The NAvy WERE THERE at kidnap of Lynn Rival

[David_Jersey]

So you think he took a decision he knew to be wrong, to avoid being later criticised as "wrong"???

He ducked making any decision by referring upwards, safe in the knowledge that the outcome would no longer be his fault. Whether that be harm to the Chandlers during a rescue attempt or later in a mud hut in Somalia. It's a win win

BTW have you thought about applying for the "modern" Navy? IMO you would fit in well or are you one of the 476 Admirals?

 

[toad_oftoadhall]

He ducked making any decision by referring upwards, safe in the knowledge that the outcome would no longer be his fault.

Let's assume that's true. (I bet it isn't.) Why did the person he referred to decide not to take a course of action that would have brought him glory and saved an elderly couple a nightmare ordeal?

Or do you think it was because he felt there was a serious risk of wasting the Chandlers if he tried and he would be blamed for that? In which case he did the right thing.

Whether that be harm to the Chandlers during a rescue attempt or later in a mud hut in Somalia. It's a win win

Remind me how many hostages have been killed by pirates so far?

If the Chandlers die in a mud hut in Somalia then a ransom won't have been paid. So the Pirates will have had no reason to kidnap any further British yachtsmen.

It's hard to think of a single reason why this won't end as usual - after a few weeks the family will pay a small ransom and they will go home alive.

 

[Major Catastrophe]

Why did the person he referred to decide not to take a course of action that would have brought him glory and saved an elderly couple a nightmare ordeal?

I am kicking myself for getting back into this pointless round robin argument, but this deserves a comment.

From the newspaper reports so far, it appears the decision not to take action before the pirate ship got to the Lynn Rival was taken in London. I am sure that anyone polishing a nice seat at Northwood or at the MOD would not be the right person to take a decision on a tactical situation occurring thousands of miles away.

That decision should be taken by the senior person on the 'ground' taking advice from the commander of the troops (The trained Royal Marines we now know to have been ready and willing to take action) who will have an 'eyes on' appraisal of the situation.

Referring a 'simple' operational decision to a desk bound person in an operation room is not the way to succeed.

If I had referred something back to my CO he would more than likely have said that he would trust my judgement and let me get on with what I was paid and trained to do, which was to make a decision, execute the plan and adjust it as and when the situation changes, which will be the moment the first shot is fired...trust me.

There has been a lot of chat on here about the safety of everyone involved, troops, hostages, even the pirates, but once you bring weapons into the equation, people will and do get hurt.

As I said many posts ago, read the book Sink the Belgrano and you see that even back then the Royal Navy was dependent on referring just about everything back to Northwood and in the end, the submarine commanders and the force commander invented communication problems and ignored decisions made by the Northwood warriors.

Also, I urge you to read Doug Beattie's book, Task Force Helmand. I have just got to page 76 where he has reached the end of the limit of exploitation he was given in his orders from his company commander. But Beattie tells his OC that he believes he can advance a few more compounds and deny the Taliban the opportunity to use a heavily fortified compound as a fire base.

Beatties OC basically tells him to get on with it as he is the man on the ground.

All officers, through Sandhurst and Staff College, are made to read countless books, reports and despatches on past conflicts to learn from previous successes and mistakes (If Bush and Blair had read books on the old Afghan campaigns, or even the past Soviet invasion, they wouldn't have gone near the place.) and the present man at Northwood should really read how the Falklands war was nearly lost because of the inability of Naval command to devolve decision making to the man on the ground.

Wielding political control over a squad of ten marines is ridiculous.

I was wondering how long it will be before we adopt the old Soviet practice of having a political officer attached to every unit, or in our case, a public relations professional.

 

[alant]

I am kicking myself for getting back into this pointless round robin argument, but this deserves a comment.

From the newspaper reports so far, it appears the decision not to take action before the pirate ship got to the Lynn Rival was taken in London. I am sure that anyone polishing a nice seat at Northwood or at the MOD would not be the right person to take a decision on a tactical situation occurring thousands of miles away.

That decision should be taken by the senior person on the 'ground' taking advice from the commander of the troops (The trained Royal Marines we now know to have been ready and willing to take action) who will have an 'eyes on' appraisal of the situation.

Referring a 'simple' operational decision to a desk bound person in an operation room is not the way to succeed.

If I had referred something back to my CO he would more than likely have said that he would trust my judgement and let me get on with what I was paid and trained to do, which was to make a decision, execute the plan and adjust it as and when the situation changes, which will be the moment the first shot is fired...trust me.

