The collision between "Elbe no. 5" and m/v "Astrosprinter"
- Thread starter Poignard
- Start date
Kukri
Well-known member
The report notes that you can’t put the helm hard over using the tiller ropes - two people have to push the tiller.
There are few if any boats of the size of the “Elbe 5” around with tiller steering now. “Jolie Brise” is tiller steered, and a big boat, and it would be interesting to hear from one of her crew, perhaps, but I think that once you are committed to putting a tiller of that size over it will take a little time to reverse the operation particularly if you have to tell the other person that they are pushing the wrong way.
LittleSister
Well-known member
But doesn't mention it was put over the wrong way?
Jodel
Active member
Kukri, I do not disagree with you that it is a very comprehensive report but it seems to go into great detail on things that don't really matter, a 4 page argument between the BSU, SHM & BSH about the length of the vessel or 3 pages on when is a hatch not an emergency hatch for example. I agree also that it does investigate the timeline of actions and occurrences leading up to the collision except for that one final action - why did the tiller get pushed in the wrong direction? It doesn't even get a mention in the conclusions!
I'm well aware that an accident is rarely caused by a single event but by a chain of events. Break any link in the chain in the chain and you avoid the accident. Each 'link' needs to be investigated to learn from the event so we can prevent a reoccurrence. On this occasion there is something missing.
I'm well aware that an accident is rarely caused by a single event but by a chain of events. Break any link in the chain in the chain and you avoid the accident. Each 'link' needs to be investigated to learn from the event so we can prevent a reoccurrence. On this occasion there is something missing.
Jodel
Active member
Capt Popeye
Well-known member
Hi there Mr K ; you appear to state ... wrong side of the Fairway .... I understand that thats well ok if there is ample room for each Vessel to pass Stbd to Stbd , or Port to Port , and to cross ahead of the other vessel is discouraged , as it causes undue Vessel movements across a Fairway plus presents a real nasty collision issue ; as indeed it did
Vessel Sailing or Under Oar might be on the wrong side of a channel owing to wind n tide constraints so its llowable , the other Vessels approaching should bear this in mind and take appropriete avoiding action without comprimising safety .
If vessels are not allowed to pass Stbd to Stbd navigating the Rivers would be very difficult indeed
Mind you the appropriete Blasts of the Horn would surely be a wise action to take ; Like them Thames Tugs etc so do ,
Having just viewed the Video its bleeding obvious that a collision was very probable , surely the Vessel under sail should have Turned to PORT much earlier , in these restricted waters another vessels Skipper cannot with any certainty know what the oncomming vessels restrictions are
It must have been really frightening to the Crews on board , watching in slow motion such a collision ; plus what was the Skipper doing , was it a case of asleep on the job or not actually understaning the sittuation ; does the investigation cover this observation
Further upon viewing the Video its apparent that the Boat is on a course thats crossing the Bow of the oncomming Ship , which is perhaps foolhardy , that would be apparent to anyone on watch on the Boat , including the Helmsman and Skipper ; If the Ship was in the fairway /channel it might have difficulty manouvering to avoid the Boat .
Might it also be a contributing factor that misunderstanding between the Colregs and Harbour Rules of Navigation ? by theSkipper ; As we all should appreciate when in a Harbour or such the Local Rules of Navigation take priority and must be adhered to ?
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Kukri
Well-known member
I’m going to have to read it yet one more time!
LittleSister
Well-known member
I have gone back to the Report. I am even more convinced, and puzzled, that the Report fails to address the critical final moments. Had the final turn been to port, no collision would have occurred, and none of the previous errors and shortcomings would have been significant.
There is no complete or consolidated account of how the apparently erroneous turn happened, nor any analysis of what went wrong to cause it. Instead relevant tidbits about the final fateful moments are scattered widely through the report.
Contrary to my earlier supposition the skipper did make a statement, and the nautical officer made a written statement. (The Report pointedly mentions the skipper's account didn't tally with that of the nautical officer about who ordered the foresail to be struck, and that the skipper 'adheres to' an aspect of his account, implying it was in question), and also a written statement from the nautical officer. [e.g. p7]
It also does not state that the order to turn to port came from the skipper. Instead it says 'Someone shouted "HARD TO PORT! Come around here, come around here! HARD TO PORT!"' [p8]
'The skipper . . . was not near the helm during the convergence with the ASTROSPRINTER . . . '[p89]
'The skipper left his position at the stern a few minutes before the collision to assess the condition of the foresail
'The helmsman receives his orders from the skipper or the nautical officer, depending on who is navigating, i.e. who is responsible at that particular point.' [p76]
'The nautical officer hurried back from the headsails, believing that the collision could only be prevented by sound signals and a starboard manoeuvre, even though at this point he could not have had an overall perspective on the positions of the No.5 ELBE and ASTROSPRINTER due to other duties assigned. The officer did not think that bearing away was an option at that moment because the mainsheet would have to be struck and there was no time left to do that. The skipper let the nautical officer have his way.' [p102]
I've run out of time to conclude my investigation into the investigation
, but here's some of my thoughts/queries on the story so far -
There is no complete or consolidated account of how the apparently erroneous turn happened, nor any analysis of what went wrong to cause it. Instead relevant tidbits about the final fateful moments are scattered widely through the report.
