Post Red Funnel grounding Local Notice to Mariners

[Lightwave395]

Let's hope Red Funnel crews get these:


LOCAL NOTICE TO MARINERS No. 30 of 2018
Vessel Movements in Restricted Visibility Within Cowes Harbour
30 October 2018

LNTM 27 of 2018 is hereby cancelled.

Notice is hereby given that all vessels, including leisure vessels, are strongly advised not to depart their berths if visibility is two cables (0.2nm / 370.4m) or less.

Vessels may proceed at the skipper’s discretion but are advised to do so with extreme caution, taking into account the tidal conditions, other traffic in the vicinity, how their vessel may appear to other traffic and the availability of suitable aids to navigation.

All vessels, where possible, are to maintain a listening watch on VHF 69 prior to arrival, departure and when underway within Cowes Harbour.

If the Harbour Master, or a duly authorised representative, has reason to believe that a vessel may not be equipped to safely enter, leave or transit in conditions of restricted visibility, they may direct that vessel to a safe anchorage or instruct it to remain alongside.

 

[VicS]

Let's hope Red Funnel crews get these:


LOCAL NOTICE TO MARINERS No. 30 of 2018
Vessel Movements in Restricted Visibility Within Cowes Harbour
30 October 2018

LNTM 27 of 2018 is hereby cancelled.

Notice is hereby given that all vessels, including leisure vessels, are strongly advised not to depart their berths if visibility is two cables (0.2nm / 370.4m) or less.

Vessels may proceed at the skipper’s discretion but are advised to do so with extreme caution, taking into account the tidal conditions, other traffic in the vicinity, how their vessel may appear to other traffic and the availability of suitable aids to navigation.

All vessels, where possible, are to maintain a listening watch on VHF 69 prior to arrival, departure and when underway within Cowes Harbour.

If the Harbour Master, or a duly authorised representative, has reason to believe that a vessel may not be equipped to safely enter, leave or transit in conditions of restricted visibility, they may direct that vessel to a safe anchorage or instruct it to remain alongside.

But would you not expect a red funnel ferry to be equipped with suitable aids to navigation to be able to safely enter, leave or transit the harbour in restricted visibility

 

[savageseadog]

But would you not expect a red funnel ferry to be equipped with suitable aids to navigation to be able to safely enter, leave or transit the harbour in restricted visibility

I thought the fundamental idea of all seamanship is to only treat aids as aids and safe navigation is about seeing and being seen? The notice is surely redundant.

 

[Lightwave395]

I'm only the messenger, but I agree entirely

 

[{151760}]

But would you not expect a red funnel ferry to be equipped with suitable aids to navigation to be able to safely enter, leave or transit the harbour in restricted visibility

One of the curiosities of these two incidents is that they have entered and left safely in similar conditions many times before. I guess the harbour authority had to respond on some way.

 

[LadyInBed]

All vessels, where possible, are to maintain a listening watch on VHF 69 prior to arrival, departure and when underway within Cowes Harbour.

If the Harbour Master, or a duly authorised representative, has reason to believe that a vessel may not be equipped to safely enter, leave or transit in conditions of restricted visibility, they may direct that vessel to a safe anchorage or instruct it to remain alongside.

As you don't need to get permission, the notice is a bit pointless!

 

[ip485]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UqlQ5PWr7A

would seem worth the investment.

 

[bedouin]

Is the implication that some other vessel acting irresponsibly might have been a factor?

Perhaps Red Funnel had to take avoiding action because a boat acted in an unpredictable fashion.

 

[{151760}]

Is the implication that some other vessel acting irresponsibly might have been a factor?

Perhaps Red Funnel had to take avoiding action because a boat acted in an unpredictable fashion.

There's absolutely no evidence or report that I have seen of another vessel being involved, apart from the moored boats that were hit.

 

[penberth3]

Notice is hereby given that all vessels, including leisure vessels, are strongly advised not to depart their berths if visibility is two cables (0.2nm / 370.4m) or less.

Any advice on judging visibility to the nearest four inches?

 

[bedouin]

There's absolutely no evidence or report that I have seen of another vessel being involved, apart from the moored boats that were hit.

