Astute Sub grounding 'catalogue of errors'

[Plomong]

I don't think he deserved what's happened.

Neither do I, John, but it happened when he was CO because he allowed a group of subordinates to perform an evolution that hindsight shows they were not capable of executing properly given the equipment and manning limitations existent.

They seemed hell-bent on continuing in towards shore when already inshore of the agreed transfer area, and took no reasonable action to avoid going further inshore, knowing the shallow bits were just 3 cables or less ahead. Jeepers, when I'm in that close in a plastic tub in unfamiliar waters I've got one finger on the "turn back or out" button, figuratively speaking, and a series of GPS and/or eyeball sights trotting across the chart just to be sure.

The CO was not around to check that all was proceeding as agreed. His sin, for which he was rapped, was to have confidence in their ability to not cock it up so greatly, and if he did not have that high level of confidence, why was he not on deck or in the area where the POOW was ???

That's the CO's sin. False or incorrect level of confidence, IMHO. The real culprit was the guy up above who, seeing the difficulties looming, did not turn and run to try again later. If that was not an option because of what the CO would say because he aborted the operation, then that again shows a failing in the CO, but this latter is conjecture on my part, with no basis in what is written in the inquiry report.

So, John, the CO is obviously a highly trained and motivated individual, no slouch, with a range of personality traits, technical and personal skills and experience that we civilians can only imagine. But his boat was sloppy in its execution of a dangerous manouevre, and so he takes the rap for allowing that to happen, not for making it happen.

What I am not so happy about is the apparent unwillingness of the Admiralty to discipline others involved, at least publicly. Going back to the steelworks analogy -- if something was seriously cocked up, the persons responsible would have to answer to an Inquest, a public inquest, and their part and responsabilities would be made public as would any disciplinary action taken.

However, probably best now for the RN to concentrate on bringing crews up to a higher level of operation, and on improving equipment so that future transfers or other operations do not result in such embarassing and public accidents.

Plomong

 

[Poignard]

Jobs for the boys

Maybe the RN should employ Scuttlebutt contributors as pilots. We all seem to think we know how things should be done

 

[john_morris_uk]

Neither do I, John, but it happened when he was CO because he allowed a group of subordinates to perform an evolution that hindsight shows they were not capable of executing properly given the equipment and manning limitations existent.

They seemed hell-bent on continuing in towards shore when already inshore of the agreed transfer area, and took no reasonable action to avoid going further inshore, knowing the shallow bits were just 3 cables or less ahead. Jeepers, when I'm in that close in a plastic tub in unfamiliar waters I've got one finger on the "turn back or out" button, figuratively speaking, and a series of GPS and/or eyeball sights trotting across the chart just to be sure.

The CO was not around to check that all was proceeding as agreed. His sin, for which he was rapped, was to have confidence in their ability to not cock it up so greatly, and if he did not have that high level of confidence, why was he not on deck or in the area where the POOW was ???

That's the CO's sin. False or incorrect level of confidence, IMHO. The real culprit was the guy up above who, seeing the difficulties looming, did not turn and run to try again later. If that was not an option because of what the CO would say because he aborted the operation, then that again shows a failing in the CO, but this latter is conjecture on my part, with no basis in what is written in the inquiry report.

So, John, the CO is obviously a highly trained and motivated individual, no slouch, with a range of personality traits, technical and personal skills and experience that we civilians can only imagine. But his boat was sloppy in its execution of a dangerous manouevre, and so he takes the rap for allowing that to happen, not for making it happen.

What I am not so happy about is the apparent unwillingness of the Admiralty to discipline others involved, at least publicly. Going back to the steelworks analogy -- if something was seriously cocked up, the persons responsible would have to answer to an Inquest, a public inquest, and their part and responsabilities would be made public as would any disciplinary action taken.

However, probably best now for the RN to concentrate on bringing crews up to a higher level of operation, and on improving equipment so that future transfers or other operations do not result in such embarassing and public accidents.

Plomong

I think (if I am permitted to comment on these matters) that you have probably hit the nail on the head.

Just to put things in context. The RN (like all organisations) is made up from ordinary people - with a bit of military selection thrown in. The end result is that any bridge watchkeeping team has people who although they are trained are at various levels of competence. One of the skills of the commanding officer is to allow for this - and usually the levels of over manning and overwatch allow for inexperienced (or even dangerously inept) beginners to come up to speed or be weeded out.

