Condor ferry & Fog!

[BrianH]

I've had the utmost difficulty avoiding a collision in fine weather, with a ship that seemed intent on running me down at only 12 kts.
The only good thing about the speed in this case is that the fishing boat would have a fairly quick and clear indication of Condor's course on target trail, but what to do about it? Assume you have the Condor approaching on radar. You can't quite tell if he is going to pass close, but clear, and you know his ARPA can show him this. Do you wait, hoping this is the case? If you decide to move, can you decide which way? If he has seen you are stopped, he quite reasonably could pass either side, he has no aspect and you may move into his path, and unless he is prepared to slow or stop, cause the collision. No time for a VHF call, unless you just yell on 16 and hope. If you had more time I would suggest make all speed at his course minus 90 deg, showing him your portside, which clearly tells him he is the give way vessel, and try to inform him by radio. The driving issue is lack of time due to speed.

How true that all is. Even in clear visibility, as anyone in the frightening situation of a fast catamaran coming straight towards you will know, it is difficult to know its exact heading. With a normal ship the prow lines up on the bridge and from a slow or stationary vessel it is easy to determine that it is going to be a close encounter. That is not always the case with twin hulls.

In the AIS screen shot below, the ship, a large catamaran ferry, was constantly wavering through 10 degrees (under autopilot?) but very clearly a threat - but which way to steer to get out of the way? To turn correctly to starboard (both under power) would be to probably place me directly under the bows at that closing speed (38 knots) and distance (1.1nm) as the CPA was, on average, marginally to starboard.

In the event, a channel 16 call to the named ship caused an immediate and definite change of course to starboard that cleared me by a significant margin.

 

[Bandit]

Context

Condor has an exemplary safety record and has operated fast ferries since 1964.

IIRC this is the first accident of this type and it is a tragic one that caused a loss of life. I feel for all concerned and especialy the fisherman who lost his life.

Condor are well established and well operated vessels, currently three identical fast ferries and two passenger/ truck ro ro's.

Both vessels in this incident appear to have radar, Condor has two and in that weather a full bridge watch.

Condor has AIS.

The fast ferries give a good signal on my radar.

Did the fishing boat have AIS and if so was it switched on? Often they are turned off so others cant see where they fish. Did it have a transponding radar reflector which are recognised as giving a much better reflection such as See-Me or Echo max?

It was a tragic accident, if the ferry operator operated a similar number of busses to its passenger capacity ie about 65 and once in 20 years there was an accident on a country road between a car and a bus at dusk in the rain with a similar outcome would a lot of people be saying the things they have?

Vitesse is very manoeverable and can stop dead in about 1.5 vessel lengths in an emergency stop.

I for one feel safer in front of one of those than a freighter, car carrier, super tanker or banana boat with minimal bridge watch, used to operating in open ocean, unmanoeverable and nigh on impossible to stop in an emergency.

I have no connection with Condor but they are a major operator serving the Channel Islands year round in all conditions.

 

[RichardS]

Vitesse is very manoeverable and can stop dead in about 1.5 vessel lengths in an emergency stop.

Can it really do that from 30kts? If not, from what speed can it stop in 1.5 lengths? Just interested in case I meet one.

Richard

 

[Bandit]

yes, with water jets you can leave full power and engage reverse thrust.

 

[Pye_End]

This seems to be a tone in some of the posts, (not by any means all your own); an acceptance that commercial motives will ensure that millions of tonnes of shipping will continue to be driven hard through blinding fogs, regardless of occasional failures by the high-tech systems set up to penetrate the gloom...because "that's the way it is".

How about, ban all small targets from fog laden shipping areas. Big targets rarely have a problem avoiding each other in fog - it's only little ones that carry the risk of not being seen.

Then again, that is what we are taught to do anyway....

 

[Pye_End]

Surely though (and what I meant by give way vessel), if a vessel choses to do 30knts in poor viability then they have taken on the responsibility for collision avoidance?

COLREGS for vessels not in sight, but which show radar targets are quite clear.

 

[Ubergeekian]

How about, ban all small targets from fog laden shipping areas.

