Cheeki Rafiki deaths: Yacht firm boss guilty

A prudent, supportive, and experienced office might have said, "Oh, by the way, probably a good idea if you get the liferaft and grab bag ready

The MAIB report indicates they did everything practical to make the LR available:

its securing straps and associated bench seat section appear to have been removed.
Removal of the liferaft from its stowage position could have resulted in it becoming
a significant hazard to the crew as a result of its potential movement within the
cockpit area. For the liferaft to have been useful in the event of the vessel capsizing
and inverting, it would have first needed to be deployed and inflated, which would
have run the risk of it being carried away in the prevailing wind and sea conditions.


http://www.sailing.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MAIBInvReport_8_2015.pdf

A recognised category surveyor has indicated to the MCA that with modification and the life raft position and securing plus the addition of a second life raft were major items, would enable CR to attain Cat 0 certification.

IIRC code 0 requires a watertight compartment which could not be fitted to a boat like CR?
 
The words to look at are disregard for life and safety of others, that was effectively proven with the guilty verdict under section 100 of the Merchant Shipping act 1995.

It's quite a leap from not taking "all reasonable steps to secure that the ship is operated in a safe manner" to "disregard for life and safety".

http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1995/21/section/100

"It shall be the duty of the owner of a ship to which this section applies to take all reasonable steps to secure that the ship is operated in a safe manner."
 
A recognised category surveyor has indicated to the MCA that with modification and the life raft position and securing plus the addition of a second life raft were major items, would enable CR to attain Cat 0 certification.

Without watertight/collision bulkheads?
 
The diver inspection found that the life raft was ready to deploy insomuch as the fastenings had been loosened as advised by by Innes in one of his last telephone calls advising to prepare for abandonment. So the actions had been taken but it seems clear that the vessel was overwhelmed so quickly that the crew were not able to release it from under its seat. Much is made of this in the MAIB report and the fact that if the vessel had been prepared to cat 0 then it would have been able to float free and auto inflate.
Not sure that floating free is actually what you want in an inversion, or generally in a storm?
It seems to me that the crew were separated from the boat.
If the crew and raft were all floating free, the chances of all/any of the crew reaching the raft are probably slim to non-existant.
Best bet might be to have the crew on long tethers so they remain with the yacht and have some chance of extracting the raft from the inverted cockpit?
Really you want to abandon before the keel falls off.
If the yacht is found still floating upright weeks later, so be it.

Float free and auto inflate is what you want if the boat is liable to suddenly sink of course.
The next accident might be hitting a container and the boat filling and sinking in seconds.
 
The MAIB report indicates they did everything practical to make the LR available:

its securing straps and associated bench seat section appear to have been removed.
Removal of the liferaft from its stowage position could have resulted in it becoming
a significant hazard to the crew as a result of its potential movement within the
cockpit area. For the liferaft to have been useful in the event of the vessel capsizing

As a Category 2 coded vessel, Cheeki Ra ki was not required to have its liferaftstowed on deck and tted with oat-free arrangements so as to be able to oat freeand in ate automatically. Instead, the liferaft was stowed aft of the helm position, inaccordance with the vessel’s design, and was not removed from its stowage positionprior to or following the vessel’s capsize and inversion. However, it seems that someattempt had been made to prepare the liferaft for deployment since its securingstraps and associated bench seat section appear to have been removed.



and inverting, it would have first needed to be deployed and inflated, which would
have run the risk of it being carried away in the prevailing wind and sea conditions.


http://www.sailing.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/MAIBInvReport_8_2015.pdf



IIRC code 0 requires a watertight compartment which could not be fitted to a boat like CR?

Without watertight/collision bulkheads?

Taken from the same MAIB report:

As part of the investigation, a YDSA surveyor, with experience of coding surveys onBeneteau First 40.7 yachts, was engaged to determine whether these vessels couldachieve Category 0 coding, as required under the SCV Code for a trans-AtlanticOcean passage. The report produced by the surveyor concludes that, withmodi cation, it would be possible for these vessels to achieve Category 0 coding(Annex I).
 
