PBO story Atlantic Heartbreak, yacht Marayna

[mog]

Any views or sugested lessons for Jesters from this story?
suggested headings:
boat prep?
equipment choices?
passage and sailing choices?

 

[quimby]

Any views or sugested lessons for Jesters from this story?
suggested headings:
boat prep?
equipment choices?
passage and sailing choices?

Boat prep has been done many times< suggest a break down leading to the decision to abandon ship and analyse what could have been done at the prep stage that may have helped to avoid the sad finale

Battery back up!
ready made storm boards( Quick fit)!
Immersion suit! yes or no?

 

[Pye_End]

It was an interesting tale, and worth a read.

Going to sea whilst not really happy with the sail plan is far from ideal, particularly if leading to steering issues, and the fatigue that this induces. The engine situation was not ideal either. Not being able to heave to in a 6/7/8 effectively is a major problem.

It does not sound as though he had a drogue to stream, which presumably let to his other problems.

Did he need to abandon ship? Sitting in a warm safe room might give a different answer from one that is jumping around, wet, and with a fatigued skipper - so not a criticism, just a question.

 

[oldbilbo]

One is always hesitant to offer 'views or suggested lessons' lest it seem like discourteous criticism, but there should be value to be had from consideration of such honest accounts. That's the purpose of the MAIB Reports, f'r example, and is now the norm in aviation, surgery, and other professions.... that the rest of us can learn some valuable lessons from the incident.

So, in the spirit of respect for the author and his honesty, how about, for a start....

"...my two deep reefs in the mainsail were not quite enough to cope with heavy weather....I cursed myself for not having that third reef put into the main...."

It seems to me that 3 well-reinforced reefs is wholly warranted. Several deeply-experienced ocean wanderers advocate having a fourth reef to perform the function of 'storm sail'.

"... the counterbalance weight was too light...."

Several windvane users I've encountered carry more than one vane, of different sizes and strengths for different wind strengths. And as spares in event of damage.

"....the starboard coachroof window exploded and water started pouring into the boat....I stuffed some cushions into the broken window and tied them with rope...."

Suffering a stove-in window has happened more than a few times and the orthodox advice, as I recall, is to have pre-planned 'shutters' which can be clamped over the impromptu opening. Some pieces of 1/4" plywood, which have been pre-marked in marker pen with the right sizes/shapes, will stow readily under the berth cushions. A cheap, sharp garden pruning saw ( sealed bag ) will cut the necessary shape in about 5-6 minutes of frenzied activity. Pre-cut and pre-drilled wood 'strongbacks' together with some coachbolts and wingnuts will likewise do the clamping job if/when needed. Agricultural sticky tape will help with some of the unavoidable gaps. So also will 'underwater setting epoxy'....

"... a tiny bit of jib to balance it....."

It would appear, from the article, illustrations and pics, that the sole facility for setting a headsail was a roller-furling genoa. Most commentators would consider a further and independent system, such as a removable inner forestay, is essential. There are those who still prefer hanked-on headsails so that a damaged or over-sized sail may be removed, and one better suited to the prevailing conditions hoisted instead. One has seen few - no - printed praise, ever, for the 'slipover/sleeve and hoist' style of storm jib.

There's lots on this sort of topic in the likes of 'Heavy Weather Sailing'. The current series in 'Yachting Monthly' and on YouTube with Skip Novak is certainly worth some careful thought.

 

[PacketRat]

Any views or sugested lessons for Jesters from this story?

Can't find it. Got a link?

@oldbilbo - I thought the MAIB report on the Ouzo incident was well worth the read. http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/ouzo_.pdf

 

[bitbaltic]

It does not sound as though he had a drogue to stream, which presumably let to his other problems.

That was my first thought on reading the story. Although I am only a coastal cruiser I would regard some sort of drogue as an essential for that trip, when to use it is another matter but the boat was described as surfing down waves, I would reckon that was the time to try it. Also agree with the mention of boards to protect the lee side windows in a knockdown.

Cheers

 

[oldbilbo]

I thought the MAIB report on the Ouzo incident was well worth the read. http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/ouzo_.pdf

From the preamble to each MAIB Report...

“The sole objective of the investigation of an accident .....shall be the prevention of future accidents through the ascertainment of its causes and circumstances.

It shall not be the purpose of an investigation to determine liability nor, except .....to achieve its objective, to apportion blame.”

I made it my practice, when teaching the RYA syllabus, to distribute every so often, p/copies of selected, relevant MAIB Reports - such as the 'Kishmul of Ayr' incident - to the students, and invite them to read and discuss the circumstances and the recommendations. I believe that was a worthwhile use of their time...and so did they.

Edit: There are several MAIB Reports mentioned towards the end of the 'Ouzo' document, each of which has suggestions of relevance to small-craft sailors i.e. us.

