onenyala
New member
Perhaps incorporating some sort of rollers into the skids would enable lifeboats to be able to be lowered down the high side when the vessel has a large list.
Concordia Disaster on TV 8PM Tonight
- Thread starter savageseadog
- Start date
chiefeng
Member
I watched the programme and i can relate to the terror of those all involved, having been in the engineroom of a cruise ship when it has hit rocks. We were lucky that all the holes were in double bottom tanks or cofferdams so none of the main spaces were flooded.
It appears to me that after the CC hit the rock at 16knots the speed imeadiately starts to drop off. If the AIS trace is somewhere close to being right then the ship was not deliberately put on the beach it drifted there. The ship's last manouver was to turn away from the shore and head into wind.
If it had stayed in deeper water then it might not have taken such a significant list, as the ship is designed to stay upright (it would have cross flooding devices or ducts) even though it would still have sunk.
These ships are designed to be safe, and they are. You can not legislate for some idiot driving it onto rocks at 16knots.
It appears to me that after the CC hit the rock at 16knots the speed imeadiately starts to drop off. If the AIS trace is somewhere close to being right then the ship was not deliberately put on the beach it drifted there. The ship's last manouver was to turn away from the shore and head into wind.
If it had stayed in deeper water then it might not have taken such a significant list, as the ship is designed to stay upright (it would have cross flooding devices or ducts) even though it would still have sunk.
These ships are designed to be safe, and they are. You can not legislate for some idiot driving it onto rocks at 16knots.
D
Deleted member 36384
Guest
chiefeng can you advise on my question above? I am interested in understanding how fast the information relating to the damage, and therefore decisions, would be available to the master? I understand you may not know the details specifically for the vessel in question but in general terms would suffice.
ProDave
Well-known member
Here's my question about WHY did it sink.
They say it can cope with 2 compartments flooding, but in this case 3 flooded, so that's too many.
But it seems these "compartments" separate the ship along it's length, but not it's height.
So what I am getting at, is if say compartment 3 flooded, it can flood right up to the top of the ship, presumably up the stairwells.
Now how about this as a radical re think of ship design. Make a HORIZONTAL watertight barrier just above the normal waterline. That would involve the ability to close off all stairwells and other ducts leading upwards from the decks bellow the water line.
So on each compartment that was holed, evacuate all persons, then close the horizontal watertight doors over the stairwells etc.
The ship wouldn't fill up beyond this horizontal barrier and wouldn't sink.
Too radical, too complicated or too expensive? I don't see why it should be. It would have prevented the ship sinking, prevented the loss of life, and the ship might even have been salvageable.
In the case of the Titanic, the bulkheads didn't go all the way up, so when it got to a certain depth, the water overspilled into the next compartment. That design flaw was corrected on later ships.
Now perhaps it's time to look at this lack of horizontal watertightness and address that design flaw.
They say it can cope with 2 compartments flooding, but in this case 3 flooded, so that's too many.
But it seems these "compartments" separate the ship along it's length, but not it's height.
So what I am getting at, is if say compartment 3 flooded, it can flood right up to the top of the ship, presumably up the stairwells.
Now how about this as a radical re think of ship design. Make a HORIZONTAL watertight barrier just above the normal waterline. That would involve the ability to close off all stairwells and other ducts leading upwards from the decks bellow the water line.
So on each compartment that was holed, evacuate all persons, then close the horizontal watertight doors over the stairwells etc.
The ship wouldn't fill up beyond this horizontal barrier and wouldn't sink.
Too radical, too complicated or too expensive? I don't see why it should be. It would have prevented the ship sinking, prevented the loss of life, and the ship might even have been salvageable.
In the case of the Titanic, the bulkheads didn't go all the way up, so when it got to a certain depth, the water overspilled into the next compartment. That design flaw was corrected on later ships.
Now perhaps it's time to look at this lack of horizontal watertightness and address that design flaw.
Last edited:
chiefeng
Member
Blowing old Boots.
To answer your question Instantly for the engineroom, they will have cctv cameras everywhere. In the accomodation maybe 1 minute at the most. The bridge would have been informed certainly within 1 minute, if there was anyone left alive in the compartment that was flooded. By the time the lights went out it was pretty obvious his ahip was doomed!
Pro Dave.
Quite frankly if the Titanic had been made to modern day designs it would have sunk alot quicker. On the ship I'm on at the moment the main deck is a sealed watertight comparment with dogged doors to all accesses.
