Cheeki Rafiki deaths: Yacht firm boss guilty

[Uricanejack]

But that is true of many products. How many times do you hear (or even have direct experience) of cars being written off despite there being little visible damage?

It is nothing new in boats. It is their nature that you can get hidden defects because much of the structural strength is hidden by subsequent parts of the building process. This is true of all forms of construction and materials. So, it could be rot in timber, failure of fastenings through corrosion, hidden corrosion in steel plating and so on.

What you are asking for is impossible to achieve. You cannot build a boat without having critical structural components hidden. However, the margins of safety are so huge that like failures in any other stressed structure does not often lead to loss of either the structure or lives. Hence my comment that total failure is extremely rare and can invariably be traced to a series of failings in the use of the object.

I think one needs to keep a sense of proportion over these issues. When you have rare events you simple do not have enough data to draw anything other than broad conclusions, which I have done above. Otherwise the lessons are individual to the case. The number of recorded keel losses where there is enough detail to be useful takes you to only one conclusion. Do not bounce keels off hard seabeds (or whales!). The former can be avoided, the latter is random.

What annoys me is that just because a tiny minority of boats are treated in this way there seems to be a belief that it can happen to anyone who owns a similar boat. No it won't and there is no evidence to say that it has.

Very good points.
The boat was not fit for purpose.

Most of the findings in the MAIB report a speculation. Educated speculation, not fact.
The MAIB followed by the MCA & CPS are speculating the inner liner ladder had failed prior to departure.
Even the broken aft keel bolt is not conclusive the liner had failed due to the three known groundings.
At best it is very good speculation the keel bolt had failed at some point due to fatigue.
The MAIB refers to a common practice among sailing schools and examiners of light groundings. Based on other boats,

The keel might have failed due simply to a long hard life sailing hard.

If used as designed it would probably still be sailing.
The report indicates the keel did not suddenly fail catastrophicaly without warning.
The report indicates. The keel failed over a period of several hours while sailing hard on the open North Atlantic in near gale conditions.
It indicated the impending failure by leaking.

Had the boat been sailing within its code limit there would have been a very good chance the boat and crew would have made it to a safe port for repair.

No keels shouldn't fall off.
They very occasionaly do.

Who really understands all these varieties of codes.
I had no clue prior to this incident what any of them meant.
I had no reason to.

 

[Mark-1]

The keel failed over a period of several hours while sailing hard on the open North Atlantic in near gale conditions.
It indicated the impending failure by leaking.

Had the boat been sailing within its code limit there would have been a very good chance the boat and crew wou

Pretty good point. In its normal commercial operation the boat would have been returned to base with a leak which would have been investigated at leisure.

Far from failing suddenly it failed over what probably added up to several weeks charter use and probably half a season of some private users.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

Thanks for the reply, It was a bit of an unfair question. I was pretty sure which way you would answer.
And the example with Transport Canada an excellent one.
Your response what a honorable shipping co manager would do.
You informed all the key agencies. One was not happy. You revised your plan.

How does it relate to Cheekie Rafiki.
He was faced with a similar simple dilemma. He had a problem with his vessel. In his case the CAT 2 code.
The MCA told him even if coded it was not a voyage he could do.

He chose to ignore this advice.

He did not know the keel was compromised. Even if the boat had been coded prior to leaving the UK. He still probably would not know the keel was compromised.

He did know even if it had a valid Cat 2 code. It was not approved to undertake the voyage.
He chose to send the boat to the Caribean and then make the return voyage.
Despite the advice he was given.

What's my point? It doesn't matter if its millions of dollars and 22 lives or a few thousand and only 4 lives.
A big ship operation or a Small craft operation.

He was the Manager of a commercial operation.
As you explained very well if he knowingly made an illegitimate voyage the consequence are as you say.
Even without the loss of the vessel and the lives.

