Adm Nimitz letter on seamanship/bad weather

[Roberto]

Some time ago I came across this letter, written in 1945 by Admiral Nimitz to the USN Pacific Fleet, a few months after a typhoon sank and/or damaged a number of USN ships.


(I don't know if it has been posted already, I searched the forum with "Nimitz" but there are only posts in the Lounge with people threatening to send Nimitzes to shell bomb each other, or some foreign nation.)

A few excerpts

Three destroyers, the HULL, MONAGHAN, and SPENCE, capsized and went down with practically all hands; serious damage was sustained by the CL MIAMI, the CVLs MONTEREY, COWPENS, and SAN JACINTO, the CVEs CAPE ESPERANCE and ALTAMAHA, and the DDs AYLWIN, DEWEY, and HICKOX. Lesser damage was sustained by at least 19 other vessels, from CAs down to DEs. Fires occurred on three carriers when planes were smashed in their hangars; and some 146 planes on various ships were lost or damaged beyond economical repair by the fires, by being smashed up, or by being swept overboard. About 790 officers and men were lost or killed, and 80 were injured

...

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet wishes to emphasize that to insure safety at sea, the best that science can devise and that naval organization can provide must be regarded only as an aid, and never as a substitute for the good seamanship, self- reliance, and sense of ultimate responsibility which are the first requisites in a seaman and naval officer

...

It is possible that too much reliance is being placed on outside sources for warnings of dangerous weather, and on the ability of our splendid ships to come through anything that wind and wave can do. If this be so, there is need for a revival of the age-old habits of self-reliance and caution in regard to the hazard from storms

...

In conclusion, both seniors and juniors alike must realize that in bad weather, as in most other situations, safety and fatal hazard are not separated by any sharp boundary line, but shade gradually from one into the other. There is no little red light which is going to flash on and inform commanding officers or higher commanders that from then on there is extreme danger from the weather, and that measures for ships' safety must now take precedence over further efforts to keep up with the formation or to execute the assigned task. This time will always be a matter of personal judgment. Naturally no commander is going to cut thin the margin between staying afloat and foundering, but he may nevertheless unwittingly pass the danger point even though no ship is yet in extremis.

...

The time for taking all measures for a ship's safety is while still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.



full text here:
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq102-4b.htm

 

[Grumpybear]

Some time ago I came across this letter, written in 1945 by Admiral Nimitz to the USN Pacific Fleet, a few months after a typhoon sank and/or damaged a number of USN ships.


(I don't know if it has been posted already, I searched the forum with "Nimitz" but there are only posts in the Lounge with people threatening to send Nimitzes to shell bomb each other, or some foreign nation.)

A few excerpts

Three destroyers, the HULL, MONAGHAN, and SPENCE, capsized and went down with practically all hands; serious damage was sustained by the CL MIAMI, the CVLs MONTEREY, COWPENS, and SAN JACINTO, the CVEs CAPE ESPERANCE and ALTAMAHA, and the DDs AYLWIN, DEWEY, and HICKOX. Lesser damage was sustained by at least 19 other vessels, from CAs down to DEs. Fires occurred on three carriers when planes were smashed in their hangars; and some 146 planes on various ships were lost or damaged beyond economical repair by the fires, by being smashed up, or by being swept overboard. About 790 officers and men were lost or killed, and 80 were injured

...

Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet wishes to emphasize that to insure safety at sea, the best that science can devise and that naval organization can provide must be regarded only as an aid, and never as a substitute for the good seamanship, self- reliance, and sense of ultimate responsibility which are the first requisites in a seaman and naval officer

...

It is possible that too much reliance is being placed on outside sources for warnings of dangerous weather, and on the ability of our splendid ships to come through anything that wind and wave can do. If this be so, there is need for a revival of the age-old habits of self-reliance and caution in regard to the hazard from storms

...

In conclusion, both seniors and juniors alike must realize that in bad weather, as in most other situations, safety and fatal hazard are not separated by any sharp boundary line, but shade gradually from one into the other. There is no little red light which is going to flash on and inform commanding officers or higher commanders that from then on there is extreme danger from the weather, and that measures for ships' safety must now take precedence over further efforts to keep up with the formation or to execute the assigned task. This time will always be a matter of personal judgment. Naturally no commander is going to cut thin the margin between staying afloat and foundering, but he may nevertheless unwittingly pass the danger point even though no ship is yet in extremis.

...

The time for taking all measures for a ship's safety is while still able to do so. Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.



full text here:
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq102-4b.htm

A very sobering message to all us modern sailors.

One reason for the losses of destroyers is that US ships carried heavier armaments, at a cost of stability. Unlike RN ships they routinely ballasted empty fuel tanks with seawater, which took a long time to remove from heavy fuel oil after refuelling. It is thought that the three lost ships, trying to save themselves hassle when refuelling when the weather abated, delayed too long before ballasting and capsized.

On a flippant note, there is a persistent myth that when the weather abated, one of the US carriers signalled to a nearby British Pacific Fleet carrier, asking how she had fared in the typhoon. the reply? "What typhoon?"

 

[prv]

Nothing is more dangerous than for a seaman to be grudging in taking precautions lest they turn out to have been unnecessary. Safety at sea for a thousand years has depended on exactly the opposite philosophy.

This is a quote worth nailing to a bulkhead somewhere, I think.

Pete

 

[Roberto]

I just copied a few passages, but the whole letter is worth reading.

This is a comparison he makes between sailing of "a hundred years ago" and his times'.


