Hoegh Osaka!

[prv]

The report's just come out. Not read the whole thing yet, but the summary is interesting. Doesn't mention any mechanical failure, of ballast systems and the like. Basically they just put all the heavy stuff up top with not much (fuel etc) down below, and it fell over at the first corner. D'oh.

Pete

 

[macd]

"Crucially, the assumed distribution of ballast on board, bore no resemblance to reality, which resulted in the ship leaving Southampton with a higher centre of gravity than normal."

"The estimated weight of cargo was also less than the actual weight."

"A loading computer is an effective and useful tool for the safe running of a ship. However, its output can only be as accurate as the information entered into it."

So a classic case of GIGO?

 

[BrianH]

I actually witnessed such an accident in the 1960s while sailing across the Tees entrance from Whitby, bound for Sunderland. Well, not quite witnessed but was in the vicinity. I was single-handed, the AP engaged and went below after noting that I was well clear of a small freighter exiting the Tees. When I later emerged there was no freighter, it had disappeared in a matter of minutes. I had no VHF - they were very rare in those days - and put into Hartlepool to report what I had seen - then not seen. However, the loss was already known.

The ship had arrived from Scotland loaded with timber, taken on steel rods from the steelworks at Redcar and loaded the steel on top of the timber to save time both loading and unloading as the steel was destined for a port before the timber. Out of the Tees she turned to starboard to sail south and rolled over immediately and sank, drowning all on board.

 

[dom]

So a classic case of GIGO?

As the captain "falsified" the ballast soundings on a daily basis because all but one of the ballast gauges were bust, Yup! My favourite line was the initial wonderfully British understatement of the pilot when he instructed:

2109:10 “Midships” immediately followed by the comment “She’s very tender captain”

​

Followed 80 seconds later by:

At 2110:30, the pilot gave the order to ‘‘stop engines’’, and soon afterwards he asked‘‘what the hell is the GM of this vessel?’’
​

Now take a look at the GZ curve in Fig 30 :ambivalence:

Tks Pete, what a total bunch of numskulls. What I also liked was that with all of the DSCs and other whatnots, the pilot clambered down the heeling bridge to retrieve his mobile in order to call VTS!

 

[sailorman]

Land Rovers were estimated to be two tonnes each but actually weighed significantly more, which accounted for almost 350 extra tonnes.
The report said: "Cargo distribution was such that the upper vehicle decks were full while the lower vehicle decks were lightly loaded.
"The ship's inadequate stability had not been identified as no accurate stability calculation had been carried out before the ship sailed."
It also said no stability estimation had been completed after all the cargo had been loaded, which had "become the norm" in the car carrier sector in general.

As was sailing with the front door open, until after the Herald of Free Enterprise

 

[dom]

.
As was sailing with the front door open, until after the Herald of Free Enterprise

Yes, the MAIB make a lot of the fact that too much weight was on top. I wonder if this applies to passenger liners:- plumpish ladies and porky blokes on Deck 1, rugby players on Deck 2, .........ballerinas on Deck 11 and schoolchildren on Deck 12

 

[macd]

What I also liked was that with all of the DSCs and other whatnots, the pilot clambered down the heeling bridge to retrieve his mobile in order to call VTS!

Yes. There's a note that because of the angle of heel, no-one could reach a VHF.

 

[DJE]

Now take a look at the GZ curve in Fig 30 :ambivalence:

Always said those things are more stable at 45 degrees heel than they are upright.

 

[prv]

What I also liked was that with all of the DSCs and other whatnots, the pilot clambered down the heeling bridge to retrieve his mobile in order to call VTS!

It does say that the ship blacked out. I believe there has to be a local battery backup for some of the radios etc, but possibly the changeover wasn't automatic? So either the pilot has to go looking for an unfamiliar switch to select battery power and reactivate the dead radios (or get the 3O or helmsman to do the same), or he goes straight to the phone in his jacket.

Pete

 

[dom]

Always said those things are more stable at 45 degrees heel than they are upright.

Yup, you certainly nailed that one! So, what's the best way forward?

Prob easiest to alter these ships to twin screws and trendy new AWB twin-rudders. With better cargo lashings they could then happily drive around on a 40-50 degree tilt

 

[Way]

Genuinely find it a bit disgusting. There seems to be a real lack of professionalism in the industry. Badly loaded cargo and falsified records, ferries and cargo ships racing too fast through fog and either killing people or sinking boats - and we all just seem to shrug. How many incidents have to happen before something is done? If the airline industry was run like this then no one would fly

 

[Giblets]

Intrigued to see that the pilot did obviously not have access to a HH VHF and had to reply on a mobile phone.

 

[prv]

Intrigued to see that the pilot did obviously not have access to a HH VHF and had to reply on a mobile phone.