Would we have heard yet had the ferry captain taken action to avoid another boat?

I know there is no evidence but it seems a possible explanation of what is otherwise hard to explain.

 

[mattnj]

... a possible explanation of what is otherwise hard to explain.

Does anyone have any theories on what actually happened, where it hit the moored boat, and ran aground is SO far out of the normal channel it would take it seems beyond comprehension to me what happened!

 

[Mark-1]

I know there is no evidence but it seems a possible explanation of what is otherwise hard to explain.

That's my take on it. Swerved for another vessel (or the perception of another vessel) and then shut down the props for fear of dicing someone in the water and went aground under its own momentum. Zero evidence to support that conjecture but I'm struggling to think of anything else.

 

[{151760}]

Would we have heard yet had the ferry captain taken action to avoid another boat?

I know there is no evidence but it seems a possible explanation of what is otherwise hard to explain.

In the first incident, a few weeks ago, the first reports were that the ferry had had to avoid a 'yacht anchored in the fairway'. This quickly proved to be false; we don't know what happened yet.
In the current incident the ship went a long, long way off course, much further than would be necessary to avoid a small vessel in the fairway, in my opinion, though I have no experience of driving ferries.
My own pet theory is some sort of software problem with the nav equipment; or some kind of collective disorientation. We'll have to wait for the MAIB report.

 

[Jungle Jim]

That's my take on it. Swerved for another vessel (or the perception of another vessel) and then shut down the props for fear of dicing someone in the water and went aground under it's own momentum. Zero evidence to support that conjecture but I'm struggling to think of anything else.

My thoughts as well. Shouting was heard, so if a lookout (big assumption, I would assume someone up front with a hand-held in that visibillity) reported a collision with possibly people in the water I would expect them to cut the engines immediately and drift wherever the tide takes them.

 

[Lightwave395]

My thoughts as well. Shouting was heard, so if a lookout (big assumption, I would assume someone up front with a hand-held in that visibillity) reported a collision with possibly people in the water I would expect them to cut the engines immediately and drift wherever the tide takes them.

Since the arrival of the new breakwater if you're coming into Cowes in the main fairway as the ferry does and the engines conked or were stopped, the tide flow would tend to push you over towards the west side so had that happened the ferry might have been more likely to have crashed into the Yacht Haven or Shepards Wharf pontoons:

 

[Mark-1]

Since the arrival of the new breakwater if you're coming into Cowes in the main fairway as the ferry does and the engines conked or were stopped, the tide flow would tend to push you over towards the west side so had that happened the ferry might have been more likely to have crashed into the Yacht Haven or Shepards Wharf pontoons

It made a sharp turn into shallower water where less tide could be expected and a thousand tons of ferry loaded with cars and HGVs must carry some momentum.

I think the biggest argument against my current favourite 'swerved and stopped engines' hypothesis is that the COGs on the AIS track look very odd indeed, which might perhaps point to some kind of instrument problem.

 

[{151760}]

It made a sharp turn into shallower water where less tide could be expected and a thousand tons of ferry loaded with cars and HGVs must carry some momentum.

I think the biggest argument against my current favourite 'swerved and stopped engines' hypothesis is that the COGs on the AIS track look very odd indeed, which might perhaps point to some kind of instrument problem.

Those COGs include the attempts to tow it off.

 

[Mark-1]

Those COGs include the attempts to tow it off.

I'm talking about the last two or three points before it hit the putty, but I still think that's a red herring and the 'swerved and stopped engines' hypothesis is still my bet.

 

[Lightwave395]

It made a sharp turn into shallower water where less tide could be expected and a thousand tons of ferry loaded with cars and HGVs must carry some momentum.

I think the biggest argument against my current favourite 'swerved and stopped engines' hypothesis is that the COGs on the AIS track look very odd indeed, which might perhaps point to some kind of instrument problem.

You may be right, the consensus around Cowes by those who know considerably more than me is cockpit error caused by possible panic, possibly due to thinking they'd gone past the ferry berth - the tide was flooding... I thought it difficult to guess exactly the track on AIS as it simply draws a straight line between two adjacent 'pings' and a lot could go wrong in that short space of time ?