MAIB report

Not trying to minimise your comments, with which I heartily agree, but I can offer a solution to the boiling water!
I have just fitted a thermostatic valve kit from ASAP which mixes hot and cold to give a constant supply temperature, it was about £25 although I needed a few extra fittings because of the limited space.
Regards,
Barry
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

You are in danger of adding more confusion to this topic.

There are two issues, class B transponders and AIS receivers.

Most dialogue on here relates to the use of receivers. This is not what this MAIB report is referring to.

Receivers are useful with the aim of giving us the quick information to make a decision to get out of the way! They are limited in so much as not all vessels will switch on. However, I have one and consider very valuable on passage.

Fitting your own class B transponder is what the report refers to. They seem to saying that AIS responses are not fully integrated into the ships radar "yet".

So, as far as I am concerned, having a AIS receiver is still a good thing, because that helps me keep out of the way. Buying a transponder may not be beneficial until ships are fully integrated.

Peter
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

There is no confusion, and I really do not understand what your argument is about. The MAIB report, quoted in my first post clearly raised the issue of what would have happened had an AIS transponder been fitted on Ouzo. My second post also concerned yacht transponders.

The matter of receivers was raised by yourself. I have made no comment on yachts carrying receivers. My concern was simply about the MAIB's comment that a large fast ferry does not seem to have integrated AIS into its lookout system.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

Surely we are all missing the point. Despite having all the latest technological gizmos the Bilbao only spotted the yacht with the aid of a human pair of eyes. Is there not an argument for having more watchkeepers on the bridge? Certainly there must be an argument for an age limit. If one has to retire as an officer in the Royal Navy at 55 why is it still possible to serve as an officer in the Merchant Navy at 61?

I spend a significant ammount of time in the English Channel during the summer months and some of the actions of merchant shipping are incredulous. Given that it is the busiest shipping route in the world it is a wonder that it is not better policed
 
A truly frightening read, especially the section in the Annexe concerning the survival times and likely experiences of the three men once they were in the sea. My heart goes out to their loved ones.

I support a number of the comments already made above. However I found the focus on survival in the water particularly compelling. I already have crotch straps on the lifejackets carried by Arabella, having read previous reports that had higlighted the difficulties of jackets riding up in use, and failing to maintain the head/mouth a safe (or indeed) any distance above the surface. I'm glad to see the recommendation made to the BSI that these should now be made standard equipment on all jackets, and not merely (overpriced) accessories. I also support and already observe the suggestion made that you carry a waterproof handheld VHF with you, in case you end up in the drink.

But I was struck by (and will now need to consider more carefully) two further points. First, the (implied) recommendation that a liferaft be carried, even on boats, like my own, that might otherwise be considered too small to carry one. I will be re-reading the cheap liferaft review in this month's (May) PBO more carefully, and re-thinking my earlier decision not to buy one (not to mention how to fit one for quick deployment).

Second, the comment that use of an EPIRB (or PLB?) would have accelerated the rescue of the three men. I was dithering on this point, having just read the review in this month's (May) Sailing Today, which concludes "if you regularly go out of reliable VHF range of the coast, then it's worth having a Cat 2 EPIRB stowed somewhere where you can reach it, even if the boat is upside down, or a PLB in your pocket." Well, these chaps were well within VHF range - and in the particular circumstances, little good did it do them. A PLB at least looks increasingly attractive.

All in all, a compelling report, all the more so because of its relevance to those of us who sail yachts at the smaller end of the scale. It should be required reading. With that, and if the recommendations on lifejackets and other items are implemented, at least some good may yet come from these tragic and unnecessary deaths.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

I would argue that the real eye-opener in this report, is that the bridge were well aware that they had had a very very close encounter, but chose not to slow down and check everything was OK, or try calling the yacht on the VHF, or speaking to the CG. Or indeed to even report the matter to the ships' Master.

As another consideration, the report states that the PoB was 2 hours late levaing port. I wonder if this meant that there was extra pressure on the crew and whether that had an influence in their decision to carry on regardless...


Marc.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

You have to bear in mind that any regulations UK government make will only apply to UK registered ships.

What is the quality of the others in the channel?

