Cheeki Rafiki deaths: Yacht firm boss guilty

[Fr J Hackett]

I thought it might be interesting at least for myself to go through the events and comment others may view the conclusions or comments differently.

1) CR had a grounding and was repaired largely in line with Beneteaus recommendations although the keel was not dropped.
Possible chance that some delammination of the hull and matrix was not discovered.
2) Boat transferred to Stormforce management with full history? and coded to Cat2 correctly including survey.
3) During the subsequent 2 years the boat grounded 3 times, no comprehensive survey done in light of the boats history and the knowledge of the 40.7 and its "problems"
4) During that time in compliance with its coding the vessel was inspected by the owner or managers (Stormforce) No records were kept of the inspections.
Was that wise or negligent in view of 3) and the boats history? I think not.
5) the boat was entered for the 2013 ARC presumably because it was outside the mainstream charter period for the UK and would enhance its earning, good business plan also it would compete in Caribbean regattas earning more money and afford both the owner and Innes a caribbean holiday! Good business plan.
6) The boat competed legally under ISAF regs in the ARC obviously complying in all respects. Innes either by deliberate omission or forgetfulness put the boat into the position where it would be in the caribbean when it was due for a full surveyor inspection to retain its cat2 classification.
Would it have been wise to arrange for this prior to the ARC as the vessel could then have been inspected by Innes himself in the Caribbean and retained its Cat classification. Would a surveyor given the boat and its grounding history, and intended use if it had been disclosed? have done an out of water inspection, dropped the keel even. We don't know but it would have been the wise thing for Innes to arrange.
6) The boat completes the ARC, has a successful time in the regattas ( no reported groundings wins its class at Antigua week, read is sailed hard and the owner and Innes have their holiday, everything good.
7) The time comes to relocate the boat, Innes realises the boat is out of classification and applies to the MCA for an extension, it is refused. His reasons for this is obvious that it was intended to sail back to the UK under ISAF rules i.e. start and return of race. There ensues a series of conversations between Innes and the MCA and Innes is advised, told even, that the return is not covered by ISAF rules and is a commercial voyage. Oh shit! This is going to cost a lot of money.
8) Options get boat to Cat 0, not possible no point in now getting to Cat 2 as the cat is out of the bag and MCA have said the vessel cannot return under ISAF rules anyway. He decides to try to circumvent the commercial aspect of the voyage and refunds the money for a milage building course to two of the crew in return the will pay only their share of expenses. The mate is an unpaid intern (employee) of Stormforce and the skipper is the boats regular captain and periodic employee of Stormforce who we are led to believe is going to do the delivery for pleasure? The MCA continue that the voyage is one of relocation for commercial reasons which will result in profit for the owner.
At this point the classification of the boat is irrelevant the key point is in Innes actions in trying to circumvent the aspect of commercial voyage with what are dubious tactics in relation to the crew and their payments, this shows knowledge and intent.
9) In full knowledge that the voyage is by definition a commercial one by its regulating authority Innes decides to go ahead with his plan
If all had gone well he might just have got away with it perhaps at worst censure by the MCA all he had to lose as opposed to shipping the boat back perhaps all in all £12,000. Not a good idea but money talks. Of course he could have dissolved the business arrangement with the owner and the owner could have got a delivery crew to sail it back but that would have been complicated and likely cost money to both Stormforce and the owner.
10) He makes preparations for the voyage with the skipper, they decide to go the logical Northern route but direct no stopover in Bermuda. The crew make visual inspection of the keel underwater and the keel bolts in the boat and detect nothing unsurprisingly.
Given the likelihood of light and contrary winds in the first 1000 miles was it wise to try for the direct route and as a consequence not plan for at least the possibility of stopping at Bermuda thus having the necessary charts. To some extent the lack of detection of any problems with the keel, if there were any at this point, is understandable. They should have had a more thorough survey earlier, if they had things would have been very different even if nothing had been detected, Innes would have largely discharged his duty of care.
11) The voyage commences and as could reasonably be expected it is mainly under engine, the precaution of a potential stop in Bermuda becomes evident but the preparation and planning for it is lacking.
​Innes clearly had a significant role to play in the planning of the return voyage how much input the skipper had is really not known but it does look that he was under instruction both unto departure and after as Innes was advising on routing.
12) Problems develop, water ingress the skipper is in contact with Innes who demonstrates good seamanship in advising the skipper where and what to look for and do to control the leak. He also increases the amount of "air time" for the sat phone.
​It is a little surprising that the skipper needed so much advice but there again given the stress of the situation and Innes undoubted experience understandable. The top up of phone time is it indicative of a little lack in planning or due to the new circumstances advisable to have more time, a little of both perhaps. What the events demonstrate and confirm is that Innes was the controlling mind in this venture.
13) after a series of phone calls with the situation worsening and Innes doing all that he possibly could from his position, I don't buy that he was an uncaring guy more concerned with his night in the pub, the communication is lost and a search commences. Positions for two PLBs are receivedthese are ones that have to be activated manually and held aloft. Given that the life raft was still on the vessel when it was found and the positions it seems clear the owners, skipper and mate were in the water when they were activated. The vessel almost certainly inverted without warning and the crew were thrown into the water or trapped in the hull and then left it. There chances of survival without the life raft were virtually zero.

