RN submarine seamanship strikes (almost) again.

East Cardinal said:
It points out that even those in the yachting fraternity can have accidents.
The Astute accidental grounding has been analysed and commented on ad nauseum. Pointing to the poor lookout in RN vessels, and commenting an RYA day skipper could do better are balanced by these sort of reports.
Even after some insightful posts by ex submariners, there is a core of posters who just keep saying the same thing about RN watchkeeping over and over again.
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I wasn't aware that anyone had suggested that yachts people never have accidents. Of course they do. Apart from introducing a "straw man", I'm not sure what point you're trying to make.
 
So you missed the posts from maxi77 then?
One quoted below.
However there is probably nothing more to gain from this thread, I am off to study for my Day Skipper exam:cool:


Yes a reflection both of the difficulty of trying to act as both an operational submarine and fit in the myriad of 'first of class trials' along with the hosts of staff personnel who witness said trials and the overbearing attitudes of senior staff officers. I can remember still doing first of class trials whilst serving on the second of class and the first was in first refit, not fun stuff. What is most galling is the knowledge that all involved would have been trained on how to avoid the incident, except the unfortunate OOW who was a logistics officer.

Read more at http://www.ybw.com/forums/showthrea...kes-(almost)-again/page11#CvEpc2L38r5Y1XqO.99
 
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Minn said:
Meanwhile the destroyer squadron (there aren't enough for a fleet) avoid all this unpleasantness by staying safely alongside in Portsmouth, with one new Type 45 already consigned to the role of harbour training vessel.
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The new aircraft carriers will show 'em all, though. If the Americans ever manage to get the F35B working, that is.
 
East Cardinal said:
Never, Ever Assume

image: https://keyassets.timeincuk.net/ins...EB_Damage-to-starboard-side-of-yacht-copy.jpg

Damage to starboard side of yacht
Damage to starboard side of yacht

It was a clear summer’s day. A 9.5m sailing yacht departed its marina with its owner, his wife and the two family dogs on board with the intention of enjoying a leisurely day sail. The boat was in good condition and well equipped for cruising. The owner was an experienced yachtsman and had sailed extensively both in the local area and further afield.

Both the skipper and his wife wore lifejackets and their dogs wore buoyancy aids. The yacht was initially motored out of the marina, the sails were set and the engine stopped once clear of a busy harbour. The breeze was light and the yacht was sailing at around 4kts. The sea was calm and visibility was excellent. The skipper maintained a course to keep his yacht to the south of a busy shipping channel.

After enjoying lunch in the cockpit, and in order to utilise favourable tidal conditions for the trip back to the marina the skipper decided to turn around, and he began to steer a course to take the yacht back to pick up the recommended yacht route into the harbour. The yacht was approximately 7 miles offshore.

His wife was relaxing, lying on the starboard cockpit bench facing aft, leaning against the cabin bulkhead. A ship had recently sailed from the port and the yacht’s skipper watched this ship to his north proceed out of the harbour following the main shipping channel.

He could see another ship a few miles further away, also proceeding out of the port in the main shipping channel. At approximately 1326 the skipper engaged the yacht’s autopilot; he could see the ship outbound from the port was still in the main channel and by looking at its aspect was content that there was no risk of collision.

Leaving his wife relaxing in the cockpit he went below to visit the heads.

image: https://keyassets.timeincuk.net/inspirewp/live/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2017/04/The-dredger.jpg

The dredger
The dredger

At about the same time, the outbound ship made a series of small alterations of course to leave the main channel. This was the ship’s normal route and it followed the same track several times a day. This alteration of course put the ship on a collision course with the yacht. The yacht’s radar echo was clearly visible on the ship’s radar, yet the target had not been acquired and the officer of the watch – who was alone on the bridge of the ship – had not visually sighted the yacht.

The yacht’s skipper was making his way up the companionway steps when he saw the bow of a large vessel through the spray-hood. He shouted a warning to his wife and tried to make a lunge for the tiller. His actions were in vain and the two vessels collided.

The force of the impact threw the skipper back down the companionway steps. Damage to the yacht was catastrophic and it sank within minutes of the collision. The yacht’s skipper managed to escape from within the sinking yacht and was rescued from the water by the ship’s rescue boat. One of the dogs was also rescued. The skipper’s wife could not be found despite an extensive air and sea search. Her body was recovered from the sunken yacht by divers the next day.

