MAIB Report Red Falcon and Phoenix collision

Simondjuk said:
I find it concerning how many people consider AIS a fundamental collision avoidance tool in the Solent, in daylight and good viz, on a busy summer Saturday afternoon?

There are too many vessels and watercraft, large numbers of the fastest, most manoeuvrable and least predictable of which are neither receiving or transmitting AIS, the courses and speeds of all vessels are too prone to abrupt and significant change, and the situation too dynamic for devices which present only a partial representation of that complex dynamic to be of value.

It's a head up, eyes out environment.
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Indeed!

But sometimes the Mark I eyeballs just don't catch the collision risk target. Here the target was coming right out of the sun. Sometimes with the best watch in the world, you just can't see. So AIS can really save your bacon on occasion. Not as a substitute for a sharp visual watch, but occasionally crucial supplement.
 
RichardS said:
Is there something about apportionment of blame that you don't understand?
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For my part: "its purpose in this context". If you're an insurance guy and familiar with the heuristics of how blame is apportioned in your professional context then I understand how that may be an interesting academic exercise for you. Both parties made serious errors. Without both parties making an error the accident wouldn't have happened. Neither performed the actions maliciously. "Who is wrongerer?" is a technical question for insurance specialists, not a moral one.

Dockhead said:
And yes, AIS on the Phoenix would have prevented the accident. [...] If Phoenix had appeared on their screen, they would have done what they do hundreds of times a day, and just dodged him.
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The respectable reason for us reading these reports (rather than "morbid fascination" ;-) is to cause us to re-evaluate our own safety. Whilst the part of the report you highlight here seems obvious, are there any here who as a result of this will change habits and start transmitting AIS in the solent? We may say this situation is not relevant to us because we'd use our eyes and invoke any relevant sections of rule 17 as necessary, but being seen is surely generally safer than not being seen. My AIS stays off in the solent. Perhaps I should re-evaluate that: I can have the transceiver on without the chart plotter.
 
capnsensible said:
Thats brilliant and a great big thank you. If it wasnt for the REMF's keeping things overseen properly, then us Guys and Girls in the Front Line would be, ahem, adrift.

:encouragement:
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OK so I have lived a sheltered life and had to look up the meaning of REMF. Now that I have added a new expression to my English usage, I need to know if it can be used in everyday modern life. Or will I be kicked about by the snowflakes for causing them offence?
Apologies for drift.
Peter
 
Resolution said:
had to look up the meaning of REMF. Now that I have added a new expression to my English usage, I need to know if it can be used in everyday modern life.
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There are two explanations for people using job-specific jargon. One is that they don't understand that it's job specific. The other is that they're using it as a shibboleth
 
A point which I dont thnk anybody has yet mentioned: the ferry was only steady on course for 50 seconds prior to the collision. So basically he altered course to starboard, knowing there was a group of small craft quite close on his starboard side, without making the appropriate sound signal. to alert them to his manoeuvre, or checking that the new course was clear before turning. Phoenix was not hidden by the glare of the sun when he started the turn.

The skipper of Phoenix, on the other hand, may well have spotted the ferry earlier, seen it initially on a direct heading for Cowes, and then put it out of his mind. He was proceeding on a steady course and speed. With no sound signal to alert him, he would not have known that the ferry had turned onto a collision course, unless he happened to look round in the final 50 seconds before impact.

With 20 years big ship experience behind me, I would say the balance of responsibility lies far more heavily on the ferry skipper. That he did not go back to assist after the collision is absolutely reprehensible, and has heavy overtones of the Ouzo tragedy. .
 
dombuckley said:
A point which I dont thnk anybody has yet mentioned: the ferry was only steady on course for 50 seconds prior to the collision. So basically he altered course to starboard, knowing there was a group of small craft quite close on his starboard side, without making the appropriate sound signal.
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You seem to be suggesting that the Red Funnel ferries should sound their whistles almost constantly when under way, at least at weekends?

