Cheeki Rafiki yacht operator cleared over sailor deaths

I do wonder whether these had anything to do with it:

1.12.2 Groundings, damage and repairs August 2007 - grounding During Cowes Week in August 2007 Cheeki Rafiki suffered what was described as a ‘light grounding’ in Stanswood Bay, in The Solent. It was subsequently inspected by a GRP repairer who had the vessel lifted out of the water and temporarily rested it on its keel to enable inspection for signs of hull deflection. The matrix was then hammer tested in an attempt to identify detached areas. Repairs to the vessel were completed in September 2007.

6 Loose equipment. Equipment which was not permanently attached to the vessel or part of the vessel’s structure and could be removed from the vessel. This included safety equipment such as liferaft, EPIRB etc.
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The repair invoice detailed the following: ‘Remove floor boards and pipe work in way of damaged areas. Cut flanges off six bays, grind back hull, laminate and sides of structural floors. Bond structural floor to hull with GRP, lightly rub down and apply wax gel. Drill off limber holes, refit pipes and floors. Clean vessel. Lift plate washers and re bed’. Cheeki Rafiki’s keel was not removed to carry out these repairs.

October 2007 – keel dressed In October 2007, Cheeki Rafiki’s keel was dressed. It is not known how or when the damage that required the repair occurred. The invoice detailed the following:
‘Dress out damage to lead keel. Fill and fair with epoxy filler. Apply epoxy primer and two coats of patch antifouling.’ It was reported that an inspection of the vessel and its matrix had probably been completed during the time the vessel was under repair, with no other defects detected. However, no documentary evidence could be found to support this. 2010 Round the Island race – grounding During the 2010 Round the Island race, Cheeki Rafiki reportedly grounded at St Catherine’s Point on the Isle of Wight, after it ‘dropped on to the ground’ when in the trough of a wave.

Another report:
The court also heard how the vessel, which had grounded three times in three years, had an undetected fault with the keel bolts and that some of the bolts had been broken “for some time” before the yacht left the UK.

“In accordance with Section 100 of The Merchant Shipping Act, Douglas Innes, the yacht’s manager, had a legal responsibility to maintain the Cheeki Rafiki in a seaworthy condition, especially when considering her frequent groundings,” he adds. “And because of sloppy oversight, the coding surveyor failed to carry out a comprehensive survey when the Cheeki Rafiki was inspected for MCA Coding.”
 
I haven't read all the replies, but just hope that others in a similar situation may now consider getting the liferaft ready for quick inflation with people on deck until the leak issue is resolved.

Very easy in hindsight but a leaking yacht with a keel will go down quickly and if it is the keel, when that comes off you have no time to take action. I've called a mayday off the Lizard on a leaking yacht, mid ocean I would have dinghy in the water and life raft ready. Keels do come off. These were experienced sailors alarm bells should have been ringing as they had many miles to go. It's a sad loss but I hope it makes others think about the options they have whilst they still have options.
 
Yes. There's so much politicisation and control over employment these days, bit by bit all the flexibility is being taken away. The Stormforce "apprenticeship" scheme has much to commend it, I wish I'd had the chance when I was younger.

There is a real problem at the moment with low-grade jobs being recategorised as apprenticeships without appropriate training. It's just a way of avoiding paying properly: NMW for the first year of an apprenticeship (and for any apprentice under 19) is only £3.70 per hour. I completely agree that a scheme like the Stormforce one could be the basis of a good apprenticeship, but only if fairly paid.

The (RYA accredited) sailing centre near me takes on young people as trainee instructors every year. They acquire various qualification (sailing, windsurfing, canoeing ...) as they go along, and they get paid, as they should.
 
There is a real problem at the moment with low-grade jobs being recategorised as apprenticeships without appropriate training. It's just a way of avoiding paying properly: NMW for the first year of an apprenticeship (and for any apprentice under 19) is only £3.70 per hour. I completely agree that a scheme like the Stormforce one could be the basis of a good apprenticeship, but only if fairly paid.