There is a difference. As a professional Big Ship company manager. You know the potential consequences and risks involved.
As a one man Small craft manager. D Innes possibly did not fully understand the implications of his decision.
He might have thought he did. He might have thought he was right.
I believed he was wrong as soon as I read the MAIB report. I also wondered If he really understood the implications.

His Lawyer tried to defend him by saying he was not wrong and there is no proof the keel broke because it was not inspected.
His Lawyer sucked.

Very good points.
The boat was not fit for purpose.

Most of the findings in the MAIB report a speculation. Educated speculation, not fact.
The MAIB followed by the MCA & CPS are speculating the inner liner ladder had failed prior to departure.
Even the broken aft keel bolt is not conclusive the liner had failed due to the three known groundings.
At best it is very good speculation the keel bolt had failed at some point due to fatigue.
The MAIB refers to a common practice among sailing schools and examiners of light groundings. Based on other boats,

The keel might have failed due simply to a long hard life sailing hard.

If used as designed it would probably still be sailing.
The report indicates the keel did not suddenly fail catastrophicaly without warning.
The report indicates. The keel failed over a period of several hours while sailing hard on the open North Atlantic in near gale conditions.
It indicated the impending failure by leaking.

Had the boat been sailing within its code limit there would have been a very good chance the boat and crew would have made it to a safe port for repair.

No keels shouldn't fall off.
They very occasionaly do.

Who really understands all these varieties of codes.
I had no clue prior to this incident what any of them meant.
I had no reason to.

You make some interesting and salient points.

Being a one man bane manager owner does not exempt him from his responsibilities though and given his experience he should have known what they were and I believe did as his continued wriggling to first get the boat coded to sail back under ISAF rules and later manipulating the crew manifest to circumvent or try to the commercial voyage aspect. He was well aware of what he was doing and that extends to his legitimate self assessment of the boat in the UK prior to the voyage his negligence comes in in not, given the boats history, getting it thoroughly surveyed prior to the ARC.

Your second post is spot on I think and yes it is speculation but speculation that was confirmed by the loss of the vessel and if admittedly with hindsight people can speculate in such a manner then so could Innes.
As regards the keel failing suddenly, yes it failed over several hours but the final element of loss was sudden. Now that raises an interesting point did the crew ever determine the source of the leak, was the table removed? The divers would know. I raise this because if the leak was established as comping from the keel quickly the boat could have been put into a safer mode of sailing where the keel was less stressed and a call for evacuation made and even abandonment or at least the full readying of the life raft for launch and inflation.
Again I think you are correct in saying had the boat been operated within it's cat2 classification or in what would be the norms for a privately owned boat the problems would not have arisen. When boats like this are used commercially and undoubtably have a hard life they should be treated with great caution. Just because the boat was RCD rated for pleasure sailing on ocean waters does not mean that it can be used commercially in the same manner that is why it was coded Cat2 in the first place.

Anyway off to play golf now.

 

[Kukri]

I have thought carefully before writing this.

First I should say that my company has been the subject of MAIB investigations, and, fwiw , I am an old friend of the head of the MAIB, so I am "declaring an interest". I can only commend the high quality of the work of the MAIB and the thoroughness, the expertise and the courtesy of their staff. That's not saying anything new, the MAIB have an international reputation. I therefore put a lot of weight on the MAIB report, and rather less on the Press reports of the trial of Mr Innes and of Stormforce Coaching.

I have done some sailing, perhaps 20,000 miles, over five decades, including some longer passages, but I have always avoided having anything to do with the commercial side of sailing. Making a living out of your hobby is not always the best idea. I therefore don’t know much about how the “commercial pressures” operate in commercial yachting. I haven’t experienced them.