Contrary to my earlier supposition the skipper did make a statement, and the nautical officer made a written statement. (The Report pointedly mentions the skipper's account didn't tally with that of the nautical officer about who ordered the foresail to be struck, and that the skipper 'adheres to' an aspect of his account, implying it was in question), and also a written statement from the nautical officer. [e.g. p7]
It also does not state that the order to turn to port came from the skipper. Instead it says 'Someone shouted "HARD TO PORT! Come around here, come around here! HARD TO PORT!"' [p8]
'The skipper . . . was not near the helm during the convergence with the ASTROSPRINTER . . . '[p89]
'The skipper left his position at the stern a few minutes before the collision to assess the condition of the foresail
'The helmsman receives his orders from the skipper or the nautical officer, depending on who is navigating, i.e. who is responsible at that particular point.' [p76]
'The nautical officer hurried back from the headsails, believing that the collision could only be prevented by sound signals and a starboard manoeuvre, even though at this point he could not have had an overall perspective on the positions of the No.5 ELBE and ASTROSPRINTER due to other duties assigned. The officer did not think that bearing away was an option at that moment because the mainsheet would have to be struck and there was no time left to do that. The skipper let the nautical officer have his way.' [p102]
I've run out of time to conclude my investigation into the investigation
, but here's some of my thoughts/queries on the story so far -- The Report's failure to address what went on in the final moments is puzzling. Is it an evasion?
- What were the helmsman's orders when the skipper and nautical officer left to deal with the damaged foresails? Was s/he told to hold a particular compass course, to aim at a mark, or to maintain position along the outer edge of the buoyed channel? Or, given that the helm was made off to windward (as seen in the video), was the vessel being left to steer itself? (Which, if that were the case, might explain the the root cause of the convergence.)
- Was the helmsman aware of the approaching vessel?
- Why and how did the skipper 'let the nautical officer 'have his way'? Did they have a conversation about it? Or was the skipper so absorbed in dealing with the damaged sails that he had just left the lookout and/or navigation to others?
- Who shouted 'Hard to Port!'?
- Why does the Report say that the nautical officer 'could not have had an overall perspective on the position of [the two vessels]? He had just been forward, and presumably had run back precisely because he had observed the situation. It can be seen in the video that when he gets aft he spends about 3 seconds sighting up the port side of the boat towards Astrosprinter.
- Why did the nautical officer think sounding a signal (twice!) was more urgent than actually making a turn?
- Why did the nautical officer think a turn to starboard was feasible given the closing speeds and aspects, and that with only foresails rigged they would presumably turn more slowly to windward and would slow even more if the aim was to turn through the wind onto the other tack?
- Why did the nautical officer think that a turn to port would require the mainsheet to be struck?
- Why did the nautical officer not gun the engines to speed a turn? Did the nautical officer know the engines were running? Were the engines in gear? (The Report states the engines had been turned on to aid manoeuvring, but I haven't noticed any confirmation as to whether they were in gear.)
dunedin
Well-known member
I agree entirely. As your first paragraph emphasises, a slight bear away to port and there would have been no accident and at worst a subsequent verbal b****g for the skipper /ex-pilot from the VTS.I have gone back to the Report. I am even more convinced, and puzzled, that the Report fails to address the critical final moments. Had the final turn been to port, no collision would have occurred, and none of the previous errors and shortcomings would have been significant.
There is no complete or consolidated account of how the apparently erroneous turn happened, nor any analysis of what went wrong to cause it. Instead relevant tidbits about the final fateful moments are scattered widely through the report.