The Lessons

1) The yacht’s skipper made an assumption that the outbound ship would remain in the channel and follow the ship that was ahead of it in the channel. When the decision was taken to go below, no risk of collision existed. Subsequent alterations of course by the ship resulted in both vessels being on a collision course.

2) It is essential that all vessels maintain a proper lookout at all times. Motor does give way to sail in most cases, nonetheless all vessels have a duty and requirement to keep a good lookout by all available means and to take avoiding action when it becomes apparent that the actions of the give way vessel alone are not going to be sufficient to avoid the risk of collision.

3) Leisure boat users should never assume that they have been seen by other vessels, nor should they assume that the other vessels will always take the correct avoiding action. In this case the yacht had a good quality radar reflector fitted high on its mast, and this provided a good radar echo. Yet due to the good visibility, the officer on watch on the ship was not using his radar and had not seen the target of the yacht that had been visible on his radar display screen for 12 minutes before the collision.

4) Leisure sailors need to be particularly aware of closing speeds between their own vessels and other vessels. In this case the ship was travelling at 12.9kts, but many types of vessels, including ferries, cruise ships and container ships regularly sail at speeds in excess of 25kts and, as a result, distances that initially appear sufficient can be reduced surprisingly quickly.

5) This yacht’s skipper’s automatic inflation lifejacket failed to inflate on immersion in the water as the CO2 bottle was not correctly fitted to the inflation mechanism. Had the skipper’s lifejacket inflated as designed, it is highly likely that he would not have been able to escape from within the sinking yacht. Nonetheless, in the vast majority of cases an automatic lifejacket is a lifesaver, and to remain effective, inflatable lifejackets must be serviced in accordance with the manufacturer’s guidelines.


Read more at https://www.pbo.co.uk/news/lessons-...-maib-safety-digest-52082#XcD2oRjov7PlfsBd.99
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Thank you. The contention is that the seamanship and sense of responsibility of RN bridge officers is often at amateur levels. You cite a detailed study into a lunchtime episode with the same level of seamanship practised by an amateur man, wife and two dogs to prove the point.

You underline the point with your later claim (actually you did make this excuse earlier too) that the entire bridge team was distracted by ‘overbearing senior officers’. If having the boss watching is too much pressure, perhaps the level of skill is insufficient - and that’s just in peacetime. (And as we all know, senior officers were not present anyway.)
 
BelleSerene said:
Thank you.

You underline the point with your later claim (actually you did make this excuse earlier too) that the entire bridge team was distracted by ‘overbearing senior officers’. If having the boss watching is too much pressure, perhaps the level of skill is insufficient - and that’s just in peacetime. (And as we all know, senior officers were not present anyway.)
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Read again. I did not say that. It was a quote from another poster who was giving some personal experience of submarines to the debate.
However it has become obvious this is no longer a discussion worth having due to entrenched positions.
Bye
 
East Cardinal said:
Yes a reflection both of the difficulty of trying to act as both an operational submarine and fit in the myriad of 'first of class trials' along with the hosts of staff personnel who witness said trials and the overbearing attitudes of senior staff officers. I can remember still doing first of class trials whilst serving on the second of class and the first was in first refit, not fun stuff. What is most galling is the knowledge that all involved would have been trained on how to avoid the incident, except the unfortunate OOW who was a logistics officer.
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Would have been trained? Or were trained? And regardless of their training, was what they did competent?

Let's set aside, if you wish, the 'unfortunate' logistics officer who, despite having been in charge, failed to delegate the task to someone actually competent in it, and then sent the nav officer as far out of reach of the bridge as was possible and without a radio. After all, the logs officer is only one of several on the team.

The Tactical Systems Officer took charge of the execution of the navigation - but, ahem, without getting out a chart, without turning on the radar or the depth sounder, and no, neither was tactically required to be silent. Was that competent?

The Officer of the Watch Below was ineffective in his supervision. Was that competent?

The CO, having delegated the task to an inappropriately trained officer (a logistics man), was not in the control room or anywhere else where he could hear the team's communications. Was that competent?