Not sure that floating free is actually what you want in an inversion, or generally in a storm?
It seems to me that the crew were separated from the boat..

I would go further and say you definitely don't want a liferaft that will self-deploy if the yacht capsizes Float free are designed to deploy when the boat sinks and CR didn't sink.
 
You have to take into account the internal interim inspections clearly used to by pass external ones which ultimately lead to the certification lapsing. Reading the MAIB report would indicate that industry surveying knew of reasons that delamination and keel problems might be masked so there is no reason why a well informed and competent surveyor would not have delved deeper.

Extract Section from 1.19.3 of the MAIB report.
"An intermediate examination is normally conducted with the vessel in the water. It
may be of a general or partial nature and include the vessel, its machinery, fittings
and equipment. In consideration of the hull’s construction material or the age, or type
and service of the vessel, the certifying authority may instead require an out-of-water
examination, in which case the hull, shell fittings, external steering and propulsion
components may also be examined"

The default therefore doesn't give the scope to delve deeper unless there was something to make the surveyor suspicion, and there's not an indication of that. Annual internal inspections appear to be the norm and were carried out at annual lift out - external inspections are a max of 3 years apart. Where did you get that internal inspections can be used to bypass external ones?

And an extract from section 2.5 of the report
"There is no industry-wide guidance available which sets out a method for detecting
matrix detachment." which then goes on to discuss the most common technique using a hammer.

It's impossible to say with any certainty that a surveyor would have detected the damage. Maybe a particularly good one or lucky one might but that's all.
 
Taken from the same MAIB report:

As part of the investigation, a YDSA surveyor, with experience of coding surveys onBeneteau First 40.7 yachts, was engaged to determine whether these vessels couldachieve Category 0 coding, as required under the SCV Code for a trans-AtlanticOcean passage. The report produced by the surveyor concludes that, withmodi cation, it would be possible for these vessels to achieve Category 0 coding(Annex I).

Could you post a link to Annex I? - I don't have it downloaded.

Anectdotal evidence is that Cat 0 isn't easy for a production boat of CRs size and type, so I'd like to read the details.
 
Extract Section from 1.19.3 of the MAIB report.
"An intermediate examination is normally conducted with the vessel in the water. It
may be of a general or partial nature and include the vessel, its machinery, fittings
and equipment. In consideration of the hull’s construction material or the age, or type
and service of the vessel, the certifying authority may instead require an out-of-water
examination, in which case the hull, shell fittings, external steering and propulsion
components may also be examined"

The default therefore doesn't give the scope to delve deeper unless there was something to make the surveyor suspicion, and there's not an indication of that. Annual internal inspections appear to be the norm and were carried out at annual lift out - external inspections are a max of 3 years apart. Where did you get that internal inspections can be used to bypass external ones?

And an extract from section 2.5 of the report
"There is no industry-wide guidance available which sets out a method for detecting
matrix detachment." which then goes on to discuss the most common technique using a hammer.

It's impossible to say with any certainty that a surveyor would have detected the damage. Maybe a particularly good one or lucky one might but that's all.

If Inees was "honest" with the surveyor about the boats history I think the surveyor may well have delved deeper.

I agree that it may not have shown anything BUT if it had been done it might and regardless Innes would not be in the position he is now as he would have demonstrated his duty of care.
 
Could you post a link to Annex I? - I don't have it downloaded.

Anectdotal evidence is that Cat 0 isn't easy for a production boat of CRs size and type, so I'd like to read the details.

I haven't read it yet but it's here:

http://www.sailing.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AnnexesToMAIBInvReport08-2015_CheekiRafiki.pdf

EDIT:

I've read it now. Computer says no:

I question if the section 11 (MGN
280) downflooding requirements could be passed by a 40.7 for area categories
1 and 0.
17.4 A 40.7 will never pass the damaged stability requirements of MGN 280 without
significant modification.
17.6 Additional manning certification would have been required if Cheeki Rafiki
was operating to area category 0 at the time of her loss.
 