8. A hundred years ago, a ship's survival depended almost solely on the competence of her master and on his constant alertness to every hint of change in the weather. To be taken aback or caught in full sail on by even a passing squall might mean the loss of spars or canvas; and to come close to the center of a genuine hurricane or typhoon was synonymous with disaster. While to be taken by surprise was thus serious, the facilities for avoiding it were meager. Each master was dependent wholly on himself for detecting the first symptoms of bad weather, for predicting its seriousness and movement, and for taking the appropriate measures to, to evade it if possible and to battle through it if it passed near to him. There was no radio by which weather data could be collected from all over the oceans and the resulting forecasts by expert aerologists broadcasted to him and to all afloat. There was no one to tell him that the time had now come to strike his light sails and spars, and snug her down under close reefs and storm trysails. His own barometer, the force and direction of the wind, and the appearance of sea and sky were all that he had for information. Ceaseless vigilance in watching and interpreting signs, plus a philosophy of taking no risk in which there was little to gain and much to be lost, was what enabled him to survive.

9. Seamen of the present day should be better at forecasting weather at sea, independently of the radio, than were their predecessors. The general laws of storms and the weather expectancy for all months of the year in all parts of the world are now more thoroughly understood, more completely catalogued, and more readily available in various publications. An intensive study of typhoons and Western Pacific weather was made over a period of many years by Father Depperman at the Manila observatory, and his conclusions have been embodied in the material available to all aerologists. What Knight and Bowditch have to say on the subject is exactly as true during this war as it was in time of peace or before the days of the radio. Familiarity with these authorities is something that no captain or navigator can do without. The monthly pilot charts, issued to all ships, give excellent information as to the probable incidence and movements of typhoons. Stress on the foregoing is no belittlement of our aerological centers and weather broadcasts. But just as a navigator is held culpable if he neglects "Log, Lead, and Lookout" through blind faith in his radio fixes, so is the seaman culpable who regards personal weather estimates as obsolete and assumes that if no radio storm warning has been received, then all is well, and no local weather signs need cause him concern.

 

[Grumpybear]

In fairness, Nimitz's problem was the staggering expansion of the USN triggered by Pearl Harbor. That typhoon happened only three years later. The enormous shipbuilding programme went far beyond the impressive capacity of the training machine, and many ships never went into service, nor would have done so had the war lasted another one or two years (assuming ship losses did not increase dramatically). The USN's expanded officer corps had to imbibe a lifetime of seagoing experience in a few short months or years, and it is neither surprising nor in any way a criticism that some of them (often the best fighting leaders) reached positions of command too early from a pure seamanship point of view. The senior ratings who are the backbone of any fighting service were also often inexperienced and the others spread far too thinly, for the same reason.

By 1944 the RN was also suffering from over stretch, for similar reasons, and damaged ships were sometimes simply left in dockyard hands after their repairs were completed. The political imperative to demobilise servicemen after the defeat of Germany also impacted on the war in the Far East and Pacific.

 

[Deleted member 36384]

This is a quote worth nailing to a bulkhead somewhere, I think.

Pete

+1 very worthy to note.

 

[Talbot]

.........One reason for the losses of destroyers is that US ships carried heavier armaments, at a cost of stability. Unlike RN ships they routinely ballasted empty fuel tanks with seawater, which took a long time to remove from heavy fuel oil after refuelling. It is thought that the three lost ships, trying to save themselves hassle when refuelling when the weather abated, delayed too long before ballasting and capsized........

Can't talk about all ships of that age, but Older UK ships definitely did not ballast with sea water. Thus I was in one ship that ran flat out for over 3 days and was definitely getting a bit wobbly before the tanker arrived.

More modern ships are actually heavier when low on fuel as their tanks are water compensated - i.e. the fuel oil floats on the sea water in the tanks. the oil is lighter than water which is why they are heavier when low on fuel!
But these ships all have water seperators to ensure that they can skim off the oil only.

 

[Grumpybear]

Can't talk about all ships of that age, but Older UK ships definitely did not ballast with sea water. Thus I was in one ship that ran flat out for over 3 days and was definitely getting a bit wobbly before the tanker arrived.

More modern ships are actually heavier when low on fuel as their tanks are water compensated - i.e. the fuel oil floats on the sea water in the tanks. the oil is lighter than water which is why they are heavier when low on fuel!
But these ships all have water seperators to ensure that they can skim off the oil only.

Ballasting and deballasting is much easier when the fuel is gasoil, which is why the RN eventually adopted gasoil in about 1970, despite the much higher cost. With the advent of the marinised aero gas turbine, stability when low on fuel became a real issue.

 

[penfold]

I thought the RN had abandoned routine use of water ballasting in fuel tanks years ago, on account of the damage it could(and sometimes did) to gas turbines and diesels. It's not much of a problem with steam propulsion, but injectors and injector pumps are easily destroyed by contaminated fuel.

 

[Grumpybear]

I thought the RN had abandoned routine use of water ballasting in fuel tanks years ago, on account of the damage it could(and sometimes did) to gas turbines and diesels. It's not much of a problem with steam propulsion, but injectors and injector pumps are easily destroyed by contaminated fuel.

I stand corrected, having been a submariner rather than a targeteer. Mark you, submarines have always had water displaced diesel tanks and survived....

 

[nimbusgb]

This is a quote worth nailing to a bulkhead somewhere, I think.

Pete

Goggles, gloves, steel capped boots and risk assessment for that job please