Controlled airspace works well. Maybe it's time for controlled seaspace too.

 

[Pye_End]

Controlled airspace works well. Maybe it's time for controlled seaspace too.

Yes indeed, but like with airspace only a small percentage of the world is controlled. Outside that it is free for all and rely on sight and local technology just like sailing.

You are also back to the same argument - is technology (plus operators) good enough to be correct 100% of the time. If it is, then the technology (and operators) on the vessels should have been sufficient. Then again, there are also sufficent deaths even when vessels have been in visual sight of each other to say that neither technology nor visual are infalable.

 

[Greenheart]

Thankyou Stav, point well made.

Cruiser2B, whatever you intended, you go a long way towards making my point for me. I hope we can bury this blunt hatchet and look at the issues here.

I agreed many, many posts ago, that we in small boats have no right to place ourselves where we may reasonably expect to encounter vessels unable to avoid us; what makes this situation an issue is the high speeds which the Condor routinely runs at, plus the apparently complete reliance on a radar system that plainly doesn't see everything...

...the concern most of us feel, is about the crew's failure to reduce speed appropriately, in spite of thick fog, as if they believed all responsibility for avoiding a crunch, rests on potential victims, because at high speed the Condor can't turn on a sixpence. That's fair enough in clear visibility, but can't justify high speed when there's fog.

The Granville prosecutor Gaudeul described the Condor's speed as 'considerable' and the impact as 'extremely violent'.

Is there a yachtsman reading this, who'd honestly prefer to have been aboard Les Marquises under the actual circumstances of her destruction, rather than in a situation where the ferry was running at 4 knots?

This isn't a personal matter - its significance is only of interest by dint of its tragic gravity - and because of the ugly suspicion that most of us hold, i.e. the ferry was speeding for the sake of its schedule, in conditions when small-boat users in the vicinity might reasonably have expected some restraint in the use of Condor's throttle. If restraint was lacking, how is the ferry's crew not blameworthy?

 

[Robin]

Not aimed at anyone in particular but I sometimes wonder from some comments if some people actually have any genuine experience or are merely commenting on perceived situations, judging by some of the suggestions being put forward. Certainly some of the replies suggest a lack of understanding of Colregs and especially as related to poor visibility and so called right of way or give way vessels.

Once again my feelings are that all of the facts need to be known and studied, not the very brief comments made by a news report to which are added multiple assumptions. In this tragic case like many others it takes two to tango and I doubt that either will be totally innocent, that is what is called an accident.

Incidentally the assumption that big ships never hit each other in fog is completely false.

 

[Ubergeekian]

Yes indeed, but like with airspace only a small percentage of the world is controlled. Outside that it is free for all and rely on sight and local technology just like sailing.

Not all seaspace would need controlled, just some bits. TSSs, for example. The point about controlled airspace is that as long as you do what the controller says 9and he's right ...) there is no chance of collision.

You are also back to the same argument - is technology (plus operators) good enough to be correct 100% of the time. If it is, then the technology (and operators) on the vessels should have been sufficient.

That doesn't apply in the air, does it, where having a controller who knows who is where is seen as a Good Thing.

 

[timbartlett]

Sorry Tim - I meant to respond to this but got sidetracked responding to slings and arrows - I'm certain you can relate.

I can indeed -- and I find it deeply frustrating that it is so difficult to have a dispassionate, fact-based discussion without people becoming offensive if you disagree with them.

I don't think it was that hard to find the excerpts - they were all in the first two pages of the Rule 6 discussion. The passage you provided likely relates to "moderate speed" having taken place before the 72 colregs had come into force. And the advice is particular to the specific vessels, cargo vessels that are doubtless incapable of matching Condor's stopping performance. Illustrative, but not definitive.

You're right: they weren't particularly difficult to find, it's just that I hadn't (at first) twigged that there were several of them, spread out, rather than a single block as they appeared in your post. It was just a layout thing -- nothing more.

I think perhaps a more salient point is that the extracts you quoted referred to a 1946 case (before the days when radar was commonplace) and the suggestion that acceptable speeds would be higher (by some unspecified amount) with radar. My example, also from Cockroft, was of a 1972 case, by which time radar was almost standard, and specifically contrasted the acceptable speed for vessels with and without radar. The key point, I think, is that in both cases the speeds were fairly low (by ship standards).