So where does all this leave it? To my mind, the judges and the jurors Innes failed to equip the vessel and exercise his duty of care as is shown in the guilty verdict.
Was he guilty of manslaughter? I think that the cumulative events and omissions show that he made deliberate decisions based on financial reasoning when he could and should have done things differently, there is no other logical explanation for the actions that he took. In my mind and the judges he was guilty of causing the loss of CR and the deaths of 4 men by his negligence, the jury was split on the decision and it waits to be seen if the retrial will go ahead. I am not sure if the CPS have the option not to with the judge ordering a retrial, we need a lawyer to tell us.

 

[flaming]

Foreign operators just charter it out cheap to some one who wants to sail it back for them.

Hence my belief that overall safety would be improved if MCA Cat 0 made a little easier to get, and then the rules on commercial operation were tightened up to ensure that charter yachts crossing oceans were coded to Cat 0 and properly manned (CR was properly manned IMHO and not an issue) instead of the present situation.

Otherwise, it seems that the rules on commercial operation are going to be more rigorously enforced and that many UK charter operators are going to end up as foreign companies running foreign registered boats to get around the Cat 0 coding difficulties. This does not make anything safer for anyone.

What is interesting to me is the difference between ISAF cat 1 that CR would have had to be compliant with to race in the ARC and MCA cat 0, specifically on the structural side, and the provision of liferafts side.

Having read the MAIB report when it was published and again in the light of the trial, I feel that there were two opportunities to prevent the loss of life that anyone not on the boat could have influenced. The first was to identify the fact that the keel was compromised before it left Antigua, and the second was to provide the crew with a liferaft that was accessible once the keel had fallen off.

ISAF cat 1 fails on both counts. Nothing in those regs would require any form of structural survey, or mandate a float free liferaft.
MCA cat 0 gives a chance of both being caught. Sure a surveyor might not have caught the keel issues. But he might have done. And the float free liferaft - whilst very much a last resort - is the one thing that could have saved lives once the keel fell off.

Given that another keel fell off last month in the North Sea, with lives lost, I do think that ISAF will need to consider beefing up their code if it is to remain fit for purpose.

 

[Mark-1]

But the lack of coding indicates a negligent approach to managing the boat. As perhaps does going to the second pub when a problem is occurring. If I'm phoned up about a problem a few thousand miles away, I'm expected to drop what I'm doing and do everything I possibly can to sort it.
There are separate sections of the law about having the correct coding. These were not used, it was the catch-all section.
It might have made no difference had the boat had a 'just about in date' cat zero coding, with no survey since the last grounding.
There are other things too. The arrangements for comms seem a bit shapeless. Not a crime in itself but yet another indication of not being adequately on top of things.
The jury would not have been split had the only issues been
Was it a commercial cat zero trip : Yes
Was the boat coded for it : No.
People get fined about ten shillings for that.

