Latest 'stable door bolting' from MAIB

[flaming]

As far as I can see, the Coxn was off watch. None of us has any idea why he was not involved. Or what exactly happened. But the continuing theme of 'only one who can do anything' is surely false.

If not "only one that can do anything" then "only one who was trying to do everything.

I don't think I, or anybody else, would argue for this being anything other than the skipper's responsibility. It normally is when the boat hits the bricks. But you're right that it's interesting that the cox'n and the other person detailed as a Nav were off watch.

 

[lpdsn]

I realise this is mainly a cruising forum but to anyone who has raced offshore amongst the senior crew on a well run amateur racer it should be obvious that the set up on this boat was deficient, with one competent guy trying to do everything. And as the report points out several other boats in the fleet came very close to being stuck on the rocks, so it wasn't a one off - they were just the unluckiest of a bunch.

He was simply doing too many different jobs and became overloaded. If he'd had a competent navigator and someone else on the bow who could organise the gybe he could have stood back and observed, and maybe decided that it was time to change helms or trimmer given the conditions, or time to suggest an earlier gybe if he felt the navigator was pushing his luck too far. That's the skipper's job, but he was too busy being navigator and crew boss to be the skipper.

Hard to blame him for not training the crew either as he'd only just got most of them.

I knew that the crew for this race qualify with a cheque book, but I also assumed they put more effort into selecting a solid core with some prior experience and trained them up to do the roles of senior crew on a racer. Apparently not.

 

[syc1]

I don't think I, or anybody else, would argue for this being anything other than the skipper's responsibility. It normally is when the boat hits the bricks.

I seem to remember that when HMS Nottingham hit something rock like Down Under, the subsequent investigation found the skipper ultimately responsible, and he wasn't even on board at the time of incident, so it seems that the RN are of that opinion.
(I imagine some crusty Ex Admiral will be along to correct my memory soon)

 

[Resolution]

Cruising Nav is a different world to race Nav.

If was planning a cruising trip round the island I would plan a few waypoints, a good clearance on the needles and some "don't go less than/more than XXX bearing" on the approach to my waypoints. Would then look at the tide and plan my departure, and when it will be with me. Might take me 15 minutes.

For the last couple of years (and this year) the owner, our normal Nav, hasn't done the RTI. So I've been doing the Nav planning together with a stand in Nav. It takes us at least 2 hours, and would certainly take us more but for the fact that we've done countless laps of that island...
And that is planning based on the fact that one person has no role on the boat other than navigating. He doesn't pull any ropes, steer, make coffee or anything. He is purely monitoring where we are, and where we are going.
Planning for a doublehanded RTI where we knew we might be less able to navigate constantly took about 4 hours.

In this context it is interesting to contrast the situation of the Golden Globe competitors, who will be navigating with old fashioned equipment, whilst sailing & skippering, all this solo.

 

[dunedin]

Wow. If not already done so worth reading the full MAIB report.
Having done so, I am now convinced this is a case of a major systemic failure - yes the skipper is at fault but also it would appear the wider fleet and organisation.
Shocking to see how many of the fleet got close to the same shore, and a second boat CV31 seemed to be within 200m if the beach, “almost certainly grounded” (at speed) yet apparently then continued on into the southern ocean after the grounding!
Interesting to note from the MAIB report (if I have gathered correctly):
- the course taken “across” the traffic separation zone - nowhere near 90 degrees
- the number of boats getting dangerously close to shore
- the garmin plotter at the nav station not having a chart card, so not able to send chart data to other MultiFunctionDisplays
- both watch captains apparently being relatively new to sailing (but assistant watch captains bizarrely more experienced)
- watch navigator being a formal role, but apparently not acting in any navigation role
- both nominated watch navigation roles being on the other below deck watch
- no passage plan, even for the early stage close to coast
Etc

 

[alant]

Seeing as ' the depth of my knowledge ' includes friends from several lifeboat CREWS from different stations I think that'l do.

Are they posting on here disguised as you then?
Anyway, hardly think a lifeboat crew of butcher/baker/candlestick maker, can add much input to a thread about RTW Racing Yachts. Even vast experience in speeding A20's is meaningless, its simply useless noise.