Pete
 
1) It takes two to crash, generally.
2) The ferry would seem to be in the wrong as it is overtaking vessel
3) The MoBo altered course towards the channel, the ferry altered couse as it followed the channel
4) it is unfortunate that the MoBo was directly 'up sun' of the ferry.
5) AIS is not going to help much as the situation only evolved over a period of two minutes

It's a bit like stumbling off the pavement onto a major road, even if there's a curve in the road and your straight line path takes you into the path of a lorry.
Ideally the lorry driver will see the child stepping into the road....

The sea, or rather the Solent, is not linear like a road, it is 2D, you need to keep a 360degree lookout.
Some people have a sort of tunnel vision mentatlity, they have little awareness or care about anything that's not directly in front of them. That's not good in boat, boats come together from all angles. I sailed a race today, where most of the time, the 'action' was all about boats that were upwind, downwind or behind me. That's pretty typical in sailing?
 
dombuckley said:
A point which I dont thnk anybody has yet mentioned: the ferry was only steady on course for 50 seconds prior to the collision. So basically he altered course to starboard, knowing there was a group of small craft quite close on his starboard side, without making the appropriate sound signal. to alert them to his manoeuvre, or checking that the new course was clear before turning. Phoenix was not hidden by the glare of the sun when he started the turn.

The skipper of Phoenix, on the other hand, may well have spotted the ferry earlier, seen it initially on a direct heading for Cowes, and then put it out of his mind. He was proceeding on a steady course and speed. With no sound signal to alert him, he would not have known that the ferry had turned onto a collision course, unless he happened to look round in the final 50 seconds before impact.

With 20 years big ship experience behind me, I would say the balance of responsibility lies far more heavily on the ferry skipper. That he did not go back to assist after the collision is absolutely reprehensible, and has heavy overtones of the Ouzo tragedy. .
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Yep
The poor lookout by a slack, lax, complacent, lazy bridge team. Didn’t see the power boat.
Even so.
They were informed they had had a collision by passengers and other crew. Kept on going.

It was a hit and run. Reprehensible +1.
 
Dockhead said:
50:50 -- clearly.

Neither vessel saw the other. Neither vessel took ANY action. Cut and dried.

And yes, AIS on the Phoenix would have prevented the accident. The Red Falcon couldn't see the mobo because of the sun. TThose guys have had a few foibles in recent years, but they have vast experience dodging all kinds of erratically maneuvering and clueless WAFI's -- they encounter hundreds of vessels on the average day, and they do it day in and day out. If Phoenix had appeared on their screen, they would have done what they do hundreds of times a day, and just dodged him. But Phoenix was coming out of the sun, and they just missed him. One time out of tens of thousands of collision risk situations they encounter on that run over the years.

As to Phoenix -- the guy maneuvered into the shipping channel without even glancing over his shoulder to see whether any traffic was coming down. No sun obscured his view; he just didn't look at all. He was worse than clueless, but that's no excuse for the Red Falcon, which also needed to see and respond.

As to the significance of the Phoenix being stand-on -- those who think this is important should read some collision cases. Someone even used the word "right of way" -- there is no right of way at sea -- being a stand-on vessel in a crossing is very different from having right of way on land.

Being stand-on means doesn't mean that you have some right to blithely carry on and rely on other vessels dealing with collision avoidance (as having right of way does, to a great extent, on a road). Being stand on means that having properly detected the risk of collision (by having kept a proper watch as you are obligated to do), you give the give-way vessel a chance to maneuver first. Standing-on is an obligation, not a privilege. If the give-way vessels fails to maneuver, and the reason why is irrelevant, it becomes your turn and your obligation to manuever yourself and prevent the collision. So having failed to keep a proper watch, having failed to detect the risk of collision, and having then failed to maneuver yourself as you are obligated to do, the fact that at some point you might otherwise have been the stand-on vessel is irrelevant. Any court would call this 50:50.
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You may be right on a leagal basis. The MAIB report isn’t about the legal issues. Indeed it barely mentions the colision regulations.

