Cheeki Rafiki deaths: Yacht firm boss guilty

[Fr J Hackett]

I have quite a lot of sympathy for D Innes as well.
Law or not. He was not the only yacht charterer or sailing school engaged in these practices. He was the guy running the company where the accident happened. The Guys running the other companies got lucky.
No excuse or defence.
There is at least 1 Cowes based company currently advertising similar oppertunities on similar CAT 2 vessels. Even Yachtmaster Traineeships. This coming season.
No excuse or defence they might just think again in light of the prosecution.
If so it would be quite foolish. Trying to create law by precedent. You best have a damn good case or you will create the wrong precedent.
English law is based on precedent.
It was an individIual manslaughter charge not the company.
The option of corporate manslaughter would have been an option in that Innes was the guiding hand or controlling mind of the business but as it was a one man business there was little point.
The commercial shipping world has a long and very poor history of commercial gain for those at the top being more important than the safety of the vessel.
Going back to the early days of Lloyds. The Classification of ships was to protect the insurance underwriter. Not the ship or the crew.
Samuel Plimsol and his load line rule.
The Titanics life boats, She fully complied
The no of FOC ships lost with their crews over the last 3 decades.

The men with the money pulling the strings are almost never held accountable.

All irrelevant in this case the man responsible has been held to account and it may well have repercussions on standards and the industry and its practices.

There is a Law here in Canada Bill C 51. result of the Westray Mine Disaster. So far a case never been pursued.
Irrelevant he was prosecuted under English Law and the jurisdiction was within England
I think the MCA has been very agresive for some reason with the yacht segment. there have been a quite few prosecutions.

 

[Kukri]

I didn't know him, so I don't know what kind of a skipper he was.
But he was the skipper.
But three other people died on his watch.
Those are facts.
Had he lived and the others not, would he have been in the dock with Mr Innes?
I'm afraid I think he would.
The point is, many of us YMs could be in that position.

We all know that corners are cut in the trade, and that a lot of things are not quite as they should be.
When occasional tragedy happens everyone likes to think 'can't happen here',we're not as bad as XYZ Co.

De mortuiis, nil nisi bonum.

It's a good rule to keep in mind, even if you knew the deceased, which, in this case, you did not.

Some people reading your comments may be rather glad that they don't know you.

 

[Kukri]

Nothing which came out in the trial suggested that Andrew Bridge was in any way responsible for the catastrophe.

You are totally out of order.

+1.

 

[lpdsn]

The survey should clearly have been done BEFORE the boat left the Caribbean it is not the back of beyond and there are surveyors there his delay if it was delay was clearly designed to reduce costs by having it done in the UK.

Oh good. If you know that for certain, you can list those available to do an MCA coding survey in Antigua. Remember it is an MCA coding survey so not just any old surveyor.

You'd be surprised how difficult it is to get a decent survey outside the mainstream. I flew a surveyor over from the UK to do the pre-purchase survey on my boat to get one with the qualifications I wanted.

It's clear that the delay was to reduce costs is only clear in your own mind. No evidence at all that a UK survey was cheaper.

 

[lpdsn]

Other YMs might want to bear in mind that in the Hot Liquid case, the skipper also ended up in court.

He knowingly made a decision to go out in a F10 to experience it and got more experience than he wanted. Skipper of CR was making a voyage that seems well planned, he just didn't know about a hidden defect.

 

[Capt Popeye]

He knowingly made a decision to go out in a F10 to experience it and got more experience than he wanted. Skipper of CR was making a voyage that seems well planned, he just didn't know about a hidden defect.

Humm please remind me, was not the chosen Northerly route sailing into a known Gale (or some such high wind situation) so was it prudent to chose that route over a safer route to the South, especially considering the apparent lack of prior knowledge about the Yachts condition; ie sail safer not faster

 

[Fr J Hackett]

the rules are the rules as written in the legislation. Do you have a commercial endorsement? If you do then you should know the basics. They seem very black and white to me about what constitutes a commercial passage and what does not. Im afraid to say that mining quarries is a different industry and what applies to one does not necessarily apply to the other.

The prosecution came under two headings the first of which Innes was found guilty on under section 100 Merchant Shipping act 1995 failing to ensure the safety of the vessel. This is quite clear in both the judges mind and that of the jurors. It almost certainly hinges on:
The conversation with the MCA re coding
The lack of inspections between 2011 and 2014
The lack of inspection prior to leaving Antigua
Then again we have the question of what constitutes a commercial passage and Innes attempt at circumventing them. He had paid members of his business on board and he refunded monies of people who had paid for ocean crossing experience although they sailed with the vessel. That is a clear demonstration that Innes knew what he was doing and was trying to circumvent regulations after a conversation with the MCA. It was also a demonstration that he did it to avoid the expense of a survey in Antigua that would have cost more money in additional equipment and time. Whether it would have identified keel problems is immaterial.