 

[zoidberg]

I remember someone quite senior - "in days of old, when nights were cold, and maidens still sighed ******" - once declaiming that 'You can delegate authority, but you cannot delegate responsibility'.....

Over the years, I've met a few who'd tried it on. Better 'seniors' soon put them straight.

 

[alant]

As a concept, I really like the idea of the Clipper races. Big boat racing for anyone (ok, so long as they can write a big cheque). They do seem to be having their fair share of incidents lately and there will always be speculation as to whether these were isolated incidents to be expected from this sort of racing or whether these incidents reflect a broader underlying issue.

I suspect part of the problem is that offshore yacht racing has a strong element of routine and this is what people train for. Sail changes, watches, manoeuvres are all trained routines and I suspect that there is no routine of displaying or monitoring the depth when racing offshore.

However, there does seem to be a trend of poor navigation on these boats. The groundings of the Clipper yachts (amateur crew) and Team Vestas (professional crew). The YM scheme is pretty clear about the requirement to record and monitor the vessel's position at an appropriately frequent basis and it appears that in these instances, the skipper / navigator felt there were other priorities. As a number of others have said, this is not a failure of the YM Scheme, it's a failure of the skippers in implementing the skills for which they were trained and assessed under the YM scheme.

In my opinion, 4 weeks doesn't seem a particularly long time to become a competent crew on a 70foot Ocean Racing Boat, but I guess they get more experienced during the voyage. However, I think it would be prudent to have a few crew members to have 2 weeks of training to get their navigation and ColRegs skills up to YM Theory Standard. The Skipper shouldn't be the only qualified and experienced sailor on board (I think the MCA have also recognised this). Interestingly, the British Steel / BT Challenge boats had YM qualified watch leaders.

BT + Clipper, have to follow the mandatory MCA manning rules, which requires an Ocean qualified skipper & YM offshore mate/watchleader. BT employed both skipper & mate, Clipper employ skipper, but have qualified YM offshore watchleaders who are paying crew. They are well scrutinised before selection & appointment.

 

[dunedin]

BT + Clipper, have to follow the mandatory MCA manning rules, which requires an Ocean qualified skipper & YM offshore mate/watchleader. BT employed both skipper & mate, Clipper employ skipper, but have qualified YM offshore watchleaders who are paying crew. They are well scrutinised before selection & appointment.

Have you actually read the MAIB report? Page 32 refers. See what qualifications the watch leaders actually had. You might be surprised

 

[Stemar]

I don't know if anyone had any qualifications on the Challenge yacht that tried to run me down off Cowes. The only time I've ever made a CHIRP report, but the buggers put the key under the door just afterwards, so no investigation possible.

 

[Uricanejack]

If not "only one that can do anything" then "only one who was trying to do everything.

I don't think I, or anybody else, would argue for this being anything other than the skipper's responsibility. It normally is when the boat hits the bricks. But you're right that it's interesting that the cox'n and the other person detailed as a Nav were off watch.

I think. You are right. About the skipper doing everything. You need ask. Why was he the only one trying to do everything?
Blame wont solve anything. The old fashioned idea. Blame the Captain, Fire the Captain, Problem Solved. Just doesn't work very well. As a means of preventing accidents.
Which does not mean the Skipper is not responsible.

Clipper have a systemic problem. The clues are there in three MAIB reports. The report make clear reference to an recommendation from a report on a previous grounding about the need for a second professional crew member. This recommendation was repeated after a fatal MOB.
I think they have responded to this after yet another fatal MOB recommended an additional professional crew member.

I hope Clipper are implementing some changes already. Clippers apparent record of not implementing recommendations. Is not impressive.
Clipper is an unusual operation. Not standard yacht racing. Non racers paying to experience a race. I suppose lots of sailing schools do this on a smaller scale.

My observation. The Skipper of a Clipper Racing Yacht has not been provided with adequate back up. Again and Again and Again. Clipper was very fortunate only one vessel and no lives were lost.

I have edited this post after further reading and thought.