No quarrel with any of that. Maybe that's what the jury had in mind, we just don't know.

Taking the 'general negligence' idea to the extreme:

1) Boats of this construction can be mortally damaged by grounding/hard use without any external sign.
2) All boats, especially Charter boats, suffer periodic groundings and hard use.

Therefore you could argue that a completely legal charter firm with all the right paperwork and doing regular keel inspections on a correctly coded boat could be still guilty under Section 100, *purely* on the basis that by design modern plastic boats of this design can never be safe enough for commercial use.

Might be bit tenuous, but food for thought.

There are separate sections of the law about having the correct coding.

Can someone point me at these, my google skills are weak.

 

[Uricanejack]

What is interesting to me is the difference between ISAF cat 1 that CR would have had to be compliant with to race in the ARC and MCA cat 0, specifically on the structural side, and the provision of liferafts side.

Having read the MAIB report when it was published and again in the light of the trial, I feel that there were two opportunities to prevent the loss of life that anyone not on the boat could have influenced. The first was to identify the fact that the keel was compromised before it left Antigua, and the second was to provide the crew with a liferaft that was accessible once the keel had fallen off.

ISAF cat 1 fails on both counts. Nothing in those regs would require any form of structural survey, or mandate a float free liferaft.
MCA cat 0 gives a chance of both being caught. Sure a surveyor might not have caught the keel issues. But he might have done. And the float free liferaft - whilst very much a last resort - is the one thing that could have saved lives once the keel fell off.

Given that another keel fell off last month in the North Sea, with lives lost, I do think that ISAF will need to consider beefing up their code if it is to remain fit for purpose.

I would add one more thing to your list.

Contact Coast Guard As soon as the leak from an unknown source was detected. Think about it middle of Atlantic vessel taking on water.
How long was the boat leaking I don't know.
Coast guard would have contacted AMVER. right away.
First Question Innes should have asked, have you contacted coast guard. He should have advised it right way.

As far as I know it wasn't part of the case. Its quite common for people to try and manage the problem for to long before calling for help.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

No quarrel with any of that. Maybe that's what the jury had in mind, we just don't know.

Taking the 'general negligence' idea to the extreme:

1) Boats of this construction can be mortally damaged by grounding/hard use without any external sign.
2) All boats, especially Charter boats, suffer periodic groundings and hard use.

Therefore you could argue that a completely legal charter firm with all the right paperwork and doing regular keel inspections on a correctly coded boat could be still guilty under Section 100, *purely* on the basis that by design modern plastic boats of this design can never be safe enough for commercial use.

Might be bit tenuous, but food for thought.



Can someone point me at these, my google skills are weak.

It is what is reasonably practicable, inspecting the keel for structural abnormalities out of the water is reasonably practicable, having done that you have gone a long way towards discharging your duty of care.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

I would add one more thing to your list.

Contact Coast Guard As soon as the leak from an unknown source was detected. Think about it middle of Atlantic vessel taking on water.
How long was the boat leaking I don't know.
Coast guard would have contacted AMVER. right away.
First Question Innes should have asked, have you contacted coast guard. He should have advised it right way.

As far as I know it wasn't part of the case. Its quite common for people to try and manage the problem for to long before calling for help.

No I think the correct procedure is to identify the cause of the leak and determined if it is possible to stop it, given a continuous leak of large proportions with no hope of stopping or identifying it then you call the coast guard and plan to abandon. In the first instance the skipper was not overly concerned it was as things got worse and then the authorities were contacted.

 

[lw395]

No quarrel with any of that. Maybe that's what the jury had in mind, we just don't know.

Taking the 'general negligence' idea to the extreme:

1) Boats of this construction can be mortally damaged by grounding/hard use without any external sign.
2) All boats, especially Charter boats, suffer periodic groundings and hard use.

Therefore you could argue that a completely legal charter firm with all the right paperwork and doing regular keel inspections on a correctly coded boat could be still guilty under Section 100, *purely* on the basis that by design modern plastic boats of this design can never be safe enough for commercial use.

Might be bit tenuous, but food for thought.
//.

