Yacht wrecked - is it just me?

Otter

Otter

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I have just read Yachting Monthly's account of the J133 that was wrecked on the Overland passage a couple of months ago. I couldn't help feeling that the tone was rather off. Sounded like it wasn't his fault, it was the fault of the CG for taking a long time to answer his mayday or the lifeboat for taking much longer than they do in the Solent (90 minutes versus 10 minutes in the Solent he said) or not being asked the right questions on his Yachtmaster exam which would have prepared him!

I'd say it was poor passage planning - a night passage with unlit buoys at dead low water with not enough under his keel, big waves and a known area for shifting sandbanks. Added to that was an obsession with saving his boat, he repeatedly refused to be rescued and instead wanted to be towed off - which damn near cost the life of his crew and of himself.
It irked me as well that his points at the end were all, "you" should do this and make sure "you" do this; rather than "I should have".
I have made some really stupid mistakes in my time; but the consequences were 100% my fault and as far as I'm concerned if there's the slightest chance of serious injury to my crew, then the sea can have my yacht anytime it likes!
 
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Fair comment, I think. I said to my missus after reading it, that he seemed to have omitted one particular 'lesson learnt'.
Also I was puzzled at the references to 'unlit buoys' - I know this passage very well (I would, wouldn't I?) and the buoys in question are lit.
 
Well, put it this way.
He lives on the Isle of Wight. He started sailing four years ago.
I am a local. I started sailing 50 years ago (although I admit sailing cruisers for only the last 20 years).
I would not have dreamt of taking that route on the night in question.
 
Sorry for popping in from the Solent, but having read the article I notice that the bio stated his training was to Coastal Skipper Theory.

Perhaps the posters who ask about theory v practical training should be refered to the article to stress that whilst theoretical knowledge is good,. there is no substitute for practice.
 
I agree (and by the way you are welcome from the Solent) but I reckon the theory would have prevented most people making the choice that the guy made. But then I guess he may have been reckoning on some shelter from the Margate Sands (they were to windward weren't they that night). He was, of course, unaware I guess of the concerns expressed on this forum of the shallowing of the East Last (it was never deep by Solent standards anyway) during last year. It is a good reminder of the dangers of the Thames Estuary which it is easy to forget when your last few passages across it have be smooth and uneventful.
 
There are times when I read the lessons learnt stories and think that it could have happened to me - not in this case, there were several occasions when I had to re-read the text in some considerable disbelief. To be kind to the owner, we should probably recognise that in writing the article the owner has been very honest and open about his mistakes and it may make useful reading for others who are relatively new to yachting
 
Lessons learnt

For me there is a very clear lesson in this story. That is that it is unwise to be reliant on systems working 100%. I frightened myself, well only a little bit, last season when I ventured out of the Crouch beyond the Swallowtail buoy, and looked back towards the Crouch and realised that I couldn't see where I had come from. My Garmin chartplotter was working perfectly but I had no working depth sounder, no working log, was singlehanded and had not, therefore, been keeping a record of my position because I couldn't leave the helm for long enough. If the chartplotter had failed I would have been in serious difficulties if visibility had reduced to the point where I couldn't see the next and the previous buoy.

Applying that to the idea of sailing up the Thames estuary in the pitch dark in winter storms and I have a very strong sense of my own mortality. The unfortunate owner of the brand new yacht Justice seems to have had a lot of confidence in his boat and in his previous experience of the Thames Estuary. Neither proved up to the task.

I agree that it is brave of him to be so open about his experience. His loss will be my gain, and I am grateful. Main lesson learned: never take the sea, or one's vessel, for granted. (The depth sounder is fixed and I have a standby GPS.)

Michael
 
Master under dog;

Please don't think I'm trying to teach you to suck eggs, but I grew up in Lake Solent and now sail out of the Crouch, single handed most of the time. It is a far more challenging area. Having run aground on the Swallow tail a couple of years ago, which was eerie, being aground out of sight of land, I now have the true course from bouy to bouy for both the north and south passage in and out of the Crouch marked on the chart with bearings written on the chart and a list of bearings on cardboard that I use in bad weather. It works a treat for bouy hopping, even in poor visibility.

Just a thought.

BTW, I my chart plotter doesn't work. Probably because my soldering isn't up to connecting the aerial plugs!
 
I did feel sorry for the guy when i read the article, didnt get the feeling he was trying to blame anyone or indeed anything else for what happened, however did think it was strange that he wasnt aware of factoring wave height into actual depth of water, this is obviously what caused the incident to happen to begin with.
Very sad turn of events though.
 
Managed to read a copy of this today.

Apart from the inconsistency with the 'unlit buoys' there was also the question of the tidal height.

Initially he said that he wanted to be round the Long Nose just before low water. He then went on to say that the tide was on the make and that he had 2m to 3m on chart datum - ie 2/3 up. Lastly, when aground he was talking about the tide changing soon after, and then taking him off. These are completely inconsistent, and make the comments that he was happy with his level of knowledge and experience rather strange. He also says that a knowledgeable crew would have double checked his decision making, even though he was comfortable with his own knowledge.

With decent electronics that he undoubtedly had he would have been able to see the tidal heights at the touch of a button.

Seeing the schedule he kept for this passage, and the level of manning for the passage on a new boat it appears to me that he had pushed himself further than was sensible, and he was probably too tired/inexperienced to keep on top of the detail.

It is interesting to read that he went aground after he had gone through the buoys (unless he thought they were unlit because he was actually somewhere else?). Whilst it is shallow once through I not recall that it is significantly shallower there than between the marks. Can’t remember, and will take more notice next time.

