Seven Spades
Well-known member
500 years ago The Mary Rose suffered a similar problem.
Hoegh Osaka!
- Thread starter prv
- Start date
sailorman
Well-known member
"Lessons will be Learned"
chrishscorp
Well-known member
It may be that the contents of the conversation with VTS he didnt want to put over the VHF which isnt private.
it is concerning that this is the third one to fall over
sailorman
Well-known member
In the light of #5 ( 350 tonnes above guestimate & above the WL ) its surprising there havnt been more
superheat6k
Well-known member
Radio Solent played the original claims that fine seamanship placed the ship on to the Brambles Bank, rather than sheer luck that the ship veered round completely out of control and fortunately God had intervened and placed the Brambles there ready for them.
A few hundred yards further on and she may have turned turtle and foundered right in the middle of the main ship channel, shutting down Southampton Port and Fawley refinery for months, let alone the inevitable loss of life.
Utter incompetence on a grand scale.
I wonder what the MAIB will say about the more recent grounding ?
A few hundred yards further on and she may have turned turtle and foundered right in the middle of the main ship channel, shutting down Southampton Port and Fawley refinery for months, let alone the inevitable loss of life.
Utter incompetence on a grand scale.
I wonder what the MAIB will say about the more recent grounding ?
NormanB
Well-known member
No it didn't.
NormanB
Well-known member
It is always interesting to observe the underpinning failures from these sorts of incidents and investigations.
They inevitably come down to human factors.
The challenge is how do you maintain standards in an industry which cuts costs to the bone and cuts corners as a matter of routine.
I wonder if the marine insurance industry could be the 'agency' to cut across flag legislation and actually impact on standards of operation.
They inevitably come down to human factors.
The challenge is how do you maintain standards in an industry which cuts costs to the bone and cuts corners as a matter of routine.
I wonder if the marine insurance industry could be the 'agency' to cut across flag legislation and actually impact on standards of operation.
VicS
Well-known member
DJE
Well-known member
I was more than half serious about the "more stable at 45 degrees" point. There have been a few incidents recently where ships like this have heeled to extreme angles and the been successfully salvaged. If the hull isn't damaged they seem to have great form stability at that angle.
I agree with your main point - these are complicated vessels and only safe if carefully managed.
Seven Spades
Well-known member
Yes it did, it suffered a similar problem. They added 20 tons of ordinance, at a high level this affected the centre of gravity, it was not the only reason, but this is a similar problem.
ChrisRayner
Member
This is the peanuts and monkeys effect. Widespread in unglamorous and financially straitened sectors. Soon to be observed in health services and education.?
sailorman
Well-known member
The Osaka didnt have gun ports
AntarcticPilot
Well-known member
The report notes that because of the angle of heel, the VHF was inaccessible.
dom
Well-known member
Allianz produce a yearly report on shipping accidents and according to it 75 large ships went down in 2015. Of these:
"Foundered (sunk or submerged) is the main cause of loss accounting foralmost half (47%) of all losses over the past decade. Wrecked/stranded(aground) is the second major cause of total losses (20%). However,such incidents have declined year-on-year since 2011".
Link if interested and a bit about Hoegh Osaka on P16: https://www.allianz.com/v_1427190309000/media/press/document/other/Shipping-Review-2015.pdf
DJE
Well-known member
A bit of a clue here perhaps:
The chief officer began to lift the stern ramp, which caused the ship to list to starboard. The pilot commented on the list, which was estimated as 7° and well in excess of the usual 1-2° normally experienced.
The chief officer began to lift the stern ramp, which caused the ship to list to starboard. The pilot commented on the list, which was estimated as 7° and well in excess of the usual 1-2° normally experienced.
dunedin
Well-known member
In amongst the catalogue of unprofessional failings, two things stand out to me
(a). In a ship type which seems to need water ballast to have any stability, all but one of the ballast tank gauges had failed and nobody bothered to repair them;
(b) Putting aside all the loading computers etc, nobody thought that putting a full load of heavy Range Rovers in the topmost decks whilst the lower decks were largely empty might have an adverse impact on stability!
(a). In a ship type which seems to need water ballast to have any stability, all but one of the ballast tank gauges had failed and nobody bothered to repair them;
(b) Putting aside all the loading computers etc, nobody thought that putting a full load of heavy Range Rovers in the topmost decks whilst the lower decks were largely empty might have an adverse impact on stability!
chrishscorp
Well-known member
:encouragement: i had not read that bit of the report
I am surprised that a vessel of that size does not have several positions on the bridge where the vhf can be used, for just that eventuality or indeed for just coming alongside for comms with the guys on the dockside/deck. :ambivalence:
NormanB
Well-known member
This is also a problem of 'passing certificates' - it is all too easy to do so without having a real understanding.
The exposure of sticking to the 'original' loading plan even though the itinerary made a nonsense of it showed the complete lack of understanding of ship stability by:
A. The Port Captain.
B. The loading contractor (forget the name).
C. The Chief Officer.
D. The Captain.
The Chief Officer was probably the most culpable and ineffectual by failing to stamp his authority over the Port Captain (whose behaviour was both outrageous and discourteous). However the Captain.......carries the responsibility for the safety of his vessel.
The exposure of sticking to the 'original' loading plan even though the itinerary made a nonsense of it showed the complete lack of understanding of ship stability by:
A. The Port Captain.
B. The loading contractor (forget the name).
C. The Chief Officer.
D. The Captain.
The Chief Officer was probably the most culpable and ineffectual by failing to stamp his authority over the Port Captain (whose behaviour was both outrageous and discourteous). However the Captain.......carries the responsibility for the safety of his vessel.
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lpdsn
New member
Maybe they should just gimble the entire wheelhouse.