Tall ship Astrid lost in Oysterhaven Cork today

We'll have to agree to differ. :)

I know what I did when I thought I might have got some water in one of my diesel tanks and it seems to have been more than that Skipper did.

Richard


Yes, we all know what we would do if we got fuel in our tanks... The question we need to ask to prevent a repeat is... Why didn't he do the right thing?

There were three direct immeadiate causes of the loss IMHO... All of which begs the above question...

1) loss of power due to know contamination.
2) poor passage planning that failed to take into account the possibility of the Los of power.
3) failure to deploy the anchors to prevent or delay the grounding.

So the real issue that lead to the loss isn't the single mistake made, that's just a symptomof the disease, It was the lack of competence by the crew... And of course, in particular, the skipper, that was the real root cause of the loss.. And this is amply evidenced by the lack of qualifications... And this lack of qualification isn't just a certification issue IMHO... It's symptmatic of the managment culture of the owners... Which would indicate to me that they were incapable of staffing the vessel with qualified folks,.. Either on paper or in reality... It appears that virtually no standards were maintained...and in these circumstance, when all evidence is to the contrary.. Why should there be any assumption of competence?

Ergo... It's not just a "health and safety issue". It's actually life and death..

A major accident is usually not caused by a simple single omission by an otherwise competent individual... There is almost always a chain of events which proper managment could have prevented. And this is really the mother of all chains.

I feel this is important to us as skippers, as we need to understand that preventing simple mistakes is usually about a lot more than just not remembering to press a button or turn a valve... It's about understanding the systems we all need to properly manage our vessels safely... And knowing when things are going wrong and when intervene to address that before disaster strikes.
 
So the real issue that lead to the loss isn't the single mistake made, that's just a symptomof the disease, It was the lack of competence by the crew... And of course, in particular, the skipper, that was the real root cause of the loss.. And this is amply evidenced by the lack of qualifications... And this lack of qualification isn't just a certification issue IMHO... It's symptmatic of the managment culture of the owners...

Absolutely. When a loss occurs it's all too easy to blame it on the person who made the mistake when there is almost invariably laxness all the way up the chain. For example, a major chemical plant accident was caused by someone using an oxy-acetylene torch to free a sticking valve on a line carrying flammable material. But the valve was regularly freed that way because it regularly stuck, and it hadn't been replaced because the corporate culture punished people who raised safety issues. Everyone knew the danger, no-one felt able to do anything about it.
 
Photodog and Jumbleduck, I agree completely.

Even if the contaminated fuel had been dealt with and Astrid made the trip, when one considers all the other problems and failings, she could only have been said to have ' got away with it, that time ' !
 
Even if the contaminated fuel had been dealt with and Astrid made the trip, when one considers all the other problems and failings, she could only have been said to have ' got away with it, that time ' !

That's not how I read it. Most of the failings were "technicalities". I recall that the Dutch authorities also felt the same but I'm not going to read it all again. Clearly, the Skipper also feels very strongly that many of the findings, which take up most of the report, are "technicalities" but his failings over the water-in-fuel issue are, IMHO, so significant that his opinion is of presumably limited value.

Oh well, if we all agreed on everything life, and this forum, would be really boring! :encouragement:

Richard
 
Reminds me of John Vigor's 'Black Box Theory' -

ON EVERY boat there’s a little black box. You can’t see it, but it’s there all the same. It’s full of points that help you get out of trouble. At least, it should be full of points.

Every time you do something seamanlike, a point goes into the black box. Every time you whip a rope-end instead of leaving it to flap itself to fluff in the breeze, you earn a point. Every time you study the chart before entering a strange port; every time you climb the mast to check the topmast fittings; every time you remember to use the bilge blower before you start the motor, the points pile up in the black box.

At sea, the system starts to work two ways. Firstly, you can continue to stuff points into the box (it accepts an infinite number) by taking seamanlike actions — say, by reefing the mainsail after you hear a gale warning on the weather forecast, or by putting on your safety harness every time you come on watch. Secondly, you can start to draw on your account.

In all small-boat voyaging there is an element of risk that cannot be eliminated. Indeed, it is the lure of danger (and overcoming it) that attracts many to the sport. Inevitably, therefore, there will be times when the ship and her crew are in danger to some degree, despite all the precautions you might take.

This is when the points start expending themselves. You have no control over when and where they’re spent. But they know when they’re needed. When horror is rife, when the mast is crashing down around your ears, those chips come rushing out of the black box to fight on your behalf.

But they have to be available. You must have earned them in the first place.

That’s why some boats and some sailors survive gales and capsizes when others don’t. Some boats will go aground on the only rock for miles around. Others will happily blunder through a maze of reefs.

Some people have a name for it, a four-letter word ending with u-c-k. But on our boat we don’t believe in l-*-*-* and we never pin our hopes on it. We try, instead, to earn points for our black box. We know that if misfortune catches us with an empty box we’re in trouble. Fate allows no overdrafts.

