Cheeki Rafiki yacht operator cleared over sailor deaths

I think the Cat 2 survey was legally irrelevant - rightly or wrongly it was deemed a commercial trip and therefore the boat should have been Cat 0.

And now his erstwhile competitors just call it a race, so Cat 0 is legally irrelevant.

How many lawyers does it take to stop a keel falling off? :)
 
And now his erstwhile competitors just call it a race, so Cat 0 is legally irrelevant.

How many lawyers does it take to stop a keel falling off? :)

Agree, and the BBC report snippet about the Jury's note suggests the latest Jury were doubtful if the 'commercial trip' definition was totally clear cut at the time. Which would perhaps explain why the MCA never prosecuted anyone for a practice that was common knowledge.

It said the Maritime and Coastguard Agency had undertaken to work with the Royal Yachting Association and the marine industry to clarify safety and maintenance requirements.
A note from the jury read out in court said it was "deeply concerned" about a maritime regulation guidance note and hoped it would be reviewed and tightened to help improve safety.
 
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Agree, and the snippet about the Jury's note I've posted below suggests the latest Jury were doubtful if the 'commercial trip' definition was especially clear cut at the time.

I'm not at all sure it was clear cut, which made him a bit of a fall guy. I guess it is clarified now.

I do believe a lot of the coding issues were a bit of a red herring at the end of the day even though they were a bit of a stick to beat Doug Innes. This boat was built completely correctly under the RCD yet it unexpectedly lost its keel. The big unanswered question is could that have happened to anyone? The vast majority of boats of this design (and I'd argue it isn't a question unique to this model or builder) will never be coded.

I know people will put it down to racers or charterers abusing boats but that's mainly prejudice. I've seen far worse abuse of boats by owners than I've ever seen from racers or charterers. Undoubtedly though this was a very heavily used example of the type.

It's the design and construction of the boat where I suspect there is most room for improvement. It is strong enough as built. But the rigours of use and misuse seem to leave damage that is damned difficult to detect and repair.
 
I do believe a lot of the coding issues were a bit of a red herring at the end of the day even though they were a bit of a stick to beat Doug Innes.

I'd think in legal terms the coding would be the basis for the "failing to operate the yacht in a safe manner", but yeah, the safety lessons here are all about the construction of the boat and the failure. I suspect we'll be adding a mental caveat to the 'step up to the boat' lessons of the '78 Fastnet from now on.
 
I'm not at all sure it was clear cut, which made him a bit of a fall guy. I guess it is clarified now.

I do believe a lot of the coding issues were a bit of a red herring at the end of the day even though they were a bit of a stick to beat Doug Innes. This boat was built completely correctly under the RCD yet it unexpectedly lost its keel. The big unanswered question is could that have happened to anyone? The vast majority of boats of this design (and I'd argue it isn't a question unique to this model or builder) will never be coded.

I know people will put it down to racers or charterers abusing boats but that's mainly prejudice. I've seen far worse abuse of boats by owners than I've ever seen from racers or charterers. Undoubtedly though this was a very heavily used example of the type.

It's the design and construction of the boat where I suspect there is most room for improvement. It is strong enough as built. But the rigours of use and misuse seem to leave damage that is damned difficult to detect and repair.

I agree. It was a delivery, not a charter so coding wasn't necessary, possibly(?) I'm not an expert on this area.
 
I know people will put it down to racers or charterers abusing boats but that's mainly prejudice. I've seen far worse abuse of boats by owners than I've ever seen from racers or charterers. Undoubtedly though this was a very heavily used example of the type.

It's the design and construction of the boat where I suspect there is most room for improvement. It is strong enough as built. But the rigours of use and misuse seem to leave damage that is damned difficult to detect and repair.

I think it's an attitude thing as well. Some owners don't skimp on repairs and kit, others do, regardless of whether it's just a toy or being used to make a living.

We, as sailors, have to accept that boats designed to sail well with fairly thin appendages and moderate build weight cannot withstand the heavy groundings that their predecessors could. What doesn't help is when damage from these groundings is hidden.
 
I would liken it to a car manufacturer being allowed to get away with suspension that failed on bumpy roads. Ridiculous. The fault initially lies with the builders but they slide away into the shadows with nonsense about calculations.
 
I would liken it to a car manufacturer being allowed to get away with suspension that failed on bumpy roads. Ridiculous. The fault initially lies with the builders but they slide away into the shadows with nonsense about calculations.

Drivel.
 
I would liken it to a car manufacturer being allowed to get away with suspension that failed on bumpy roads. Ridiculous. The fault initially lies with the builders but they slide away into the shadows with nonsense about calculations.

It's more complex than that. It's not that either the suspension or keel will suffer damage if it hits a big enough rock. It's that that damage just isn't easy to spot.