Maybe so.
With our current knowledge, would a prudent person choose such a boat for charter use?
Loads of stuff that's sold for leisure or domestic use is marked 'not for commercial use' or has weasel words in the warranty.
I've just bought a ladder for instance. Domestic use only. I don't doubt there are shady window cleaners using the same.

 

[Mark-1]

Contact Coast Guard As soon as the leak from an unknown source was detected.

I don't think this was DI's judgement to make, that judgement was for the people on the boat alone.

As for calling for rescue every time a boat becomes a bit leaky, I don't think that's practical. Loads of boats have a bit of water sloshing in the bilge, loads of owners spend years chasing leaks that turn out to be round stanchion bolts or somesuch. Tragically in this case it went fatally wrong before it became clear that the leak was a symptom of a serious problem.

I would add one more thing to your list.

One thing I've half pondered that I'm sure has been covered in previous threads but I dont' recall: I can't remember the times of distances involved, but IIRC it was something like people were alive for about 20 hours 600 miles offshore. Is there really not any aircraft that could have covered a 1200 mile round trip and drop a couple of liferafts somewhere near the people in the water? Either military or charter? Seemingly not, but it doesn't seem beyond the wit of man to me. Don't the RAF use Nimrods our side of the pond for exactly that purpose? (Chances of the people getting to the liferaft might be remote, but worth a try? - In fact let's take that factor out, if it had been a flat calm for days, could that have been done.)

 

[Fr J Hackett]

I don't think this was DI's judgement to make, that judgement was for the people on the boat alone.

As for calling for rescue every time a boat becomes a bit leaky, I don't think that's practical. Loads of boats have a bit of water sloshing in the bilge, loads of owners spend years chasing leaks that turn out to be round stanchion bolts or somesuch. Tragically in this case it went fatally wrong before it became clear that the leak was a symptom of a serious problem.



One thing I've half pondered that I'm sure has been covered in previous threads but I dont' recall: I can't remember the times of distances involved, but IIRC it was something like people were alive for about 20 hours 600 miles offshore. Is there really not any aircraft that could have covered a 1200 mile round trip and drop a couple of liferafts somewhere near the people in the water? Either military or charter? Seemingly not, but it doesn't seem beyond the wit of man to me. Don't the RAF use Nimrods our side of the pond for exactly that purpose?

It's difficult enough trying to locate a MOB in moderate seas but in 5M waves 30+MPH winds no chance.

 

[lpdsn]

One thing I've half pondered that I'm sure has been covered in previous threads but I dont' recall: I can't remember the times of distances involved, but IIRC it was something like people were alive for about 20 hours 600 miles offshore. Is there really not any aircraft that could have covered a 1200 mile round trip and drop a couple of liferafts somewhere near the people in the water? Either military or charter? Seemingly not, but it doesn't seem beyond the wit of man to me. Don't the RAF use Nimrods our side of the pond for exactly that purpose?

There are. Apparently they did fly there. Couldn't find the crew so didn't drop the liferafts. It was covered in the MAIB report. They can't drop the liferafts until they identify where to drop them. Otherwise if they dropped them in the general area then spotted the crew twenty miles away...

 

[Mark-1]

​It is a little surprising that the skipper needed so much advice

Requesting advice isn't the same as 'needing' advice. Being given advice isn't the same as 'needing' advice.

From the details in the MAIB report it seems were already doing everything sensible in the situation. Crew competence wasn't a factor here at all.

 

[Mark-1]

There are. Apparently they did fly there. Couldn't find the crew so didn't drop the liferafts. It was covered in the MAIB report. They can't drop the liferafts until they identify where to drop them. Otherwise if they dropped them in the general area then spotted the crew twenty miles away...

Thanks, poor memory on my part.

EDIT: Just re-read the relevant part of the MAIB report. I'd completely forgotten, or perhaps it never struck me, how close they were to being rescued. If they'd found themselves near the bigger bits of debris, or had strobes or any debris they could improvise to make themselves more visible to the aircraft they'd have probably made it. Just adds a new layer of 'ifs' to the whole tradgedy.