Even then, some of the rules around what constitutes operating the vessel in a safe manner are very grey to say the least, as there are no explicit rules around how often you have to have a survey. Coding is irrelevent in this case as it was not a commercial voyage according to the law.
It was according to the MCA and would be regarded as such within English law as the vessel was being operated by a paid member of the business

If companies/schools are operating in a manner that the MCA do not agree with then the MCA need to lobby government to get the rules changed and/or tightened up. Being disatisfied and waiting for decades for an accident to happen and then pursue a scapegoat does not seem to me to be the moral and best way to go about things.

A mute point law is often made in that way but yes perhaps the MCA could have enforced what rules there were could have lobbied for a change in law.

I fail to see how gross negligence can be proven in this case when all the other operators are doing exactly the same thing. This is because to prove gross negligence you need to have behaved in a way that was not what other reasonable individuals involved in the industry would have done.

What other operators do and get away with has no bearing on determining guilt or degree of negligence, it is not down to what others do, I will borrow a phrase from HASAWA, it is what is reasonably practicable to do! The question of negligence or gross negligence is what the jury had to decide and they went against the judges summing up which was probably based around:
Did Innes take a risk. Yes
Did he know what he was doing. Yes
Why did he do it. To save money
Was it practicable to do it. Yes
If he had done any or all of the things required was there a possibility that lives would have been saved. Yes

 

[bedouin]

Other YMs might want to bear in mind that in the Hot Liquid case, the skipper also ended up in court.

I thought the skipper in that case was acquitted?

 

[Kukri]

Humm please remind me, was not the chosen Northerly route sailing into a known Gale (or some such high wind situation) so was it prudent to chose that route over a safer route to the South, especially considering the apparent lack of prior knowledge about the Yachts condition; ie sail safer not faster

The northern route is the long accepted and normal route. Has been for centuries. Nothing at all remarkable in that choice.

 

[lw395]

He knowingly made a decision to go out in a F10 to experience it and got more experience than he wanted. Skipper of CR was making a voyage that seems well planned, he just didn't know about a hidden defect.

But as skipper, he was well placed to know about the lack of coding, history of the boat, issues with that class etc.
He had the boat in from of him to inspect before leaving, which Innes, being in the UK did not.
Being master of a ship, even a yacht is not a trivial responsibility.
There will be dozens of YMs having to make the decision to go to sea in similar circumstances this year. Where do they stand?
It seems that nobody is being brought to book unless things go terribly wrong.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

If he was a real skipper, he'd have realised that a big portion of the buck stops with him.
Al skippers should bear that in mind.

Now that is an interesting point. I in no way wish to question the mans competence, I am not in a position to do so and it has little relevance. There is the question that a competent skipper would assess the seaworthiness of a vessel he was about to take charge of, maybe he did maybe he he didn't. Maybe he did and was prevented from doing what he thought was necessary by financial constraints imposed by his employer and he chose to accept them in light of his employment or was persuaded that he was being over cautious . This is a valid hypothesis and one that I think the judge would have considered and perhaps the jury. We won't ever know.

 

[lpdsn]

Humm please remind me, was not the chosen Northerly route sailing into a known Gale (or some such high wind situation) so was it prudent to chose that route over a safer route to the South, especially considering the apparent lack of prior knowledge about the Yachts condition; ie sail safer not faster

CR was following a 'normal' route back across the Atlantic. A 40.7 would've have been considered perfectly acceptable for the voyage in those conditions. Doug Inness was apparently responsible for weather routing - the MAIB reports quite clearly show the forecasts he would've been working off. He did seemingly send them further north than would've been best - into a forecast F6 IIRC - when I heard he was going to be prosecuted it was the weather routing where I thought he had some culpability. But still, a 40.7 wouldn't have been expected to suffer unduly in those circumstances.

I presume the skipper knew the boat well. He had no reason to believe there was a hidden defect and seems to have checked the keelbolts himself if the photo showing him examining the keel is to be believed. As far as I'm aware, there were no similar well-known keel failures to inform him. I'm sure if he had thought the boat needed to be nursed back he wouldn't have set off.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

I have only read the first 10 pages but as a Structural Engineer that has been involved in building structural failures/problems plus a boat owner that had his boat charter through a sailing school and a charter company for some 18yrs I would comment as follows.

