RN submarine seamanship strikes (almost) again.

Indeed the degree of ignorance displayed by some who claim some sort of seamanship ability is quite illuminating. The level of chippyness is good for a laugh though.
 
It would appear that some of the "retired admirals" have some very raw nerves.:rolleyes:

Come on then, let's hear you defend the utter ineptitude of the Astute fiasco.:D
 
NormanS said:
It would appear that some of the "retired admirals" have some very raw nerves.:rolleyes:

Come on then, let's hear you defend the utter ineptitude of the Astute fiasco.:D
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I don't think any ex RN bod would defend the situation. Very sad reflection on the RN today.
Astute has had more than her fair share of troubles, the blame for which must surely rest with the "Admirals" and the MOD.
 
mainsail1 said:
I don't think any ex RN bod would defend the situation. Very sad reflection on the RN today.
Astute has had more than her fair share of troubles, the blame for which must surely rest with the "Admirals" and the MOD.
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Yes a reflection both of the difficulty of trying to act as both an operational submarine and fit in the myriad of 'first of class trials' along with the hosts of staff personnel who witness said trials and the overbearing attitudes of senior staff officers. I can remember still doing first of class trials whilst serving on the second of class and the first was in first refit, not fun stuff. What is most galling is the knowledge that all involved would have been trained on how to avoid the incident, except the unfortunate OOW who was a logistics officer.
 
Elecglitch said:
It certainly seems to fit you, though navy might be a bit of a push with its implication of contributing something to ones country.
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Playing the man, are we?:disgust: Well it shows that you have nothing relevant or useful to contribute.:rolleyes:
Regarding the Navy, my main contribution is financial, so I do have a legitimate interest.
Regarding my experience of the actual incident, I can claim to have navigated in the particular locality in daylight and in darkness on countless occasions (without grounding).
 
A colleague of mine was aboard HMS Endurance when she nearly sank off South America. She said that it was an absolute shambles, and that political considerations were allowed to over-ride seamanship and safety. The incident wasn't widely reported here, and was downplayed - but I've seen my colleague's photos, and Endurance came awfully close to foundering. Because no lives were lost, no other vessels were involved and she made it into port there wasn't much fuss - but she came awfully close to sinking from an accident that SHOULD have been an incident.
 
AntarcticPilot said:
A colleague of mine was aboard HMS Endurance when she nearly sank off South America. She said that it was an absolute shambles, and that political considerations were allowed to over-ride seamanship and safety. The incident wasn't widely reported here, and was downplayed - but I've seen my colleague's photos, and Endurance came awfully close to foundering. Because no lives were lost, no other vessels were involved and she made it into port there wasn't much fuss - but she came awfully close to sinking from an accident that SHOULD have been an incident.
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IIRC the Endurance incident was caused by a maintainer error down below which effectively caused the engine room to be opened up to the sea. Not much political pressure I would thought mainly hydrostatic pressure. Unless of course you are referring to another incident.

From the BOI: (Link)
3. Whilst operating in the South Atlantic, as part of an 18 month deployment, HMS ENDURANCE suffered a major flood in her Engine Room, resulting in the near loss of the ship. At the time of the incident ship’s staff were cleaning a high level sea water inlet strainer, in an attempt to improve the ship’s production of fresh water. During this operation a remotely operated hull valve opened unexpectedly, allowing water into the ship through the disassembled strainer, causing the flood. A very satisfactory damage control response by the Ship’s Company, in very challenging conditions, together with the fortunate proximity of a suitable anchorage led to the successful stabilisation of the situation and saved the ship. External support, from both UK and Chilean agencies, allowed the recovery of the platform.
4. The opening of the hull valve was caused by the incorrect re-connection of the air control lines during the reassembly of the strainer, and a failure to fully isolate the compressed air supply to those lines. There were a number of contributory factors: poor system knowledge among those attempting the maintenance work; the absence of the appropriately trained system maintainer due to the manpower constraints of an extended deployment; management failure to implement a safe system of work including adequate risk assessment and mitigation measures; a failure to apply satisfactory engineering practice and design shortfalls in the valve control system. Externally, the provision of engineering and management assurance for a unit conducting an unusually lengthy deployment in a remote and challenging environment was insufficient, and the significance of previous incidents suggesting poor engineering management were not recognised.
 