A very simplistic and brief explination.
When naval architects talk about watertight compartments it is a watertight bulkhead that reaches to the main "watertight deck". This gernerally, on a cruise ship would be a deck that is high enough, so that if two compartments were holed then the ship would be lower in the water but the "watertight deck" would still be above the water line and still have inherent bouyancy in the ship to keep it afloat. With 3 compartments holed, especially next to each other then the watertight deck will sink below the waterline and it is inevitible the vessel will go down. If only two compartments were holed or even if the third one had a hole in it that the pumps could have coped with then the ship would heve been saved.
Hope this helps.
Rgds
Bob
To answer your question Instantly for the engineroom, they will have cctv cameras everywhere. In the accomodation maybe 1 minute at the most. The bridge would have been informed certainly within 1 minute, if there was anyone left alive in the compartment that was flooded. By the time the lights went out it was pretty obvious his ahip was doomed!
Pro Dave.
Quite frankly if the Titanic had been made to modern day designs it would have sunk alot quicker. On the ship I'm on at the moment the main deck is a sealed watertight comparment with dogged doors to all accesses.
A very simplistic and brief explination.
When naval architects talk about watertight compartments it is a watertight bulkhead that reaches to the main "watertight deck". This gernerally, on a cruise ship would be a deck that is high enough, so that if two compartments were holed then the ship would be lower in the water but the "watertight deck" would still be above the water line and still have inherent bouyancy in the ship to keep it afloat. With 3 compartments holed, especially next to each other then the watertight deck will sink below the waterline and it is inevitible the vessel will go down. If only two compartments were holed or even if the third one had a hole in it that the pumps could have coped with then the ship would heve been saved.
Hope this helps.
Rgds
Bob
haydude
New member
Where did you get this from? Everyone knew the location of the ship and rescue got there even before they were officially called.
Kukri
Well-known member
Well said chiefeng!
As I think I said earlier, the idea of watertight subdivison is to stop the ship sinking if she is in collision, which will involve at most two compartments, and to allow the boats to be lowered safely if the ship is more severely damaged, as in this case and in the case of the Titanic. You cannot design a ship that will float if you run a can opener down one side; not in 1912, not now. What you can do, and what has been done in the past hundred years, is to design a ship with enough lifeboats and one that stays upright as she sinks. This one capsized after she grounded.
The Guardia Costiera and indeed the Carabineri did an outstanding job and should be congratulated.
Incidentally the best run ship I've ever been aboard (and I've run ships for most of my working life) was Italian, twenty years old, Jugoslav built, with four Pielsticks (chiefeng can interpret that one!) with an Italian crew of 67 and owned by Corsica Ferries.
As I think I said earlier, the idea of watertight subdivison is to stop the ship sinking if she is in collision, which will involve at most two compartments, and to allow the boats to be lowered safely if the ship is more severely damaged, as in this case and in the case of the Titanic. You cannot design a ship that will float if you run a can opener down one side; not in 1912, not now. What you can do, and what has been done in the past hundred years, is to design a ship with enough lifeboats and one that stays upright as she sinks. This one capsized after she grounded.
The Guardia Costiera and indeed the Carabineri did an outstanding job and should be congratulated.
Incidentally the best run ship I've ever been aboard (and I've run ships for most of my working life) was Italian, twenty years old, Jugoslav built, with four Pielsticks (chiefeng can interpret that one!) with an Italian crew of 67 and owned by Corsica Ferries.
Last edited:
chiefeng
Member
With you here Minn
Having listened to a lot of the hype from the media and read much speculation from the armchair admirals, this was a once in a hundred years event (literally). There is as usual, knee jerk reactions and premature assumptions that we in the industry will have to deal with in the future.
Pielsticks by the way, are the Germans revenge on the French for coming 2nd in '45.
Rgds
Bob
Having listened to a lot of the hype from the media and read much speculation from the armchair admirals, this was a once in a hundred years event (literally). There is as usual, knee jerk reactions and premature assumptions that we in the industry will have to deal with in the future.
Pielsticks by the way, are the Germans revenge on the French for coming 2nd in '45.
Rgds
Bob
Duffer
New member
To answer the question about how long it took for helicopters to find the ship, that is what the programme said.