There has been a lot of chat on here about the safety of everyone involved, troops, hostages, even the pirates, but once you bring weapons into the equation, people will and do get hurt.

As I said many posts ago, read the book Sink the Belgrano and you see that even back then the Royal Navy was dependent on referring just about everything back to Northwood and in the end, the submarine commanders and the force commander invented communication problems and ignored decisions made by the Northwood warriors.

Also, I urge you to read Doug Beattie's book, Task Force Helmand. I have just got to page 76 where he has reached the end of the limit of exploitation he was given in his orders from his company commander. But Beattie tells his OC that he believes he can advance a few more compounds and deny the Taliban the opportunity to use a heavily fortified compound as a fire base.

Beatties OC basically tells him to get on with it as he is the man on the ground.

All officers, through Sandhurst and Staff College, are made to read countless books, reports and despatches on past conflicts to learn from previous successes and mistakes (If Bush and Blair had read books on the old Afghan campaigns, or even the past Soviet invasion, they wouldn't have gone near the place.) and the present man at Northwood should really read how the Falklands war was nearly lost because of the inability of Naval command to devolve decision making to the man on the ground.

Wielding political control over a squad of ten marines is ridiculous.

I was wondering how long it will be before we adopt the old Soviet practice of having a political officer attached to every unit, or in our case, a public relations professional.

Says it all!

 

[toad_oftoadhall]

From the newspaper reports so far, it appears the decision not to take action before the pirate ship got to the Lynn Rival was taken in London.

Name one newspaper report from a source in a position to know that states who made the decision and when?

Let's assume the decision was made from a distance. You're condemning that decision from a similar distance based on almost no information whatsoever.

once you bring weapons into the equation, people will and do get hurt.

So perhaps a considered approach is more appropriate than a decision to "kick arse" regardless?

As I said many posts ago, read the book Sink the Belgrano and you see that even back then the Royal Navy was dependent on referring just about everything back to Northwood

And over simplistic view. Take the Belgrano. As a military decision it was plain and simple. The Belgrano had two escorts fitted with Exocet. These ships could have sunk a carrier, therefore in military terms it had to be sunk. But the decision couldn't be made based on military considerations alone because only the Foreign Office could understand the implications of that decision on the world wide stage. The captain of the Sub can hardly phone up the leaders of France (suppliers the Exocet) and America (suppliers of the 1000 pound bombs) plus all the other nations who gave us essential support to work out if sinking 'x' ship would damage the campaign more than it would assist it. Only the Foreign office could judge that. If it had put us offside with a handful of key nations we'd have lost the war just as surely as if the Belgrano's exocets had sunk a carrier.

See? It's not so simple is it?

(I will read StB - you should try Simon Jenkins and Max Hasting's book on the Falklands.)

All officers, through Sandhurst and Staff College, are made to read countless books, reports and despatches on past conflicts to learn from previous successes and mistakes

Currently "Operation Snakebite" is one such book - indeed the author gave a lecture at Shrivenham which went down very well. Very good, I recommend it. ...and I will read "Task Force Helmand". By the way it's spelt 'dispatches'. HTH



Is there really any point in carrying on this circular debate? You would have “kicked arse” I would have taken a considered approach and done the best thing possible for all concerned? Can’t we just agree to differ?

I wonder what the Chandlers will say when and if they get back?

 

[David_Jersey]

Says it all!

Yeah. good post

 

[Clarky]

Name one newspaper report from a source in a position to know that states who made the decision and when?

Let's assume the decision was made from a distance. You're condemning that decision from a similar distance based on almost no information whatsoever.



So perhaps a considered approach is more appropriate than a decision to "kick arse" regardless?



And over simplistic view. Take the Belgrano. As a military decision it was plain and simple. The Belgrano had two escorts fitted with Exocet. These ships could have sunk a carrier, therefore in military terms it had to be sunk. But the decision couldn't be made based on military considerations alone because only the Foreign Office could understand the implications of that decision on the world wide stage. The captain of the Sub can hardly phone up the leaders of France (suppliers the Exocet) and America (suppliers of the 1000 pound bombs) plus all the other nations who gave us essential support to work out if sinking 'x' ship would damage the campaign more than it would assist it. Only the Foreign office could judge that. If it had put us offside with a handful of key nations we'd have lost the war just as surely as if the Belgrano's exocets had sunk a carrier.

See? It's not so simple is it?

(I will read StB - you should try Simon Jenkins and Max Hasting's book on the Falklands.)




