Vulcan 607

[beancounter]

I must own up to having a soft spot for the Avro Vulcan. As a lad, I was taken to an air display by my dad; I remember being absolutely awestruck by this giant bat-shape that thundered by me in a low pass down the runway.

Whatever your views of the Falklands conflict, "Vulcan 607" is a cracking story. It's well told - not a dry history, but with all the tension of a good thriller. Not at all jingoistic.

Having decided that a response to the Argentine invasion was needed, the only aircraft that could deliver a significant bomb load to the Falklands was the Vulcan. The problems were: they were all due to be taken out of service in 3 months; it was 4000 miles beyond it's maximum range; the crews were all trained to deliver nuclear weapons ("buckets of instant sunshine" in the RAF slang) not conventional bombs; the refuelling probes on the Vulcans had been decommissioned 20 years earlier; and many more....

The resolution of these through a mixture of planning, improvisation, and skill make a great tale. Interweaving the preparations with the developments in the wider political and military situation, the author builds the tension up as Operation BLACK BUCK unfolds. 14 Victor tanker aircraft lift off; 2 Vulcans roar away from Ascension island, relying on a complex plan involving 5 in-flight fill-ups to get to the target and back. Needless to say, the complex plan soon starts to unravel.....

I loved it...

 

[paulm299]

Brilliant book , I was at Ascension Island and served alongside Vulcans and Victors ( Ground Tradesman ) . Brought atear of pride to the eye .

 

[BrendanS]

I used to (as a kid) live on the flightpath of RAF St Athan, where they were serviced. There was nothing like sitting on the garage roof watching them take off, and vibrating inside your body.

You can probably start another Red Flag exercise thread. of which there have been several over the years on ybw. Have a read here

http://www.pprune.org/forums/archive/index.php/t-48541.html

 

[Nauti Fox]

Just reading it at the moment and fully agree with what you say.

 

[bilbobaggins]

A fascinating story. Much enjoyed!

So let's stir the pot with a little controversy.....

a) The bit about no-one realising that flying in close formation, with the necessary constant throttle adjustments, would result in fuel burn much increased over the info in the Operating Data Manual, is simply not credible.

This simply does not ring true. All aircrew know that constant throttle adjustment results in increased fuel use - and we all know this from driving cars! Besides, the Vulcan crews were 'operational' at low-level penetration - had been for years - and constant throttle adjustment to maintain crucial 'Time Over Target' was the norm. Monitoring fuel burn, and its variations, was and is a critical aspect of flight ops everywhere. This smacks of an order from on high to 'never mind the facts, my mind is made up'....

b) The crew's concerns about the 'Roland' SAM installation are valid. Faulty staff work indicated, firstly, that it was impossible for such a system to be transported to The Falklands. Some 'source' ( probably reconnaissance units on the ground ) spotted it and reported back. Consternation! Reading between the lines further on, suddenly the Vulcan crews weren't much worried after all. Could it possibly be that the SAM installation was 'taken out' by the same Special Forces team that had reported it? If so, they probably didn't last long afterwards....

c) The idea of an aircraft commander simply deciding for himself - without reference to the many layers of 'AirShips' directing every aspect of the operation - that he'd just pop up another couple of thousand feet to do the final Bomb Run, and that it wouldn't matter at all - is ludicrous. Every Target Planner in the English-speaking world would have sweated the midnight hours in determining what altitude was best - and why - and all that would have been fully agreed in advance. This bit smacks of another 'intel' cockup over the effective range of the installed AAA - a common issue that pervades the Service even today.

c) It is telling that the use of a handful of Vulcans to breach the runway at Stanley demonstrated something very significant to the Argie command structure, as did the effective use of submarine capability..... That Britain had retained the capability to mount offensive air operations many ( undetermined ) thousands of miles from a safe base, by means of that great 'force multiplier', in-flight refuelling.

This had been demonstrated frequently....

[ QUOTE ]
In 1975 ......the Guatemalans began concentrating their troops along the border once again. The British reaction was swift ......six Harrier GR.Mk1A "jump jets“ .....were deployed in a trans-Atlantic flight, supported by Handley Page Victor K.Mk.1A tankers,

[/ QUOTE ]

It was also known that, just a few years earlier, RAF Buccaneers with in-flight refuelling support had made a demonstration mock attack on a Soviet 'Kiev'-class carrier/cruiser in the Barents Sea near Novya Zemlya, thousands of miles beyond what the Soviets thought were the limits of that aircraft's effective Radius of Action. That exercise gave a sobering 'heads up' to military analysts and planners worldwide.

Perhaps the critical point about Operation Black Buck was the clear demonstration that British Air Power could be extended over the Argentinian mainland assets - using Vulcans and/or Buccaneers - should that be deemed necessary.

d) Comment is made in the book that sufficient navigational accuracy could not be guaranteed, and that this had implications for the conduct of operations. Bluntly, this is not so, and is likely to have been inserted to mask something else. All operational V-bomber crews were trained to navigate by astro to a very high degree of accuracy and reliability ( no GPS then ) - as were the corresponding B-52 SAC crews. Results of NATO Bombing Competitions over many years show clearly the standards reached - and the BLACK BUCK crews were the best available. Student RAF navigators, regardless of their future postings, were all trained in precision astro-navigation techniques, without which demonstrated abilities they simply failed the Advanced Navigation Course.

Food for thought - and argument?

/forums/images/graemlins/grin.gif

 

[HoratioHB]

I have the dubious privilege to be the first person to fly down Port Stanley airfield runway in a Lynx, the day of the surrender and was gobsmacked to see a totally intact piece of concrete with only one small and repaired crater at the eastern threshold. Days before I had seen recce photographs in HMS Hermes showing numerous craters - the Argies had chalk circles marked out which they covered in top soil by day and then cleared away by night. So all those Harrier strikes and the Vulcan raid were tactically useless. Mind you 21 1000lb bombs going off unexpectedly must have done wonders for moral!

Makes one wonder why so much effort was expended for so little. A cynical RN hector like me might think it was more for RAF PR purposes as they had little else to do (ducks head and waits for brickbat)

 

[Fin]

(c)

Adjusting altitude isn't a snag normally. Not getting the altitude that you have planned can happen for lots of reasons eg enemy activity. Changing alt can make life slightly more complicated but its definitely not a show stopper.

(d)

Medium Altitude dumb bombing isn't the most accurate way of doing things. Even now. Thats why we use some form of guidance such as laser or GPS.

Fin

 

[grumpy_o_g]

I think the key point here is Bilbo's comment about the ability to hit the Argentinian mainland. Likewise the Belgrano strike was both a statement of intent and an appropriate military act. The message that needed to be sent was this is a war - you have invaded British space and we will defend it to the point of removing the aggressors ability to do any harm ever again if need be and we will do it quickly and ruthlessly.

That message was for both the Argentinians and any other countries that thought this would be a good chance to play politics. If the conflict had dragged on it would have been very difficult, if not impossible, to support it over that distance, but people tend to support the winning side and Mrs Thatcher made it quite clear who that was going to be.

As for RAF PR, we won't mention the Torrey Canyon (partly because the RAF didn't do that much better) but I do remember spending a late evening helping the riggers patch up a Canberra after a target-towing sortie reputedly for the FAA - being considerate types they did make sure the target was undamaged though /forums/images/graemlins/smile.gif

 

[HoratioHB]

Hence the famous signal -

Tug to firing unit - I'm pulling the target not pushing it!!!!!!