 

[RobbieW]

....
There is currently no reason in law why, Charter companies could not get together and organise a Race from Antigua to Cowes every spring. Which could be entered by all their CAT 2 boats.

In casual conversation in the last couple of weeks I understand this has already happened, though its not obvious from the offerings of one or two companies that operate Cat 2 boats on the ARC.

 

[Kukri]

Similar to you I guess. I would also guess that you have never been responsible and criminally liable in a H&S sense for the activities of both yourself, others (employees) and systems designed to comply with law and regulations to protect people from themselves and the actions of others. It's a remarkably sobering experience.

You could not be more spectacularly mistaken. You may not have read my other posts on this thread. To save you the trouble, here is one:

I would like to make a general point.

The boat capsized because the keel fell off. The four men in her crew died either as a direct result of the capsize or because they could not get to the liferaft; we do not know which.

There seem to be a lot of people here who are keen to discuss the minutiae of MCA rules, M notices, etc.

The crew were not being paid; they were undertaking the trip for fun - for "sporting and pleasure purposes".

I live in the world of MCA rules - I operate British flag ships - it's how I earn my living. Before anyone rises to the dizzy height of Third Mate on a British ship, she or he has spent three years studying their profession including the rules that govern it, and been examined orally and in writing on their knowledge.

Before you all rush into getting the MCA involved in the activities of boats smaller than 45 ft LOA with crews who are not being paid - "I beseech you in the bowels of Christ - consider that you may be mistaken"

There are those here who know me and can confirm that I am not making it up - "references on request"...

 

[Mark-1]

In casual conversation in the last couple of weeks I understand this has already happened, though its not obvious from the offerings of one or two companies that operate Cat 2 boats on the ARC.

I think to really "stick it to the man" they should make the startline 59 miles off Antuiga and the finish line 59 miles off the UK coast.

 

[lpdsn]

I thought it might be interesting at least for myself to go through the events and comment others may view the conclusions or comments differently.

