive

It was widely known in the fleet that the battlecruisers' gunnery was abysmal. Their so called experts came up with increasing the rate of fire instead, on the grounds that even if they didn't hit anything, the enemy would be blinded by the splashes from the near misses! Hence the appalling lapses in flash precautions which caused the first two battlecruiser losses. In fact, at Jutland the 3rd BCS was fresh from an intensive gunnery practice programme at Scapa, hence their slightly better performance. The loss of their flagship Invincible probably had more to do with her obsolescent protection than any amo handling lapses. that more battlecruisers were not lost was probably due to this detachment, as the 3rd BCS were temporarily replaced in Beatty's command by the four available 15" gunned battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class which were fortunately thus available to engage the Germans at longer range and draw their fire from the wounded battlecruisers, albeit at considerable cost in damage and casualties. Anyone who wants to dig into the subject might care to try "The Rules of the Game" by Andrew Gordon, a long but very accessible study of the whole Jutland story, putting it into a prper historical context and incidentally drawing some very uncomfortable lessons for the RN and all other military organisations now and in the future.

An earlier poster was quite right about the proper use of battlecruisers. Had the war started six months later (when Beatty's tenure in command would have expired), the battlecruiser squadron (as it then was) would have been broken up and the ships retasked as flagships of cruiser squadrons and used in their proper reconnaissance role. Instead Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty, whose protege Beatty was, grouped all ten battlecruisers together and titled them the Battlecruiser Fleet, giving Beatty ideas above his station and an inflated concept of his role. Needless to say, after the battle, and especially when he bacame First Sea Lord after the war, Beatty drew a veil over all this. When he relieved Jellicoe as CinC, the surviving battlecruisers became the Battlecruiser FORCE, firmly subordinate to himself.
 
There are two types of naval dominance of a sea...

Sea control

Sea denial.


In the first instance a navy has the ability to do whatever it wants whenever it wants... And it's merchant fleet can operate unhindered and unmolested.
When a state has this ability it's called sea control, or other times Command of the Seas.

In the second instance a navy seeks to deny the opposition of sea control... So a navy may not have sea control... But it has denied the opposition the same...

Depending upon the strategic circumstances either may be in a particular parties interest.


sea denial can be accomplished in a number of ways... Through the use of air power...or submarines .. Or through asymetrical warfare.. ( think somoli pirates..) and classically through the existance of a "fleet in being".

This was the strategy adopted by the Germans in WW1, and again in WW2 by the Italians.

The Italian strategy of a fleet in being is what drove Cunningham to launch his raid at Taranto...

So, the German navies grand fleet denied the royal navy control of the north sea, Baltic, and north Atlantic (to a lessor extent) during ww1, which had odvious implications for the prosecution of the war.

It doesn't mean that these areas became no go ares for the royal navy, it means that the royal navy, and it's merchant fleet, could not move around and conduct operations without threat or danger... And this ties up resources, and limits their ability to operate.

This is a basic naval strategy which you can learn more about by googling the terms...

Actually, apart from a few tip and run raids on towns on the est cast of England, the Ge rman High Seas Fleet (sic) imposed no limitations at all on the ability of the British to use the seas for any purpose they pleased (apart from the fantasy project of saling into the Baltic, where minefields and shoals would anyway have had more impact). Perhaps the Germans' first and most obvious failure was to allow the British Army to move to France in 1914 without losing a man.

The effect of submarines and commerce raiders was obviously much greater, but if anything the existence of the German battleships with their crews represented a waste of scarce resources and hindered their overall effort, while the RN suffered no such constraints.
 
Actually, apart from a few tip and run raids on towns on the est cast of England, the Ge rman High Seas Fleet (sic) imposed no limitations at all on the ability of the British to use the seas for any purpose they pleased (apart from the fantasy project of saling into the Baltic, where minefields and shoals would anyway have had more impact). Perhaps the Germans' first and most obvious failure was to allow the British Army to move to France in 1914 without losing a man.

The effect of submarines and commerce raiders was obviously much greater, but if anything the existence of the German battleships with their crews represented a waste of scarce resources and hindered their overall effort, while the RN suffered no such constraints.


But it's not about combat actions... You are missing the point.

The royal navy and it's merchant fleet could not operate with impunity from risk of intervention. they had to hang around and escort merchant ships... Etc etc...

Yes they could go we're they wanted... But they couldn't leave. They couldn't divert the resources to another task... They could not operate offensively without risk.

They could not take the initiative as the threat always existed...

That is the whole point of sea denial... It's threat, and tying up resources.. And denying the opposition the initiative.

Amateurs talk of tactics and actions... The profesionals talk about logistics....

If the navy had control of the north sea... Why did they have to hang around?

Why did we lose the Battle of Coronel in such a spectacular fashion?? If we had control of the north sea we would not have had to chase down Spee with a third rate squadron... Instead all the first rate ships were tied up in the uk... Giving Spee the run of the Pacific...

that is the sort of impact that the German grand fleet had on the royal navy by its denying of the north sea to royal navy control...
 
The royal navy and it's merchant fleet could not operate with impunity from risk of intervention. they had to hang around and escort merchant ships... Etc etc...
Only because of the submarines, not because of the High Seas Fleet. Without the subs, the Brtish Merchant Navy would have had full run of the seas.

Von Scheer? A classic example of a small cruiser squadron tying down forces ten times its size. Works for about a month, and then it gets caught out. Ditto in WW II with Langsdorff, except that there wasn't a 'fleet in being' to worry about. Result was just the same.

And that was one of the functions the battlecruisers were designed for. Nothing that could beat them could catch them; nothing they could beat could out run them.
 
Only because of the submarines, not because of the High Seas Fleet. Without the subs, the Brtish Merchant Navy would have had full run of the seas.

Von Scheer? A classic example of a small cruiser squadron tying down forces ten times its size. Works for about a month, and then it gets caught out. Ditto in WW II with Langsdorff, except that there wasn't a 'fleet in being' to worry about. Result was just the same.

And that was one of the functions the battlecruisers were designed for. Nothing that could beat them could catch them; nothing they could beat could out run them.

Exactly.
 
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