The Synopsis of the MAIB report contains this paragraph:

"A recommendation has been made to the British Marine Federation to co-operate with certifying authorities, manufacturers and repairers with the aim of developing best practiceindustry-wide guidance on the inspection and repair of yachts where a glass reinforced plastic matrix and hull have been bonded together. A recommendation has also beenmade to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to provide more explicit guidance about circumstances under which commercial certification for small vessels is required, and whenit is not. Further recommendations have been made to sport governing bodies with regardto issuing operational guidance to both the commercial and pleasure sectors of the yachtingcommunity aimed at raising awareness of the potential damage caused by any grounding,and the factors to be taken into consideration when planning ocean passages."

In the formal Recommendations section, the MAIB write:

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is recommended to:
2015/119 Issue operational guidance to owners, operators and managers of smallcommercial sailing vessels, including:
• The circumstances in which a small vessel is required to comply withthe provisions of the SCV Code and those in which it is exempt fromcompliance.
• Management responsibilities and best practice with regard to:
◦ vessel structural inspection and planned maintenance by competent personnel, particularly prior to long ocean passages,
◦ passage planning and execution, including weather routing,
◦ the provision of appropriate lifesaving equipment, including liferafts, EPIRBs and PLBs, and the extent to which they should be float-free and/or readily available, and
◦ the provision of onboard procedures, including the action to be taken on discovering water ingress.
The need for an inspection following any grounding, taking into account thedanger of potential unseen damage, particularly where a GRP matrix andhull have been bonded together.
2015/120 Include in the SCV Code a requirement that vessels operating commerciallyunder ISAF OSR should undergo a full inspection to the extent otherwiserequired for vessels complying with the SCV Code.

Now, this shows that the MAIB don’t think that the MCA’s position with regard to “commercial voyages”, as it was at the time, was as clear as it might have been. The obvious way for Mr Innes to “get round” the issue of whether the return voyage was a “commercial voyage” would have been to agree with the owner to terminate the bareboat charter in the Caribbean, to enter into a delivery contract for the boat on the usual terms, and to re-enter the bareboat charter on the boat’s return to base. He didn’t do this – I know plenty of shipowners who would have done – and I think that speaks well of him.

Stormforce Coaching’s list of changes to procedures following the loss is impressive, I think:

◦ All staff and crew on races or motor/sail training courses who travel more than 60 miles from a safe haven are required to carry a PLB.

◦ An external professional weather forecaster and router is to be engaged for ocean passages. ◦ In addition to regular visual inspections and inspection following a grounding, all ocean-going yachts are to undergo an annual third-party external survey.

◦ Unless participating in a race, yachts on ocean passages are to endeavour to sail in close company with another yacht, with skippers establishing a formal reporting schedule prior to departure.

◦ Liferaft stowage locations on all newly acquired yachts that will spend extended periods more than 60 miles from a safe haven are to be reviewed to ensure that the liferaft can be launched in the event of an inversion.

◦ Where appropriate stowage is available, existing 12-person capacity liferafts on yachts capable of venturing offshore are to be replaced with two 6-person capacityliferafts.

◦ Rudders on sailing yachts capable of venturing offshore are to be painted day-glow orange to assist with their location in the event of an inversion.

◦ Lifejackets with retrofitted spray hoods carried on yachts that are likely to venture more than 60 miles from a safe haven have been replaced with new 190N lifejackets fitted with an integral spray hood.

◦ A second EPIRB in a float-free location has been fitted on yachts that are likely to venture more than 60 miles from a safe haven.

◦ All fleet maintenance reporting, recording and planning are now managed using online cloud-based software.

◦ An ‘out of the water hull inspection’ policy is now documented in the company’s operations manual

In my business, it has been said that “20/20 hindsight is the cheapest thing in shipping” and I think we should beware of applying it here.

CR had made this passage before, and she had evidently done so without comment from the MCA (although they may have been unaware of it) and it seems that plenty of boats do the same.

It's easy for me to say, in my sixties, that as soon as she fell off a wave and started leaking, I would have suspected the keel attachment and it’s very easy for me to say that I would have reduced sail and started nursing the boat as soon as she started making water. I would do that now, but If I am honest, when I was 22, (and I was doing a fair bit of sailing at that age) I would not have done either of those things.

