The Black Deep and the PLA General Directions - Update

[Egret]

And the barges, but maybe they just slipped across the sands at high tide.

 

[Egret]

There don't seem to be many ships going to Thames Gateway each day (BBC said 2 extra from Felixstowe per week) and they seem to work to a timetable so shoudn't be too difficult to plan to cross Black deep in a gap and confirm by radio. Have Thames VTS indicated how big a no-go zone they would like around a ship - presumably need to allow a fair distance ahead but can wait if it is near then pass behind once it has gone

 

[tillergirl]

No I don't think they a defined no-go zone but I don't know. There can be different situations. A Panamax at full bore could be easy; heave to and await for permission to cross behind. At full bore, it wouldn't be long to wait. But on one occasion we saw a large ship (not a container) that crept along towards the Knock John waiting for an outbound to clear from the Knock John. Defining a 'fair distance ahead' is not easy. Remember last year a yacht was dismasted in the Black Deep.

 

[crawlerm]

#29

Sunk VTS is responsible for the Sunk area: London VTS covers the Black Deep. Yuo are right about the seaward limit of the PLA but the PA has an extension of its Pilotage Area which covers most of the Black Deep. The two VTS do not have coterminus borders (is that the right word?), actually bits overlap. The PLA Pilotage area starts where the seaward limit ends from the Old Gunfleet Light house just on the south of the east side of the new East Long Sand Head cardinal and returning back along the southeast side of the Long Sand. So the 'Black Deep' PBH buoy is outside of the PLA Pilotage area. Matters are simplified by the Sunk scheme area whichuses the Black Deep PHB as a limit mark. the east side of Sunk scheme runs north up the west side of the Two-Way route up to the East Cardinal at the Long Sand head, across to and pass by the Black Deep PHB to an unmarked limit which turns NW towards the SW corner of the Sunk Inner ships anchorage. Thus, as you all know, there is a triangular area of dual sovereign responsibility. I shall be asking questions tomorrow morning.

I ought to be serious. The PLA Pilotage Area has been in force for over 24 years but the Black Deep proviso was not created at the same time; much more recent but I am not sure exactly when - 2019?. Using a chart plotter to identify such limits are a challenge. In that area there is a small multitude of dotted magenta lines. I am not quite sure how I thought it interesting today to look at the way in two different chart plotters both using Navionics. First point. There is no caution on Navionics about the Black Deep until on plotter 1 is zoomed down of 0.8nm. That says 'Draught restrictions - see lower zooms'. At 0.6nm it says the same. Then at 0.4nm it says about the draught of 6m restriction. Any further zoom has the same. There is no mention of the requirement for permission and says 'Normally restricted to vessels with a draught of over 6 metres. Consult London VTS for further detail'. Plotter 2 shows no warning until 500m zoom when it has just 'Draught restrictions (see lower zooms)'. One step down to 250m gets the same more full instructions.

So using a chart plotter at say 5 or 2km step for passage planning anyone would be ignorant of the requirement. And as for an app! (I was going to add '.................' but the Moderators would ban me so I didn't )

Date of Foulger's Buoyage. Not sure myself. It wasn't buoyed in 1987 but actually the Black Deep No 6 PHB marked (accidentally?) the northern entrance of Foulger's. Janet's East Coast Rivers shows the two SWBs in Foulgers Gat (using the name for the first time) in 2003. Janet may be tell us more on the history.

@tillergirl I think I understand now. It's certainly a muddle of magenta on the chart and the areas need some study. After a while, I found the extension and did a quick tracing of the areas which, assuming I got it right (corrections welcomed) might help visualise the area.

 

[crawlerm]

I’m afraid I can’t tell you much more about the history of Foulgers Gat except that, as you say, we first included it in the 2003 edition ECR, published at that time by Nautical Data. I believe it was actually buoyed for the first time in 2002.
However, with apologies for slight thread drift, I do have more info on Brian Foulger and his trio of boats named Ailish. Brian was chairman of the EAORA from 1978 to 1981. His first Ailish was a Philip Rhodes-designed 28-footer built in Scotland in 1963. Ailish 11 was the fourth S&S34 to be completed by Priors of Burnham for various East Anglian sailors, including Brian, following the success in 1969 of Ted Heath’s S&S34 Morning Cloud. The beautifully-varnished Ailish 111 was a Dick Carter-designed One Tonner built by Clare Lallow in 1974 as Eleuthera but re-named by Brian when he bought her, in time to take part in the ‘79 Fastnet. In Plymouth afterwards, having come through relatively unscathed, Brian is reported to have commented that “it was a bit choppy!” There is a photo of Ailish 111 on her mooring at Burnham in the 1981 edition of ECR.
Brian related many EAORA anecdotes to Jan Wise and they can be found recorded in her little book 50 Years of East Anglian Offshore Racing (2001).
The Seastream Shelia (Ailish backwards) was, I imagine, Brian’s last boat and is possibly the one he was sailing, I’m guessing in the ‘90s, when he started using the Gat that now bears his name? Presumably allocated by the Admiralty/Hydrographers at that time?