 

[RobF]

BT + Clipper, have to follow the mandatory MCA manning rules, which requires an Ocean qualified skipper & YM offshore mate/watchleader. BT employed both skipper & mate, Clipper employ skipper, but have qualified YM offshore watchleaders who are paying crew. They are well scrutinised before selection & appointment.

Umm, from reading the MAIB report - it is clear that the use of qualified YM offshore watchleaders was a direct result of this grounding. Section 4.3 refers (in https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5b30ee7d40f0b67f8511a514/2018_-_12_-_CV24.pdf)

I think this is why there is so much suspicion with Clipper Ventures. They seem to be good at implementing corrective actions after a key event has occurred (hence the OP's post title). Great that they've remediated this issue and ensured the skipper isn't the only competent person on the boat, but might have been sensible to have had qualified watch leaders at outset (in the same way the Steel / BT boats had qualified mates at outset).

 

[BelleSerene]

Clipper employ skipper, but have qualified YM offshore watchleaders who are paying crew. They are well scrutinised before selection & appointment.

If that were true, it would say nothing of the negligence that was shown in the event, and wouldn’t excuse the skipper of poor leadership either.

But it’s not even true.

 

[lw395]

I just don't understand the mindset of the punters.
You'd think anyone who was spending a five figure sum on a boating adventure would learn enough to be useful before the race started?
You'd think that by the time they'd done the training, they'd be familiar with the very basics of getting a boat from A to B?
You'd expect most of them to take enough interest that the skipper would get some support?
I can understand any training/experience operation producing a certain fraction of people who just don't learn anything, but a whole crew?
Is the ethos of the organisation just to do your own job and take no interest? I can't imagine anything worse than spending days on end in that atmosphere.

 

[NormanS]

To my mind, as an ordinary yachtsman, the problem with the "incidents" and "accidents" that the Clipper yachts have had, reflect unfairly on yachting in general. This is an organisation which thrives on publicity, but unfortunately a lot of the publicity would make the general public think that yachting is dangerous. I am in no position to say who or what is at fault, but I wish "they" would clean up their act, before some "elf n safety" people decide that sailing is too dangerous.

 

[Uricanejack]

There is no reason for some "elf n safety" people to decide sailing is to dangerous.

The MAIB reports are about the incidents which occurred to a commercial sailing vessel on a commercial voyage. "elf n safety" already applies.
Clipper have had a few incidents. Doesn't mean its a bad idea. It just means they have to look at why they have had those incidents and put into place some, the recommendations the investigation's made.
Almost all big operators of Planes, Trains, Automobiles, Ships, Even NASA space craft. Have had tragic incidents at some time in their history.
Although most transportation companies have had some history of tragic incidents. Good reputable companies implement recommendations or provide dam good reasons why a recommendation is not implemented.

Edited after further reading

 

[zoidberg]

You'd think anyone who was spending a five figure sum on a boating adventure would learn enough to be useful before the race started?
You'd think that by the time they'd done the training, they'd be familiar with the very basics of getting a boat from A to B?
You'd expect most of them to take enough interest that the skipper would get some support?
I can understand any training/experience operation producing a certain fraction of people who just don't learn anything, but a whole crew?
I can't imagine anything worse than spending days on end in that atmosphere.

The 'group dynamics', or whatever, on that boat and indeed on other, similar vessels would seem to have been other than optimum. It may well be the skipper had formed the view of a bunch of 'individualists' who were a long way from pulling together as a pair of watches/ a consolidated crew, and expected to do the leader-work of 'team building' in the unobstructed waters of the Southern Indian Ocean in the weeks ahead. "Let me just get clear of the Cape Peninsula....." is not IMO unreasonable.

However, it is self-evident he did not adequately assess the needs of the developing situation, and failed to provide adequately for those needs. 'Insufficient planning' is only a part of it....

It may be there is a culture of laddish superiority, of a 'playground pecking order', based more on male assertiveness in the early stages of a group coming together. This works to inhibit some in 'speaking up' if uncertain of their judgement or place, and it could be this may have played a role. Many, I know, would hesitate to question in any way what seems OK to the skipper on deck - even when the shore lights are visible close at hand. This is a human failing, a persistent problem, in crewed vehicle management which the aviation industry and, to some extent, the marine world, has tried to address by means of CRM training.