1) CR had a grounding and was repaired largely in line with Beneteaus recommendations although the keel was not dropped.
Possible chance that some delammination of the hull and matrix was not discovered.
2) Boat transferred to Stormforce management with full history? and coded to Cat2 correctly including survey.
3) During the subsequent 2 years the boat grounded 3 times, no comprehensive survey done in light of the boats history and the knowledge of the 40.7 and its "problems"
4) During that time in compliance with its coding the vessel was inspected by the owner or managers (Stormforce) No records were kept of the inspections.
Was that wise or negligent in view of 3) and the boats history? I think not.
5) the boat was entered for the 2013 ARC presumably because it was outside the mainstream charter period for the UK and would enhance its earning, good business plan also it would compete in Caribbean regattas earning more money and afford both the owner and Innes a caribbean holiday! Good business plan.
6) The boat competed legally under ISAF regs in the ARC obviously complying in all respects. Innes either by deliberate omission or forgetfulness put the boat into the position where it would be in the caribbean when it was due for a full surveyor inspection to retain its cat2 classification.
Would it have been wise to arrange for this prior to the ARC as the vessel could then have been inspected by Innes himself in the Caribbean and retained its Cat classification. Would a surveyor given the boat and its grounding history, and intended use if it had been disclosed? have done an out of water inspection, dropped the keel even. We don't know but it would have been the wise thing for Innes to arrange.
6) The boat completes the ARC, has a successful time in the regattas ( no reported groundings wins its class at Antigua week, read is sailed hard and the owner and Innes have their holiday, everything good.
7) The time comes to relocate the boat, Innes realises the boat is out of classification and applies to the MCA for an extension, it is refused. His reasons for this is obvious that it was intended to sail back to the UK under ISAF rules i.e. start and return of race. There ensues a series of conversations between Innes and the MCA and Innes is advised, told even, that the return is not covered by ISAF rules and is a commercial voyage. Oh shit! This is going to cost a lot of money.
8) Options get boat to Cat 0, not possible no point in now getting to Cat 2 as the cat is out of the bag and MCA have said the vessel cannot return under ISAF rules anyway. He decides to try to circumvent the commercial aspect of the voyage and refunds the money for a milage building course to two of the crew in return the will pay only their share of expenses. The mate is an unpaid intern (employee) of Stormforce and the skipper is the boats regular captain and periodic employee of Stormforce who we are led to believe is going to do the delivery for pleasure? The MCA continue that the voyage is one of relocation for commercial reasons which will result in profit for the owner.
At this point the classification of the boat is irrelevant the key point is in Innes actions in trying to circumvent the aspect of commercial voyage with what are dubious tactics in relation to the crew and their payments, this shows knowledge and intent.
9) In full knowledge that the voyage is by definition a commercial one by its regulating authority Innes decides to go ahead with his plan
If all had gone well he might just have got away with it perhaps at worst censure by the MCA all he had to lose as opposed to shipping the boat back perhaps all in all £12,000. Not a good idea but money talks. Of course he could have dissolved the business arrangement with the owner and the owner could have got a delivery crew to sail it back but that would have been complicated and likely cost money to both Stormforce and the owner.
10) He makes preparations for the voyage with the skipper, they decide to go the logical Northern route but direct no stopover in Bermuda. The crew make visual inspection of the keel underwater and the keel bolts in the boat and detect nothing unsurprisingly.
Given the likelihood of light and contrary winds in the first 1000 miles was it wise to try for the direct route and as a consequence not plan for at least the possibility of stopping at Bermuda thus having the necessary charts. To some extent the lack of detection of any problems with the keel, if there were any at this point, is understandable. They should have had a more thorough survey earlier, if they had things would have been very different even if nothing had been detected, Innes would have largely discharged his duty of care.
11) The voyage commences and as could reasonably be expected it is mainly under engine, the precaution of a potential stop in Bermuda becomes evident but the preparation and planning for it is lacking.
​Innes clearly had a significant role to play in the planning of the return voyage how much input the skipper had is really not known but it does look that he was under instruction both unto departure and after as Innes was advising on routing.
12) Problems develop, water ingress the skipper is in contact with Innes who demonstrates good seamanship in advising the skipper where and what to look for and do to control the leak. He also increases the amount of "air time" for the sat phone.
​It is a little surprising that the skipper needed so much advice but there again given the stress of the situation and Innes undoubted experience understandable. The top up of phone time is it indicative of a little lack in planning or due to the new circumstances advisable to have more time, a little of both perhaps. What the events demonstrate and confirm is that Innes was the controlling mind in this venture.
13) after a series of phone calls with the situation worsening and Innes doing all that he possibly could from his position, I don't buy that he was an uncaring guy more concerned with his night in the pub, the communication is lost and a search commences. Positions for two PLBs are receivedthese are ones that have to be activated manually and held aloft. Given that the life raft was still on the vessel when it was found and the positions it seems clear the owners, skipper and mate were in the water when they were activated. The vessel almost certainly inverted without warning and the crew were thrown into the water or trapped in the hull and then left it. There chances of survival without the life raft were virtually zero.

So where does all this leave it? To my mind, the judges and the jurors Innes failed to equip the vessel and exercise his duty of care as is shown in the guilty verdict.
Was he guilty of manslaughter? I think that the cumulative events and omissions show that he made deliberate decisions based on financial reasoning when he could and should have done things differently, there is no other logical explanation for the actions that he took. In my mind and the judges he was guilty of causing the loss of CR and the deaths of 4 men by his negligence, the jury was split on the decision and it waits to be seen if the retrial will go ahead. I am not sure if the CPS have the option not to with the judge ordering a retrial, we need a lawyer to tell us.

I agree with a lot of that, but not all.

I realise you want all business to be run like large multi-nationals or the civil service with lots more people doing the paperwork than doing the work but that's never going to happen in a small business. Of course you could create an environment where small businesses can't operate, but then who pays for the civil service. So, for example, the fact they only recorded the faults found in their internal surveys rather than spending a couple of days per boat writing up what they checked and found ok doesn't count.