I have been on many ships where the CO knew that some members of his team were weak (I guess that most people understand that one of my roles is that I get to hear peoples worries - even the CO's sometimes!) but sometimes the whole ship would know about the ineptitude of some people. There's nothing new about this; its a truism that on EVERY ship some people are weaker than others! Generally the training and exercising sorts things out and things remain safe and people are removed from their position and others step in or are promoted when its obvious that they really aren't going to improve. (I have also spent many hours on the bridge with young officers wracked with angst because they knew that they weren't cutting the mustard - not matter how hard they tried and they were heading into career oblivion.)

It appears that on this occasion multiple things went wrong which conspired to cause the most embarrassing and expensive cock-up. From the report it appears that one or two people and one or two systems failing - together with a change of watch and a failure to grasp what was happening and failure to hear the urgent calls from below lead to a very public and expensive grounding.

The real reason the CO takes the hit is because its his job to ensure that his teams are effective and safe. Its rather more complex than - 'he should have been on the bridge' etc.

Its interesting to hear of the manning levels in the merchant navy from other posters, but its of little relevance. Merchant ships steam from port to port in reasonably straight lines. They don't constantly alter course to allow for helicopters to fly off them or to avoid simulated attacks from missiles or all the myriad of reasons why the steel grey box zig zags all over the place all the time. They also don't have to be manned up to allow for haldf the crew being killed or involved in firefighting and damage control while the rest of the crew fight the ship. The final and telling pat is that merchant ships crews are far more stable - they don't have the same tempo of throughput of young aspiring officers every few months or every couple of years as they learn their profession on the greasy poll to command. Its a young man and womans service - and experience is gained rapidly.

 

[jonjo]

Maybe the RN should employ Scuttlebutt contributors as pilots. We all seem to think we know how things should be done

The average contributor here is over qualified if the intent was to avoid running Astute up the beach. This is not a sophisticated incident, they simply ran into the shore at right angles, they had been on this course for 30/40 minutes, they had crossed through the whole transfer zone marked on the chart and continued out the other side. They crossed into the dark blue, don't go here margin of the coast on the chart, as understood by any reluctant Sunday afternoon leisure yachting galley slave.

But had I been the pilot in the control room and having overheard a junior rating question the wisdom of the course multiple times during a 20 minute period I would probably have asked for a depth sounding. At this point I would have been informed that a depth sounding was not available because the sub has not switched to "river routine". The failure to switch to river routine is a red flag in the report.

 

[jonjo]

But you still fail to understand the cause of the accident. Your little handheld as I understand things would have made sod all difference.

Obviously you have not read the report as I have done in the past 40 minutes.

A major finding of the report is that something like a hand held plotter up top in the fin or in the hand of the XO organizing the transfer party would have made all the difference.

 

[FWB]

The report reads like an episode from The Navy Lark
"Left hand down a bit Mr Philips. Look out! Oh lummy we've hit it!"

 

[st599]

Makes you wonder why the Petty OOW or the OOW Below didn't pipe for the captain when the OOW didn't change course? Or re-phrased to "hoy muppet, we're going aground if you don't stop dicking about up there". Or just issued the order to turn themselves.

Also, why did it take so long to rig the equipment on the fin?

 

[Pete7]

Or just issued the order to turn themselves.

You're asking for a Petty Officer to over ride a Lt Commander, it just doesn't happen and he isn't the OOW. Also the PO was down below, he couldn't see what other vessels were doing top side which the the OOW could, or should have been able to do. However, the PO should have switched the depth sounder on earlier.

The river routine is interesting, going to river routine would have doubled the lookouts and staff available and ensured they were watching for shallow water.

Finally this sub was under trials. Systems, both physical and operational hadn't been sorted out yet so they should have been expecting stuff to happen or not work.

Pete

 

[maxi77]

He was relaxing in his cabin when his ship was struck, where was the captain of his buddy vessel HMS Coventry at that moment? His no.1 was nattering with stewards in the canteen, the air defense section in the war room was almost deserted.

Many and wide failings indeed, the captain did not deserve a spell in prison but I believe most other credible military institutions around the world would have quietly pensioned him off within 18 months.

Even COs need to rest from time to time, as it is where he was had very little to do with it when the missile was fired they were stuffed, simple as that. But of course that does not stop armchair admirals thinking differently.

 

[maxi77]

Obviously you have not read the report as I have done in the past 40 minutes.

A major finding of the report is that something like a hand held plotter up top in the fin or in the hand of the XO organizing the transfer party would have made all the difference.

