ouzo - the complete report. Change colregs?

[Birdseye]

is available as a pdf here http://www.maib.gov.uk/cms_resources/Ouzo_.pdf

Just read through it, but I'm not at all sure what the report achieves in the way of giving us means of avoidance of future accidents.. Inevitably it is one sided since the Ouzo crew cant be interviewed. But it doesnt seem as if the Bilbao crew did much wrong that triggered the accident though they were criticised for not making sure that the Ouzo was safe after such a close encounter. Given the stopping and turning distance of such a big ferry, I'm not clear how they would have best done that.

Seems to me that colregs are certainly irrelevant and possibly out of date as a way of looking at such problems. Elephants cant dance and big ships cant manouevre like little yachts. So should colregs be altered to say that small gives way to big under all circs? Maybe to make radar compulsory for all yachts more than 3 miles from shore. And a See Me type target enhancer compulsory too. And a liferaft.

Even had the Bilbao seen the Ouzo, a violent avoidance turn in a close encounter situation could easily have put as many lives at risk on board a large ferry as were at risk on the small boat. So as the bridge officer which risk do you take? Once sailed on a very large tanker with a German master and he was clear - there was little he could do at speed without risking his ship and a big disaster so he relied on yachts to get out of his way

 

[Poignard]

"So should colregs be altered to say that small gives way to big under all circs?"

At first glance your idea may appear to have some merit but how could it possibly be done? Who defines what is big or small? Some coasters are smaller than some yachts. Should a small coaster have to give way to an Isle of Wight car ferry just because it's larger?

"Maybe to make radar compulsory for all yachts more than 3 miles from shore."

More rules. A radar that is not much use except at short ranges. A requirement to have it operated by a certificated person. Regular inspections to see it is working. No way!!

"And a See Me type target enhancer compulsory too".

Imposes power requirements that many yachts cannot provide. It is still quite legal not to have an engine at all, by the way. Imagine the radar display on a ship coming up the Channel during the fastnet Race. Total white-out.

"And a liferaft"

No. This is a personal decision for the owner.

_______________________________________________________________

There is a danger here of using a sledgehammer to crack a nut. The Ouzo affair is a tragedy but sailing is actually a very safe sport and will not benefit from more nannying. Very few yachtsmen get killed by ships, I should think more get drowned in dinghy accidents.

 

[roger]

Reaction to Report

Clearly the radar reflectors normally in use are pretty ineffective. The Sea me does a better job - at X freqeuencies. Most yachts have enough power to operate one when needed. Nothing will be any good if there's no-one on the bridge.
Radar is useful but its demands are considerable in power consumption, training and use of manpower. If radar is to be used I would guess that you need at least two people on watch all the time. Thats a heavy load for a small boat and makes a two person crew impossible.
Even with GPS and radar combined at the wheel the load on a single person watch would be considerable - to say nothing of the likelihood of seasickness peering at the screen all the time.
I also tend to feel that if we all start giving way to big ships irrespective of the Colregs then our paths will become completely unpredictable to the conscientous ship drivers and the last state may be worse than the first.

 

[Robin]

The other option, only a trifle less sensible would be to ban all leisure vessels from water deeper than say 1m. That would do the trick.

 

[bilbobaggins]

I still believe firmly that one thing we can do right now - cheaply and easily - to enhance our safety in such 'close encounter' situations is to enhance our visibility.

Rule 2 - Responsibility ( the 'seamanship' rule ) tells us that
"a. Nothing....shall exonerate....the master....from the consequences....of the neglect of any precaution which may be required....by the special circumstances of the case" and
"b. In construing and complying....due regard shall be had to all dangers of....collision and to any special circumstances which may make a departure from these Rules necessary to avoid immediate danger."

That means, for me, a masthead strobe that can be manually switched on for short periods as an urgent 'attention-getter', or a pocket strobe that does the same job. 'ACR Electronics', and others, have been making them for decades. UK chandlers sell them. Civil aircraft large and small have been using them worldwide for exactly that purpose, and we have not had an outcry from confused pilots.....

Such use is commonplace in US waters, and it's high time WE insisted that the IMO provide us with some protection by removing the restrictive comment in Rule 36.

I shall continue to use a strobe, a white flare, a burning tar barrel, or anything else that comes to hand to help prevent me being run down because the other guy didn't see me. I'll happily discuss the proprieties afterwards.....


/forums/images/graemlins/shocked.gif

 

[Cornishman]

If the seaman lookout is wearing photochromic glasses after dark is this keeping a "proper lookout"? Would he have seen your strobe light?
[ QUOTE ]
and we have not had an outcry from confused pilots.....

[/ QUOTE ]

A few years ago the warning lights on the very high radio/TV transmitter masts (see North Hessary Tor on Dartmoor and Caradon Hill on Bodmin Moor for example) were changed from strobes to 5 FR vert because, I understand, that was what airline pilots had asked for.