However, the 'big boat sailing' world is a macho one, and it may be of the culture to give scarcely a nod to such ideas as 'inclusion' and 'safe practices'. That seems evident from the imagery around the MOB near-loss of Alex Gough. Runts and 'noobs' are ignored.

As example, quite some years ago I spent a week aboard an RYA-approved training yacht, a Rival 38, where one other crew member was a markedly underconfident young man, albeit an enthusiast. His g/f had paid for him to have this week's basic 'Day Skippery' training, and it swiftly became evident any natural confidence he may have had in himself had been comprehensively subverted. He had previously paid £thousands to be a 'legger' on a Whitbread/Volvo (?) event to Brazil, and had endured - no other word for it - several weeks of bullying. He had learned nothing. Our RYA training boat's owner/skipper, an ex-RAF Regiment Squadron Leader, was no slouch when it came to understanding and motivating individuals, and I knew the score, too. Between us, we had to rebuild this young man's faith in himself, that he could accomplish straightforward tasks on board satisfactorily and learn new ones, so that he could enjoy boating again..... and yes, we did.

My host, the Squabbling Bleeder, confided that 'group pecking order' invites bullying of the perceived weak and redirecting this destructive urge is very much a leader-role..... Perhaps such skills and insight are rather lacking in e.g. the Clipper ethos.

 

[Deleted member 36384]

Disastrous Decisions: The Human and Organisational Causes of the Gulf of Mexico Blowout, Andrew Hopkins, describes how organisations set themselves up to fail.

He was told that it is not rocket science to which his response was, it’s much harder than that, you are trying to change human beings.

 

[Seajet]

Eleglitch & PRV, try looking at page 1 of this discusussion

 

[Kukri]

The 'group dynamics', or whatever, on that boat and indeed on other, similar vessels would seem to have been other than optimum. It may well be the skipper had formed the view of a bunch of 'individualists' who were a long way from pulling together as a pair of watches/ a consolidated crew, and expected to do the leader-work of 'team building' in the unobstructed waters of the Southern Indian Ocean in the weeks ahead. "Let me just get clear of the Cape Peninsula....." is not IMO unreasonable.

However, it is self-evident he did not adequately assess the needs of the developing situation, and failed to provide adequately for those needs. 'Insufficient planning' is only a part of it....

It may be there is a culture of laddish superiority, of a 'playground pecking order', based more on male assertiveness in the early stages of a group coming together. This works to inhibit some in 'speaking up' if uncertain of their judgement or place, and it could be this may have played a role. Many, I know, would hesitate to question in any way what seems OK to the skipper on deck - even when the shore lights are visible close at hand. This is a human failing, a persistent problem, in crewed vehicle management which the aviation industry and, to some extent, the marine world, has tried to address by means of CRM training.

However, the 'big boat sailing' world is a macho one, and it may be of the culture to give scarcely a nod to such ideas as 'inclusion' and 'safe practices'. That seems evident from the imagery around the MOB near-loss of Alex Gough. Runts and 'noobs' are ignored.

As example, quite some years ago I spent a week aboard an RYA-approved training yacht, a Rival 38, where one other crew member was a markedly underconfident young man, albeit an enthusiast. His g/f had paid for him to have this week's basic 'Day Skippery' training, and it swiftly became evident any natural confidence he may have had in himself had been comprehensively subverted. He had previously paid £thousands to be a 'legger' on a Whitbread/Volvo (?) event to Brazil, and had endured - no other word for it - several weeks of bullying. He had learned nothing. Our RYA training boat's owner/skipper, an ex-RAF Regiment Squadron Leader, was no slouch when it came to understanding and motivating individuals, and I knew the score, too. Between us, we had to rebuild this young man's faith in himself, that he could accomplish straightforward tasks on board satisfactorily and learn new ones, so that he could enjoy boating again..... and yes, we did.

My host, the Squabbling Bleeder, confided that 'group pecking order' invites bullying of the perceived weak and redirecting this destructive urge is very much a leader-role..... Perhaps such skills and insight are rather lacking in e.g. the Clipper ethos.

Thank you for a very good post.