The (RYA accredited) sailing centre near me takes on young people as trainee instructors every year. They acquire various qualification (sailing, windsurfing, canoeing ...) as they go along, and they get paid, as they should.

We're not going to agree

I'll add that Doug Innes was kind enough to offer me cheap berthing for my boat prior to the 2013 Fastnet race.
 
I, and several others working in the marine industry, am aware that a new Oyster 565 was run very hard onto a granite part of Scotland a few years ago. It was promptly lifted and returned by road to Ipswitch heavily draped in tarpaulins, where 'unspecified repairs' were carried out. The boat was refloated and moved swiftly out of the country to Oyster's Palma base, with a degree of secrecy around her movements.

I wonder who owns her now.

I sailed on a Sweden 38 which hit a reef hard, the rear of the keel pushed up and lifted the hull box sections off the hull. The keel was dropped at the time and the internal reinforcement repaired and beefed up. A few years later in Majorca the yacht was lifted and the keel was again removed, inspected and re bedded before the boat was sold. The internal structure that had been repaired before was looked at in detail. I was also there for the second lift to supervise repair for the owner. I had no qualifications but was there to make sure the yard were thorough in their inspection and repairs. I'd have sailed it across an ocean again.
 
The Daily Mail would be proud of you for getting 'exploitation' in so quickly. Well done!

Can you please point me toward the positions you imagine exist where people are both being paid a living wage in an unqualified saving job AND simultaneously being trained and qualified to commercially endorsed YMO level for free in addition to that wage?

All "Modern Apprenticeships", such as those offered by the company my wife works for, and which are widely available. The vast majority of internships also attract some wage, especially where the intern is doing work that would otherwise require a regular employee. Our HR department pretty much refused to have people working for longer than a week or so without them being offered at least minimum wage.
 
All "Modern Apprenticeships", such as those offered by the company my wife works for, and which are widely available. The vast majority of internships also attract some wage, especially where the intern is doing work that would otherwise require a regular employee. Our HR department pretty much refused to have people working for longer than a week or so without them being offered at least minimum wage.

We are talking about a small business here, not one that is big enough for an HR department
 
I believe that's incorrect, the boat started taking on water the day before she sank, the crew had ample time to fire off the EPIRB, use their satphone and ready the liferaft if they thought there was a chance the boat was doomed. It was the following day they used the satphone to call Doug Innes who (and why not?) happened to be in a pub. Doug Innes did instruct the crew at that time, to ready the liferaftand he also alerted the coastguard albeit without too much urgency.

But he wasnt aboard Cheeki Rafiki, he was in a pub in the UK and I’m guessing he felt if the situation was critical and not just worrying, the crew would make the decision to activate the EPIRB and handle the Mayday broadcasts themselves if Doug Innes had broadcast a Mayday (Mayday Relay?) from a pub in the UK and the US rescue services had gone out 700 miles to rescue the crew only to find eveything was actually under control, they’d be pretty miffed. In my humble opinion, it was absolutely down to the crew to initiate Mayday procedures at the appropriate time. Doug Innes provided advice to the crew and alerted the UK coatguard to the possibility of a sinking, but he couldn’t have done anymore - the final decisions had to be made by the crew onboard Cheeki Rafiki.

This sums it up perfectly. It was never Doug's call, I know it is not popular here but this was the skippers call from the start. As soon as the leak was discovered the skipper was totally responsible for the safety of the crew and it his decision rightly or wrongly to make the Mayday call and abandon ship or otherwise.
 
I do wonder whether these had anything to do with it:

Not sure why you posted all this as it is nothing new - and of course it was relevant - just not to this case as the operation of the boat has already been dealt with by the courts.

The case that is being discussed here is about negligence of the individual and he has been found not guilty.
 