Currently "Operation Snakebite" is one such book - indeed the author gave a lecture at Shrivenham which went down very well. Very good, I recommend it. ...and I will read "Task Force Helmand". By the way it's spelt 'dispatches'. HTH



Is there really any point in carrying on this circular debate? You would have “kicked arse” I would have taken a considered approach and done the best thing possible for all concerned? Can’t we just agree to differ?

I wonder what the Chandlers will say when and if they get back?

Dear Toad,
A considered approach can include rescuing the hostages,you seem unable to take this point on board .Not making a decision such as Northwood have done in this case is called dithering,exhibiting poor leadership.
Making things up afterwards is called trying to deceive the public.
In my view Northwood clearly failed on both accounts ,making a good considered approach and deceiving the public ,because in the second instance they got found out.
Its obvious from your posts you have some connection ,so why dont you stop spouting **** because you are only succeeding in making Mr Stanhope et al look even sillier.

 

[toad_oftoadhall]

A considered approach can include rescuing the hostages

Of course, and often has - indeed Wave Knight has been involved in such operations. Which is even more reason to think that on this occasion Wave Knight made the right call for all concerned. Hard to see why they'd rescue some hostages but randomly from time to time decide not rescue hostages for no good reason. Suggests there's something different about this case that made a rescue attempt seem like a bad idea, doesn't it?

Not making a decision such as Northwood have done in this case is called dithering,exhibiting poor leadership.

But you can't back that up can you? It's out of your imagination! You have no way of know if they dithered or if they showed poor leadership. It's quite possible to decide in a forceful and effective manner that action is not appropriate. Indeed I expect it often takes a great deal of leadership to prevent men under your command making foolish sacrifices when the red mist descends.

Its obvious from your posts you have some connection

If you think I have a connection then you must also think I have better and more accurate information than you. In which case I’m right, and you’re wrong. (For the record I have no connection of any kind so we're both just guessing what might have happened.)

Re Cover up: See my previous comments.



Shall we all agree to leave this issue alone until such time as new information becomes available?

 

[toad_oftoadhall]

Shall we all agree to leave this issue alone until such time as new information becomes available?

Nearly 350 posts! An epic!

Gvien that news, b*11*cks to leaving the thread alone!

I have a new angle on this:

What is the best anchor for hostage recovery work?

 

[Clarky]

Of course, and often has - indeed Wave Knight has been involved in such operations. Which is even more reason to think that on this occasion Wave Knight made the right call for all concerned. Hard to see why they'd rescue some hostages but randomly from time to time decide not rescue hostages for no good reason. Suggests there's something different about this case that made a rescue attempt seem like a bad idea, doesn't it?



But you can't back that up can you? It's out of your imagination! You have no way of know if they dithered or if they showed poor leadership. It's quite possible to decide in a forceful and effective manner that action is not appropriate. Indeed I expect it often takes a great deal of leadership to prevent men under your command making foolish sacrifices when the red mist descends.



If you think I have a connection then you must also think I have better and more accurate information than you. In which case I’m right, and you’re wrong. (For the record I have no connection of any kind so we're both just guessing what might have happened.)

Re Cover up: See my previous comments.



Shall we all agree to leave this issue alone until such time as new information becomes available?

Dear Toad,

No sorry,but I dont agree with any of your ridiculous arguments .
My view is that the Chandlers were sold down the river by a dithering senior naval officer or Whitehall official,who couldnt make a quick decision for fear of making a wrong one.
The fact you may have some connection to these buffoons does not mean you have any better information ,go on keep your posts going ,they become more ridiculous each time.

 

[toad_oftoadhall]

Dear Toad,

No sorry,but I dont agree with any of your ridiculous arguments .
My view is that the Chandlers were sold down the river by a dithering senior naval officer or Whitehall official,who couldnt make a quick decision for fear of making a wrong one.
The fact you may have some connection to these buffoons does not mean you have any better information ,go on keep your posts going ,they become more ridiculous each time.

Sorry, Clarky, I really can't carry on. I'm calling it a day until some new information comes along.

 

[Major Catastrophe]

Take the Belgrano. As a military decision it was plain and simple. The Belgrano had two escorts fitted with Exocet. These ships could have sunk a carrier, therefore in military terms it had to be sunk. But the decision couldn't be made based on military considerations alone because only the Foreign Office could understand the implications of that decision on the world wide stage. The captain of the Sub can hardly phone up the leaders of France (suppliers the Exocet) and America (suppliers of the 1000 pound bombs) plus all the other nations who gave us essential support to work out if sinking 'x' ship would damage the campaign more than it would assist it. Only the Foreign office could judge that. If it had put us offside with a handful of key nations we'd have lost the war just as surely as if the Belgrano's exocets had sunk a carrier.