 

[hrchivers]

Definitely agree that MAIB reports are worth reading, also US reports. I would recommend Royal Majesty incident to all enthusiasts of electronic auto-navigation Search will get the official reports, but there is a very readable writeup at:

http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/m/profile/adegani/Grounding of the Royal Majesty.pdf

 

[PacketRat]

there is a very readable writeup at ...

Well, all right, but ...

that is one badly designed GPS set.

 

[mog]

One is always hesitant to offer 'views or suggested lessons' lest it seem like discourteous criticism, but there should be value to be had from consideration of such honest accounts. That's the purpose of the MAIB Reports, f'r example, and is now the norm in aviation, surgery, and other professions.... that the rest of us can learn some valuable lessons from the incident.

So, in the spirit of respect for the author and his honesty, how about, for a start....
QUOTE]

Thanks Wil
I totally agree and it was certainly not my intention to show or encourage any disrespect for this skipper or his choices before and during his voyage.
Indeed, as you identify, it is in the spirit of MIAB and AAIB/CAA reporting that I seek to identify for the benefit of all and with the blinding clarity of 20/20 hindsight lessons that we may all humbly learn from those who go before us.
Of course every skipper has to make his own choices based on many factors that often compete.
I also believe that there invaluable advice and information for all skippers, whereever they sail, alone or crewed, in the titles suggested in the jesterinfo.org pages. I would urge all to read widely and with open minds before embarking on a voyage.
Murphy's law applies at sea of course. The assumption must be made that if a part or a system can fail, it will and we all need to think a bit like helicopter designers and provide our selves with double or even triple redundancy for critical systems. It is far easier to ensure that we are self sufficient at sea when prepping the boat at home. So leaving with the backups on board and ready to use is far better than having in improvise at sea, under extreme stress in survival conditions. BUT do take the materials and tools to allow an on the spot fix as well!
On passage the choices made in preparation of the yacht and equipment/stores carried have consequential effects that may not be apparent until things go wrong.
In this case, it appears that the skippers choices with his sailplan (reefs and lack of storm canvas) started a sequence of events that lead to the sad loss of the yacht. His choices were limited and he was tempted to drive the yacht harder than it could cope with. His need to continue upwind in strong conditions on the return leg with the same limited choices due to sailplan and equipment selection* ultimately lead to the abandonment.

*(such as a lack of a series drogue, battery handheld dscvhf/gps, spares for steering gear or knowledge of sheet/tiller system, accessable strum boxes, watertight battery box, 20ah backup battery, alternative charging by wind/solar, immersion suit,)

For this skipper he survived and that id the single most important factor. Whether he could have made landfall safely without outside assistance.. I would never judge as I am not him and I was not there.
Nick
Meteor

 

[ScallywagII]

Well, all right, but ...

that is one badly designed GPS set.

I think the expression is "a poor workman blames his tools" Yes the display could have been better, eg the DR symbol could have flashed, and the signal lost alarm could have repeated every minute, etc, but the point of the articles was to highlight the fact that GPS and chartplottters are not infallible and frequent opportunities should be taken to confirm position by other means. In this case numerous mistakes were made by the professional navigating officers, and the use of sounder, Loran or the appropriate radar range should have raised concern over the GPS position.

It is normal for GPS systems to occasionally lose signals and drop position, usually it is temporary but Sod's Law applies with respect to timing. My AIS receiver loses it's position when that happens, and than it won't pick up the position again and display targets until I switch the AIS off and on again. Fortunately it happens more in coastal waters than far offshore. I believe it is because the weak GPS signals are more easily lost in background radio noise closer to land.

Thank you Howard for posting the link. It is a valuable lesson that I for one am happy to be reminded of.

Len

 

[PacketRat]

Hi Len:

Sorry, but the assumption in your adage is that the tools are fit for purpose. I'm not defending any professional navigating officer. It is their responsibility to be all seeing and all knowing, but I think it is a mistake to overlook the fact that there was a piece of kit that said "ON COURSE" * when the ship was heading for the rocks.

Your AIS loses it's position. Fine. Good design.

How would you feel if it displayed a DR position identifiable by some mark shown in the appendix of a manual you haven't checked for years? Dark night, poor visibility, and the AIS says a ship is passing a mile off, when in reality it is on an imminent collision course?

What next? A radar set that goes into demo mode when the aerial stops going round?

My worst navigation error was dismissing a GPS fix. Lesson learned.

Robin.

* "not"

 

[rob2]

One hesitates to write until having thought through the first reactions to the article. There were a number of items aboard which proved to be unsuitable in trying conditions and yes, in retrospect, I'm sure the author wishes he had carried boards to blank off the broken portlight. What struck me was the fact that having concerns about "some woodwork" grinding away near the bulkhead was not investigated and repaired before the return trip. The description of later events suggest that the deck and hull integrity was deteriorating day by day, it isn't that unusual for mast compression to prove problematical in any boat of that age.

Sadly the combined problems brought about the end of a lovely boat, but a happy outcome in that the skipper was picked up without injury.

Rob.