RN submarine seamanship strikes (almost) again.

Seajet said:
It's unfair to keep mentioning HMS Astute going aground - this is not a p' take.

It seems from what I've heard the skipper was very good - as one would have to be to get the job as C/O of first of class nuclear attack boat - but he was pressured by examiners to get them to a nearby jetty to help their trip home - damned if he did, damned if he didn't - I'm sure he now wishes he'd told them to get stuffed and walk or arrange a lift from a safer berth.
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To avoid looking foolish I suggest you read the Service Enquiry Report into the grounding.
https://assets.publishing.service.g...ata/file/27118/astute_grounding_si_report.pdf
 
A1Sailor said:
To avoid looking foolish I suggest you read the Service Enquiry Report into the grounding.
https://assets.publishing.service.g...ata/file/27118/astute_grounding_si_report.pdf
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Good grief!! That's pathetic. I'm always better prepared, single handed on my Folkboat. I DO have a functioning VHF; I DO have a nav system that's updating me all of the time; I DO have a back up for both of the above. I DO know where I am and in 'confined waters', I DO have the echo sounder running. Here's the other thing, if something isn't working, I repair it. I write the above in the full knowledge of not really being very good, but better than that.
What was the phrase; "Casual"? With a nuclear boat?? Really?!?!
 
jamie N said:
Good grief!! That's pathetic. I'm always better prepared, single handed on my Folkboat.
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Absolutely. Perhaps those so vehemently defending Royal Navy standards would care to comment on this:

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Sounds like a Day Skipper fail to me.
 
A1Sailor said:
To avoid looking foolish I suggest you read the Service Enquiry Report into the grounding.
https://assets.publishing.service.g...ata/file/27118/astute_grounding_si_report.pdf
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I think Seajet is conflating the Astute grounding (in which the need to do a boat, not jetty, transfer was a root cause) and the Ambush collision, which showed poor coordination between the CO and an examiner on board.

I wonder whether they'll find a new way to screw up with the Artful (almost hit a ferry, maybe?) or stick to the tried-and-tested.
 
You seem to have an axe to grind, Jumbleduck -

sure the services have been ground down, one look at modern documentaries on the RN featuring clueless fat Mancunian girls on warships shows that, and having women on subs seems a bad PR idea - not being sexist, just pragmatic.

However I wouldn't fancy your or my chances on a Perisher course.
 
Seajet said:
You seem to have an axe to grind, Jumbleduck -

sure the services have been ground down, one look at modern documentaries on the RN featuring clueless fat Mancunian girls on warships shows that, and having women on subs seems a bad PR idea - not being sexist, just pragmatic.
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Why is having female submariners a bad PR idea? Do you have an axe to grind?
 
jamie N said:
Good grief!! That's pathetic. I'm always better prepared, single handed on my Folkboat. I DO have a functioning VHF; I DO have a nav system that's updating me all of the time; I DO have a back up for both of the above. I DO know where I am and in 'confined waters', I DO have the echo sounder running. Here's the other thing, if something isn't working, I repair it. I write the above in the full knowledge of not really being very good, but better than that.
What was the phrase; "Casual"? With a nuclear boat?? Really?!?!
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Always seems to me that the real problem is the fragmentation of what ought to be one person's job into several. The military does this all over the place; most 'staff jobs' are actually but one part of a responsibility that would be given to one person in a regular organisation. What then happens is that the need for those roles to communicate induces the person in each role to assume that the other will sort a problem out. That lack of taking responsibility is then compounded by the culture that it's the 'team' that failed, rather than that either or both of the roles failed in reasonable responsibility; and this results in even less focus on the practicalities of doing each job right, coz it's teamwork innit. This in turn further lessens the sense of responsibility that either of the roles actually feels for getting the job done. The job becomes merely something that gets done once the team is all in place, and the rot has truly set in.

This distraction from the deficit of actual skill and seamanship results in a culture where people think it's OK to have a flaky understanding of the ColRegs, or not to maintain constant situational awareness, or not to have checked the sea lanes their (submarine) boat is crossing, or not to have a passage plan in place, or a Plan B should problems arise, or...

Back in the real world, in contrast, a single person - you or me - does all of these things on passage. And when we're tired, another equally competent and responsible person takes over the watch to do them. Because we don't subdivide the seamanship task into navigation, collision avoidance, pilotage, signals, disaster response etc, we don't fall into the trap, and or suffer the pervasive skills rot, of a navy's well-paid but often irresponsible bridge team. And when we do fail - we take responsibility. Because it's clear where it lies.