This sums it up perfectly. It was never Doug's call, I know it is not popular here but this was the skippers call from the start. As soon as the leak was discovered the skipper was totally responsible for the safety of the crew and it his decision rightly or wrongly to make the Mayday call and abandon ship or otherwise.

You're right - it's not a popular view here but I'm broadly in agreement. I know that Andy was a very capable sailor and practical seaman and such, but I wonder if he felt confident to tell Doug that he was abandoning ship without fear of "facing the music" when he got home and whether he was in a way deferring to Doug to make that decision on his behalf. Perhaps there's a wider issue regarding the preparedness of fast-track/young skippers. Don't get me wrong, I'm not necessarily suggesting that younger skippers can't be great skippers, nor am I suggesting that in this case, the skipper was at fault - it's more the interaction/dynamic between the skipper and the owner/manager that I'm thinking of. The skipper absolutely must feel empowered to make that call without 'permission' from the manager. And it's the manager's responsibility to create that environment for the skipper.
 
We are talking about a small business here, not one that is big enough for an HR department

My wife's company is small - less than 50 employees, I think, maybe a lot less. Certainly no HR department. The other organization was governmental, and in the public eye, so it felt very strongly that it had to be squeaky clean WRT employment etc.

By the way, I am simply giving examples to counter the idea that unpaid apprenticeships or internships are somehow "normal", without any judgement about the specific case of StormForce's offer. I seriously considered it for myself when newly retired, and entered into a dialogue with Doug Innes about it - interestingly, he would have been happy to take me despite my advancing years! I decided that the stress on other aspects of my life and also the taking away of opportunity for others who needed it more were over-riding concerns. I do wonder what if I'd gone ahead and been on "Cheeki Rafiki" for that voyage. Would I have done anything differently from the young men who died? AT the very least, one of them would have survived, even if I didn't. I hope I'd have been more cautious and less "push on" than they were, but who can tell?
 
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You're right - it's not a popular view here but I'm broadly in agreement. I know that Andy was a very capable sailor and practical seaman and such, but I wonder if he felt confident to tell Doug that he was abandoning ship without fear of "facing the music" when he got home and whether he was in a way deferring to Doug to make that decision on his behalf. Perhaps there's a wider issue regarding the preparedness of fast-track/young skippers. Don't get me wrong, I'm not necessarily suggesting that younger skippers can't be great skippers, nor am I suggesting that in this case, the skipper was at fault - it's more the interaction/dynamic between the skipper and the owner/manager that I'm thinking of. The skipper absolutely must feel empowered to make that call without 'permission' from the manager. And it's the manager's responsibility to create that environment for the skipper.

I partially agree with you. But abandoning a boat in mid-Atlantic is a big step when there probably appeared a very good chance of making it to the Azores. It is drummed into people that you step up into the liferaft and I don't believe they had enough warning of failure to make that decision. They were in a F6, so any partial attempt to get the liferaft ready would have been difficult. It would've been a case of get it out and use it once the decision had been taken and unfortunately things appear to have happened too quickly in the end. I certainly wouldn't blame the skipper for that.

There are people who will claim to be able to spot the impending loss of the keel by sniffing the bilge water. All from the comfort of their own armchair. But in reality keel loss is so rare in practical terms it remains down the list of suspects until there's definite evidence to point at it. Remember that the very experienced race crew of Hooligan V treated the early symptoms of keel loss by attempting to put in a reef. Even they didn't immediately recognise that they were heeling too much for the wind the were experiencing.
 
...... The (RYA accredited) sailing centre near me takes on young people as trainee instructors every year. They acquire various qualification (sailing, windsurfing, canoeing ...) as they go along, and they get paid, as they should.

That was the same as myself in the 1980s for dinghy sailing and offshore sailing, although I still had to pay my fee for examination and share for the boat. While the money was not great, I managed to buy a flat with a 100% mortgage in those days. In fact it was not uncommon in the 1980s for sail training yachts to pay a salary to their skippers and mates, even those under training. The Ocean Youth Club did not pay except their skippers and relied heavily on volunteers.

