Ferry doesn't collide with submarine

[awol]

Near miss between ro-ro ferry Stena Superfast VII and Royal Navy submarine

Now I understand why the Navy needs so many accompanying craft for sub movements in the Clyde. It is to protect us !

 

[Quandary]

Those Superfast are ex Baltic ferries and very fast but you might think that like most yachties using the N Channel, submariners might be aware of that, credit to the ferry lookout for spotting the periscope in time to take avoiding action. It does increase the worry about these things coming and going in the relatively busier waters of the Clyde. I wonder what clearance the sub thought would be enough?

 

[awol]

At least the RN have improved since the Drum incident. They actually admitted it was one of theirs this time.

 

[cherod]

Near miss between ro-ro ferry Stena Superfast VII and Royal Navy submarine

Now I understand why the Navy needs so many accompanying craft for sub movements in the Clyde. It is to protect us !

didnt do the boys on the Antares much good that night , and the lying bast**ds continued to lie about it when they should have been helping in the search , even when the nets were found tied round the coning tower !!,, an ironic thing about that incident was that that the prat who was doing his " driving test " at the time actually passed !! these are the people who think that they are defending us ..

 

[chrishscorp]

That close and at that speed I would think you just try and avoid the conning tower and hope there is enough depth, I bet there was some choice language on both vessels.
Not read the report yet, I assume the Captain is now sailing a desk somewhere in Whitehall

 

[SaltIre]

Capnsensible needs to be recalled...

The two vessels came within 50-100 metres of each other west of the Rhins of Galloway on 6 November, 2018, a Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) report stated today.
The UK Department for Transport body said: “Although there was no collision, this was the third accident or incident between a dived Royal Navy submarine and a surface vessel in four years, which is a matter of significant concern.”

Stena ferry crew averted submarine collision disaster by spotting periscope

A wee bit boaty - sorry.

 

[Tony Cross]

It's worrying don't you think, that those in charge of a nuclear submarine, presumably packed with the latest gizzmos and gear, are able to get the course and speed of a vessel the size of a ferry so wrong?

We once had a periscope appear about 60 yards off our port quarter whilst motoring off the south of Turkey. We were in a submarine exercise area but I made sure that we kept our course and speed when the periscope disappeared...!

 

[greggron]

It’s a good job they were keeping a competent watch

 

[[2068]]

It's a good job the watch keeper on the ferry was keeping a competent watch.
The sub made assumptions about speed and distance that turned out be sub-optimal.
Also turning towards the target wasn't the smartest move.

 

[SaltIre]

It's worrying don't you think, that those in charge of a nuclear submarine, presumably packed with the latest gizzmos and gear, are able to get the course and speed of a vessel the size of a ferry so wrong?

We once had a periscope appear about 60 yards off our port quarter whilst motoring off the south of Turkey. We were in a submarine exercise area but I made sure that we kept our course and speed when the periscope disappeared...!

The MAIB report is HERE.

Stena Superfast VII was on a scheduled North Channel crossing from Belfast to Cairnryan; a Royal Navy submarine was at periscope depth conducting pre-deployment safety training in the same vicinity.
The submarine’s command team detected and tracked the ferry using visual, sonar and automatic information system data. As the ferry’s range reduced, the submarine’s officer of the watch altered course to avoid it. However, this turn was towards the ferry and reduced the time available for the submarine to keep out of the ferry’s way.
With the sonar contact on a steady bearing, the submarine’s sonar team initiated a close quarters procedure; the commanding officer was also called to the control room. Based on the picture displayed by the submarine’s electronic tactical command system, the commanding officer intervened to cancel the close quarters procedure and ordered that the submarine remain at periscope depth rather than go deep to its safe depth. At about the same time, Stena Superfast VII’s lookout spotted a submarine periscope close on the port bow, and alerted the officer of the watch, who took immediate action to avoid collision. After taking avoiding action, the ferry’s closest point of approach with the submarine was about 250 yards, which was unsafe; however, the submarine’s commanding officer believed the passing distance to be about 1000 yards, or four times the actual range.
This incident happened because the submarine’s control room team overestimated the ferry’s range and underestimated its speed. This combination meant that the submarine’s commanding officer and its officer of the watch made safety-critical decisions that might have appeared rational to them at the time but were actually based on inaccurate information.
Two previous collisions between Royal Navy submarines and surface vessels show a similarity in that key decisions on board the submarines were made based on an insufficient appreciation of the location of surface ships in the vicinity. The Royal Navy has taken a series of actions in response to this incident, and previous similar accidents. As a result, this report makes a safety recommendation to the Royal Navy to undertake an independent review of its actions taken to ensure that such actions have been effective.