Also please take out everything implying he was trying to get rich quick or wanting Carribean holidays. These businesses are very marginal. If he was getting rich quick he'd have expanded (or got a better suit/lawyer for the trial). Until I see any evidence to the contrary I'll continue to assume that it was a marginal business, that he was only doing this type of Carribean trade to keep the business going and that spending way over the odds would've quickly put him out of business. Then a delivery crew would've commenced the voyage quite legally to get the boat back.

Bermuda is a red herring because fuel was never an issue, which is all they'd have gained by stoppping there. It was disappointing however that the skipper didn't check they had a chart before setting off - the only mistake I can blame him for.

You're completely wrong on the mobile phone top-ups. There are money laundering regulations which are implemented by all/most mobile operators to prevent anyone building up too much on a prepaid account. What DI did was absolutely reasonable.

You're also going too far in your arguments for negligence/gross negligence. It is not negligent per se to cross the Atlantic in a 40.7 or similar boat. They are explicitly designed to a standard for that purpose (RDC Cat A). Any private citizen can do it. The coding issue was treated as a separate offence (for which he was found guilty). Hard to say it is GROSS negligence when many others, with slightly different commercial/paperwork positions, could've quite legally done it.

Similarly it was normal practice to lift out or inspect the bottom after a grounding, but it was NOT normal practice to drop the keel for the inspection and there is very good reason to believe that there is a much reduced chance of spotting significant damage without dropping the keel. So again, can't demonstrate gross negligence on DI's part there. I do think some blame should be shared around on that one and also that a means of reliably testing for de-bonding has to become normal practice, but that is aside from the g negligence argument.

You also have to accept the general understanding what was necessary to run these vessels at that time. There is no evidence that other operators were particularly concerned about de-bonding. Did the guidance for MCA surveys even say, make sure you thoroughly check for de-bonding of the floors? It should now, but I doubt it did then.

I am glad you agree with me about the irrelevance of the pub visits - but I suspect it was an influencial part of the prosecution case.

Anyway, I'm going to be offline for a few days after this, so enjoy the debate.

PS And there is obviously a lot of room for improvement regarding liferafts for ocean voyages on both ISAF (WS) and the MCAs part. Not easy as I suspect even float-free liferafts would've more likely blown away than been caught even if they had floated free after an inversion (they often don't when required and installed on fishing vessels)

 

[Kukri]

I agree with a lot of that, but not all.

I realise you want all business to be run like large multi-nationals or the civil service with lots more people doing the paperwork than doing the work but that's never going to happen in a small business. Of course you could create an environment where small businesses can't operate, but then who pays for the civil service. So, for example, the fact they only recorded the faults found in their internal surveys rather than spending a couple of days per boat writing up what they checked and found ok doesn't count.

Also please take out everything implying he was trying to get rich quick or wanting Carribean holidays. These businesses are very marginal. If he was getting rich quick he'd have expanded (or got a better suit/lawyer for the trial). Until I see any evidence to the contrary I'll continue to assume that it was a marginal business, that he was only doing this type of Carribean trade to keep the business going and that spending way over the odds would've quickly put him out of business. Then a delivery crew would've commenced the voyage quite legally to get the boat back.

Bermuda is a red herring because fuel was never an issue, which is all they'd have gained by stoppping there. It was disappointing however that the skipper didn't check they had a chart before setting off - the only mistake I can blame him for.

You're completely wrong on the mobile phone top-ups. There are money laundering regulations which are implemented by all/most mobile operators to prevent anyone building up too much on a prepaid account. What DI did was absolutely reasonable.

You're also going too far in your arguments for negligence/gross negligence. It is not negligent per se to cross the Atlantic in a 40.7 or similar boat. They are explicitly designed to a standard for that purpose (RDC Cat A). Any private citizen can do it. The coding issue was treated as a separate offence (for which he was found guilty). Hard to say it is GROSS negligence when many others, with slightly different commercial/paperwork positions, could've quite legally done it.

Similarly it was normal practice to lift out or inspect the bottom after a grounding, but it was NOT normal practice to drop the keel for the inspection and there is very good reason to believe that there is a much reduced chance of spotting significant damage without dropping the keel. So again, can't demonstrate gross negligence on DI's part there. I do think some blame should be shared around on that one and also that a means of reliably testing for de-bonding has to become normal practice, but that is aside from the g negligence argument.