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NormanB said:
IIRC the Endurance incident was caused by a maintainer error down below which effectively caused the engine room to be opened up to the sea. Not much political pressure I would thought mainly hydrostatic pressure. Unless of course you are referring to another incident.
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The political pressure was that she refused assistance when in serious danger of sinking. It is clear from photographs I have seen that she was very close to losing stability, and my colleague's accounts of the events on board certainly don't fill you with confidence. While it is perhaps OK to put service personnel at risk (after all, they signed up for it), it is NOT OK to put civilians at risk - and Endurance often carried a large civilian contingent.
 
AntarcticPilot said:
The political pressure was that she refused assistance when in serious danger of sinking. It is clear from photographs I have seen that she was very close to losing stability, and my colleague's accounts of the events on board certainly don't fill you with confidence. While it is perhaps OK to put service personnel at risk (after all, they signed up for it), it is NOT OK to put civilians at risk - and Endurance often carried a large civilian contingent.
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Clearly with your handle you realise this was not like an incident in the Solent.
You are correct there were 38 non military passengers.
Have you read the report?
What evidence do you have that they refused assistance?
What political pressure do you believe the Command Team were subjected to?

I am not defending the situation - it was a sorry state of affairs but I would like to see your evidence for the political pressure and the refusal of assistance.

The relevant bits of the BOI report state:

On the Bridge the command team were building a picture of the incidents and establishing command priorities. A VHF Mayday call was authorised by the XO and issued by the Operations Officer. Further emergency calls via the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), were delayed due to the need to repair a pre- existing defect on the aerial. The Operations Officer contacted the Duty Fleet Controller at the Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, reporting the flooding incident, and that the ship was now in very significant danger.

Whilst the initial command priority was to attack the flood, the ship’s drift rate towards land soon became a key concern, indicating that the ship was likely to be set aground. The ship made radio contact with the nearby Felix Lighthouse29 who then requested the cruise liner NORWEGIAN SUN to close ENDURANCE’s position to render assistance. However, it was apparent that the NORWEGIAN SUN would not be on the scene before ENDURANCE’s predicted grounding. Discussions on options for evacuating the ship were commenced.

On the advice of the Salvage & Marine Operations Integrated Project Team (S&MO IPT), 9 shackles30 of the starboard anchor were lowered whilst the ship was still drifting and in a depth of 300m of water; the logic was that the anchor could act as a drogue and slow the ship’s drift rate. It remains uncertain whether this was the case or not, however, a significant change in the direction of drift was observed. This had the effect of setting ENDURANCE down onto the ‘Bas Magellanas Bank’ and over the next few hours, analysis of the drift indicated that there was a prospect of anchoring and not being set ashore. Eventually the starboard anchor took hold, albeit dragging before the port anchor was also let go to enable the ship to hold her position, coming round into wind, significantly reducing the roll and making conditions below decks for the damage control effort more tenable. Planning for any potential evacuation of the ship was now put in abeyance.

Overnight, at anchor, efforts continued onboard to contain flooding, increase pumping capacity and land non-essential personnel to shore. The Chilean Naval Vessel CASMA arrived on the scene to assist and two Chilean tugs, BEAGLE and AGUILLA had departed Punta Arenas. A Chilean liaison officer from CASMA had also been transferred across to ENDURANCE.

Both ship’s helicopters were utilised to transfer pumps, drinking water and salvage equipment to the ship. A Chilean Search and Rescue helicopter was also in attendance throughout the evening of 16 Dec and the morning of 17 Dec and was used to transport 15 civilian personnel off the ship.
 