Not that surprising really, a handheld wouldn't reach VTS from out by the Nab, so why have two different radios for different phases of the pilotage? As long as they don't put all the diggers on the top deck and roll the thing over, there's always going to be a fixed set for the pilot to use.

Pete

 

[AntarcticPilot]

I've just scanned the report (HERE, incidentally), and was awe-struck by the idea (section 1.6.5) that you could keep track of the contents of ballast tanks by simply adding and subtracting weight estimated from the run-time of the ballast pumps! It simply ain't so - any minor discrepancy in either the estimation of the run-time of the pumps or of the rate of flow would rapidly accumulate so that the actual contents of the tanks would bear little or no relationship to the estimate. This is a well-known issue in computer programming - rounding errors mean that you can't keep track of a cumulative value by adding and subtracting successively from it, at least not if you expect the result to be accurate!

 

[Biggles Wader]

I've just scanned the report (HERE, incidentally), and was awe-struck by the idea (section 1.6.5) that you could keep track of the contents of ballast tanks by simply adding and subtracting weight estimated from the run-time of the ballast pumps! It simply ain't so - any minor discrepancy in either the estimation of the run-time of the pumps or of the rate of flow would rapidly accumulate so that the actual contents of the tanks would bear little or no relationship to the estimate. This is a well-known issue in computer programming - rounding errors mean that you can't keep track of a cumulative value by adding and subtracting successively from it, at least not if you expect the result to be accurate!

It used to be the ships carpenters job to sound every space every day as routine,and more often if anything was going on such as ballast transfers.Its utterly astounding that officers on inherently unstable ships pay such scant regard to stability.This is not an isolated example either.

 

[Way]

+1

It all looks so casual. Getting the weight of Range Rovers wrong by a few hundred kilos a piece.

I've just scanned the report (HERE, incidentally), and was awe-struck by the idea (section 1.6.5) that you could keep track of the contents of ballast tanks by simply adding and subtracting weight estimated from the run-time of the ballast pumps! It simply ain't so - any minor discrepancy in either the estimation of the run-time of the pumps or of the rate of flow would rapidly accumulate so that the actual contents of the tanks would bear little or no relationship to the estimate. This is a well-known issue in computer programming - rounding errors mean that you can't keep track of a cumulative value by adding and subtracting successively from it, at least not if you expect the result to be accurate!

 

[prv]

Getting the weight of Range Rovers wrong by a few hundred kilos a piece.

That one's particularly unfortunate when apparently the barcode-scanning system had the correct weight for each item, but wasn't connected to the loading system which just used rough estimates.

Pete

 

[duncan99210]

I remember after the Herald of Free Enterprise capsized off Zeebrugge, one of the measure brought in to help prevent it happening again was the need to weigh each HGV loaded to a ro-ro ferry. This was to enable the chief officer to carry out stability calculations. I was, and remain so today, sceptical that this measure ever led to ferry officers doing any meaningful stability calculations before departure. This report tends to reinforce my scepticism.
Time constraints imposed by ship operating companies tend to lead crews to find the easiest and fastest way to turn the vessel round. When this lack of time is added to poor maintenance (ballast tank gauges not working), inadequate supervision on board (estimated ballast tank contents rather than dipped tanks) and negligent supervision by the operating company you have a recipe for incidents like this.
I spent a fair bit of time inspecting Army units. Where I found most problems was where unit staff didn't understand why they were doing things in a certain way, but merely following instructions by rote (ie ticking the boxes on a checklist), things tended to go wrong and senior staff spent much of their time in crisis management. Where unit staff understood their position in the system and why they needed to comply with instructions things tended to both work well and safely.
It seems to me that the crew on Osaka had fallen into a routine which worked just so a long as nothing significant changed. But their corner cutting and lack of attention to simple matters of detail fell apart when circumstances changed in terms of itinerary and loading. Lucky that no fatalities or major pollution occurred in this particular instance.

 

[mjcoon]

I've just scanned the report (HERE, incidentally), and was awe-struck by the idea (section 1.6.5) that you could keep track of the contents of ballast tanks by simply adding and subtracting weight estimated from the run-time of the ballast pumps! It simply ain't so - any minor discrepancy in either the estimation of the run-time of the pumps or of the rate of flow would rapidly accumulate so that the actual contents of the tanks would bear little or no relationship to the estimate. This is a well-known issue in computer programming - rounding errors mean that you can't keep track of a cumulative value by adding and subtracting successively from it, at least not if you expect the result to be accurate!

Isn't that the same principle as dead reckoning?

Mike.

 

[prv]

Isn't that the same principle as dead reckoning?

Yes, and if you do that for several weeks without a fix you'll be hopelessly adrift too

Pete