alant
Well-Known Member
See post 104. Sounds more like a good 8 at Dover around 6am, and rising.
Its not simply just the wind strength, the tidal flow past Dover can be very strong, with accompanying bad conditions close in.
See post 104. Sounds more like a good 8 at Dover around 6am, and rising.
AFAIC the 1100 forecast isn't relevant because the critical point was when they passed Eastbourne. AFAIC the only forecast that matters in establishing if they meant to be out in the 10/11 or not is the last one the heard before they passed Eastbourne.
The MAIB report at the time indicated that the condisions were F6 + rather than F10
See post 104. Sounds more like a good 8 at Dover around 6am, and rising.
The actual values on the night were posted by Photodog and I *think* the forecasts came from the YM article, so that's where my assertion in post 9 came from. It was undisputed in the last thread on this but it's worth double checking so it would be nice if someone with time to google or access to the YM article could post the forecasts Sunday evening and during the night.
The F11 imminent forecast came at 04:00 which was 3 hours past Eastbourne, I assume that was shortly after it was issued.
All of which supports CS's version that they planned to be in Dover about 6-7am before the F10 kicked off and *would have been* if a freak wave hadn't damaged the steering. Certainly pushing the weather window but CS freely admits that.
Whilst I would dispute that a skipper in such circumstances should rely on a single forecast for such an important action
He passed Beachy Head at 1am with 48 miles to go, and had averaged a bit over 6kn over the ground thus far. At 6am he was still underway and 12 miles to get to Dover. Dover was always more like 0730 to 0800. At 0600 - 0700 he would not have got into Dover - it was too dangerous, and he wasn't there.
The critical part of the process were the decisions to continue based on the forecasts available.
I found the following on a site where someone records the forecasts though.
AFAIC the 1100 forecast isn't relevant because the critical point was when they passed Eastbourne. AFAIC the only forecast that matters in establishing if they meant to be out in the 10/11 or not is the last one the heard before they passed Eastbourne. CS says that forecast gave him a window to get to Dover (although he accepts he pushed that window). So we need to see that forecast to find out if CS is right about that and I'm certain we've seen that forecast in one of these threads or in the YM interview with CS.
Why has news from the trial dried up? Is the prosecution case more interesting to the press than defence?
I think this is the one we're really interested in:
http://simonholliday.com/shippingforecast/issue/OTQzOTMw
Fisher, German Bight, Humber, Thames, Dover
South or southwest, veering west later, 7, increasing gale 8 to storm 10, perhaps violent storm 11 later. Rain or squally showers. Good, occasionally poor.
Wight, Portland, Plymouth
Southwest 7, increasing gale 8 to storm 10, veering west 6 to gale 8 later. Rain or squally showers. Good, occasionally poor.
The dispute is whether or not they *intended* to be out in a ten. I maintain they didn't and were workign to a plan that they thought would get them in before the worst of the weather.
At the risk of repeating myself, to me, "Great F8/9 maybe even F10 Tue!!! At least it's from west so just run under storm jib!!! May even use Trysail!!!!" sounds like a crystal clear statement of intent.
Michael, I wholly agree with your post.
However, there is one factor missing and it is this :
The vessel set out unprepared for heavy weather.
It did not carry an emergency tiller in the event of steering failure.
And it did not carry a drogue, essential if heaving to in heavy seas under bare poles or under a handkerchief jib.
If the vessel had been properly equipped as above, the outcome would have been very different.
The root cause is lack of having the right kit on board at the time.
I cannot understand someone setting out expecting a hooley in the neck of a funnel without ensuring the vessel is properly kitted out, is my view.
Where did this come from? Liquid Vortex was commercially coded. It must have had an emergency tiller. However, it would have been next to useless in those conditions. To use the emergency tiller with the wheel jammed they would have had to remove the wheel which would probably have taken longer than straightening it – even assuming they carried and could find the right socket. The bottom of the wheel runs in a deep trough in the cockpit floor with only a couple of inches clearance fore and aft. I have a similar wheel but would not attempt to use the emergency tiller if the cables to the wheel were intact, the emergency tiller has to stop short of the binnacle and is much too short to cope with those seas. Much easier to do what they did and straighten the wheel. If you cannot do it by hand all that is needed is a block mounted aft and a line to a winch.
The only use for a drogue in this instance would have been to stabilise the yacht under tow. This wasn’t the Southern Ocean where there might be a risk of pitchpoling and there is no suggestion that they were broaching. In the conditions they experienced a yacht like Liquid Vortex is much more stable and controllable running fast. (see post 96) Heaving to with a drogue out whilst upwind and uptide of the Goodwins would have been lunacy. I estimate she would have been running at a displacement speed of 8/9 knots with frequent surfs in the low teens. Running with a drogue would only have slowed her to about 5/6 knots but would probably have stopped the surfing and made her much more vulnerable to pooping.
+1
Is that intent criminal?
Interesting to see the S or SW in the midnight forecast. Perhaps there was sufficient S in the wind to make Eastbourne a no go port. Perhaps he began realising by then then not going into Newhaven was a mistake, but as has been discussed before the whole passage plan gave so few alternatives.