The Navigation Officer took no means of communication with him to the casing so he could actually use the judgment he was employed for, during a manoeuvre that clearly required it. Was that competent?

The entire ship control team was unaware of a procedure upon grounding. If you were captain of a crewed vessel, would you consider that competent on your part while navigating in shallows?​

Look, it's a natural response to dismiss criticism of the standard of naval seamanship when you take pride in the organisation. But the facts are not on your side, and I suggest it is telling that you haven't claimed any reason why such behaviour was not incompetent. Just to say that those outside the organisation cannot know, despite the investigation report stating all the facts, is what's called an 'argument from authority': you're just claiming that 'Them Wot No are Qualified to No and You're Not, so they must be right innit'. Any legitimate defence of their actions would be most interesting, but you've provided none and I'm afraid the 'armchair admirals' retort doesn't wash.
 
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BelleSerene said:
... you're just claiming that 'Them Wot No are Qualified to No and You're Not, so they must be right innit'. Any legitimate defence of their actions would be most interesting, but you've provided none and I'm afraid the 'armchair admirals' retort doesn't wash.
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No only "doesn't wash" but also "is the most perfect example of unaware irony I have seen this year".
 
BelleSerene said:
Would have been trained? Or were trained? And regardless of their training, was what they did competent?

Let's set aside, if you wish, the 'unfortunate' logistics officer who, despite having been in charge, failed to delegate the task to someone actually competent in it, and then sent the nav officer as far out of reach of the bridge as was possible and without a radio. After all, the logs officer is only one of several on the team.

The Tactical Systems Officer took charge of the execution of the navigation - but, ahem, without getting out a chart, without turning on the radar or the depth sounder, and no, neither was tactically required to be silent. Was that competent?

The Officer of the Watch Below was ineffective in his supervision. Was that competent?

The CO, having delegated the task to an inappropriately trained officer (a logistics man), was not in the control room or anywhere else where he could hear the team's communications. Was that competent?

The Navigation Officer took no means of communication with him to the casing so he could actually use the judgment he was employed for, during a manoeuvre that clearly required it. Was that competent?

The entire ship control team was unaware of a procedure upon grounding. If you were captain of a crewed vessel, would you consider that competent on your part while navigating in shallows?​

Look, it's a natural response to dismiss criticism of the standard of naval seamanship when you take pride in the organisation. But the facts are not on your side, and I suggest it is telling that you haven't claimed any reason why such behaviour was not incompetent. Just to say that those outside the organisation cannot know, despite the investigation report stating all the facts, is what's called an 'argument from authority': you're just claiming that 'Them Wot No are Qualified to No and You're Not, so they must be right innit'. Any legitimate defence of their actions would be most interesting, but you've provided none and I'm afraid the 'armchair admirals' retort doesn't wash.
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I didn't dismiss the criticism, but some of the comments are a bit over the top. The CO not having a radio, he could shout at the OOW on the bridge, which certainly in my day was the normal means of communicating from the casing to the bridge. Equally not having a radio on the bridge we certainly had more than one means of communicating from the bridge to the control room. Overall it was an accumulation of minor errors each on it's own not likely to cause serious problems but together act like an accumulator bet.
 
maxi77 said:
I didn't dismiss the criticism, but some of the comments are a bit over the top. The CO not having a radio, he could shout at the OOW on the bridge, which certainly in my day was the normal means of communicating from the casing to the bridge. Equally not having a radio on the bridge we certainly had more than one means of communicating from the bridge to the control room. Overall it was an accumulation of minor errors each on it's own not likely to cause serious problems but together act like an accumulator bet.
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Indeed, I think BelleSerene described the process well in Post #73.

Re over the top comments, totally agree; I guess it's to some extent a natural response to the "In the know" Joe 90 brigade. Unfair to treat this as a credible RN defence.
 
Mark-1 said:
https://features.propublica.org/navy-accidents/us-navy-crashes-japan-cause-mccain/
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I suspect you will find the same problems in many Navies. I member the submarine I served in being 'unfit to dive' for six months because Harold Wilson refusing to pay for the replacement of our stern glands by a commercial yard. When we finally got time in dock we had big corks to put in the stern tubes if the dock was needed for a Polaris boat and we had to be floated out mid job.
 
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