Mr Innes lost friends, he has now, it seems, lost his business, and has been dragged through a criminal court, but his advice to the boat at the time, and the changes he made after the loss, all seem to be to be sensible and seamanlike.

I'd note in passing, having done it myself a few times, that giving advice from shore to the Master or skipper of a vessel in trouble is not at all an easy thing to do. You don't want to overload someone who is already very busy, but you do want to make sure that nothing is overlooked, and I have myself done what Mr Innes did and sent an email (OK, a cable or a telex over radio in the Old Days!) rather than stay on the radio or the phone, because people have a better chance to consider that way and they can choose the right time to read it.

Let’s give him a break.

 

[Frogmogman]

Thank you for taking the time to write that Minn.

What a sensible and well argued post.

 

[duncan99210]

Minn, the post is a thoughtful one and covers some useful points. I agree that Innes revised guidance to his employees after the incident is well written and covers all the bases. However, as you remark, it was issued with the advantage of 20/20 hindsight. It is for discussion as to whether it would've prevented the loss of CR had it been in place before the crossing and the trial was on the basis of the policies extant within Stormforce at the time of the incident.
The MAIB report explicitly states in its preamble that it cannot be used as evidence in court, hence its removal from the MAIB website until the court case is finally settled. So, although you mention both the recommendations and other evidence from the report, that is not the evidence that was brought before the court. I agree that there seems to be something of a grey area in the commercial/not commercial decision and that the MCA should issue better guidance on the topic but I'm unsure as to how much of a factor that was in the verdict. We will perhaps have to await the judge's summing up to see how much weight he placed upon this within the overall case.

 

[Kukri]

The thought also occurs to me that if the keel of a yacht detaches, she will invert, going to 90 degrees, flat in the water, in a couple of seconds, she will then continue to roll down to 180 degrees but more slowly, due to the drag of the sails and the rig, and she will then remain stable inverted, but if any crew members are in the water she will be of no help to them - a rounded surface with nothing to hold on to, with seas breaking over.

Which I think amounts to the possibility of just posibly getting out of the cabin, although one would be hugely disorientated, as it would take a little while for her to downflood through the companion hatch, but really no chance to get a liferaft up from below or even out of a closed cockpit locker. And as has been said the hydrostatic release on a deck mounted raft will not be triggered as there will not be enough water pressure.

 

[lw395]

The thought also occurs to me that if the keel of a yacht detaches, she will invert, going to 90 degrees, flat in the water, in a couple of seconds, she will then continue to roll down to 180 degrees but more slowly, due to the drag of the sails and the rig, and she will then remain stable inverted, but if any crew members are in the water she will be of no help to them - a rounded surface with nothing to hold on to, with seas breaking over.

I will hazard a guess that Mr Bullimore felt that his inverted hull was something of an asset.
The obvious difference is that Exide Challenger floated USD with a useful air pocket inside.

 

[Hacker]

I will hazard a guess that Mr Bullimore felt that his inverted hull was something of an asset

Would you care to explain that?

 

[Kukri]

I will hazard a guess that Mr Bullimore felt that his inverted hull was something of an asset.
The obvious difference is that Exide Challenger floated USD with a useful air pocket inside.

Yes; a snapped carbon fibre keel is a different thing - there would be no air pocket where a keel bolt has pulled through.

https://angusnoble.com/exdie-challenger/

 

[lw395]

Yes; a snapped carbon fibre keel is a different thing - there would be no air pocket where a keel bolt has pulled through.

https://angusnoble.com/exdie-challenger/

ISTR that the air pocket in Exide was not reliant on the upturned hull being sealed above the water?
Wasn't Mr B removing the log paddlewheel and poking the aerial of the EPIRB through the hole?
Exide probably had a much more buoyant structure? More foam sandwich, less solid GRP?
Plus water ballast tanks which were empty?
This adds up to a hull which floats USD with a viable dry space inside.

