GPS Spoofing

[James Marinero]

New Scientist is reporting an apparent GPS spoofing 'experiment' in the Black Sea., quote:

'Reports of satellite navigation problems in the Black Sea suggest that Russia may be testing a new system for spoofing GPS, New Scientist has learned. This could be the first hint of a new form of electronic warfare available to everyone from rogue nation states to petty criminals.

On 22 June, the US Maritime Administration filed a seemingly bland incident report. The master of a ship off the Russian port of Novorossiysk had discovered his GPS put him in the wrong spot – more than 32 kilometres inland, at Gelendzhik Airport.'

Do you monitor your track and/or keep paper plots going? For me, a 32 km diversion would be obvious. However, if the 'errors' were smaller then it might not be so obvious - but still be accumulate enough to cause a problem. Checking compass bearings, depths and using all the inputs you have access to - and applying common sense is always good practice.

Full story at

https://www.newscientist.com/article/2143499-ships-fooled-in-gps-spoofing-attack-suggest-russian-cyberweapon/

 

[Deleted member 36384]

To be honest, the vast majority of my navigation these days is by pilotage so I do compare visually with a chart far more than the plotter using objects and depth, rarely take bearings as sticking the finger on the chart is usually accurate. That's only because I am in a familiar area, it would likely be different if I went further and I would tend to trust the GPS.

Interesting article, but it could also just be propaganda and misinformation, the Russians are masters at sowing seeds of disinformation.

 

[Lon nan Gruagach]

Trivial to detect with a large vessel though., therefore its not a brilliant weapon.
The result of this spoofing is to place all affected receivers at the same (wrong) location, if the GPS at the front of your super tanker says its on the same spot as the GPS at the rear then you know you been spoofed.
And... it wont take long for military spec GPS to implement single receiver spoof detection by adding an encrypted signal. So, again, not a fab weapon.

 

[Bru]

And... it wont take long for military spec GPS to implement single receiver spoof detection by adding an encrypted signal. So, again, not a fab weapon.

Mil spec GPS already uses encrypted signals - there has always been an encrypted code with enhanced features, the P(Y) code but that required the receiver to also receive a valid C/A (Coarse Acquisition) code which could still be spoofed. Since 2005 a new encrypted 'M' code has been added which directly gives a very accurate position. Virtually nothing about it has been published, for obvious reasons. There's also plans in the pipeline to launch additional satellites (from next year) with higher output directional steerable antennas which will be able to blast the 'M' code signal through jamming over an area of several hundred kilometres (the directional signal will be up to 100 times stronger than the normal GPS signal)

 

[johnalison]

Trinity House did some tests off the East Coast a few years ago which showed that confusion could be caused over a small area. As far as I remember from their demo, the main area suffered loss of position whereas the margins gave rise to misleading data. I dare say that the Russians or somebody could develop something more sophisticated than the simple equipment used, but I imagine that it would still be local and so more suitable for someone with the mentality of those who zap planes with lasers than for a military usage.

 

[Sandyman]

. Virtually nothing about it has been published, for obvious reasons.

Its obvious that most of this lot on here wouldn't even understand what the obvious reasons were

 

[Bru]

Its obvious that most of this lot on here wouldn't even understand what the obvious reasons were

 

[wizard]

Its obvious that most of this lot on here wouldn't even understand what the obvious reasons were

So secret that in fact I am not sure I should even say 'no comment'

 

[brman]

Do you monitor your track and/or keep paper plots going? For me, a 32 km diversion would be obvious. However, if the 'errors' were smaller then it might not be so obvious - but still be accumulate enough to cause a problem. Checking compass bearings, depths and using all the inputs you have access to - and applying common sense is always good practice.

There has been comments on how detectable such spoofing is but, for the average sailor, isn't this the point? Whether it is just a simple blocker or more intelligent spoofing, it still means your GPS is useless. How many regularly double check position etc using traditional methods?

I know from recent experience it is very easy to slip into the habit of assuming the GPS is better than my own observations, to the extent that you believe the GPS if it contradicts where you think you are.