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I think you will find a watertight bulkhead is a requirement for Cat 0. This can be added to most boats but not cheap.
I know that BOSS sailing school had a Westerly with a watertight bulkhead for Atlantic Trips.
 
Could you post a link to Annex I? - I don't have it downloaded.

Anectdotal evidence is that Cat 0 isn't easy for a production boat of CRs size and type, so I'd like to read the details.

The au report link doesn't contain the annexes and for whatever reason the MAIB report is no longer available either direct from the UK.gov site or various links to it. Has it been suppressed? However a coding surveyor testified to the MAIB that with modification it was possible. Of course if it couldn't the other option was to ship the boat back.
 
I haven't read it yet but it's here:

http://www.sailing.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/AnnexesToMAIBInvReport08-2015_CheekiRafiki.pdf

EDIT:

I've read it now. Computer says no:

I question if the section 11 (MGN
280) downflooding requirements could be passed by a 40.7 for area categories
1 and 0.
17.4 A 40.7 will never pass the damaged stability requirements of MGN 280 without
significant modification.
17.6 Additional manning certification would have been required if Cheeki Rafiki
was operating to area category 0 at the time of her loss.

That does not say it is not possible.
 
I agree that it may not have shown anything BUT if it had been done it might and regardless Innes would not be in the position he is now as he would have demonstrated his duty of care.

Turn it round, if DI had turned up at court and said "Look I've demonstrated I fulfilled my duty of care by getting an intermediate survey for a completely irrelevant inappropriate coding" it would not have strengthened his case one iota. Therefore lack of it can't have weakened his case much.

Rightly or wrongly, not meeting Cat 0 is the important factor here everything else is padding, especially the lack of survey before departure. We'll never know but I don't think the jury would have considered it important - even compared to the lack of past surveys following groundings which I personally regard as quite flimsy.
 
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That does not say it is not possible.

From the Annex.

"7.4
It is my opinion (I would go so far as to say this is a fact) that a 40.7 will
therefore never satisfy the damaged stability requirements, as there is only
one compartment.
7.5
In order to satisfy the damaged stability criteria it would therefore be
required that some form of watertight bulkhead be manufactured and that in
this case would be a significant structural modification which would then
debatably invalidate 4.2. "

Bear in mind to remain afloat in a damaged condition it really needs two bulkheads. Otherwise the bow or stern would just be pointing at the sky until sufficient downfloading occurred.

Fuel load, water tank capacity, machinery spaces fire barriers and downflooding also seem to be significant issues.
 
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From the Annex.
"7.4
It is my opinion (I would go so far as to say this is a fact) that a 40.7 will
therefore never satisfy the damaged stability requirements, as there is only
one compartment.
7.5
In order to satisfy the damaged stability criteria it would therefore be
required that some form of watertight bulkhead be manufactured and that in
this case would be a significant structural modification which would then
debatably invalidate 4.2. "
Bear in mind to remain afloat in a damaged condition it really needs two bulkheads. Otherwise the bow or stern would just be pointing at the sky until sufficient downfloading occurred.

Nice.

Of course, the real alternative to sending it as a Cat 2 is not modifying it to Cat 0, it's to send it as cargo or not send it at all or (maybe) get the crew to set up a delivery company and take the boat as a delivery FOC if that workaround works or register it abroad if that works.
 
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One can fit a yacht out with all equipment etc as much as you like but its all rather pointless without a stability category allocation.

Thats the first thing to do. Get one. That will tell you where the boat can operate. Either by calculation or by stability trial I have done the first lots, the second twice.

Links.

http://www.rya.org.uk/newsevents/e-...ed/Pages/five-minute-briefing-mca-coding.aspx


http://www.rya.org.uk/SiteCollectionDocuments/technical/Web Documents/SS1.pdf

Do not shoot the messenger.


If anything is not possible for the boat in question, that is probably it.
 
Taken from the same MAIB report:

The report produced by the surveyor concludes that, withmodi cation, it would be possible for these vessels to achieve Category 0 coding(Annex I).
The summary in the report states the above. However, the surveyors report is included as an appendix. In the Appendix he states quite the opposite.
 
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