NormanS said:
Playing the man, are we?:disgust: Well it shows that you have nothing relevant or useful to contribute.:rolleyes:
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But it is useful, personal attacks throw up lots of chaff to help disguise the central facts of the case.

And there do seem to be facts here well worth disguising ;)
 
NormanB said:
Clearly with your handle you realise this was not like an incident in the Solent.
You are correct there were 38 non military passengers.
Have you read the report?
What evidence do you have that they refused assistance?
What political pressure do you believe the Command Team were subjected to?

I am not defending the situation - it was a sorry state of affairs but I would like to see your evidence for the political pressure and the refusal of assistance.

The relevant bits of the BOI report state:

On the Bridge the command team were building a picture of the incidents and establishing command priorities. A VHF Mayday call was authorised by the XO and issued by the Operations Officer. Further emergency calls via the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS), were delayed due to the need to repair a pre- existing defect on the aerial. The Operations Officer contacted the Duty Fleet Controller at the Fleet Headquarters at Northwood, reporting the flooding incident, and that the ship was now in very significant danger.

Whilst the initial command priority was to attack the flood, the ship’s drift rate towards land soon became a key concern, indicating that the ship was likely to be set aground. The ship made radio contact with the nearby Felix Lighthouse29 who then requested the cruise liner NORWEGIAN SUN to close ENDURANCE’s position to render assistance. However, it was apparent that the NORWEGIAN SUN would not be on the scene before ENDURANCE’s predicted grounding. Discussions on options for evacuating the ship were commenced.

On the advice of the Salvage & Marine Operations Integrated Project Team (S&MO IPT), 9 shackles30 of the starboard anchor were lowered whilst the ship was still drifting and in a depth of 300m of water; the logic was that the anchor could act as a drogue and slow the ship’s drift rate. It remains uncertain whether this was the case or not, however, a significant change in the direction of drift was observed. This had the effect of setting ENDURANCE down onto the ‘Bas Magellanas Bank’ and over the next few hours, analysis of the drift indicated that there was a prospect of anchoring and not being set ashore. Eventually the starboard anchor took hold, albeit dragging before the port anchor was also let go to enable the ship to hold her position, coming round into wind, significantly reducing the roll and making conditions below decks for the damage control effort more tenable. Planning for any potential evacuation of the ship was now put in abeyance.

Overnight, at anchor, efforts continued onboard to contain flooding, increase pumping capacity and land non-essential personnel to shore. The Chilean Naval Vessel CASMA arrived on the scene to assist and two Chilean tugs, BEAGLE and AGUILLA had departed Punta Arenas. A Chilean liaison officer from CASMA had also been transferred across to ENDURANCE.

Both ship’s helicopters were utilised to transfer pumps, drinking water and salvage equipment to the ship. A Chilean Search and Rescue helicopter was also in attendance throughout the evening of 16 Dec and the morning of 17 Dec and was used to transport 15 civilian personnel off the ship.
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I am merely going by my colleague's first-hand account, which she sent to us within 24 hours of the events, and by her photos. Of course a report made with hindsight is going to put as a good a gloss on events as possible!
 
Never, Ever Assume

image: https://keyassets.timeincuk.net/ins...EB_Damage-to-starboard-side-of-yacht-copy.jpg

Damage to starboard side of yacht
Damage to starboard side of yacht

It was a clear summer’s day. A 9.5m sailing yacht departed its marina with its owner, his wife and the two family dogs on board with the intention of enjoying a leisurely day sail. The boat was in good condition and well equipped for cruising. The owner was an experienced yachtsman and had sailed extensively both in the local area and further afield.

Both the skipper and his wife wore lifejackets and their dogs wore buoyancy aids. The yacht was initially motored out of the marina, the sails were set and the engine stopped once clear of a busy harbour. The breeze was light and the yacht was sailing at around 4kts. The sea was calm and visibility was excellent. The skipper maintained a course to keep his yacht to the south of a busy shipping channel.