So there’s really no need to wonder why some people and some boats seem to be treated by Fate more kindly than others. It all depends on how much you’ve got in your black box.

Incidentally, you can never tell exactly how much credit you’ve earned, so you can never relax completely. If you examine your conscience you will have a fair idea of how full your black box is, but to be sure of having enough points you must keep learning the ways of the sea, and the way of a ship in the sea. And you must keep putting your knowledge to practice.

In other words: Look after your ship, and she’ll look after you.


More on this from John Vigor: http://www.johnvigor.com/Black_Box_Theory.html
 
This post appeared as an entire duplicate of my previous post - don't know why but have now deleted it.

:)
 
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The real issue wasn't his failure to deal with his fuel problem.... That was just one part of a long chain of failures that lead to the loss... A chain of failures which began with the failure of the owners to ensure that the crew were qualified and competent to do their jobs. If the crew had been competent, then the chain of events would have been broken and the loss prevented.

The lessons that need to be learnt are not, oh, make sure your fuel isn't screwed... It's... Make sure you are running your ship safely.. Cause if we don't tackle the big issues... Then the little ones will keep reoccurring.. Though different evey time. This loss was a unending catalogue of errors... And the way to prevent these is to get the training and managment right.
Like others I beg to differ...

The tickets were out of date, but the skill of the crew was the same.

Every disaster is a chain of events. This one was quite simply the crew did not sort out the water in the fuel tanks.

What was lacking was common sense; water in the fuel tank you check the whole system before you go to sea.
 
Like others I beg to differ...

The tickets were out of date, but the skill of the crew was the same.

Every disaster is a chain of events. This one was quite simply the crew did not sort out the water in the fuel tanks.

What was lacking was common sense; water in the fuel tank you check the whole system before you go to sea.

And if you have the slighest doubt about your fuel system or engine you do not take a boat deliberately close to a lee shore in strongish winds.

Even then, you have a plan B should your engine fail.
 
If it hadn't been the contaminated fuel something else would have got her very soon; a whole long list of accidents waiting to happen, it just happened to be the fuel which won the prize.

I suppose it's very lucky it happened where and when it did, for the sake of the trusting passengers...
 
The point of the report is that the management of the ship was broken. Whilst you can argue the toss about the Dutch register accepting this vessel wasn't required to comply with the passenger elements of SOLAS, what can't be argued is that it simply wasn't being run in a safe manner.

The owners were not employing properly qualified people to run the ship: it didn't even have a qualified skipper on board. How can you expect a man who thought that a RIB could push his bow through the wind to be competent to run a vessel of that size? Why didn't he drop an anchor? From the report, it would appear to be either because the ship couldn't drop an anchor without power (failure by the owners to have fail safe systems on board) or because he simply didn't think of it in time (incompetent skipper, as evidenced by his lack of qualification).

Why didn't the vessel have its fuel system purged after the water incident? No idea but it's down either to a failure of the skipper to appreciate the potential for disaster with water in the fuel (incompetent skipper, who didn't appreciate the scale of the problem because he didn't have the training, lack of qualification) or the failure of the owners to take action in allowing the ship to sail without correcting the situation.

Looking the the photos of the fuel manifold, there is potential for cross contamination of the fuel system from one tank to another. Why didn't the skipper ensure the contaminated tank valve was closed and then remove the valve handle, if the owners refused to allow time and money to purge the fuel system? It was because he wasn't competent to recognise this as a temporary solution to the problem, due to a lack to training and qualifiaction. Why wasn't there an engineer on board to manage the engines? Because the Dutch authorities didn't require one as the vessel was sail powered and not reliant on her engines....

You can go on and on through the report. Each time you come across a question, the basic fail is down to the owners for not employing a properly qualified and competent skipper, the Dutch authorities for failing to enforce their own regulations and the skipper for being untrained for the job he was doing.

The only good thing to come out of the whole thing was that no one got killed or injured.
 
It is perhaps inevitable that this incident report will divide opinion.

The engine room photos were taken after the sinking so it's not surprising that it looked a like a mess.

The life rafts were a couple of weeks beyond their service date but within the two months extension granted by the Dutch authorities and the service session was booked. All the life rafts used were fine and those not used were tested after the sinking and all were found to work perfectly.

The ship was registered to the satisfaction of the Dutch authorities but not the Irish ones.

The Captain and Crew were commercially qualified but to a level below the standard required and there qualifications were some months out of date.

All the above is from memory but you can inevitably appreciate where my instincts lie and I'm definitely a "less regulation" rather than a "more regulation" type.

More regulation - definitely fewer incidents and fewer deaths but inevitably with resulting greater interference from officialdom and higher costs and bureaucracy associated with "adventure" activities.