I would be interested to know how efficiently or otherwise the passengers were disembarked FROM the lifeboats and whether any nav equipment such as a chartplotter on the lifeboats would help in this regard?
mcframe
New member
I'd guess that the dancers are classed as entertainment staff rather than crew.
On a (smallish) ferry, I once had a close look at the safety plan and noticed that in the event of an emergency, it was the chief barman that had the job of driving the ship's rescue boat. I guess that on /most/ passenger boats there is a fair chance that *he'll* be on station, sober and in control of the situation...
Kukri
Well-known member
To clarify, as one who used to have responsibility for a much smaller (520 passenger) cruise ship - only those who have received the specfied training and who hold "lifeboat certificates" may operate the lifeboats. These may, and usually do, include members of the hotel staff but they are trained, they have been examinedm they have practiced, they are just as competent to lower and take command of a lifeboat as, say, a greaser.
The reason is that the marine crew is relatively small in number - there are not enough career "seamen" to go round.
Now, what to do with the rest of the hotel staff and the dancers, photographers, puppeteers, shop assistants and so on? Best make then useful so we give them jobs like tallying passenger numbers, pointing the way to muster stations, knocking on cabin doors to make sure nobody has missed the announcement and so on.
It's just common sense.
The reason is that the marine crew is relatively small in number - there are not enough career "seamen" to go round.
Now, what to do with the rest of the hotel staff and the dancers, photographers, puppeteers, shop assistants and so on? Best make then useful so we give them jobs like tallying passenger numbers, pointing the way to muster stations, knocking on cabin doors to make sure nobody has missed the announcement and so on.
It's just common sense.
trapezeartist
New member
So, time for a summary maybe.
Ship hit rocks. Insanely incompetent bit of navigation on the part of the skipper.
The bridge was telling everyone from the coastguard to the passengers that there was just a technical problem when in reality the boat was on the verge of sinking. Ludicrous! Though possibly can be partly explained by the peculiarities of Italian law which (allegedly) discourage the use of Mayday.
Following the impact the ship was beached. To what degree this was luck or skill is difficult to determine, but it saved a lot of lives.
The telephone ranting of the coastguard commander was a ridiculous and totally unhelpful piece of posturing.
Despite the preceding posting explaining the use of hotel staff for lifeboat duties, I continue to find that alarming. With the best will in the world, they are there to dance, or serve drinks, or make beds or whatever and I would doubt that they would take emergency training all that seriously.
Nevertheless nearly everyone got off the ship safely.
I'm sure lessons can be learned, but in the end this is a big hotel that happens to float and move around. Inevitably, when Poseidon decides to flex his muscles, the floating hotel will be found to be neither shipshape nor Bristol fashion.
The behaviour of the owners is as bad as the afore-mentioned coastguard. I don't expect them to defend the indefensible but they seem to be defending themselves by hanging the captain out to dry.
Many people have sought to bring a little voice of reason to the vilification of the captain by suggesting that we'll learn the real story after the investigation. Knowing the result of legal investigation into the deaths of Wolfgang von Trips, Jochen Rindt, Ronnie Peterson and Ayrton Senna, I have no faith in the Italian legal processes whatsoever.
Ship hit rocks. Insanely incompetent bit of navigation on the part of the skipper.
The bridge was telling everyone from the coastguard to the passengers that there was just a technical problem when in reality the boat was on the verge of sinking. Ludicrous! Though possibly can be partly explained by the peculiarities of Italian law which (allegedly) discourage the use of Mayday.
Following the impact the ship was beached. To what degree this was luck or skill is difficult to determine, but it saved a lot of lives.
The telephone ranting of the coastguard commander was a ridiculous and totally unhelpful piece of posturing.
Despite the preceding posting explaining the use of hotel staff for lifeboat duties, I continue to find that alarming. With the best will in the world, they are there to dance, or serve drinks, or make beds or whatever and I would doubt that they would take emergency training all that seriously.
Nevertheless nearly everyone got off the ship safely.
I'm sure lessons can be learned, but in the end this is a big hotel that happens to float and move around. Inevitably, when Poseidon decides to flex his muscles, the floating hotel will be found to be neither shipshape nor Bristol fashion.
The behaviour of the owners is as bad as the afore-mentioned coastguard. I don't expect them to defend the indefensible but they seem to be defending themselves by hanging the captain out to dry.