Relying on an air space because the hull is sealed, like a glass upside down in washing up water, would need seriously sealed compartments and a lot of details to be considered before it would work in waves.

 

[Kukri]

ISTR that the air pocket in Exide was not reliant on the upturned hull being sealed above the water?
Wasn't Mr B removing the log paddlewheel and poking the aerial of the EPIRB through the hole?
Exide probably had a much more buoyant structure? More foam sandwich, less solid GRP?
Plus water ballast tanks which were empty?
This adds up to a hull which floats USD with a viable dry space inside.

Relying on an air space because the hull is sealed, like a glass upside down in washing up water, would need seriously sealed compartments and a lot of details to be considered before it would work in waves.

I think you are right.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

ISTR that the air pocket in Exide was not reliant on the upturned hull being sealed above the water?
Wasn't Mr B removing the log paddlewheel and poking the aerial of the EPIRB through the hole?
Exide probably had a much more buoyant structure? More foam sandwich, less solid GRP?
Plus water ballast tanks which were empty?
This adds up to a hull which floats USD with a viable dry space inside.

Relying on an air space because the hull is sealed, like a glass upside down in washing up water, would need seriously sealed compartments and a lot of details to be considered before it would work in waves.

Isn't that the basis and reasoning behind Cat 0?

 

[westernman]

Isn't that the basis and reasoning behind Cat 0?

No.

Cat 0 requires a stability analysis which shows that the boat will stay up the right way!

Unfortunately none of the MCA codes will currently guarantee that your keel will not drop off.

MCA Cat 0 requires that the boat will float (high enough - there is a specification of exactly what high enough is) when there is a catastrophic breach in one compartment. I.e. requires water tight doors between compartments and enough compartments to ensure it floats high enough.

Plus additional safety equipment and a huge medical kit worthy of a county hospital with splints, spinal boards and various other bulky things. Also enough powerful drugs for you to get locked up for a very long time for drug running in many countries.

At one time Cat 0 also required that you carry a body bag for every member of the crew. Quite how the last crew member who died was supposed to end up in his body bag was not specified. I think only one body bag is required now (a relaxation and downgrading of the standard?).

 

[lw395]

Isn't that the basis and reasoning behind Cat 0?

I was under the impression that the bulkhead requirements in Cat 0 were as much about staying afloat in the event of holing the hull or swamping the accommodation.
I am not up to date with such regs but I thought only a single crash bulkhead was required, essentially in case you ram a container or fishing boat the boat will float upright with plenty of freeboard with the bow flooded.
If the keel fell off such a coded boat, it might just float with the sealed-off bow in the air, which is no use to anyone.
AIUI, boats like Etaps which have enough foam in them to float flooded with the keel on still don't comply without a bulkhead.

 

[Kukri]

No.

Cat 0 requires a stability analysis which shows that the boat will stay up the right way!

Unfortunately none of the MCA codes will currently guarantee that your keel will not drop off.

MCA Cat 0 requires that the boat will float (high enough - there is a specification of exactly what high enough is) when there is a catastrophic breach in one compartment. I.e. requires water tight doors between compartments and enough compartments to ensure it floats high enough.

Plus additional safety equipment and a huge medical kit worthy of a county hospital with splints, spinal boards and various other bulky things. Also enough powerful drugs for you to get locked up for a very long time for drug running in many countries.

At one time Cat 0 also required that you carry a body bag for every member of the crew. Quite how the last crew member who died was supposed to end up in his body bag was not specified. I think only one body bag is required now (a relaxation and downgrading of the standard?).

MGN 280 shows signs of having been written by people (it is undoubtedly the product of a committee) who had knowledge of commercial ships but little knowledge of yachts.

One clue is here:

"20.2.1 The Tabulated values for anchor masses refer to High Holding Power anchors. Anchors of
other designs may be accepted based on the stated holding power."