To take an example like this one, and to paraphrase the findings of the official investigation:

  • the Officer of the Watch had not planned what he intended to happen over the passage
  • He had not planned for the boat transfer either
  • Nonetheless, he put no-one in effective charge of the team...
  • ... and didn't brief the staff who were supposed to execute the manoeuvre on the navigation plan for it. He also gave no brief on failure procedures (ie if the following sh!t happens, call me or him). I mean seriously, such people would be laughed off a Day Skipper course!
  • The transfer was planned to be conducted without the depth sounder running. As this was not militarily necessary (the sub was visible!) and a clear hazard (the surrounding waters were shallow), it was irresponsible
  • The person in charge of this eyeball navigation task had no experience of operating there outside daylight hours.
  • Someone put an unqualified (logistics) officer in charge of the team below decks, although qualified seaman officers were present on board...
  • ... and despatched the Navigation Officer to a position from where he couldn't navigate (on the casing of the submarine)
  • The person charged with navigating the submarine had put no got any chart out in the bridge. Or turned the radar on.
  • The Officer of the Watch wasn't aware what their location was, as they navigated shallow banks without radar, depth sounder or comms with the officer with the eyeballs on the casing
  • The guy on the bridge did not take a handheld VHF (or any other means of communication) so he could communicate with the control team
  • Nobody had included an operating procedure for grounding in the boat's list of operating procedures. And unbelievably, nobody in the whole 'Ship Control Team' knew what it was. Seriously, they didn't know what they were supposed to do on grounding the boat. You've thought what you'd do if you grounded yours, haven't you?
Either amusingly or tragically, the review team considered that 'the failings observed are not indicative of wider failings within the Submarine Service as a whole. .. this grounding was caused by failures specific to HMS Astute'. Quite how one boat's management, culture and level of individual responsibility and seamanship could have descended so low in isolation of adequate professional standards on other boats evades me. Perhaps those words were added to save the blushes of the more senior officers who had to approve the report on behalf of the Navy.
 
Seajet said:
You seem to have an axe to grind, Jumbleduck -
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Only inasmuch as the submarine department of the navy seems far too often to display wanton disregard for other water users.

Perisher course? How hard can it be? I've watched "The Hunt for Red October" twice.

One ping.
 
JumbleDuck said:
Only inasmuch as the submarine department of the navy seems far too often to display wanton disregard for other water users.

Perisher course? How hard can it be? I've watched "The Hunt for Red October" twice.k


Jumble duck, if you could pass the perisher course, I might take you seriously.:)
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BelleSerene said:
Always seems to me that the real problem is the fragmentation of what ought to be one person's job into several. The military does this all over the place; most 'staff jobs' are actually but one part of a responsibility that would be given to one person in a regular organisation. What then happens is that the need for those roles to communicate induces the person in each role to assume that the other will sort a problem out. That lack of taking responsibility is then compounded by the culture that it's the 'team' that failed, rather than that either or both of the roles failed in reasonable responsibility; and this results in even less focus on the practicalities of doing each job right, coz it's teamwork innit. This in turn further lessens the sense of responsibility that either of the roles actually feels for getting the job done. The job becomes merely something that gets done once the team is all in place, and the rot has truly set in.
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That is a very eloquent extension of Parkinson's Lawas with some added Peter Principle. Thank you - I shall remember it.

Back in the real world, in contrast, a single person - you or me - does all of these things on passage. And when we're tired, another equally competent and responsible person takes over the watch to do them. Because we don't subdivide the seamanship task into navigation, collision avoidance, pilotage, signals, disaster response etc, we don't fall into the trap, and or suffer the pervasive skills rot, of a navy's well-paid but often irresponsible bridge team.
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It seems very much like what happened on the USS Fitzgerald - lots of nominally qualified people assuming that someone else would take care of "it", for almost any value of "it". It's also reminiscent of the Lord Trenchard gas explosion. Everybody seemed to know that the system was badly designed, badly maintained and sloppily operated but everybody assumed that someone else would sort the problem(s) out. Bang.
 
Try reading “Hunter Killers” by Iain Ballantyne, for an insight into the submarine world.
It is very easy to criticise from a keyboard.
 
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