Many people have sought to bring a little voice of reason to the vilification of the captain by suggesting that we'll learn the real story after the investigation. Knowing the result of legal investigation into the deaths of Wolfgang von Trips, Jochen Rindt, Ronnie Peterson and Ayrton Senna, I have no faith in the Italian legal processes whatsoever.
rib
Well-known member
i might be having a senior moment but im sure that i read many years ago after an ferry sinking in the english channel that one of the recommendations for safty was a rope like fixture was placed along the floor so that if a ship was on her side and the passage ways had become shafts people had a chance to climb up to safty.thought it was a good idea at the time,prehaps elf and safty thought it was a trip hazzard !
Kukri
Well-known member
I don't think the ship was beached; I think she drifted ashore. With the engine rooms flooded she had no power beyond the emergency generators, which woould give steering but no power for propellers or thrusters. She could have anchored, cf the old advice "Never go ashore with an anchor in the pipe!"
It may have been the second grounding that cost the lives. This sort of ship is designed to remain upright, even if sinking, and to sink slowly, so that the boats can be launched. The technical standard is defined in SOLAS 90. A class one passenger ship is required to remain stable and upright within defined stability criteria with two compartments flooded and to remain upright (just!) with three compartments flooded.
Assuming that no lives were lost in the initial contact with the rock or the flooding of the engine rooms, the loss of life was consequent upon the capsize and the capsize only occurred because the ship grounded.
It may have been the second grounding that cost the lives. This sort of ship is designed to remain upright, even if sinking, and to sink slowly, so that the boats can be launched. The technical standard is defined in SOLAS 90. A class one passenger ship is required to remain stable and upright within defined stability criteria with two compartments flooded and to remain upright (just!) with three compartments flooded.
Assuming that no lives were lost in the initial contact with the rock or the flooding of the engine rooms, the loss of life was consequent upon the capsize and the capsize only occurred because the ship grounded.
Kukri
Well-known member
my summary:
Before sailing:
The ship embarks passengers at more than one port so some passengers had not had a boat drill. That is allowed for in SOLAS. The voyage date recorder ("VDR" - the "black box") was reportedly, according to Captain Schettino in need of attention and had been reported as such - that does happen- but we now know that the problem was an error reading concerning the casing. The VDR data is being analysed and will be released in early March.
The AIS data:
It is well to be cautious in interpolating between the recorded positions. However it does tell us something.
As the ship approached the point where she routinely altered course to close Giglio, there was another vessel overtaking her on her port side, so she allowed that vessel to draw ahead before altering course. This meant that the COSTA CONCORDIA approached the island on a broader bearing than she had usually done. The effect was that the alter course position, and perhaps also the amount of helm applied, should have been changed. This may not have been, or been made, sufficiently apparent to Captain Schettino by the two officers already on the bridge as he entered the wheelhouse and took the con.
After impact, which lasted just over 4 seconds at 15 knots, the ship's engine room (or engine rooms - there may be two engine rooms, as on a near sister vessel) -, containing her six Wartsila prime movers and their alternators, must have started to flood, so that she lost all power. We know from the Channel four film that the ship blacked out temorarily ten minutes after impact and that would have been the moment when the emergency generators started. They are located high up above the bulkhead deck. Fortunately, although, as a Class 1 passenger ship, the engine room would have been manned, the engine room staff on watch were probably all in the control room, and seem to have escaped.
Between the initial grounding and the capsize:
As a Class 1 passenger ship, her emergency generator(s) must give power to the steering engines as well as providing lighting, etc., but the emergency power circuit would not include the thrusters. Slowing down, and flooding aft, the ship seems to have turned, or been turned, to starboard, and she seems to have lost way and stopped in the eye of the North-Easterly F3 wind, described by Captain Schettino as a "gregale", which blew the bows off to starboard, with the ship pivoting on the stopped fixed pitch props and the increasing draft aft. She then drifted, lying across the wind, until she reached pretty much the position where she is now. Both anchors were dropped, obviously when the foredeck was still tenable, roughly in the ship's present position.
Embarcation of the passengers into the boats began. This was sucessful; if 99% of the passengers and crew of an aircraft walk away from a crash landing, we call that a sucess.The officers and crew deserve great credit for this.
Suggestions by passengers that they did not see the officers are not surprising, there are a lot of passengers and not many officers, some of whom have other things to do, such as keeping the lights on and summoning help, and those members of the hotel staff who have been trained and who have lifeboat certificates (a specified number) supervise and carry out the embarcation into the boats. In a plane which crash lands, would you wait for the Captain and co-pilot to show you to the emergency exits or would you do what the cabin staff tell you to do?