1. The charter Industry is operated on very narrow margins. When I chartered my first boat with Hamble School Of Yachting, two competitors that I was considering went bust. From the infrequency that boat owners were paid by the then owners of HPYC (1998) is was obvious to me they were struggling - they later changed ownership.

2. For the charter industry to survive they cannot operate in the most thorough manner that some on here suggest. However many cut corners and I do not believe StormForce operated any differently from many of their competitors.

3. Both the MCA and RYA are aware of how the UK charter industry operates.

4. Up to this incidence the lack of thoroughness in ensuring the structural integrity of yachts did not involve fatalities (these do focus the mind)

5. Hindsight is a wonderful thing but no one was shouting about the state of this boat before this incidence.

6. A factor in deciding negligence is to compare the actions of a person to that of their contemporaries. As such I don't see StormForce acted vary differently from the rest of the charter market.

7. As a structural Engineer I have always been concerned with the adequacy of an inner eggcrate type inner hull being bonded to an outer hull and hence bought my current boat in 2005 as one of the last jeanneau's built with conventional ribs etc but economics and competition has driven ALL production boat builders to go the inner hull bonded to an outer. this solution keeps boats cheap, is structurally adequate in normal use but possibly suspect with extensive hard use and especially in groundings.

8. It is possible to improve yacht design and strength but this would cause increased costs and must be internationally agreed and implimented. Car impact tests that resulted in the demise of the early Mini are an example. Its more difficult to get agreement on the kind of impact a boat must survive undamaged. Keel or Hull impacts, Rock or Soft mud, 8kts at impact or 3kts?

9. The authorities in this case were embarrassed by the 4 deaths and to absolve themselves of complicity by them not stopping what was common practice threw the book at StormForce via the CPS.

10. Pictures of Doug in the press were not flattering and a lot of juries would convict him on appearance alone. Unfortunately appearances do matter.

I would add in conclusion that I have no personal knowledge of this case other than I have read on here and from the media and have no connection with the parties involved.

What you say in the first two points in no way excuses or is a defence for non compliance it is in fact quite the opposite.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

Read the MAIB report. It quite clearly shows that Innes was in consultation with the MCA about the status of the return voyage. He was advised categorically that the voyage was considered commercial: he didn't like the advice, he chose to ignore it. That compounded the problems surrounding the lack of a survey. And it doesn't matter at all what others were doing: he had quite clear advice. That's why he was found guilty of the offence. No loop holes, no questions, no defence.

Robs point about the RYA is interesting. I suspect that the RYA removed recognition from the schools in question because the incidents involved activities where they were offering services under the RYA brand: mile building courses, coastal skipper or some such. The RYA revisited their certification as a result of the incidents, found the schools lacking and removed their approval. Stormforce wasn't providing any RYA based courses during the CR incident and therefore the RYA had no basis for action in relation to their accreditation.
As to gross negligence manslaughter, that's still an open book and the CPS may yet return to court with the case. Then the lawyers can argue to their hearts content about the difference between negligence and gross negligence.

Correct.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

Oh good. If you know that for certain, you can list those available to do an MCA coding survey in Antigua. Remember it is an MCA coding survey so not just any old surveyor.

You'd be surprised how difficult it is to get a decent survey outside the mainstream. I flew a surveyor over from the UK to do the pre-purchase survey on my boat to get one with the qualifications I wanted.

It's clear that the delay was to reduce costs is only clear in your own mind. No evidence at all that a UK survey was cheaper.

If a coding surveyor was not available in Antigua then he would have had to fly one out from the UK ergo increased costs, I rest my case m'laud.

 

[Wandering Star]

What has the ARC got to do with it?
"Racing, going to a race, returning from a race" exempts vessels from any MCA regulations or manning rules, which is probably why commercial yachts like CR can drive a bulldozer through them.

Humm please remind me, was not the chosen Northerly route sailing into a known Gale (or some such high wind situation) so was it prudent to chose that route over a safer route to the South, especially considering the apparent lack of prior knowledge about the Yachts condition; ie sail safer not faster

Apples & Oranges Popeye! Generally speaking the Azores high and Gulf stream dictate the route selected for an west/east crossing. A sailing boat needs wind or lots of fuel to make progress. I'm absolutely sure the skipper of CR would have spent loads of time poring over wind charts and downloading daily Grib charts via his Satphone/PC. Whatever the sensationalist media tell you, in most years sailing boats will choose to head north for wind - the skippers decision (imo) was probably the correct one. The southerly route can be taken if the boat has a reliable engine and is fuelled up for potentially 2800 miles of motoring - thats normally impossible and especially for a racing boat with small tankage. Ask any sailor making a longish passage, its a lot more comfortable sailing in big winds aboard a well found boat than it is to be becalmed for days on end in a windless millpond of an ocean making no progress whatsoever apart from wherever the tide or current takes you - that isn't a happy situation. So heading north was the correct decision from where the 2 dofferent courses diverge on this long passage, in my opinion. The problem for CR was she was broken allegedly before she left Antigua. From what I've read, the keel would have fallen off at some stage even in fairly benign conditions.