So whilst I look back at my own experiences and see several ‘near misses’ due to tiredness and inexperience, and therefore am not critical of what he did, but I agree with the analysis in the original post that he was trying to explain the accident on buoys/tidal oddities/crew inexperience/weather (at least in part) when it was purely his own decision making that was found wanting.

Lessons, I feel, have not been learned.
 
I have read all the speculation about this incident.

Is it not more a case of time/crew restraints taking preference over the weather?
Local knowledge aside about depths at Hook Spit, wanting to get the new boat home for New Year's Eve and a jolly at St Kats, a novice crew member and NE 6 plus off the foreland in the dark, was not the day for it.

I cancelled trip to Ramsgate for fireworks etc New Years Eve because the weather looked a bit sad, a hard call to make when people have built their expectations up, but a decision responsible skippers make and more importantly should not feel bad about.

I'm not suggesting I'm the man and know best, but knowing when to say we are not going/turning back is the hard bit.
 
Pye_End said:
......It is interesting to read that he went aground after he had gone through the buoys (unless he thought they were unlit because he was actually somewhere else?). Whilst it is shallow once through I not recall that it is significantly shallower there than between the marks. Can’t remember, and will take more notice next time.......
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All that I've read and heard suggests the yacht went on the Last Sand, which for the last few years has been spreading N from the East Last buoy. So if, bound westwards, you resume a westerly heading immediately after passing between the buoys, you will trip over a very shallow patch.
Many inconsistencies indeed. A thoughtful analysis, Pye_End.
 
xyachtdave said:
I have read all the speculation about this incident.

Is it not more a case of time/crew restraints taking preference over the weather?
Local knowledge aside about depths at Hook Spit, wanting to get the new boat home for New Year's Eve and a jolly at St Kats, a novice crew member and NE 6 plus off the foreland in the dark, was not the day for it.

I cancelled trip to Ramsgate for fireworks etc New Years Eve because the weather looked a bit sad, a hard call to make when people have built their expectations up, but a decision responsible skippers make and more importantly should not feel bad about.

I'm not suggesting I'm the man and know best, but knowing when to say we are not going/turning back is the hard bit.
Click to expand...

And this coming from a man who doesnt know what 'putting in a reef' is all about...........some say his armchair is set at a permanent 40 degree heel just so he doesnt loose the feeling.........Oh yes Dave I see your racing exploits on the Medway :)



Good to see you on here, enjoy :) :) :) :) :) :)
 
Just read it properly, and was horrified.

He was brave to write it up for everyone to criticise!

However, it worried me that among the lessons learned, he missed out the most important one : Don't play chicken with East Coast sandbanks!

Most of us would not dream of using that route (or any other of the sandbanks we cross every week -eg Deben bar, Ray Sand, Pye End, Spitway, etc etc) in any one or two of the following conditions:
in the middle of the night,
in the middle of winter (when the sand is quite likely to have shifted since the last survey),
on a falling tide (or at least very close to low water),
when there are waves of 1 m or more,
when your tidal calculations show only 1 m below a fin keel (a swing or bilge keel is another matter - you may risk grounding in that, but only in benign conditions).

He chose that route (despite there being a safer alternative one) in all those conditions.

I hope that he has learned that lesson, or has decided to stick to the Solent, where helicopters come quickly and the rocks stay where they were last surveyed.
 
AliM said:
Just read it properly, and was horrified.

He was brave to write it up for everyone to criticise!

However, it worried me that among the lessons learned, he missed out the most important one : Don't play chicken with East Coast sandbanks!

Most of us would not dream of using that route (or any other of the sandbanks we cross every week -eg Deben bar, Ray Sand, Pye End, Spitway, etc etc) in any one or two of the following conditions:
in the middle of the night,
in the middle of winter (when the sand is quite likely to have shifted since the last survey),
on a falling tide (or at least very close to low water),
when there are waves of 1 m or more,
when your tidal calculations show only 1 m below a fin keel (a swing or bilge keel is another matter - you may risk grounding in that, but only in benign conditions).

He chose that route (despite there being a safer alternative one) in all those conditions.

I hope that he has learned that lesson, or has decided to stick to the Solent, where helicopters come quickly and the rocks stay where they were last surveyed.
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Ali,
I cannot disagree with your synopsis, very text book. However, the chap doesn't have the 'hours' in on the East Coast, and hasn't developed the nose or the reading of wave patterns or the noise.
I would cross most of the East Coast nasties at night in winter and on a falling tide, but have learned to edge those areas. I cannot describe it, but you 'know' when it ain't right, and you go in at a slow speed with a prepared reversal plan, or, go the long way round.

I have been aground on just about every East Coast high spot, sometimes benignly, sometimes a bit bumpy, and sometimes quite deliberate. In a F6, I would have been going around the long way, for the simple reason that there is not enough sea room if things didn't quite go my way. I don't think a channel 100m wide is much use in that sort of weather.
 
Jim,

Agreed, it was the combination of risky situations which showed the lack of common sense, and the lack of a get-out plan.

At the first sign that things are not quite as anticipated (eg shallower than expected - before first grounding, a bit bumpier than expected, lit buoys not where they should be or not lit), we'd have turned tail and gone for the safe option. We've all got it wrong in the past, but few of us so disasterously.

I just hope he learns the lesson that he did not include in that list!
 
aquaholic said:
And this coming from a man who doesnt know what 'putting in a reef' is all about...........some say his armchair is set at a permanent 40 degree heel just so he doesnt loose the feeling.........Oh yes Dave I see your racing exploits on the Medway :)



Good to see you on here, enjoy :) :) :) :) :) :)
Click to expand...


When I took my new to sailing mate under my wing, we went for a blast up and down the Medway one Wednesday evening, with a steady 25 knots over the deck, bits of the floor falling out and most of the side deck under water he asked "Does it lean over anymore than this?" and seemed disappointed when I said "no,"
 
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