I was racing on a Sigma that hit a rock (except I have an alibi that I was away that day). The boat didn't sink but the rear of the keel was driven up into the hull. A blind man on a galloping horse couldn't have missed spotting the damage. The boat was hauled out and repaired.

The whole CR thing was that it suffered a number of 'light' groundings and allegedly an unreported heavy grounding, but the effect of that was not visible.
 
Not about to run Cat 0 or Cat 2 yachts again, so personally I think the biggest thing to take away from this tragedy is any possible lesson if this started to happen on your own yacht a long way off shore.

1 If there is an unusual amount of water in the bilge, you can tell immediately if it's a leak or if a water tank has split: taste it.

2 If it's salty you MUST find the source. Look everywhere, never mind a bit of internal damage if necessary. Start with all the known through fittings, close all sea cocks, check log and echo sounder, check the rudder stock, check the stern gland, cockpit drains, etc., but FIND it.

3 If you can't find it, and particularly if it's getting worse, it may be structural. You're sinking. Fire the EPIRB.
 
My point is that If the keel and its surrounding structure was built to a more demanding specification there would be no damage to find after light/heavy groundings (whatever that means) and in very heavy groundings the damage would be obvious.
 
My point is that If the keel and its surrounding structure was built to a more demanding specification there would be no damage to find after light/heavy groundings (whatever that means) and in very heavy groundings the damage would be obvious.

Then you may have to discuss your requirements with Brent Swain. I believe he is the only builder of damage proof yachts on the planet.

In the real world any structure will suffer damage if hit hard enough. I'm making no suggestion that the 40.7s weren't strong enough when they left the yard nor that the specification resulting from the RCD wasn't higher than those used in previous decades. I'm only raising the issue that damage isn't obvious and therefore at a pragmatic level maintenance and repair are fraught with risks.
 
And now his erstwhile competitors just call it a race, so Cat 0 is legally irrelevant.

How many lawyers does it take to stop a keel falling off? :)

The MCA disagreed.

According to the MAIB report:
Stormforce Coaching asked YDSA to grant an extension to allow the survey to be completed when the vessel was back in the UK. YDSA passed the request to theMCA, who confirmed that no extension was permitted under the SCV Code. Owingto the cost of completing the survey while in the Caribbean Sea, it was not carried out and Cheeki Rafiki’s Category 2 coding expired.

On 26 March 2014, the MCA stated in an email to YDSA ‘...not sure how it got
to the Caribbean from the UK on a Cat 2 Certificate, especially as they are usingit commercially out there?’
This email was forwarded by YDSA to Stormforce Coaching, who responded directly to the MCA on 27 March 2014 ‘...Just to clarify, the yacht crossed the Atlantic in the racing division of the ARC under ISAF regulations. She will not be carrying any paying passengers for the way home...’

On 28 March 2014, the MCA responded, stating ‘Paying passengers are only
one element of the definition. If the voyage is a relocation voyage for commercialpurposes, the vessel is almost certainly not being used as a pleasure vessel.’
The definition of a ‘pleasure vessel’, a copy of which was attached to the email,
is provided in The Merchant Shipping (Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure) Regulations 1998 and is reproduced at Annex F. On 31 March 2014, the principal/director telephoned the MCA to discuss the issue but the content andoutcome of the conversation were not documented and cannot be verified.

Subsequent to the accident, the MCA has stated that for the return crossing of the
Atlantic Ocean ‘the vessel should have been appropriately coded or complied fully with the relevant merchant shipping legislation that would otherwise have applied’.


So it seems that not only was a Cat 0 coding required, but even the yacht's Category 2 coding was no longer valid.

One difference between Cat 2 and Cat 0 coding is in the life raft requirements. It requires that in the event of one life raft being lost, there's sufficient capacity for all crew in another; and also that the life rafts be able to float free. Cheeki Rafiki's single liferaft was stowed in a cockpit bench, as is usual in Beneteau 40.7s.
 
I would liken it to a car manufacturer being allowed to get away with a radiator that failed when a tree got in the way. Ridiculous. The fault initially lies with the builders but they slide away into the shadows with nonsense about calculations.

There. Fixed that for you.
 
Not about to run Cat 0 or Cat 2 yachts again, so personally I think the biggest thing to take away from this tragedy is any possible lesson if this started to happen on your own yacht a long way off shore.

1 If there is an unusual amount of water in the bilge, you can tell immediately if it's a leak or if a water tank has split: taste it.

2 If it's salty you MUST find the source. Look everywhere, never mind a bit of internal damage if necessary. Start with all the known through fittings, close all sea cocks, check log and echo sounder, check the rudder stock, check the stern gland, cockpit drains, etc., but FIND it.

3 If you can't find it, and particularly if it's getting worse, it may be structural. You're sinking. Fire the EPIRB.

Even fresh water in a bilge could taste salty, so not a foolproof test.
 
The MCA disagreed.