 

[Deleted member 36384]

Aye right! I don't believe that our submarine "electronic tactical display" is that shite. I can imagine the RN doing this deliberately for whatever reason. Why I say this is that back in the 80's, on the Clyde, I had a periscope about 10' from my stern follow me for a few minutes, a deliberate action. It slipped underwater when a frigate accelerated towards me and did a full 360 around the yacht, pinging away.

Summary
At 1256 on 6 November 2018, Stena Superfast VII’s officer of the watch took urgent action to avoid a submerged submarine after its periscope had been spotted close ahead of the ferry. Post-event analysis showed that, prior to the ferry’s course alteration, there had been a serious risk of collision. This near miss happened because the submarine’s control room team had underestimated the ferry’s speed and overestimated its range, resulting in an unsafe situation developing. However, the submarine’s control room electronic tactical display presented a picture of a safer situation than reality; this meant that safety-critical decisions made on board the submarine may have appeared rational at the time.

 

[prv]

Aye right! I don't believe that our submarine "electronic tactical display" is that shite.

Why not? At the end of the day it’s a piece of government IT...

It‘s only as good as the data fed into it, and according to the report the only range input was the periscope watchkeeper’s guess. Radar not being used, passive sonar only gave a bearing, and AIS only received very intermittently (although it’s not clear why that should be, even from a low-lying antenna, when the ferry was so close).

Pete

 

[Kukri]

I hope that a resident submariner may comment on the “rules” of going to safe depth. I think I am right in saying that in a close quarters situation the submarine is in more danger than a surface ship because the sub is built to a one compartment standard.

 

[michael_w]

Surprised to read that there isn't some form of optical range finder in the periscope. How else do they set the range for a torpedo when under radio emission silence?

 

[Kukri]

Surprised to read that there isn't some form of optical range finder in the periscope. How else do they set the range for a torpedo when under radio emission silence?

I believe that’s in the “attack periscope”. At least, in the days of optical perisopes, it was. All digital, now.

 

[JumbleDuck]

Aye right! I don't believe that our submarine "electronic tactical display" is that shite. I can imagine the RN doing this deliberately for whatever reason. Why I say this is that back in the 80's, on the Clyde, I had a periscope about 10' from my stern follow me for a few minutes, a deliberate action. It slipped underwater when a frigate accelerated towards me and did a full 360 around the yacht, pinging away.

The Americans on the Clyde used to be even worse. I had one of the bastards approach on the surface at some speed, dive under me and resurface on the other side. I gave the keel bolts some welly with a hammer and hope it hurt someone.

 

[Spyro]

The navy's finest again. They spotted the ferry when it was 9-10km away. They made calculations etc based on assumptions. This is just basic navigation if it's bearing relative to them doesn't change it's on a collision course. Looking out of the window (periscope) would have told them this they didn't need any calculations. Thank god someone knew what they were doing, and it wasn't the ones on the sub.

 

[capnsensible]

I hope that a resident submariner may comment on the “rules” of going to safe depth. I think I am right in saying that in a close quarters situation the submarine is in more danger than a surface ship because the sub is built to a one compartment standard.

Hiya, I'm not going to get drawn into an argument here with the rights and wrongs of the risk of collision that didn't happen! But I'm fairly sure that twenty months ago there were some very uncomfortable moments in a senior officers office ashore back at CSB and the miscreants got the bollocking they deserved for stupid. The emergency go deep procedure is regularly excercised. No idea why they didn't, even after reading the report.

Not sure what you mean by a one compartment standard. The pressure hull is divided into watertight compartments. The forward one, whose watertight door is permanently manned, could be flooded, probably, without loss of the boat. Mebbe. Problem is the ballast tanks outside the pressure hull. Once badly damaged, you are cream crackered.

All I can add is that from what I saw sat in the Ship Control seat for gawd knows how long dived, is that such mistakes are rare and the standard of professionalism through the the control room and sound room is very high. Others may read newspapers and think otherwise.

 

[SaltIre]

I'm surpised Nicola Sturgeon and her one party state SNP Government hasn't been blamed yet.

 

[SaltIre]

Hiya, I'm not going to get drawn into an argument here with the rights and wrongs of the risk of collision that didn't happen! But I'm fairly sure that twenty months ago there were some very uncomfortable moments in a senior officers office ashore back at CSB and the miscreants got the bollocking they deserved for stupid. The emergency go deep procedure is regularly excercised. No idea why they didn't, even after reading the report.

Not sure what you mean by a one compartment standard. The pressure hull is divided into watertight compartments. The forward one, whose watertight door is permanently manned, could be flooded, probably, without loss of the boat. Mebbe. Problem is the ballast tanks outside the pressure hull. Once badly damaged, you are cream crackered.

All I can add is that from what I saw sat in the Ship Control seat for gawd knows how long dived, is that such mistakes are rare and the standard of professionalism through the the control room and sound room is very high. Others may read newspapers and think otherwise.

A very astute post, if I may say so. Were you in the vanguard of sub drivers?