Even more to the point it is obvious to any one with the slightest amount of CDF that if the XO had bothered to look at the plot as he should have done he would have stopped pissing about with the transfer and taken control of the situation which was clearly developing. They didn't need a handheld plotter they just needed to do their jobs properly.

I really do not see all this fascination with having a handheld plotter when basic navigation procedures will do and actually be more reliable. Have you ever even been on a submarine bridge or navigated one?

And yes I did read the report.

 

[prv]

The part that seems most bizarre to me is that the guy up top, who was apparently in charge, didn't have a chart with him, and therefore didn't know where he was.

Pete

 

[maxi77]

The part that seems most bizarre to me is that the guy up top, who was apparently in charge, didn't have a chart with him, and therefore didn't know where he was.

Pete

There is no chart table on a submarine bridge, I used to navigate the boat all the way up the Clyde without a chart, and pass the first line ashore within 1 minute of published eta. All you need is a bit of planning a notebook and a compass.

 

[Poignard]

The part that seems most bizarre to me is that the guy up top, who was apparently in charge, didn't have a chart with him, and therefore didn't know where he was.

Pete

He doesn't need a chart. There is one on the chart table with someone paid to look at it for him.

 

[Twister_Ken]

The part that seems most bizarre to me is that the guy up top, who was apparently in charge, didn't have a chart with him, and therefore didn't know where he was.

Pete

Don't be silly. It would get soggy when submerged.

 

[prv]

I really do not see all this fascination with having a handheld plotter when basic navigation procedures will do and actually be more reliable

The problem was the guy on the fin not knowing where he was.

This could have been solved in various ways.

The intended solution was for him to have a copy of the chart with matching boxes drawn on it, and for the plotting party below to regularly tell him which box they were in. A reasonable enough system, but one that did not prove reliable in this case, because he forgot to bring the chart and the telephones were playing up.

A portable plotter would also have worked, which is why people are suggesting it.

Note that one of the recommendations of the Navy's own report is that a plotter ("WECDIS") should be fitted, and a portable device ("safe navigation laptop") be deployed in the interim.

Pete

 

[prv]

All you need is a bit of planning a notebook and a compass.

Well, he didn't have those either

Pete

 

[prv]

He doesn't need a chart. There is one on the chart table with someone paid to look at it for him.

Sure, and there's no suggestion that the people below didn't know where they were. But the guy on top was the one directing the boat, and he didn't know where he was. The report says he "noted the lack of a handheld VHF radio or chart, and requested that these items were brought up". Also that the plotting party were reporting positions in terms of the boxes drawn on the chart (for example, F3) but the OOW on the fin "had no chart and could not therefore reference the position".

Pete

 

[Kukri]

It's interesting to hear of the manning levels in the merchant navy from other posters, but it's of little relevance. Merchant ships steam from port to port in reasonably straight lines. They don't constantly alter course to allow for helicopters to fly off them or to avoid simulated attacks from missiles or all the myriad of reasons why the steel grey box zig zags all over the place all the time.

(coughs politely) You want helicopters, divers in sat, ROVs , live well fluids on deck, maneouvering all over the place very precisely, in close proximity to others, in all weathers? Try the offshore oil business.

They also don't have to be manned up to allow for half the crew being killed or involved in firefighting and damage control while the rest of the crew fight the ship.

This is a hardship? How?

The final and telling pat is that merchant ships crews are far more stable - they don't have the same tempo of throughput of young aspiring officers every few months or every couple of years as they learn their profession on the greasy poll to command. Its a young man and womans service - and experience is gained rapidly.

With great respect, John, at this point you are out of your tiny, cotton picking, RN mind.

 

[Kukri]

Merchant ships did not carry charts in the wheelhouse until really quite recently - the incorporation of the chart room into the wheelhouse goes back maybe forty years or so.

Go back further to pre-WW2 with open bridges and the charts were carried locked away in the Master's cabin.

 

[Poignard]

Note that one of the recommendations of the Navy's own report is that a plotter ("WECDIS") should be fitted, and a portable device ("safe navigation laptop") be deployed in the interim.

Pete

Well the standard response of the military to any problem is more kit and more blokes.

But seriously, this was no more than human error. The man responsible has been punished and that will encourage les autres to try harder for a while. Hopefully lessons have been learned. All we can do now is await the next calamity; when the process will doubtless be repeated.

At least the Navy deals with its wrongdoers. Which is more than can be said of some organisations, e.g. Social Services and the Catholic Church.