 

[PeterR]

Much the same happened to us in the very early days of GPS. We were about 20 miles south of Plymouth at night when the GPS started to tell us we were somewhere on the top of Dartmoor. It carried on doing that for about two hours before deciding to tell the truth. It never behaved like that again. I never found out the cause but my assumption was that the Navy were experimenting - however there was a lot of sunspot activity at the time.

It wasn't a problem on that occasion as we just reverted to DR from the last realistic logged position and then took bearings on lighthouses but if we had been close inshore in thick weather it might have been a different story. The experience did re-enforce the need to keep a regular paper record of Lat/long, log reading, time, course and speed. Even if you do not actually plot the position you can then go back and plot it in the event of electrical failure, lightening strike etc. People who shrug their shoulders and say there is no need as they have multiple GPS receivers on board beware.

 

[lw395]

Mil spec GPS already uses encrypted signals - there has always been an encrypted code with enhanced features, the P(Y) code but that required the receiver to also receive a valid C/A (Coarse Acquisition) code which could still be spoofed. Since 2005 a new encrypted 'M' code has been added which directly gives a very accurate position. Virtually nothing about it has been published, for obvious reasons. There's also plans in the pipeline to launch additional satellites (from next year) with higher output directional steerable antennas which will be able to blast the 'M' code signal through jamming over an area of several hundred kilometres (the directional signal will be up to 100 times stronger than the normal GPS signal)

AIUI, the 'military' also rarely rely absolutely on GPS in the way that many leisure sailors do.
Inertial navigation is in a lot of things, there are other nav aids.

 

[James Marinero]

I always calibrate my GPS when making a landfall in an area I haven't previously visited, usually by setting a waypoint over a depth feature. WGS 84 charts are not always accurate. And I do try to apply common sense. What happened to HMS Association can still happen today. I've had several instances where the GPS has said I'm ashore when I'm actually at anchor. Important to use the largest scale chart available.

The reported spoofing could cause chaos (we do not know whether errors apply equally to all receivers in an area or, e.g. is position dependent - i.e errors vary by actual position or other variable, which would affect the relative positions of vessels - bedlam).

 

[lw395]

....

The reported spoofing could cause chaos (we do not know whether errors apply equally to all receivers in an area or, e.g. is position dependent - i.e errors vary by actual position or other variable, which would affect the relative positions of vessels - bedlam).

The report states that all the spoofed receivers are getting the same position.
This is the simplest form of spoofing, you receive the genuine GPS signal at a location and re-broadcast it at a different location(s).
I wonder if they fiddle with their own GLONASS at the same time?
Not sure what would happen in a typical consumer dual system receiver if the two systems were giving different answers?

 

[sarabande]

So secret that in fact I am not sure I should even say 'no comment'

It's a good job that none of the info is on the public domain....

http://gpsworld.com/spirent-federal-developing-mnsa-capable-simulators/

http://www.insidegnss.com/auto/MayJune06GNSSSolutions.pdf

 

[James Marinero]

Another take on GPS spoofing, but this is from Sophos, the pc security firm. Some of the reporting is a bit OTT, but you do wonder. Sure, the military has selective availability but just think of the chaos Kim Sun-il could cause to commercial shipping without resorting to nukes.

$80 million yacht hijacked by students spoofing GPS signals

 

[Polly's Kettle]

Trivial to detect with a large vessel though., therefore its not a brilliant weapon.

Well, yes, if you've set up your system to detect such an anomaly and if that's how the spoofing works - I had imagined it spoofs the location of the satellite by giving a different time delay, so both ends of the ship would still be in different spots.

Even if you do spot it, that doesn't help you identify where you actually are, so still dastardly inconvenient.

 

[Sandy]

When you do the maths to look at signal strength when it reaches the receiver you will be amazed it ever works.

 

[Polly's Kettle]

I always calibrate my GPS when making a landfall in an area I haven't previously visited, usually by setting a waypoint over a depth feature.

James - I've never heard of calibrating your GPS before - how do you go about it?

 

[RichardS]

James - I've never heard of calibrating your GPS before - how do you go about it?

It's probably cailbrating the chart position on the chart plotter as derived from GPS rather than calibrating the GPS.

Richard

 

[Blue Sunray]

Sure, the military has selective availability.

Not since the beginning of 2000 and the current gen of satellites no longer have the capability.

http://archive.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=11335