I won't put you on the spot and ask what you would think a safe speed would be - without knowing all the factors and the vessel's performance characteristics, it would be unfair - but would appreciate reading your thoughts on how you determine safe speed.

It's a fair few years since I stood on the bridge of a ship as anything other than a spectator, so it would be pretty impertinent to comment, but I agree that the manoeuvrability of the vessel is an obvious consideration.

And I am not one of those who still believes in the "stop within half the distance you can see" rule. It was dinned into me during training, but it is clearly impractical in the context of ships whose bows are out of sight of the bridge!

Large vessels (let's not get bogged down with a definition of "large" but I'm thinking in terms of 50m+) should be able to see and monitor each other by radar and AIS. The chances of two vessels on which both systems have failed meeting on collision courses on one of the 10 days a year or so that it is foggy are, to my mind, too remote to seriously worry about.

The problem is large vessel meeting small one in circumstances such that the small vessel is lost in the sea clutter (or whatever). I would suggest that the speed should be such that the small vessel has a chance of using its manoeuvrability and/or so that any collision is survivable.

(The survivabilty criterion, incidentally, might allow a higher speed for a vessel with a rounded bow than for a wave-piercer!).

At the same time, we have to allow that life must go on. Thousands -- possibly millions -- of lives and businesses would be seriously disrupted if shipping came to a complete standstill at random intervals. The possible sacrifice of a handful of lives per decade is something that -- with regret -- I think we have to accept, just as we accept road accidents, plane crashes, and accidents at work.

My gut feeling is that the compromise is probably something in the order of 10 knots, in visibility of 1 cable. If two vessels are approaching each other at 10 knots each the worst-case closing speed is 2 miles per 6 minutes, which -- in 1 cable visibility -- would give just under twenty seconds to see, react, and turn. I'm not exactly "comfortable" with 20 seconds -- but I would be distinctly "uncomfortable" with any less.

 

[iain789]

I agreed many, many posts ago, that we in small boats have no right to place ourselves where we may reasonably expect to encounter vessels unable to avoid us; what makes this situation an issue is the high speeds which the Condor routinely runs at, plus the apparently complete reliance on a radar system that plainly doesn't see everything...

Quite agree that avoiding a difficult situation is ideal, but some times we have no option but to mix it with the big boys. How else do we cross the Channel, the Irish Sea, from Scillies to Brest, etc, etc. And when out at sea we can't always accurately predict when fog will engulf us. I vividly remember some years ago crossing the TSS of Ushant in a Sadler 34 when a thick fog rolled in. We called the TSS people on the VHF to let them know where we were.

"Ah oui," came the reply "we see you on ze Radar. Zere is a tanquaire coming towards you. We will let him know you are there."

Cue for acute anxiety and donning of brown trousers. Tanker passed - we heard its engines and were hit by its wash, but never saw it. Really quite close.

On another occasion I was on a large CalMac ferry (normal speed 18kn), crossing from Ullapool to Stornoway. At the mouth of Loch Broom we ran into a dense wall of fog. The ship immediately slowed, and sounded its horn for the rest of the journey. We were 3 hours late arriving in Stornoway, but we arrived safely. Commercial pressures and timetables must never override good seamanship.

 

[sarabande]

domains

many years ago when I was a card-carrying member of the Inst of Nav, there arose the concept of a ship's "domain".

This was a shape of roughly tear-drop proportions, which represented the area of sea within which a ship could be technically expected to operate,at its present course and speed. A virtual domain represented the area where a ship might be if it altered course and speed.

Clearly, the domain for a RIB at 30 knots is very different from the domain for a catamaran ferry at the same speed. And also for a fishing boat hauling pots at 4 knots.

Where the domains of two or more ships overlap, then risk of collision exists. I cannot see why designers of radar sets do not overprint the virtual domain (and its changing size and shape as course and speed alter) onto a radar screen to indicate just how big a ship really is. .