The term "High Holding Power anchors" " ("HHP anchors") is not a generic term for anthing that isn't a Fisherman, as you might imagine. If it were, there would be no need to refer to "anchors of other designs". An HHP anchor is a particular type of stockless anchor carried by merchant ships. HHP anchors don't work in yacht sizes. If they did, you would see them on yachts...

Hence all the body bags, which are presumably to be used to stow the corpses in the walk in meat freezer compartment which, in our case, being a yacht, we have not got...

 

[Uricanejack]

I have thought carefully before writing this.

First I should say that my company has been the subject of MAIB investigations, and, fwiw , I am an old friend of the head of the MAIB, so I am "declaring an interest". I can only commend the high quality of the work of the MAIB and the thoroughness, the expertise and the courtesy of their staff. That's not saying anything new, the MAIB have an international reputation. I therefore put a lot of weight on the MAIB report, and rather less on the Press reports of the trial of Mr Innes and of Stormforce Coaching.

I have done some sailing, perhaps 20,000 miles, over five decades, including some longer passages, but I have always avoided having anything to do with the commercial side of sailing. Making a living out of your hobby is not always the best idea. I therefore don’t know much about how the “commercial pressures” operate in commercial yachting. I haven’t experienced them.

The Synopsis of the MAIB report contains this paragraph:

"A recommendation has been made to the British Marine Federation to co-operate with certifying authorities, manufacturers and repairers with the aim of developing best practiceindustry-wide guidance on the inspection and repair of yachts where a glass reinforced plastic matrix and hull have been bonded together. A recommendation has also beenmade to the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to provide more explicit guidance about circumstances under which commercial certification for small vessels is required, and whenit is not. Further recommendations have been made to sport governing bodies with regardto issuing operational guidance to both the commercial and pleasure sectors of the yachtingcommunity aimed at raising awareness of the potential damage caused by any grounding,and the factors to be taken into consideration when planning ocean passages."

In the formal Recommendations section, the MAIB write:

The Maritime and Coastguard Agency is recommended to:
2015/119 Issue operational guidance to owners, operators and managers of smallcommercial sailing vessels, including:
• The circumstances in which a small vessel is required to comply withthe provisions of the SCV Code and those in which it is exempt fromcompliance.
• Management responsibilities and best practice with regard to:
◦ vessel structural inspection and planned maintenance by competent personnel, particularly prior to long ocean passages,
◦ passage planning and execution, including weather routing,
◦ the provision of appropriate lifesaving equipment, including liferafts, EPIRBs and PLBs, and the extent to which they should be float-free and/or readily available, and
◦ the provision of onboard procedures, including the action to be taken on discovering water ingress.
The need for an inspection following any grounding, taking into account thedanger of potential unseen damage, particularly where a GRP matrix andhull have been bonded together.
2015/120 Include in the SCV Code a requirement that vessels operating commerciallyunder ISAF OSR should undergo a full inspection to the extent otherwiserequired for vessels complying with the SCV Code.

Now, this shows that the MAIB don’t think that the MCA’s position with regard to “commercial voyages”, as it was at the time, was as clear as it might have been. The obvious way for Mr Innes to “get round” the issue of whether the return voyage was a “commercial voyage” would have been to agree with the owner to terminate the bareboat charter in the Caribbean, to enter into a delivery contract for the boat on the usual terms, and to re-enter the bareboat charter on the boat’s return to base. He didn’t do this – I know plenty of shipowners who would have done – and I think that speaks well of him.

Stormforce Coaching’s list of changes to procedures following the loss is impressive, I think:

◦ All staff and crew on races or motor/sail training courses who travel more than 60 miles from a safe haven are required to carry a PLB.

◦ An external professional weather forecaster and router is to be engaged for ocean passages. ◦ In addition to regular visual inspections and inspection following a grounding, all ocean-going yachts are to undergo an annual third-party external survey.

◦ Unless participating in a race, yachts on ocean passages are to endeavour to sail in close company with another yacht, with skippers establishing a formal reporting schedule prior to departure.