See? It's not so simple is it?

(I will read StB - you should try Simon Jenkins and Max Hasting's book on the Falklands.)

I knew after rereading my post you would have rant about the sinking of the Belgrano. If you read the book the political control, communications difficulties, and Northwood constantly ignoring the advice of the commanders actually there, were a thorn in their side from before the recapture of South Georgia. Forget the Belgrano and concentrate on the way the commanders allege that Northwood's numerous orders and counter orders cost them ships and nearly made the subs lose contact with the Argentine task forces and failed to make contact with the aircraft carrier because Northwood decided to ignore the sub commander.

It got so bad the senior signals officer, if I remember correctly he was on the flagship, decided to fake a comms breakdown so they could conduct ops without all the bad calls from the UK.

" I see no signal"
Nelson, Battle of Copenhagen, 2nd Apr 1801.

As to Max Hastings, he is generally reviled by the navy, marines and the army. I have no idea what the RAF think of him.

 

[grumpy_o_g]

As to Max Hastings, he is generally reviled by the navy, marines and the army. I have no idea what the RAF think of him.

I don't like him, but then I don't like a lot of people. In fairness people like him can be very useful in minefields.....

 

[Sybaris]

I have to give 10 points out of 10 to Toad and Woodlouse for being very patient, trying to promote known facts, and applying some basic critical thinking in this discussion.

The problem is that logic is typically difficult to use against conspiracy type thinking. In this case an attack on the RN based solely on one newspaper article from a known sensationalist paper quoting the opinion of one person who we don’t even know who he is, what rank he holds, etc. Toad and Woodlouse have pointed out that the article is full of holes and ambiguities and then applied some basic logic. What they are saying is that and although anyone is entitled to base their point of view on anything, it is not really rational to see this one article as the whole and definitive truth.

I was compelled to write this comment because I was seriously disturbed last night when I had a discussion with a guy who argued that all Somalis in boats should be gunned down immediately. He did not stop at that, he then went on to say that they should just kill all Somalis, women and children included, because they all condone what the pirates are doing. I find it scary that a seemingly sane person can have that point of view, and dare not think where we would be today if he would hold a high command in the RN.

 

[xxyyzz]

I have to give 10 points out of 10 to Toad and Woodlouse for being very patient, trying to promote known facts, and applying some basic critical thinking in this discussion.

Really? Woodlouse kicked off by denying the RFA ship had any weaponry or weapons trained crew. For a while he seemed to be suggesting that we were lucky the pirates stuck with a yacht rather than a tanker.

 

[Woodlouse]

Really? Woodlouse kicked off by denying the RFA ship had any weaponry or weapons trained crew. For a while he seemed to be suggesting that we were lucky the pirates stuck with a yacht rather than a tanker.

I'm leaving this post alone now because quite frankly it's got boring. But for the record, I never suggested the RFA ship had no weapons, and any suggestions I made that there were no troops on board were made before that information was made available to us. I never suggested that the pirates could have seized Wave Knight but did speculate on the damage that could be inflicted by an RPG which is about on a par with others suggestions of sinking a 20,000 ton ship with a 20mm cannon and a gatling gun.

And with that good morning, good afternoon and good night.

 

[xxyyzz]

Indeed, I suspect we'll all reconvene at the denouement.

Hopefully days or weeks rather than months or years.

 

[David_Jersey]

I was seriously disturbed last night when I had a discussion with a guy who argued that all Somalis in boats should be gunned down immediately. He did not stop at that, he then went on to say that they should just kill all Somalis, women and children included, because they all condone what the pirates are doing. I find it scary that a seemingly sane person can have that point of view, and dare not think where we would be today if he would hold a high command in the RN.

I just thought I would deny that was me

That is of course a rather old fashioned approach to winning wars. We don't do that anymore

 

[xxyyzz]

That is of course a rather old fashioned approach to winning wars. We don't do that anymore

Of course, back then, when we did, we won wars.

Can I just emphasise that I only ever advocated destroying the boats.

 

[David_Jersey]

Of course, back then, when we did, we won wars.

Yeah.............In the modern west some folk seem to forget that wars are between peoples / tribes / nations and not only Armies. An Army may be your representatives on the battlefield, but unlike your football team no guarantee of simply watching the game from a comfy seat and then win or lose getting to go safely home. Your tribe sent the Army out, all your tribe get to pay the consequences of defeat - by a team playing to win......that's why if your nation is Doncaster you don't choose to play Brazil. and you should even think twice about Accrington Stanley, let alone Mogadishu Utd - especially away from home .