Contrary to my earlier supposition the skipper did make a statement, and the nautical officer made a written statement. (The Report pointedly mentions the skipper's account didn't tally with that of the nautical officer about who ordered the foresail to be struck, and that the skipper 'adheres to' an aspect of his account, implying it was in question), and also a written statement from the nautical officer. [e.g. p7]
It also does not state that the order to turn to port came from the skipper. Instead it says 'Someone shouted "HARD TO PORT! Come around here, come around here! HARD TO PORT!"' [p8]
'The skipper . . . was not near the helm during the convergence with the ASTROSPRINTER . . . '[p89]
'The skipper left his position at the stern a few minutes before the collision to assess the condition of the foresail
'The helmsman receives his orders from the skipper or the nautical officer, depending on who is navigating, i.e. who is responsible at that particular point.' [p76]
'The nautical officer hurried back from the headsails, believing that the collision could only be prevented by sound signals and a starboard manoeuvre, even though at this point he could not have had an overall perspective on the positions of the No.5 ELBE and ASTROSPRINTER due to other duties assigned. The officer did not think that bearing away was an option at that moment because the mainsheet would have to be struck and there was no time left to do that. The skipper let the nautical officer have his way.' [p102]
I've run out of time to conclude my investigation into the investigation
- The Report's failure to address what went on in the final moments is puzzling. Is it an evasion?
- What were the helmsman's orders when the skipper and nautical officer left to deal with the damaged foresails? Was s/he told to hold a particular compass course, to aim at a mark, or to maintain position along the outer edge of the buoyed channel? Or, given that the helm was made off to windward (as seen in the video), was the vessel being left to steer itself? (Which, if that were the case, might explain the the root cause of the convergence.)
- Was the helmsman aware of the approaching vessel?
- Why and how did the skipper 'let the nautical officer 'have his way'? Did they have a conversation about it? Or was the skipper so absorbed in dealing with the damaged sails that he had just left the lookout and/or navigation to others?
- Who shouted 'Hard to Port!'?
- Why does the Report say that the nautical officer 'could not have had an overall perspective on the position of [the two vessels]? He had just been forward, and presumably had run back precisely because he had observed the situation. It can be seen in the video that when he gets aft he spends about 3 seconds sighting up the port side of the boat towards Astrosprinter.
- Why did the nautical officer think sounding a signal (twice!) was more urgent than actually making a turn?
- Why did the nautical officer think a turn to starboard was feasible given the closing speeds and aspects, and that with only foresails rigged they would presumably turn more slowly to windward and would slow even more if the aim was to turn through the wind onto the other tack?
- Why did the nautical officer think that a turn to port would require the mainsheet to be struck?
- Why did the nautical officer not gun the engines to speed a turn? Did the nautical officer know the engines were running? Were the engines in gear? (The Report states the engines had been turned on to aid manoeuvring, but I haven't noticed any confirmation as to whether they were in gear.)
All your more detail points i agree with also. To not seek to at least identify (a) who called the the turn to port and (b) why the turn to starboard instead seems to have missed the core of the accident cause (on top of the skipper / nautical officer both departing their usual posts to go forward).
R.Ems
Active member
Excellent questions LittleSister.
It certainly seems evasive.
Leaving the boat to steer herself, in the circumstances, would have been criminally insane, or very poor seamanship to put it politely.
He must have been aware of her, a cargo vessel in broad daylight.
Confused/absent chain of command, lack of prior briefing by skipper.
As above^
The Nautical Officer allowed himself to become distracted?
The sound signals were pointless and wasted time; he should have known, as does any Day Skipper, that sound signals are notoriously inaudible on the closed bridges of cargo vessels, which are themselves often very slow to answer the helm, and may not be able to alter anyway due to other factors.
Inexperience and panic.
As above^
No idea why the engines weren't used.
Does the report list the crews' qualifications and experience?
To me, the crash was caused by easily avoidable wrong decisions, and human factors.
The effect was like that of a helm/rudder jamming hard to starboard at the very worst possible moment; but it was all done by ostensibly hand-picked peoples' decisions!
It certainly seems evasive.
Leaving the boat to steer herself, in the circumstances, would have been criminally insane, or very poor seamanship to put it politely.
He must have been aware of her, a cargo vessel in broad daylight.
Confused/absent chain of command, lack of prior briefing by skipper.
As above^
The Nautical Officer allowed himself to become distracted?
The sound signals were pointless and wasted time; he should have known, as does any Day Skipper, that sound signals are notoriously inaudible on the closed bridges of cargo vessels, which are themselves often very slow to answer the helm, and may not be able to alter anyway due to other factors.
Inexperience and panic.
As above^
No idea why the engines weren't used.
Does the report list the crews' qualifications and experience?
To me, the crash was caused by easily avoidable wrong decisions, and human factors.