(Power is not required either to drop an anchor or to lower a lifeboat.)
It should be noted that all but three of the boats got away.
The flooding:
As the ship continued to take water, she developed an angle of loll, reported as initially a heel to port.
According to the evidence of the witnesses in the Channel Four documentary, the ship rolled to starboard as she grounded for the second and last time.
Given her very high sides and relatively shoal (8.3m) draft, the cause of the heel may have been the wind, coupled with loss of stability due to free surface in the flooding spaces. She continued to flood, espescially, aft - the photos of the starboard side boats going away show her drawing roughly six metres more aft than forward. By the time the last of the starboard boats were leaving the ship, the edge of the boat deck was almost immersed aft, but the mooring deck aft was one deck below the boat deck.
An engineer officer has commented that he expected the ship to remain afloat with three compartments flooded, but that five spaces (not clear if he means watertight compartments) appeared to be flooded or flooding.
The capsize and second grounding:
Soon after the boats got away, the ship capsized to starboard. It may be that, due to the increase in draft aft, which is evident in the pictures, she had grounded on her afterbody and this may have created an additional capsizing lever due to continuing flooding. The emergency generator(s) would cut out as the heel exceeded 20 degrees. She would roll quickly until she assumed a new stable position, flat on her side, as shown in the helicopter infra-red videos of the crew disembarking. She would float in that position, downflooding rapidly through the passageways, stairwells and windows until she settled in the position that she is in now.
The aftermath:
Costa found themselves with ten 747 loads of people shivering on a little island in the middle of the night . They handled the care and repatriation of all these people very well.
The insurance implications:
The ship's insurers will pay. The ship is probably a constructive total loss and will probably be removed under a wreck removal contract.
Summary: it is very rare that a passenger ship gets can openered along one side under water. Indeed, it is a once every hundred years incident. Very similar to the loss of the TITANIC but this time 99% of those on board survived. So, some progress...
Re: post 32 - entertainers are not hotel staff. Those hotel staff who have lifeboat certificates take their training as seriously as anyone else. Their professional pride is involved - they are seamen, not just bartenders waiters stewards and stewardesses.
Before sailing:
The ship embarks passengers at more than one port so some passengers had not had a boat drill. That is allowed for in SOLAS. The voyage date recorder ("VDR" - the "black box") was reportedly, according to Captain Schettino in need of attention and had been reported as such - that does happen- but we now know that the problem was an error reading concerning the casing. The VDR data is being analysed and will be released in early March.
The AIS data:
It is well to be cautious in interpolating between the recorded positions. However it does tell us something.
As the ship approached the point where she routinely altered course to close Giglio, there was another vessel overtaking her on her port side, so she allowed that vessel to draw ahead before altering course. This meant that the COSTA CONCORDIA approached the island on a broader bearing than she had usually done. The effect was that the alter course position, and perhaps also the amount of helm applied, should have been changed. This may not have been, or been made, sufficiently apparent to Captain Schettino by the two officers already on the bridge as he entered the wheelhouse and took the con.
After impact, which lasted just over 4 seconds at 15 knots, the ship's engine room (or engine rooms - there may be two engine rooms, as on a near sister vessel) -, containing her six Wartsila prime movers and their alternators, must have started to flood, so that she lost all power. We know from the Channel four film that the ship blacked out temorarily ten minutes after impact and that would have been the moment when the emergency generators started. They are located high up above the bulkhead deck. Fortunately, although, as a Class 1 passenger ship, the engine room would have been manned, the engine room staff on watch were probably all in the control room, and seem to have escaped.
Between the initial grounding and the capsize:
As a Class 1 passenger ship, her emergency generator(s) must give power to the steering engines as well as providing lighting, etc., but the emergency power circuit would not include the thrusters. Slowing down, and flooding aft, the ship seems to have turned, or been turned, to starboard, and she seems to have lost way and stopped in the eye of the North-Easterly F3 wind, described by Captain Schettino as a "gregale", which blew the bows off to starboard, with the ship pivoting on the stopped fixed pitch props and the increasing draft aft. She then drifted, lying across the wind, until she reached pretty much the position where she is now. Both anchors were dropped, obviously when the foredeck was still tenable, roughly in the ship's present position.