 

[rhumlady]

While Bilbao might not have taken drastic action to avoid the Ouzo, he should have stopped and the Master should have been called to the bridge. As for the Seame, asahs been said it only works on one frequency. If you look at the copy of Chirp in this months PBO you will see several occurances of the use of only one frequency and that is not always the right one. It also shows that big ships don't always setup there radar properly.

 

[albineer]

[ QUOTE ]
If the seaman lookout is wearing photochromic glasses after dark is this keeping a "proper lookout"? Would he have seen your strobe light?
[ QUOTE ]

The MAIB are recommending that the MCA eliminates the practice on UK registered vessels but in my experience with photochromics a watch keeper would see a strobe light. Incidentally I've bought a pair of glasses with clear lenses for night sailing and driving.

I can't see how the crew of the Ouzo would have allowed the PoB to get so close if they had seen her in time. This is consistent with them not using their high power torch I suspect that she was close hauled on starboard and the PoB was masked by the sails and they didn't see the PoB soon enough so switching on strobes or letting off flares would have been impossible. IMHO of course

 

[Topcat47]

Bearing in mind the Ouzo passage plan, POB would have been comming up astern. POB altered course very slowly, although she was travelling at speed, and it was most likely POB that turned onto the collision course with the Ouzo. POB (like most ferries) is generally lit up like a christmas tree and picking out the steaming light from all the others is a SOD. Only by monitiring the relationship between the steaming light and the stbd nav light would Ouzo's crew have had eany idea what was going on. POB as overtaking vessel, had a clear duty to pass wide and clear. POB 25knots, Ouzo 4.5, how were they to get out of the way when they didn't know where POB was going?

White light on the bridge; Failure to check on the safety of smalle vessel; All culpable acts in defiance of good seamanship, but sadly typical of P&O IMO.

 

[l'escargot]

What it comes down to is what is the greater responsibility - to look out, or to be seen?

It is no good making sure you can be seen if there is no adequate look out - if you aren't spotted you can't get out of the way of a faster vessel bearing down on you. All the strobes and radar reflectors in the world won't stop you being mown down if nobody sees you.

The onus has to be on proper watch keeping on large vessels - it would seem that it was seriously lacking on PoB.

 

[Twister_Ken]

Birdseye, I must disagree.

As I read it the MAIB were very critical of the PoB.
White lights not red at the chart table.
Chart table blinds not closed.
(because of this every time someone went on the bridge, their night vision adaption went back to 0%)
Photochromic lenses.
Radar left on auto clutter control.
Insufficient hand over time between the two watch keepers, so that the new watch keeper hadn't yet got full night vision.
When the red light was spotted the bridge officer did not react right away.
When he did react he tried to 'dodge' using the slow turn rate autopilot, rather than the manual override.
At no point did he slow, stop, or reverse engines.
At no point did he attempt to ascertain if they had hit anything, nor did he turn the ship to check, nor did he call a senior officer to the bridge.

As to the maneuverability of the PoB, I once heard a Ferry Captain say that his ship could stop from full speed in her own length. Don't know whether this is true also of the PoB, but ferries are a lot more maneuverable than bulk carriers, container ships, etc.

As to the applicability of Colregs, can I remind you that a primary rule, the first one after the definitions, etc, have been expressed is Rule 5:

Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight as well as by hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision. Manifestly the PoB was not maintaining a proper lookout by sight.

Seems to me that the PoB fell down at so many points, that to use that as a reason to make wholesale changes to colregs is a nonsense.

One final thing. This incident is remarkable by its rareness. Thousands (probably tens or hundreds of thousands) of yachts transit the busy waters around Britain every year, without getting into any sort of drama, let alone fatal drama. It's all too easy to shout "Something must be done". But to base new laws on one incident is bad law making. The ban on handguns after Dunblane, or the Dangerous Dogs Act are just two examples that spring to mind. We still have deaths from handguns, we still have people mauled by dogs.

 

[[2068]]

>his ship could stop from full speed in her own length
I don't believe it!

 

[Lizzie_B]

'this incident is remarkable by its rareness'

Agreed. Which also makes it remarkable that PoB had already come to MAIB's notice for doing exactly the same thing (turning towards a yacht), fortunately without the tragic results.

We will never know what happened aboard Ouzo, they may well have seen PoB and assesed (correctly) that she would pass clear and then not watched her as she made her turn.

We have a good idea what happened on PoB.
Basically, very sloppy nightwatchkeeping procedures.

Incidentally, If PoB had even made a sound signal before turning it may have alerted Ouzo in time for the accident to be averted. We will never know.

 

[johna]

At no point did he attempt to ascertain if they had hit anything, nor did he turn the ship to check, nor did he call a senior officer to the bridge.[unquote]

This is what I find so unbelievable a call to the Coast Guard at this time may well have saved lives.

 

[Birdseye]

What is in my mind is the unreality of expecting a 38000 tonne ship to manoeuvre round a 26ft 1.5 tonne sailing yacht.

I too have heard it said that a ferry can stop in its own length but the person telling me explained that it would afterwards have to go into dry dock for repair. Assuming this is correct it means that the watch officer has to decide whether to risk injury on board and serious damage to his ship (not to mention probable dismissal). So you are not sure if a risk of collision exists - do you risk your ship? Do you stop dead in the water, abort your voyage, risk legal action from disgruntled passengers etc to try (you may not find the small boat) and check if the yacht is OK when you have seen her lights?