With regard to Hot Liquid, they set out in high winds on a short passage with a generally weak crew - at anytime they could have called a halt to their mistake - stupid, stupid, stupid!

 

[Mark-1]

There is the question that a competent skipper would assess the seaworthiness of a vessel he was about to take charge of, maybe he did maybe he he didn't.

They did. IIRC the keel was thoroughly checked by the four guys on the boat. There are photographs of the skipper and previous crew with table/flooring removed and bolts in clear view. (I think that was from a previous trip but it shows they did routinely check before long trips). Also IIRC the water was pretty clear and they could easily check underneath which I think they did as standard practice.

The only survey I've ever seen done on a commercial yacht was pretty cursory. Maybe it's just my own prejudice but I think it's likely that experienced amateurs who knew the boat well and were going to be on the boat far from help would do a far better check of the keel than a professional who wasn't betting his life on the integrity of the keel.

I doubt it has any bearing on legal responsibility but I think it's safe to say the keel was checked as effectively & carefully as a surveyor would have and there were no signs of impending failure before the yacht left. (Which seems consitent with the MAIB report which said the structure could be significantly weakened with not external sign at all.)

 

[Kukri]

That's a very valid point.

The fact that when the leak started nobody on board suspected the keel also tells us that they were confident hat they had checked it properly. They started - as did Innes - with the "usual suspects" - "is it salt or fresh?" "Check the seacocks" "Check the stern gland"...

 

[Resolution]

But as skipper, he was well placed to know about the lack of coding, history of the boat, issues with that class etc.
He had the boat in from of him to inspect before leaving, which Innes, being in the UK did not.
Being master of a ship, even a yacht is not a trivial responsibility.
There will be dozens of YMs having to make the decision to go to sea in similar circumstances this year. Where do they stand?
It seems that nobody is being brought to book unless things go terribly wrong.

lw395, you imply he was not behaving as responsibly as a skipper should, but are you being fair?
"lack of coding" : Do we know whether he had been told about his boss's discussions with the MCA? Even if he did, it is likely he assumed they would be operating under the same racing exemption that many other charter boats were.
"history of the boat" : Sure, it was a well-used workhorse that had been repaired after damage on a couple of occasions. Like lots of yachts. Very familiar.
"issues with that class" : Remind me how many 40.7s had lost their keels up to that point? Out of the dozens that race regularly and rather vigorously? Surely you are not confusing with the Bavaria Match series ?
"he had the boat in front of him to inspect" : What evidence is there that he did not do as much physical inspection as all the rest of the skippers returning back across the Atlantic? With hindsight, the only relevant test would have been to lift the yacht out and in the slings to give the keel a good waggle. Even then, we cannot know if the breakdown of the bonding to the grid had already occurred, or whether this happened early in their final storm.

Usual disclaimer that I didn't know the guy or this particular boat.

 

[Fr J Hackett]

They did. IIRC the keel was thoroughly checked by the four guys on the boat. There are photographs of the skipper and previous crew with table/flooring removed and bolts in clear view. (I think that was from a previous trip but it shows they did routinely check before long trips). Also IIRC the water was pretty clear and they could easily check underneath which I think they did as standard practice.

The only survey I've ever seen done on a commercial yacht was pretty cursory. Maybe it's just my own prejudice but I think it's likely that experienced amateurs who knew the boat well and were going to be on the boat far from help would do a far better check of the keel than a professional who wasn't betting his life on the integrity of the keel.

I doubt it has any bearing on legal responsibility but I think it's safe to say the keel was checked as effectively & carefully as a surveyor would have and there were no signs of impending failure before the yacht left. (Which seems consitent with the MAIB report which said the structure could be significantly weakened with not external sign at all.)

I doubt that they could have checked the keel as effectively as a surveyor would have done or recommended had the surveyor been in possession of all the "facts" and was thinking about his insurance and possible law suits. As Fleming has suggested racing boats that have been involved in groundings are known to have their keel dropped. Didn't one of the photos show damage to one of the keel bolts?

The other thing to draw from that is that there is no recorded evidence of what was found or discussed only the photos.