Embarcation of the passengers into the boats began. This was sucessful; if 99% of the passengers and crew of an aircraft walk away from a crash landing, we call that a sucess.The officers and crew deserve great credit for this.
Suggestions by passengers that they did not see the officers are not surprising, there are a lot of passengers and not many officers, some of whom have other things to do, such as keeping the lights on and summoning help, and those members of the hotel staff who have been trained and who have lifeboat certificates (a specified number) supervise and carry out the embarcation into the boats. In a plane which crash lands, would you wait for the Captain and co-pilot to show you to the emergency exits or would you do what the cabin staff tell you to do?
(Power is not required either to drop an anchor or to lower a lifeboat.)
It should be noted that all but three of the boats got away.
The flooding:
As the ship continued to take water, she developed an angle of loll, reported as initially a heel to port.
According to the evidence of the witnesses in the Channel Four documentary, the ship rolled to starboard as she grounded for the second and last time.
Given her very high sides and relatively shoal (8.3m) draft, the cause of the heel may have been the wind, coupled with loss of stability due to free surface in the flooding spaces. She continued to flood, espescially, aft - the photos of the starboard side boats going away show her drawing roughly six metres more aft than forward. By the time the last of the starboard boats were leaving the ship, the edge of the boat deck was almost immersed aft, but the mooring deck aft was one deck below the boat deck.
An engineer officer has commented that he expected the ship to remain afloat with three compartments flooded, but that five spaces (not clear if he means watertight compartments) appeared to be flooded or flooding.
The capsize and second grounding:
Soon after the boats got away, the ship capsized to starboard. It may be that, due to the increase in draft aft, which is evident in the pictures, she had grounded on her afterbody and this may have created an additional capsizing lever due to continuing flooding. The emergency generator(s) would cut out as the heel exceeded 20 degrees. She would roll quickly until she assumed a new stable position, flat on her side, as shown in the helicopter infra-red videos of the crew disembarking. She would float in that position, downflooding rapidly through the passageways, stairwells and windows until she settled in the position that she is in now.
The aftermath:
Costa found themselves with ten 747 loads of people shivering on a little island in the middle of the night . They handled the care and repatriation of all these people very well.
The insurance implications:
The ship's insurers will pay. The ship is probably a constructive total loss and will probably be removed under a wreck removal contract.
Summary: it is very rare that a passenger ship gets can openered along one side under water. Indeed, it is a once every hundred years incident. Very similar to the loss of the TITANIC but this time 99% of those on board survived. So, some progress...
Re: post 32 - entertainers are not hotel staff. Those hotel staff who have lifeboat certificates take their training as seriously as anyone else. Their professional pride is involved - they are seamen, not just bartenders waiters stewards and stewardesses.
Last edited:
haydude
New member
Thanks God because he invented the English with their perfect legal system and fine language.
chiefeng
Member
Minn
I concur!
I concur!
Hoolie
Well-known member
Minn - excellent summary!
One point still puzzling me is that if all but three lifeboats were deployed why did so many have to be evacuated via the rope ladder over the port bow?
Perhaps it's just statistics - 95% escaped on liferafts, 95% of those left escaped by other means and the rest perished
One point still puzzling me is that if all but three lifeboats were deployed why did so many have to be evacuated via the rope ladder over the port bow?
Perhaps it's just statistics - 95% escaped on liferafts, 95% of those left escaped by other means and the rest perished
Sailfree
Well-known member
Minn - excellent summary!
One point still puzzling me is that if all but three lifeboats were deployed why did so many have to be evacuated via the rope ladder over the port bow?
Perhaps it's just statistics - 95% escaped on liferafts, 95% of those left escaped by other means and the rest perished
+1
and I wondered whether the number left on board indicated that the lifeboats were launched before being fully loaded when it became apparent that the angle of heel was causing difficulties and required the fending off of the lifeboat from the ships side. Fending off may have been impossible with a fully laden lifeboat.
I do speculate that the captain did make a judgement error in going as close as he probably had on previous "fly bys" and not appreciating the necessary turn and consequental stern swing needed due to the broader angle of approach. I also wonder how approachable the captain was by junior officers and whether under his "management" he encouraged juniors to voice dessenting opinions.
Last edited:
dancrane
Well-known member
Has any conclusion been reached, regarding the claim made about the rocks not being on the chart? I may have missed it.