I am not sure when it changed but it was round the time that zero to hero courses started being offered which coincided with the late 1980s / early 1990s boom in sailing for leisure.
 
I partially agree with you. But abandoning a boat in mid-Atlantic is a big step when there probably appeared a very good chance of making it to the Azores. It is drummed into people that you step up into the liferaft and I don't believe they had enough warning of failure to make that decision. They were in a F6, so any partial attempt to get the liferaft ready would have been difficult. It would've been a case of get it out and use it once the decision had been taken and unfortunately things appear to have happened too quickly in the end. I certainly wouldn't blame the skipper for that.

There are people who will claim to be able to spot the impending loss of the keel by sniffing the bilge water. All from the comfort of their own armchair. But in reality keel loss is so rare in practical terms it remains down the list of suspects until there's definite evidence to point at it. Remember that the very experienced race crew of Hooligan V treated the early symptoms of keel loss by attempting to put in a reef. Even they didn't immediately recognise that they were heeling too much for the wind the were experiencing.

Very good post.

Remember that this was the first widely reported incident of a keel loss from a 40.7. I have no doubt that any skipper now of a 40.7 with an unexplained leak will be thinking that the keel might be about to fall off and preparing for such, but it isn't reasonable to have expected the skipper of Cheeky Rafiki to have made that assumption. And in my opinion those who are claiming that they would have acted differently are using the hindsight that he was not granted.

I think the bit about Doug being in the pub is, and always has been, mudslinging by the prosecution. Doug's role in the loss is really all about the coding issue, and the maintenance history of the boat. A jury have found him not guilty of negligent manslaughter. The question is now therefore what we the sailing population should make of that.

The keel fell off.
The person who was responsible for the maintenance of the boat was not negligent.

So does that mean that the maintenance schedule of the boat had no effect and the keel would have fallen off the most stringently maintained 40.7 with the same useage / groundings?
Where does that leave the designers and the builders with respect to the thousand odd 40.7s still sailing?
 
The keel fell off.
The person who was responsible for the maintenance of the boat was not negligent.

So does that mean that the maintenance schedule of the boat had no effect and the keel would have fallen off the most stringently maintained 40.7 with the same useage / groundings?
Where does that leave the designers and the builders with respect to the thousand odd 40.7s still sailing?

That's the big question. He was certainly not guilty in my opinion although of course he wasn't perfect.

What I guess most of the rest of us do is lift approximately annually, visually inspect the keel and, if the boat is of that age, get an insurance survey every seven years.

The worrying thing is that DI did more than that (because he was forced to because it was a commercial vessel). He was found guilty of a lesser charge because he postponed a Cat 2 survey, but I honestly don't believe that would've found this fault and it was notable that they had a surveyor say more or less that in the first trial and presumably the second.

So really I don't think that what is normal amongst private owners who care for their boats diligently would've spotted this with any degree of reliability. That's the worrying bit.

And although the focus is on 40.7s, it was not a unique design technique.
 
Very good post.

Remember that this was the first widely reported incident of a keel loss from a 40.7. I have no doubt that any skipper now of a 40.7 with an unexplained leak will be thinking that the keel might be about to fall off and preparing for such, but it isn't reasonable to have expected the skipper of Cheeky Rafiki to have made that assumption.

+1

...and there were three other people on board. If they'd strongly thought a Mayday was necessary they could have overpowered Andy and made the distress call themselves.

Nobody's going to risk death to save an elderly, knackered charter boat owned by a third party punter they've never even met. Clearly nobody on the boat was seriously anticipating this outcome, nor would any of us before we knew the failure mode which we only understand because of the publicity around this case.
 
He was found guilty of a lesser charge because he postponed a Cat 2 survey

I think the Cat 2 survey was legally irrelevant - rightly or wrongly it was deemed a commercial trip and therefore the boat should have been Cat 0.
 
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