I agree though with your concern that it appears a well equipped and properly manned Ferry that is used to crossing busy areas is accused of causing this accident - what chance of the rest?? Third world registered boats with questionable quality of manning levels/equipment and calibre of officers.

Obey the collision rules, keep a good lookout and don't assume you have been seen and give way to anyone bigger than yourself seems to be the lessons to be learnt but with the kicker that implies that a certain minimum list of safety equipment is required.

I think many will now reflect on the adequacy of their own lifejackets and the advisability of carrying minifares/collision white flare/handheld VHF/ hydrostatically released liferaft/ EPIRB. I would be interested to hear others order of priority and whether these should be mandatory?

While this is a sad incident it is a relatively rare one and I am sure many small boats go to sea and give lots of pleasure to many that are on a limited budget and for some possibly the cost of the safety equipment would equal the cost of their small boat.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

agreed

they KNEW it was too close to call as they couldn't even see the vessel as it passed from the extended bridge!

putting any possible inconvienince to the ships passengers that might result from a 'sudden helm movement' ahead of the safety of a small vessel that has already disappeared from view by virtue of it proximity to the hull beggars belief - although from another perspective it shows huge control over natural reactions.............
 
All good points Andrew. I have long held the belief that cold water is at best demoralising and at worst deadly. I frequently wear a dry suit (harks back to my old bow-rider days) especially if single-handing and going long distance...especially off shore. My modest sized 29 footer also carries a 4 man life raft and hand-held VHF / Flares / GPS etc all in a grab bag.

It really isn't too much to carry, even in a modest boat.
 
Re: MAIB report and being seen

[ QUOTE ]
Quote:
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Also I've finally got round to re-instating the spreader lights, which could be switched on to illuminate the sail, although at the cost of destroying my own night vision.


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Good point. My deck flood light has failed, possibly only needs a bulb replacing, but I haven't bothered because we tend to use led headlamps now.


[/ QUOTE ] - Why not just have a big 3 gazillion candlepower 'steamer scarer'** fully charged when on night passage. This lights up the sail nicely and can be shone straight at the bridge of an oncoming vessel with some effect if necessary (had to do this once last year coming into Santa Cruz de Tenerife at night)

- Nick

** pennies from Halfords
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

Having spent many a night on a bridge, I have mixed feelings about this. There is no way any of the OOW's I served with would have carried on regardless if they suspected they had caused a collision or overwhelmed a boat. I served with officers of many nationalities and I cannot think of a single exception who would not have mustered all his resources to effect the speedy rescue of anyone in difficulties

A telling comment in the report is that the reaction of the OOW was 'not atypical' and I think it is important for us to understand this. Many of the officers I encountered (if not most) had never been to sea in a small boat and so simply didn't understand the mindset and perspective of the short-handed sailor in his small ship. On a bad night I would often call a sailing boat from the bridge and have a chat about conditions, perhaps passing on our detailed weather forecast and his own position (this was pre widespread GPS). On some occasions we'd relay his course via SSB and other ships would keep a lookout and check all was well

The consequences were that many of the officers started to do the same, and I like to think that we brought some comfort to a few anxious crews

I'm very sad about what happened to Ouzo, not least because one forumite was a colleague of one of the casualties. The lessons I've learned are that an EPIRB and liferaft are essential (we have them both) and that the EPIRB should have a deck stowage position within reach of the helm - this is something I need to fix. We already have crotch straps and lights on all our lifejackets

Since working on survey ships equipped with both S and X band radars I've never relied on being seen and avoided, especially at night or in poor visibility. There are lessons here for us all
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

[ QUOTE ]
I would argue that the real eye-opener in this report, is that the bridge were well aware that they had had a very very close encounter, but chose not to slow down and check everything was OK, or try calling the yacht on the VHF, or speaking to the CG. Or indeed to even report the matter to the ships' Master.

[/ QUOTE ]

Echoing tome's comments, the report did think the OOW's reaction was typical. If one considers that he has probably passed thousands of small boats in the daytime and seen clearly that they were okay, you can see how he could be lulled into thinking he passed Ouzo. He saw the nav-lights astern and figured all was well - even if he called the Master, they probably wouldn't have stopped. Perhaps if they had a handheld VHF in the water and broadcast a 'mayday', PoB would have heard it and responded (of that I am certain). This was a tragedy, but complacency was the killer, not malicious intent or criminal negligence. No doubt the OOW is devastated by what happened.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

I very much doubt they pass boats close enough to have to swing the bow in and stern away to avoid a collision... It was less than 30 metres after all.