It's quite revealing when a domain for a VLCC is several miles long.

 

[Mariner69]

Not Specific to Condor

One of the things being ignored here is that for a safe speed to be set there has to be consideration as to the manoeuvring capabilities of the ship.

Many large vessels operate on Intermediate Fuel Oil(IFO) which needs heating to burn in the diesel engine. When the vessel slows down it is necessary in some cases to change to gas oil for the main engine, this costs at least twice the amount per tonne so has a strong economic consequence.

In addition, extra steering gear motors are started and additional auxillary motors for the extra electrical draw. More crew members are summoned and that leads to increased overtime payments in many cases.

In smaller coasters the loss of sleep factors can make life even more desperate since they operate a 6 on 6 off watch system for months with calls to ports disturbing any routine built up.

So to go from "On Passage" status to "Manoeuvring" has costs implications before we even look at the effect of charter party conditions, owner's schedules.

It is highly probable that this case will find its way to the admiralty court in one way or another and the results will then govern actions for some time to come. The liability insurers (P&I Clubs) will ensure that the results are advised worldwide.

There are no easy answers in the commercial world of shipping and fishing nor for that matter in the leisure world of yachting.

 

[Resolution]

My gut feeling is that the compromise is probably something in the order of 10 knots, in visibility of 1 cable. If two vessels are approaching each other at 10 knots each the worst-case closing speed is 2 miles per 6 minutes, which -- in 1 cable visibility -- would give just under twenty seconds to see, react, and turn. I'm not exactly "comfortable" with 20 seconds -- but I would be distinctly "uncomfortable" with any less.

I think you will find that when the Condor recommenced its journey after the impact, it maintained 10 knots for the rest of the leg. Of course this may have been dictated by crash damage and the fog may have lifted by then, but if not maybe this is the speed they should have been down to all along.

 

[Cruiser2B]

Surely though (and what I meant by give way vessel), if a vessel choses to do 30knts in poor viability then they have taken on the responsibility for collision avoidance?

One could say the same thing in clear visibility - and one would still be wrong. Yes a vessel going 30 kts needs to be looking further ahead and reacting earlier than a slower moving vessel, but she will never assume sole responsibility for collision avoidance. At the risk of sounding like a stuck record - we do not know at this point, that Condor was doing 30 kts. I have made the point, several times now, that even if Condor was at a moderate speed (even 4 kts) this collision still could have occurred, and still with a devastating outcome.

Some on here seem to be under the impression that Marquises' lookout was irrelevant. If they saw a radar paint on Condor at 6 miles, and tied that into their knowledge of traffic patterns, they could have contacted Condor by VHF several minutes before they came into contact. Is there a VTS that covers this region? Do they have radar coverage of this area? Was Marquises reporting to VTS? These are questions that need to be answered yet.
For two vessels to come together, there are generally failings on both vessels.

 

[Cruiser2B]

I think perhaps a more salient point is that the extracts you quoted referred to a 1946 case (before the days when radar was commonplace) and the suggestion that acceptable speeds would be higher (by some unspecified amount) with radar.

Thanks for your insight, Tim. I should have made my selections from Cockcroft clearer - there were four distinct sections; only one chunk referred to the 1946 case - that was the line that a vessel making proper use of radar in open ocean is not required to take all way off when the fog is so dense that it's not possible to see beyond the forecastle.

If I had provided the full unabridged text, it would have made a rather large post, so I selected what I felt were the pertinent sections. I invite everyone to read the full chapter - it's worthwhile reading.

 

[Cruiser2B]

I vividly remember some years ago crossing the TSS of Ushant in a Sadler 34 when a thick fog rolled in. We called the TSS people on the VHF to let them know where we were.

Brilliant! Thank you for providing such an excellent illustration of what is involved in maintaining a "proper lookout."

 

[timbartlett]

It's an interesting though (well, I find it interesting) that the USCG regard calling another vessel on VHF to clarify its intentions as an integral part of good collision-avoidance strategy.

The MCA, on the other hand, issue MGNs telling us not to.

Yet AIS is very nearly an automated version of the "have you seen me and what are you doing" conversation.