According to the MAIB report:
Stormforce Coaching asked YDSA to grant an extension to allow the survey to be completed when the vessel was back in the UK. YDSA passed the request to theMCA, who confirmed that no extension was permitted under the SCV Code. Owingto the cost of completing the survey while in the Caribbean Sea, it was not carried out and Cheeki Rafiki’s Category 2 coding expired.

On 26 March 2014, the MCA stated in an email to YDSA ‘...not sure how it got
to the Caribbean from the UK on a Cat 2 Certificate, especially as they are usingit commercially out there?’
This email was forwarded by YDSA to Stormforce Coaching, who responded directly to the MCA on 27 March 2014 ‘...Just to clarify, the yacht crossed the Atlantic in the racing division of the ARC under ISAF regulations. She will not be carrying any paying passengers for the way home...’

On 28 March 2014, the MCA responded, stating ‘Paying passengers are only
one element of the definition. If the voyage is a relocation voyage for commercialpurposes, the vessel is almost certainly not being used as a pleasure vessel.’
The definition of a ‘pleasure vessel’, a copy of which was attached to the email,
is provided in The Merchant Shipping (Vessels in Commercial Use for Sport or Pleasure) Regulations 1998 and is reproduced at Annex F. On 31 March 2014, the principal/director telephoned the MCA to discuss the issue but the content andoutcome of the conversation were not documented and cannot be verified.

Subsequent to the accident, the MCA has stated that for the return crossing of the
Atlantic Ocean ‘the vessel should have been appropriately coded or complied fully with the relevant merchant shipping legislation that would otherwise have applied’.


So it seems that not only was a Cat 0 coding required, but even the yacht's Category 2 coding was no longer valid.

One difference between Cat 2 and Cat 0 coding is in the life raft requirements. It requires that in the event of one life raft being lost, there's sufficient capacity for all crew in another; and also that the life rafts be able to float free. Cheeki Rafiki's single liferaft was stowed in a cockpit bench, as is usual in Beneteau 40.7s.

You've wholly missed the point there I'm afraid.

CR like a number of other boats got to the other side of the Atlantic by taking part in the ARC, a race, and therefore outside the scope of MCA coding. If they had immediately turned around and come back they would've been returning directly from a race and would still not have required coding. They would of course have to comply with the appropriate offshore cat as a racer.

They didn't immediately turn around. Like most of their competitors they kept the boat in the Caribbean for a while on a commercial basis. Stormforce thought that they could bring the boat back as a non-commercial voyage but the court disagreed.

As I said in the post above. His erstwhile competitors now call the trip back a race. So it can be done on the same basis as the ARC.
 
Not really.
Car suspension is a vital safety feature on a car. If it fails you may die. A keel is a vital safety feature on a boat. If it fails you may die. A radiator failure is not.
Yes, all very well. But you're not meant to be able to run your car into a lamppost and get off with no damage, nor are you meant to be able to run your yacht hard aground without consequences.....

Innes was found guilty of not properly maintaining the boat he was responsible for in the earlie trial. You can argue the toss back and forth about the ins and out of coding and all the rest. The court took evidence on the maintenance of the boat, on the questions relating to survey and coding and the jury then found him guilty of offences relating to those matters. He will be sentenced for those offences on 11 May.

The bar for convicting him of manslaughter due to his actions or inactions was clearly much higher and the evidence presented to two juries failed to convince them of his guilt.
 
Remember that this was the first widely reported incident of a keel loss from a 40.7. I have no doubt that any skipper now of a 40.7 with an unexplained leak will be thinking that the keel might be about to fall off and preparing for such, but it isn't reasonable to have expected the skipper of Cheeky Rafiki to have made that assumption. And in my opinion those who are claiming that they would have acted differently are using the hindsight that he was not granted.

I can't agree with this assessment. There have been many cases of boat losing their keels from Drum, Alec Thomsons boat (Hugh Boss?) and Hooligan and famously Tony Bullimore's.

In two of those cases the loss was very sudden. Maybe I am a worrier but evey time I take a long passage the one thing that worries me most is the loss of a keel. I know that my boat would float in any conditions so the trick is to stay on board but the loss of a keel is another matter compleatly.

To me the FIRST thing that would occur to me after confirming that no through-were to blame would be that there was a keel problem. It is no great stretch to reach that conclusion and I think you are wrong to say that people here are commenting withthe benifit of hindsight, that is simply not true. Problem solving on a boat comes as second nature to many.

I am not suggestng that I would have abandond ship but I know that liferaft would have been in the cockpit and not a locker.
 
I am not suggestng that I would have abandond ship but I know that liferaft would have been in the cockpit and not a locker.

"In a Locker" is a bit deceptive here. They'd taken the lid off the locker and made the liferaft as ready as they practically could. Given the design of the locker I'm not sure there was a significant accessibility difference between in the locker and in the cockpit. Clearly they thought it was in the best possible place and they were there.
 
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