Astute Sub grounding 'catalogue of errors'

[Pete7]

Frankly to end up grounded where the submarine grounded you would need a crew of blind and perhaps deaf men!

How odd you should say that

The report does say in the first in the first paragraph "The OOW did not give any helm orders that would have turned the submarine away from the danger on the ships head. This was despite being instructed to on at least three occasions by the POOW and the OOW below.

I believe the POOW was more than "instructing" by the third attempt, shame no one listened to him


Pete

 

[kyleview]

Even when they are submerged?

But they were not submerged - well above the water and like many ships transferring crew. Just like what they do off Largs most days.

 

[BrendanS]

whoosh

 

[uxb]

Seems pretty simple to me QUOTE]

Bless....

 

[john_morris_uk]

Seems pretty simple to me - buy the very best Garmin / Raymarine / Simrad kit for £1000, also Navonics for another £300 for the charts and see everything under the boat, and above even with AIS.

I regret that your post shows more about your lack of understanding of how submarines are navigated and what kit they have to do it with than sheds any light on how things could be improved. Furthermore the charting that they have is rather better than anything Navionics gets - but that's another matter.

There ought to be a bit more of 'there but for the grace of God go I...' in some of the armchair critics on these matters.

PS The very best Raymarine etc kit costs substantially more than £1000 - but that's not the point. The sub had enough kit - and had the capability of knowing EXACTLY where it was - but they mucked up.

 

[maxi77]

Seems pretty simple to me - buy the very best Garmin / Raymarine / Simrad kit for £1000, also Navonics for another £300 for the charts and see everything under the boat, and above even with AIS.

But the very best from your favoured supplier is not as good as the stuff they have, and any way is not suitable for full diving pressure on the bridge. Read the report then you will find out what went wrong, it was not a navigation error, but a communications and procedure error, partly caused by the problem that temporary electronic comms equipment on the bridge was faulty, one of the continual problems of 'plug in kit' on an SSN bridge. We had it back in the 70s when they first tried to have some smart stuff up there.

 

[[70521]]

"Rear Adm Corder said he was confident the HMS Astute incident was not "indicative of wider failings" within the submarine service."

Well, he would say that, wouldn't he?

Perhaps they were all getting used to their new, and very expensive, boat?

 

[OGITD]

Spot-On Pete (Lets Put This One To Bed)

How odd you should say that
The report does say in the first in the first paragraph "The OOW did not give any helm orders that would have turned the submarine away from the danger on the ships head. This was despite being instructed to on at least three occasions by the POOW and the OOW below.
I believe the POOW was more than "instructing" by the third attempt, shame no one listened to him
Pete

As you rightly said, the POOW (Navigation Plot) would have been screaming at the Bridge (or should have been).
All comms is (or at least was) audible in the Control Room as they are in constant communication between Ship-Control, Helm and the Plot (Nav Table).
The exercise must have been planned and plotted on the chart below (it’s the way we used to do it).
The only failing I can see is the OOW on the Bridge.
But in saying this …. there was a time when the Plot (POOW) failed to notice we were out of the ‘box’.
So in my conclusion (with the exception of equipment failure) it’s either the OOW (Bridge), the POOW (Plot) below, or a combination of those two and not the Captain.

I didn’t bring into the equation the Navigator because he has qualified in advanced navigation, and will of set everything out on the appropriate charts maintained and corrected by the Navigators Yeoman.

 

[maxi77]

As you rightly said, the POOW (Navigation Plot) would have been screaming at the Bridge (or should have been).
All comms is (or at least was) audible in the Control Room as they are in constant communication between Ship-Control, Helm and the Plot (Nav Table).
The exercise must have been planned and plotted on the chart below (it’s the way we used to do it).
The only failing I can see is the OOW on the Bridge.
But in saying this …. there was a time when the Plot (POOW) failed to notice we were out of the ‘box’.
So in my conclusion (with the exception of equipment failure) it’s either the OOW (Bridge), the POOW (Plot) below, or a combination of those two and not the Captain.

If you read the report there were several systematic failures, no proper plan, communications difficulties, both the CO and NO not interested in the handling of the boat in close proximity to land, no it was right to dismiss the CO fron the boat, he had run a pretty sloppy operation. I did a lot of work up there in the early days when we used Whitehead and at almost every transfer the CO was on the bridge. I assume that in this modern day there is no longer a voice pipe from the bridge to the control room, nor do they have the watertight loudspeaker microphones on the bridge but now rely on plugged in kit hence the comms problems.

 

[Flashy]

I still come back to the simplicity of a gps antenna in the cockpit, on the surface, connected to a chart plotter, showing what's ahead would have caused them the same amount of consternation as me nearly going the wrong side of St Peter Port entrance in near zero viz.

Really can't see the difference.

There is a difference, and at least in part it's down to the size and maneuverability of your yacht compared with a bigger ship.