◦ Liferaft stowage locations on all newly acquired yachts that will spend extended periods more than 60 miles from a safe haven are to be reviewed to ensure that the liferaft can be launched in the event of an inversion.

◦ Where appropriate stowage is available, existing 12-person capacity liferafts on yachts capable of venturing offshore are to be replaced with two 6-person capacityliferafts.

◦ Rudders on sailing yachts capable of venturing offshore are to be painted day-glow orange to assist with their location in the event of an inversion.

◦ Lifejackets with retrofitted spray hoods carried on yachts that are likely to venture more than 60 miles from a safe haven have been replaced with new 190N lifejackets fitted with an integral spray hood.

◦ A second EPIRB in a float-free location has been fitted on yachts that are likely to venture more than 60 miles from a safe haven.

◦ All fleet maintenance reporting, recording and planning are now managed using online cloud-based software.

◦ An ‘out of the water hull inspection’ policy is now documented in the company’s operations manual

In my business, it has been said that “20/20 hindsight is the cheapest thing in shipping” and I think we should beware of applying it here.

CR had made this passage before, and she had evidently done so without comment from the MCA (although they may have been unaware of it) and it seems that plenty of boats do the same.

It's easy for me to say, in my sixties, that as soon as she fell off a wave and started leaking, I would have suspected the keel attachment and it’s very easy for me to say that I would have reduced sail and started nursing the boat as soon as she started making water. I would do that now, but If I am honest, when I was 22, (and I was doing a fair bit of sailing at that age) I would not have done either of those things.

Mr Innes lost friends, he has now, it seems, lost his business, and has been dragged through a criminal court, but his advice to the boat at the time, and the changes he made after the loss, all seem to be to be sensible and seamanlike.

I'd note in passing, having done it myself a few times, that giving advice from shore to the Master or skipper of a vessel in trouble is not at all an easy thing to do. You don't want to overload someone who is already very busy, but you do want to make sure that nothing is overlooked, and I have myself done what Mr Innes did and sent an email (OK, a cable or a telex over radio in the Old Days!) rather than stay on the radio or the phone, because people have a better chance to consider that way and they can choose the right time to read it.

Let’s give him a break.

Excellent post
Just my opinion the MAIB does a very good job

 

[Uricanejack]

MGN 280 shows signs of having been written by people (it is undoubtedly the product of a committee) who had knowledge of commercial ships but little knowledge of yachts.

One clue is here:

"20.2.1 The Tabulated values for anchor masses refer to High Holding Power anchors. Anchors of
other designs may be accepted based on the stated holding power."

The term "High Holding Power anchors" " ("HHP anchors") is not a generic term for anthing that isn't a Fisherman, as you might imagine. If it were, there would be no need to refer to "anchors of other designs". An HHP anchor is a particular type of stockless anchor carried by merchant ships. HHP anchors don't work in yacht sizes. If they did, you would see them on yachts...

Hence all the body bags, which are presumably to be used to stow the corpses in the walk in meat freezer compartment which, in our case, being a yacht, we have not got...

Had an unfortunate siuattion where we put a body bag in the cold store
Turns out we were no supposed to do that.
It froze.
Biggest problem we got shit for violating a whole load of health regs regarding food
Turns out they are sealed and supposed to be left sealed in hospital room

I was quite surprised by the burial at sea. Wot no body bag.

 

[Frogmogman]

Hence all the body bags, which are presumably to be used to stow the corpses in the walk in meat freezer compartment which, in our case, being a yacht, we have not got...

Love the reference to Henry Reed's 'The naming of parts'

 

[penberth3]

...I have to say I feel some blame attaches to the skipper. Once you have leak in a grp boat and it's not the plumbing, it seems to me that the keel has to be suspect. An older, more experienced skipper might have either nursed the boat to a safe refuge or abandoned it? Or at least made some preparations for the possibility?...

Was there ever a Mayday call?