You also have to accept the general understanding what was necessary to run these vessels at that time. There is no evidence that other operators were particularly concerned about de-bonding. Did the guidance for MCA surveys even say, make sure you thoroughly check for de-bonding of the floors? It should now, but I doubt it did then.

I am glad you agree with me about the irrelevance of the pub visits - but I suspect it was an influencial part of the prosecution case.

Anyway, I'm going to be offline for a few days after this, so enjoy the debate.

PS And there is obviously a lot of room for improvement regarding liferafts for ocean voyages on both ISAF (WS) and the MCAs part. Not easy as I suspect even float-free liferafts would've more likely blown away than been caught even if they had floated free after an inversion (they often don't when required and installed on fishing vessels)

+1.

 

[Kukri]

What is interesting to me is the difference between ISAF cat 1 that CR would have had to be compliant with to race in the ARC and MCA cat 0, specifically on the structural side, and the provision of liferafts side.

Having read the MAIB report when it was published and again in the light of the trial, I feel that there were two opportunities to prevent the loss of life that anyone not on the boat could have influenced. The first was to identify the fact that the keel was compromised before it left Antigua, and the second was to provide the crew with a liferaft that was accessible once the keel had fallen off.

ISAF cat 1 fails on both counts. Nothing in those regs would require any form of structural survey, or mandate a float free liferaft.
MCA cat 0 gives a chance of both being caught. Sure a surveyor might not have caught the keel issues. But he might have done. And the float free liferaft - whilst very much a last resort - is the one thing that could have saved lives once the keel fell off.

Given that another keel fell off last month in the North Sea, with lives lost, I do think that ISAF will need to consider beefing up their code if it is to remain fit for purpose.

I agree. Not that I know much about it. My only experience on a Cat 0 boat was a day out in the Solent organised by the MCA (!) using two of Sir RK-J's RTW Clippers (it was "big ship folks vs yotties" - the big ship folks won haha!") I remember looking round that boat and thinking two thoughts - "This boat's design and outfit have been taken very seriously indeed" and "There's nothing here that I can criticise, but she must have cost a fortune!"

Surprised that nobody else has raised the death of Frans Maas - a very respected designer, in his own, not so very extreme, boat, and not in a position where she might have just clouted the tail of a bank.

 

[lw395]

Requesting advice isn't the same as 'needing' advice. Being given advice isn't the same as 'needing' advice.

From the details in the MAIB report it seems were already doing everything sensible in the situation. Crew competence wasn't a factor here at all.

With hindsight:
They held off reporting taking on a lot of water for over 24hours
When reporting it they were still talking about fresh water tanks.
In this condition, they continued to beat towards a depression forecast to give 35knots and 6m waves.

I'm not going to call that a lack of competence, but it is a series of actions that had grave consequences.
Had they
reported the leak earlier
Hove to or whatever makes it easiest to rule out stanchion or deck leaks and bail the boat

Then informed decisions could have been made before the weather hit them.
Had USCG been informed much earlier, they could have done a lot more.

 

[Mark-1]

They held off reporting taking on a lot of water for over 24hours
When reporting it they were still talking about fresh water tanks.
In this condition, they continued to beat towards a depression forecast to give 35knots and 6m waves.

I'd need to close read the MAIB report to see if this is a fair characterisaztion of what happened. But if the leak was substantial for 24 hours, and if there was a substantial 'sample size' washing around and if after all that time between the four of them they hadn't thought of the obvious way to work out if it was primarily salt or not then I'd agree, that's a black mark against them. I confess I have doubts if that was the case, but I don't have time to read up on it!

Had USCG been informed much earlier, they could have done a lot more.

Again I don't have time to read the MAIB report again but I'm pretty sure when they did tell the CG all the CG did was monitor the situation. Which was probably reasonable because unexplained water ingress is a concern, but it doesn't typically lead to total and sudden loss of the boat.