I've been on the bridge of a ship performing tight pilotage (entrance between a cliff and rock about 200m wide). In a yacht you'd make use of your plotter for that, but they never looked at the plotter or the GPS -- everything was done by eye and by radar. For any nav when in view of land the radar was the principle method of position fixing and GPS was only used when out of sight of land.

The first officer on board was a yacht racer and he commented to me how on his yacht he'd use GPS and plotter but it was much less useful on a bigger ship in these situations. I can't explain why exactly.

There are probably other reasons of which I am not aware, but that's what I've seen a number of times.

 

[Boat44]

Submariners are all nuts.....they need to be.

Skimmers Rool.

Target!!

 

[penfold]

There is a difference, and at least in part it's down to the size and maneuverability of your yacht compared with a bigger ship.

I've been on the bridge of a ship performing tight pilotage (entrance between a cliff and rock about 200m wide). In a yacht you'd make use of your plotter for that, but they never looked at the plotter or the GPS -- everything was done by eye and by radar. For any nav when in view of land the radar was the principle method of position fixing and GPS was only used when out of sight of land.

The first officer on board was a yacht racer and he commented to me how on his yacht he'd use GPS and plotter but it was much less useful on a bigger ship in these situations. I can't explain why exactly.

There are probably other reasons of which I am not aware, but that's what I've seen a number of times.

I have seen similar; pilots and the master all use the Mk1 eyeball with occasional glances at the chart or ECDIS when manoeuvring in close quarters. There is always a deck officer watching the ECDIS or updating the chart plot, but that's really for backup. I can only assume that it's easier to form a spatial image(particularly with regard to relative motion and rates of acceleration) from looking out the window than assimilating that information from a display.

 

[oldbilbo]

So what can WE learn from this?

I've read the report, and I'm quite interested in Little Sister.....

 

[Pete7]

So what can WE learn from this?

I've read the report, and I'm quite interested in Little Sister.....

Avoid the grey funnel line at all costs.

Pete

 

[alant]

As I said,you - and the other yotty know-it-alls know not of which you speak.

Think of one small point. These boats are built for stealth under the sea. The conning tower is exposed to the sea - at depth..you can't fit electronics there. If its doing a sneaky on the surface you CAN NOT have any light emitting devices there so an iPad is out too. Work the rest out for your self- if you can't then my simple explanation will be too much for such a small mind.

Never heard of 'blind nav' then - maybe send em on a YM course!

 

[Bav34]

Never heard of 'blind nav' then - maybe send em on a YM course!

Forget it Alant.

Apparently our minds are so small that we have to be told that subs are built for stealth, that the conning tower is exposed to the sea at depth (no sh!t Sherlock), and if it's doing a sneaky on the surface it mustn't show lights.

Next he'll be telling us that it's a good idea to lower the undercarriage on airliners and avoid forests when landing!

 

[john_morris_uk]

Never heard of 'blind nav' then - maybe send em on a YM course!

I think you need to visit a sub - and see (some - ie what you are allowed to see) of the kit and talk to them about navigation. People might stop making cheap wise crack remarks if they knew a few % of what they do and how they do it.

I know you put a smiley face on the end of your post, but I am not sure that some things are that funny.

If I am being over sensitive my apologies. As I said before, I know the CO and I don't think he deserved what's happened.

 

[Grumpybear]

I think you need to visit a sub - and see (some - ie what you are allowed to see) of the kit and talk to them about navigation. People might stop making cheap wise crack remarks if they knew a few % of what they do and how they do it.

I know you put a smiley face on the end of your post, but I am not sure that some things are that funny.

If I am being over sensitive my apologies. As I said before, I know the CO and I don't think he deserved what's happened.

John, your loyalty does you credit. However, having read the report I have to say that the internal organisation of the boat seems to have left a lot to be desired, and familiarity with frequent rider changes clearly bred a dangerous contempt for the risks they might be running and a lack of awareness of the cumulative relatively minor changes and shortcomings in personnel and experience that had occurred.

The sinking of ARTEMIS in Gosport many years ago happened when I was making the decision to volunteer for submarines, and the concatenation of minor problems that led to it was deeply engraved in the minds of everyone in the submarine service then and for many years afterwards. Let us hope that this unnecessary but salutary event has the same effect in the future.

Finally, I find it surprising and disappointing that the evident problems with internal communications and the hidden ones with recording systems were not sorted out before they mattered, for which the blame must be shared between ship's staff, the supervising authorities and the shipbuilder.

 

[Twister_Ken]

As I said before, I know the CO and I don't think he deserved what's happened.

Under grey funnel rules it was his boat and he broke it. Consequence inevitable.

 

[john_morris_uk]

Under grey funnel rules it was his boat and he broke it. Consequence inevitable.

I know that is how it works. Its an automatic courts martial but it doesn't mean he deserved what happened. It just happens that he was in charge when a lot of mistakes were made.