​

 

[crawlerm]

I’m afraid I can’t tell you much more about the history of Foulgers Gat except that, as you say, we first included it in the 2003 edition ECR, published at that time by Nautical Data. I believe it was actually buoyed for the first time in 2002.
However, with apologies for slight thread drift, I do have more info on Brian Foulger and his trio of boats named Ailish. Brian was chairman of the EAORA from 1978 to 1981. His first Ailish was a Philip Rhodes-designed 28-footer built in Scotland in 1963. Ailish 11 was the fourth S&S34 to be completed by Priors of Burnham for various East Anglian sailors, including Brian, following the success in 1969 of Ted Heath’s S&S34 Morning Cloud. The beautifully-varnished Ailish 111 was a Dick Carter-designed One Tonner built by Clare Lallow in 1974 as Eleuthera but re-named by Brian when he bought her, in time to take part in the ‘79 Fastnet. In Plymouth afterwards, having come through relatively unscathed, Brian is reported to have commented that “it was a bit choppy!” There is a photo of Ailish 111 on her mooring at Burnham in the 1981 edition of ECR.
Brian related many EAORA anecdotes to Jan Wise and they can be found recorded in her little book 50 Years of East Anglian Offshore Racing (2001).
The Seastream Shelia (Ailish backwards) was, I imagine, Brian’s last boat and is possibly the one he was sailing, I’m guessing in the ‘90s, when he started using the Gat that now bears his name? Presumably allocated by the Admiralty/Hydrographers at that time?

Thanks for that Jan,

There is a Brian Foulger Family History website. However, he is not this one but has provided the following information: This is probably the correct man: Brian Foulger born 11.12.1917 West Ham died 14.7.2000 Chelmsford.

So, it looks like he never saw his name on the chart, a shame.

Maybe he was crewing in the 1979 Fastnet as 1979 Fastnet Race – Wikipedia does not list Foulger or Ailish. Perhaps the book clarifies.

Bob Crawley

 

[Poecheng]

I feel it has some relevance to the discussion, as had the yacht's skipper been monitoring Harwich VTS, he would have known that the dredger was going to leave the channel early, and thus the collision wouldn't have occurred.

Whilst it wasn't the primary cause of the accident, it was another hole in the cheese.

Not only was it not a primary cause of the accident, it was not any cause of the accident according to the MAIB.
Conclusions (direct causes) are at §3.1, safety issues not directly contributing are at §3.2 and non-related safety issues at §3.3. None make the suggestion you have.

Further, and importantly,
(i) the notification by the ship (to Harwich VTS by VHF) it would *leave the dredged channel was at 1312hrs [§1.2.2]. The incident occurred at 1331hrs [§2.3.4], some 19 minutes after the VHF traffic.
"Would" is the word used in the report [§1.2.2] and is correctly used in the future tense as the change of course out of the dredged channel did not take place until 1326hrs, some 14 mins later and was not subject to VHF traffic. It was therefore the usual advance notification of intentions VHF traffic to Harwich VTS, not an announcement of an alteration of course immediately to be executed.
(ii) there was no MAIB finding one way or the other whether Harwich VTS was being monitored by the yacht; there is simply no mention of the issue.The report noted that Harwich harbour had already reminded local yachts clubs and other similar representatives of the recommendation to monitor Harwich VTS (VHF 71); that was not a recommendation nor was there any implication that had not been done. It was simply noted as an action that had already occurred.

Therefore, in my view,
(a) there is no basis in fact for your premise that the yacht skipper was not monitoring Harwich VTS.
(b) had he done so, he would not be expected to know that the dredger was leaving the channel early since it was routine VHF traffic 14 or 19 minutes earlier; there was no announcement by the ship at or about the time of its change of course of its location (thus identifying which ship is on the radio) carrying out its change of course or any other warning.
(c) 'Thus, the collision would not have occurred....' is not justified. It is not identified as a primary or secondary cause by the MAIB as set out above and and contradicted by your next sentence "Whilst it wasn't a primary cause of the accident...'
I am familiar with the Swiss cheese analogy but for that to be engaged, it has to be a cause.

 

[MikeBz]

…

Maybe he was crewing in the 1979 Fastnet as 1979 Fastnet Race – Wikipedia does not list Foulger or Ailish. Perhaps the book clarifies.

Fastnet '79: The story of Ailish III by Gardner, L. T: Very Good Hardcover (1979) 1st Edition | Swan Books

 

[crawlerm]

Fastnet '79: The story of Ailish III by Gardner, L. T: Very Good Hardcover (1979) 1st Edition | Swan Books

Just ordered, thanks.

 

[M Hill]

@tillergirl I think I understand now. It's certainly a muddle of magenta on the chart and the areas need some study. After a while, I found the extension and did a quick tracing of the areas which, assuming I got it right (corrections welcomed) might help visualise the area.

It would be interesting to see that on an actual chart.

 

[tillergirl]

It would be interesting to see that on an actual chart.

There are plenty of charts that do show the various limits and there are plenty of charts that don't and there are plenty of charts that show the limits which you can find if you know where the limits are (i.e. they aren't very clear at various scales). Your sentence could be construed in several ways. Crawlerm's pastiche looks pretty good to me.

 

[dsw]

They must have seen us on AIS / RADAR many times. I have not had a call on the VHF from VTS complaining that I hadn't asked permission.
Has anyone else?

same as above i have been there many times over the years and i have also dropped anchor and done some fishing and never heard a thing.