After enjoying lunch in the cockpit, and in order to utilise favourable tidal conditions for the trip back to the marina the skipper decided to turn around, and he began to steer a course to take the yacht back to pick up the recommended yacht route into the harbour. The yacht was approximately 7 miles offshore.

His wife was relaxing, lying on the starboard cockpit bench facing aft, leaning against the cabin bulkhead. A ship had recently sailed from the port and the yacht’s skipper watched this ship to his north proceed out of the harbour following the main shipping channel.

He could see another ship a few miles further away, also proceeding out of the port in the main shipping channel. At approximately 1326 the skipper engaged the yacht’s autopilot; he could see the ship outbound from the port was still in the main channel and by looking at its aspect was content that there was no risk of collision.

Leaving his wife relaxing in the cockpit he went below to visit the heads.

image: https://keyassets.timeincuk.net/inspirewp/live/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2017/04/The-dredger.jpg

The dredger
The dredger

At about the same time, the outbound ship made a series of small alterations of course to leave the main channel. This was the ship’s normal route and it followed the same track several times a day. This alteration of course put the ship on a collision course with the yacht. The yacht’s radar echo was clearly visible on the ship’s radar, yet the target had not been acquired and the officer of the watch – who was alone on the bridge of the ship – had not visually sighted the yacht.

The yacht’s skipper was making his way up the companionway steps when he saw the bow of a large vessel through the spray-hood. He shouted a warning to his wife and tried to make a lunge for the tiller. His actions were in vain and the two vessels collided.

The force of the impact threw the skipper back down the companionway steps. Damage to the yacht was catastrophic and it sank within minutes of the collision. The yacht’s skipper managed to escape from within the sinking yacht and was rescued from the water by the ship’s rescue boat. One of the dogs was also rescued. The skipper’s wife could not be found despite an extensive air and sea search. Her body was recovered from the sunken yacht by divers the next day.

The Lessons

1) The yacht’s skipper made an assumption that the outbound ship would remain in the channel and follow the ship that was ahead of it in the channel. When the decision was taken to go below, no risk of collision existed. Subsequent alterations of course by the ship resulted in both vessels being on a collision course.

2) It is essential that all vessels maintain a proper lookout at all times. Motor does give way to sail in most cases, nonetheless all vessels have a duty and requirement to keep a good lookout by all available means and to take avoiding action when it becomes apparent that the actions of the give way vessel alone are not going to be sufficient to avoid the risk of collision.

3) Leisure boat users should never assume that they have been seen by other vessels, nor should they assume that the other vessels will always take the correct avoiding action. In this case the yacht had a good quality radar reflector fitted high on its mast, and this provided a good radar echo. Yet due to the good visibility, the officer on watch on the ship was not using his radar and had not seen the target of the yacht that had been visible on his radar display screen for 12 minutes before the collision.

4) Leisure sailors need to be particularly aware of closing speeds between their own vessels and other vessels. In this case the ship was travelling at 12.9kts, but many types of vessels, including ferries, cruise ships and container ships regularly sail at speeds in excess of 25kts and, as a result, distances that initially appear sufficient can be reduced surprisingly quickly.

5) This yacht’s skipper’s automatic inflation lifejacket failed to inflate on immersion in the water as the CO2 bottle was not correctly fitted to the inflation mechanism. Had the skipper’s lifejacket inflated as designed, it is highly likely that he would not have been able to escape from within the sinking yacht. Nonetheless, in the vast majority of cases an automatic lifejacket is a lifesaver, and to remain effective, inflatable lifejackets must be serviced in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines.


Read more at https://www.pbo.co.uk/news/lessons-...-maib-safety-digest-52082#XcD2oRjov7PlfsBd.99
 
It points out that even those in the yachting fraternity can have accidents.
The Astute accidental grounding has been analysed and commented on ad nauseum. Pointing to the poor lookout in RN vessels, and commenting an RYA day skipper could do better are balanced by these sort of reports.
Even after some insightful posts by ex submariners, there is a core of posters who just keep saying the same thing about RN watchkeeping over and over again.
 
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