It is in my view neglicence, the fact that it is typical is to a degree irrelevant. It is typical for people to speed on motorways, but if a crash occurs you cannot turn an say "oh but everybody does it". (I admit the comparison is far-fetched.)

Also they did not as such "see the nav lights". They eventually saw some lights and chose to assume those were the nav lights.

Marc.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

[ QUOTE ]
I very much doubt they pass boats close enough to have to swing the bow in and stern away to avoid a collision... It was less than 30 metres after all.

[/ QUOTE ]

You are wrong - it happens all the time; that was the point of my post. No doubt there was negligence, but it was more complacency than criminal malfeasance.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

In this case it is thought they passed close enough to swamp and sink the vessel. Surely that doesn't happen "all the time" does it?

I think the bridge team wanted to convince themselves that all was well, so were all too willing to be assured by brief glimpses of lights astern.

I read an air accident report where the same reaction showed. The airliner crew were made aware of the presence of a light aircraft, and spotted but then lost sight of the aircraft. They still confirmed to ATC that they were clear, and their comments to each other right up to impact were on the lines of "he's clear", "yes I'm sure he is", "he must be" etc.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

Re swamping, we were once in the shallower water west of the main Southampton Water shipping channel, waiting for an outbound box boat to pass before crossing: 100 metres from him, at least. We still got massive wash, which came green over the boat as far aft as the mast (and that was turning into his wash). Only happened once, so presumably some sort of freak occurence, maybe associated with a wake-wave coming into shallower water. But I can well imagine such a wash, catching a smaller and less well ballasted boat beam-on could have caused a capsize. Also, Ouzo would appear to have been very close to the PoB (20 m), and presumably PoB at 19 kts would have been travelling rather quicker outbound to the East of Wight than my box boat outbound in Soton Water. So a bigger, steeper wash.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

[ QUOTE ]
In this case it is thought they passed close enough to swamp and sink the vessel. Surely that doesn't happen "all the time" does it?

I think the bridge team wanted to convince themselves that all was well, so were all too willing to be assured by brief glimpses of lights astern.

I read an air accident report where the same reaction showed. The airliner crew were made aware of the presence of a light aircraft, and spotted but then lost sight of the aircraft. They still confirmed to ATC that they were clear, and their comments to each other right up to impact were on the lines of "he's clear", "yes I'm sure he is", "he must be" etc.

[/ QUOTE ]

The point is they didn't know it was swamped or capsized - they pass small vessels all the time without doing damage. Your other point seems to corroborate the point that it is very easy to convince yourself that all is well. The OOW never saw the vessel prior to his alteration; he only heard from the lookout that it was "close". Well "close" is rather subjective - it can mean 30 m or 300 m. The effect of the bow-wave and wake on a small vessel is also dependent on the direction it comes from - bow on would have caused no problem, whereas on the quarter as it was would cause swamping; not easy to see at night, or even consider if the OOW has never been out in a small boat.
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

I still think it was an unforgiveable error due to a cavalier attitude towards safe operations of the ferry.....P&O do rather seem to make a habit of this, don't they?
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

[ QUOTE ]
I still think it was an unforgiveable error due to a cavalier attitude towards safe operations of the ferry.....P&O do rather seem to make a habit of this, don't they?

[/ QUOTE ]

Can you give examples?!

PW
 
Re: AIS and the MAIB report

[ QUOTE ]
[ QUOTE ]
I still think it was an unforgiveable error due to a cavalier attitude towards safe operations of the ferry.....P&O do rather seem to make a habit of this, don't they?

[/ QUOTE ]

Can you give examples?!

PW

[/ QUOTE ]


You may wish to have another look at the MAIB report on Ouzo (full text, not the synopsis). You will find listed there a number of previous P&O incidents, including one that occurred very close to the location of the Ouzo incident. When I read them, it occurred to me that possibly the writer was seeking to make the point that P&O did indeed seem to feature rather often. Then, to be fair, they are one of biggest ferry operators, which for statistical purposes has to be taken into account.
 
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