The narrow channel was only a small factor, only applicable to the small power boats, desision to cross the channel. It was a poor decision based on lack of knowledge and understanding,
The power boat skipper was running slowly for a passengers comfort crossing the Chanel at a fine angle heading directly to his destination completely unaware the Ferry was approaching at aproximytwice his speed from behind.
Failure of lookout.
The rest not factors contributing to this incident.

Given it’s an Englishman’s god given right to purchase a boat and head off with no requirements beyond payment.
This is surely not unusual.

The Ferry’s lookout. Completely and underly failed to detect the small power boat. Obviously rule 5.
The rest were not a contributing factor to this event.
The Ferry had both a Radar and ECS. Nobody was looking at. AIS would not have made a difference. No body would have seen it because nobody was looking.
The Bridge Team on the Ferry were navigating and doing colision avoidance by sight only from a couple of chairs. Despite thier claim to not have been able to see into the suns glare. Or other blind sectors created by the structure of the vessel.

The reference to the sound signal for manoeuvre. MAIB state it was not required due to the alteration of course not being required by colision avoidance.
The MAIB point out if a sound signal had been made to indicate the ferry was intending to alter to starboard for navigation. it may have alerted the power boat to the ferries presence.
This is a point I have discussed in the past. It’s quite reasonable to give a sound signal for any alteration even alterations which are not for colision avoidance.

Read the report again without thinking about the law.
What would have changed the out come.
What could be changed to prevent this happening again?

The MAIB made no recommendations deferring to action already taken by the Ferry company.

From a lay perspective. I do see this as a “hit and Run” by the ferry. Which I believe puts culpability firmly on the ferry bridge crew. Out weighing the actions of the powerboat skipper by a mile.
I also see the ferry crew as professionals who would have known better. Who chose not to act better.
 
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Uricanejack said:
You may be right on a leagal basis. The MAIB report isn’t about the legal issues. Indeed it barely mentions the colision regulations.

The narrow channel was only a small factor, only applicable to the small power boats, desision to cross the channel. It was a poor decision based on lack of knowledge and understanding,
The power boat skipper was running slowly for a passengers comfort crossing the Chanel at a fine angle heading directly to his destination completely unaware the Ferry was approaching at aproximytwice his speed from behind.
Failure of lookout.
The rest not factors contributing to this incident.

Given it’s an Englishman’s god given right to purchase a boat and head off with no requirements beyond payment.
This is surely not unusual.

The Ferry’s lookout. Completely and underly failed to detect the small power boat. Obviously rule 5.
The rest were not a contributing factor to this event.
The Ferry had both a Radar and ECS. Nobody was looking at. AIS would not have made a difference. No body would have seen it because nobody was looking.
The Bridge Team on the Ferry were navigating and doing colision avoidance by sight only from a couple of chairs. Despite thier claim to not have been able to see into the suns glare. Or other blind sectors created by the structure of the vessel.

The reference to the sound signal for manoeuvre. MAIB state it was not required due to the alteration of course not being required by colision avoidance.
The MAIB point out if a sound signal had been made to indicate the ferry was intending to alter to starboard for navigation. it may have alerted the power boat to the ferries presence.
This is a point I have discussed in the past. It’s quite reasonable to give a sound signal for any alteration even alterations which are not for colision avoidance.

Read the report again without thinking about the law.
What would have changed the out come.
What could be changed to prevent this happening again?

The MAIB made no recommendations deferring to action already taken by the Ferry company.

From a lay perspective. I do see this as a “hit and Run” by the ferry. Which I believe puts culpability firmly on the ferry bridge crew. Out weighing the actions of the powerboat skipper by a mile.
I also see the ferry crew as professionals who would have known better. Who chose not to act better.
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Well, not much to argue with here.

The ferry crew may or may not have had inadequate watch procedures -- I can't really tell from the materials, nor would I really know how you're supposed to do it in that kind of vessel. Whether there was a deeper failure or not, it's obvious there was at least a momentary failure here. They got distracted by the other sailboat; sun obscured the mobo; etc. -- they screwed up, no question.