I still think the best way is for small boats to be obliged to keep out of the way at all times. This way, responsibilities are clear and practical. To implement that, they need the kit to do so - radar and marpa. As back up see-me and liferaft and epirb.

Boats can easily be modified to give enough electric power to do this. The definition of small is easy enough - there are few yachts above 50 ft and few coasters below. Recognition could be by flashing strobe.

 

[Twister_Ken]

>I still think the best way is for small boats to be obliged to keep out of the way at all times.<

I still think the best way is for big boats to comply with Rule 5 and keep a proper lookout.

 

[Gargleblaster]

When I first saw this fellow 10 minutes before this photo, I thought it was a spinnaker coming up behind me. He must have seen me as he has turned to port to avoid me. I have adjusted my course to starboard just in case. Even with my adjustment in course. If he had not avoided me or had made a course adjustment towards me there is no way I could have avoided him.
I think the problem in the Ouzo case was they did not know which way to turn when the PoB started her course change. I often cross the TSS between Dover- Boulogne, Boulogne-Dungeness, I find that the best tactic is to maintain your course at right angles to the shipping unless the ships that come up on a collision course [rare] don't change theirs, then I will either turn to pass behind them and/or slow down if under engine. In most situations they have far better control over the situation with their speed than I do. This seems to work well for all parties.

 

[jonjo]

[ QUOTE ]
What is in my mind is the unreality of expecting a 38000 tonne ship to maneuver round a 26ft 1.5 tonne sailing yacht.

[/ QUOTE ]
Have you read the report? The best guess is the PoB turned towards the Ouzo and mowed it down or swamped it.

[ QUOTE ]
I too have heard it said that a ferry can stop in its own length but the person telling me explained that it would afterwards have to go into dry dock for repair. Assuming this is correct it means that the watch officer has to decide whether to risk injury on board and serious damage to his ship (not to mention probable dismissal)

[/ QUOTE ]
Why do you present options as such daft extremes?

Given the low grade leisure-user distress dross that choppers are launched for each summer weekend in the Solent do you think Solent Coastguard would have hesitated to summon emergency services if the master of the PoB had broadcast a concern that a small craft might have scraped down the side of his hull?

The MAIB report estimates that some of the crew survived many hours in the water, a simple VHF call could have saved lives.

I suspect this odd jobbing temporary OOW probably did not want to prejudice future assignments with P&O by invoking a distress situation. A full time OOW with an established reputation within the crew might have had the self confidence to react differently.

 

[Stoshak]

The accident has shaken my faith in the integrity of professional mariners as a whole.
I look at the huge number of vessels roaring up and down the Channel, registered under all sorts of flags of convenience, and I wonder which ones I can actually trust to comply with the Col Regs. I can't distinguish between the good ones and the bad.
This insecurity leads me to believe that we have to assume that none of them is keeping a proper watch for small vessels.
So I intend to navigate in future on the basis that there is no one on the bridge.
What else can one do?
I would like to see a bit more support for the leisure sailor in this respect from CGA and MAIB. I see lots of fragmented advice leading us towards Seeme, liferafts, and so on , but no top down approach aimed at preventing these sorts of accidents.

 

[landaftaf]

[ QUOTE ]
So I intend to navigate in future on the basis that there is no one on the bridge.

[/ QUOTE ]

sound advice ....... but if you think about it, if there was no one on the bridge of the PoB the vessel would not have presumably altered towards the yot .......

What else can one do?

well - ensure a small boat at night can be seen from as great a distance off as possible ....... both visually and electronically


[ QUOTE ]
I would like to see a bit more support for the leisure sailor in this respect from CGA and MAIB. I see lots of fragmented advice leading us towards Seeme, liferafts, and so on , but no top down approach aimed at preventing these sorts of accidents.

[/ QUOTE ]

what do you suggest is implemented - deck officers and ratings forming part of a navigational watch are regularly checked for fitness, including sight.
they are certified as competent by regulatory authorities - part of which is a through working knowledge of the the Col Regs
they are assisted by electronic means supplementing a visual watch to maximise the chance of detecting other vessels
they are (or should be) acting on behalf of the Master, who is there ensuring the highest standards are maintained ..............

maybe an additional lookout should have been posted, this seems obvious in retrospect but not mentioned in the report

the question as to just what the OOW was doing for (?) so long and (?) so often in the chartroom has not been asked

but the biggest question remains as to why the yot wasnt seen and / or the yot didnt see the PoB until it was too late to take effective avoiding action - this is the crux of the matter

another question is - was the action taken after the event consistent with good seamanship

another question could be - why was no entry in the deck log made

without the facts known from the yots perspective, it is not possible to apportion blame for the probable near miss or collision - as some seem to have done /forums/images/graemlins/confused.gif

and finally - an epirb is specifically designed for just this sort of event .......... why not introduce a rule whereby all vessels must have one before casting off