Less regulation - certainly more incidents and more deaths but less interference, bureaucracy and certification and more opportunity for "adventure" due to lower costs.

OK, that's not the whole story but I believe that it is a valid synopsis of the risk / regulation equation.

Once you know my main interests are sailing, skiing, motorcycling and driving a V8 sports car, you can understand why I fall into the "less regulation / higher risk / lower cost" category. The Dutch authorities seem to be more on my side of the equation than the Irish authorities in this particular case.

Ultimately, you could regulate and certificate everything to oblivion at enormous expense for all concerned but it only needs a Captain to decide to do a "fly past" a small Italian island (or something else stupid as in the case under discussion) and all that certification is not going to help you.

Richard
 
It appears that I am incompetent at everything, other than perhaps cycling proficiency.

It's not just about the qualifications though is it.... The proof of the pudding is in the eating... And in this case substnatial incompetence was demonstrated at every opportunity.

Why did he passage plan to put the ship on a lee shore? This is supposed to be, under dutch rules apparently... A sail driven vessel and not dependent on her engine... Yet the captain purposely navigated the ship in a manner that meant she was Entirley dependent on her engine. Surely this is contradictory to her licencing conditions? Either she is power driven, or not... And if not... Why sail into danger on a lee shore in a force six???

The issues go on and on.. And actually comparing how we personally here run our boats... And saying that the qualifications don't matter... Is dissengenuous. Clearly the crew were incompetent and not legally qualified.. Ignoring their lack of qualifications doesn't change the former incompetence... And I think in this case... If it looks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, the lack of a veterinary certificate isn't going to change it into a horse.
 
It is perhaps inevitable that this incident report will divide opinion.

The engine room photos were taken after the sinking so it's not surprising that it looked a like a mess.

The life rafts were a couple of weeks beyond their service date but within the two months extension granted by the Dutch authorities and the service session was booked. All the life rafts used were fine and those not used were tested after the sinking and all were found to work perfectly.

The ship was registered to the satisfaction of the Dutch authorities but not the Irish ones.

The Captain and Crew were commercially qualified but to a level below the standard required and there qualifications were some months out of date.

All the above is from memory but you can inevitably appreciate where my instincts lie and I'm definitely a "less regulation" rather than a "more regulation" type.

More regulation - definitely fewer incidents and fewer deaths but inevitably with resulting greater interference from officialdom and higher costs and bureaucracy associated with "adventure" activities.

Less regulation - certainly more incidents and more deaths but less interference, bureaucracy and certification and more opportunity for "adventure" due to lower costs.

OK, that's not the whole story but I believe that it is a valid synopsis of the risk / regulation equation.

Once you know my main interests are sailing, skiing, motorcycling and driving a V8 sports car, you can understand why I fall into the "less regulation / higher risk / lower cost" category. The Dutch authorities seem to be more on my side of the equation than the Irish authorities in this particular case.

Ultimately, you could regulate and certificate everything to oblivion at enormous expense for all concerned but it only needs a Captain to decide to do a "fly past" a small Italian island (or something else stupid as in the case under discussion) and all that certification is not going to help you.

Richard

See my above post... Whilst the lack of certificates doesnt nessecarily display incompetence... We should at least be trying to ensure that people are qualified. And in is case... They were blatantly not.
 
The idea of qualifications is to ensure a minimum standard of competence. Whilst I agree that the absence of qualifications does not always mean an absence of competence, in this particular case there is little doubt that the skipper had neither competence nor qualification. One then has to question the competence of the owners, in letting their vessel go to sea commanded by an incompetent, unqualified skipper.

There is a lot of difference between sailing your own boat for your own pleasure at your own risk, with or without competence or qualification and being placed in charge of a passenger carrying vessel with paying customers. For someone in that position, there is a reasonable expectation that there is no anarchy involved and that the vessel is manned by properly trained and qualified people. This quite clearly wasn't the case with Astrid.
 
We should at least be trying to ensure that people are qualified...in is case...they were blatantly not.

Hmm. But are we to assume that this same crew couldn't have made the same rotten judgments, if their certificates had been in date?

Aren't there plenty of major cock-ups annually at sea, caused by certificated professionals whose training was intended (but ultimately failed) to prevent bad decision-making?

I happened to be watching Three Men in Another Boat last week, and spotted Astrid in the background, at Cowes or Portsmouth. In the hour that followed I was appalled to discover that she'd been sunk.

It's very reminiscent of the shocking, wholly unnecessary loss of the Maria Assumpta in 1995, except that with Astrid, no-one was drowned.

I can't see why vessels whose sailing efficiency is so lousy that they can't make basic progress to windward in moderate conditions, aren't universally regarded as motor-driven...

...the idea that in a tight spot on a lee shore, she might sail her way out of trouble caused by contaminated fuel, is sheerest wishful thinking.
 
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