But the mobo driver also screwed up, egregiously. Not to look UP the channel, before going out into it? That's crazy. The Thorn Channel has some of the heaviest ship traffic on the coast. This really is very much like bumbling into the road without even looking around. The mobo didn't have AIS or even VHF, but it had a chart plotter, and the Thorn Channel is clearly marked on it, plus it's heavily lined with buoys.

The Falcon normally dodge around such guys, but it just didn't happen this time, and as the mobo driver wasn't even looking, it was the double witching hour which causes collisions.

I agree with you that we hardly care about the legal situation -- it's an insurance matter. But the OP asked for opinions.
 
Dockhead said:
Well, not much to argue with here.

The ferry crew may or may not have had inadequate watch procedures -- I can't really tell from the materials, nor would I really know how you're supposed to do it in that kind of vessel. Whether there was a deeper failure or not, it's obvious there was at least a momentary failure here. They got distracted by the other sailboat; sun obscured the mobo; etc. -- they screwed up, no question.

But the mobo driver also screwed up, egregiously. Not to look UP the channel, before going out into it? That's crazy. The Thorn Channel has some of the heaviest ship traffic on the coast. This really is very much like bumbling into the road without even looking around. The mobo didn't have AIS or even VHF, but it had a chart plotter, and the Thorn Channel is clearly marked on it, plus it's heavily lined with buoys.

The Falcon normally dodge around such guys, but it just didn't happen this time, and as the mobo driver wasn't even looking, it was the double witching hour which causes collisions.

I agree with you that we hardly care about the legal situation -- it's an insurance matter. But the OP asked for opinions.
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Above my pay grade so I don't know the answer... If the MOBO driver was found negligent in anyway would his insurers either not pay out or reduce the amount of payment?

I wrote this to another formite in a PM recently regarding Los Angeles and Long Beach harbors/channels and I think it's maybe relevant.


It’s nothing like as busy as the Solent unless you stay inside the harbour but there are several rental companies where the renters think a boat drives like car have no knowledge of colregs and no one seems to care.

500 ton at 30kts is going to hurt but still they play chicken with us.

I don't advocate compulsory training but you can't drive a car without passing a test but you can spend the same $ on a boat without any idea of what you're doing or the risks to you and your passengers and that is somehow wrong.

California is introducing compulsory testing on a rolling time frame based on age. I think there are excemptions on casual hirers so kind of defeats the point as a regular boater (this case excepted), will usually take the time to learn. Who drives a car without ever reading or learning the Highway Code?

One of our vessels has limited visibility due to construction but everyone is aware of it and know they need to make extra efforts to overcome it.

Also IMHO the bouyage is substandard to the UK, many not lit or easy to see against the background lights, so maintains by the USCG others by local authorities, differences between open sea and inland waterways.

If I had $1 for every leisure idiot I've encountered I could have retired years ago. If I'd had $1 for every 'professional' idiot I'd be rich but still working.

W.
 
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I'm afraid 'the target was coming right out of the sun' excuse just doesn't work.... it was 1635....sunset wasn't until 1848........ the sun was still quite high in the sky by UK standards.

So there was sun on the water.... there has been sun on the water since Noah was a deckboy..... ships in pre radar days didn't go round crashing into each other just because it was sunny.

You have sun screens on the windows, you have sun glasses, you have a hand ( or even two ) to shade your eyes with....

That is a truly lame excuse for what happened.

The sun was in their eyes because they were too bone idle to do anything about it......
 
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Frank Holden said:
I'm afraid 'the target was coming right out of the sun' excuse just doesn't work.... it was 1635....sunset wasn't until 1848........ the sun was still quite high in the sky by UK standards.

So there was sun on the water.... there has been sun on the water since Noah was a deckboy..... ships in pre radar days didn't go round crashing into each other just because it was sunny.

You have sun screens on the windows, you have sun glasses, you have a hand ( or even two ) to shade your eyes with....

That is a truly lame excuse for what happened.

The sun was in their eyes because they were too bone idle to do anything about it......
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+1
 
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