The effect was like that of a helm/rudder jamming hard to starboard at the very worst possible moment; but it was all done by ostensibly hand-picked peoples' decisions!
R.Ems
Active member
Q, anyone know what a 'Nautical Officer' would be in English?
Poignard
Well-known member
1st Mate
LittleSister
Well-known member
Another snippet from the Report '. . . the skipper and nautical officer claimed that a starboard turn was intended'. [footnote p17] Does the use of the word 'claimed' imply doubt, I wonder (bearing in mind this English version is presumably translated from German)?
The skipper was very experienced - 50 years on ships, had been skipper of the vessel for 16 years, previously had long been an Elbe pilot, had done dozens of trips on this boat in the same area, and has passed the required medical a few months earlier. (My suspicions from reading aviation and other accident reports - very long service; much more highly experienced than colleagues; unlikely to have views, judgements and customs challenged; a relatively undemanding and long held position; is a typical recipe for complacency and sloppy attention to formalities.) The Report banged on at some length about the fact that his radio certificate didn't qualify him to operate the particular radio on the vessel, and therefore he didn't have the full qualifications required of the skipper, but it didn't establish whether he knew how to operate the radio or ever did so.
The nautical officer had an ICC to command such a vessel, had held the nautical officer position for several years and done the same trip quite a few times. They don't mention a medical. I wonder what his eyesight was like.
I'm guessing first mate. (Damn, beaten to it by Poignard! But at least he confirms my expert opinion stab in the dark.)
The skipper was very experienced - 50 years on ships, had been skipper of the vessel for 16 years, previously had long been an Elbe pilot, had done dozens of trips on this boat in the same area, and has passed the required medical a few months earlier. (My suspicions from reading aviation and other accident reports - very long service; much more highly experienced than colleagues; unlikely to have views, judgements and customs challenged; a relatively undemanding and long held position; is a typical recipe for complacency and sloppy attention to formalities.) The Report banged on at some length about the fact that his radio certificate didn't qualify him to operate the particular radio on the vessel, and therefore he didn't have the full qualifications required of the skipper, but it didn't establish whether he knew how to operate the radio or ever did so.
The nautical officer had an ICC to command such a vessel, had held the nautical officer position for several years and done the same trip quite a few times. They don't mention a medical. I wonder what his eyesight was like.
I'm guessing first mate. (Damn, beaten to it by Poignard!
But at least he confirms my
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Poignard
Well-known member
From the Report's Conclusions (p.109)
Capt Popeye
Well-known member
Well reading the recent postings /comments above , was there a mistaken impression , by those in charge on the boat , that the Ship was going to 'give way' at all , to the Boat , as under Power gives way to Sail etc etc ; if so guess that the asked for Sound Siginals were meant to attract the attention of the Ships Officers ?
Capt Popeye
Well-known member
Well quite puzzled by that statement , when refering to the Ship are they refering to the Boat by any chance ; also the statement about 'wrong side of the Fairway means what ; surely as long as meeting head on there is room to move Stbd to Stbd or Port to Port ? Did not see any other Vessels in the Video in the area , but maybe I am wrong ?
LittleSister
Well-known member
In short, no.
That rule doesn't apply on that section of that waterway.
You could read the report for yourself!
LittleSister
Well-known member
They are referring to the sailing vessel, No. 5 Elbe.
You are indeed wrong!
Try reading the report. It's long-winded, but clear on the question of the correct use of the fairway.
Poignard
Well-known member
The skipper of the #5 Elbe (a former pilot) knew that the Astrosprinter would be soon be altering course to starboard to follow the fairway but he wrongly assumed that she was about to make that turn when, in fact, she had not yet reached the buoy at which the turn would normally be made.
The skipper of the #5 Elbe was not communicating with the Astrosprinter or with the Hanna, which he had a close encounter with not long before and whose skipper complained about his manouvering, or with VTS.
Capt Popeye
Well-known member
Humm well yes , but how can a Boat /Yacht /Ship actually be propelled by the wind , ie sailing ' plus keep to the Fairway , caus a Craft under Sail (Sailing) surely needs to plot their course according the whats acheiveable with the wind Direction ?
This collision appears to be similar to the one that happned off the Isle Wight , a Yacht Skipper thought that the Approaching Ship , head on , was going to alter its course to enter Southampton Water , which also meant a turn to Stbd ' so the Yacht Skipper could sail on towards the Ship , BUT the Ship did not make the turn as expected = a collision
Surely the Ship in thie case under scruitiny should made suitable sound signals to indicated its intentions of altering course ?
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