Cheeki Rafiki deaths: Yacht firm boss guilty

I'm sure the effect on the schools has already taken effect. But then there's the question of a professional delivery of charter boat. I think some charter companies regularly move their boats between the Med & the Carribean.

And certainly there will be a big impact on surveyors. If you were a purchaser of a 40.7 or similar, would you be happy with a pre-purchase survey that didn't check the hull to frame bonding? That'll mean dropping the keel. That's going to up the survey costs. And how would you feel as a seller if the surveyor was taking the keel off?

I suspect the RCD protects the manufacturers and designers, which is maybe why the MCA didn't involve the builder.

This issue was well covered in the MAIB report. Apart from one minor point the boat was desgned and built to the required standards at the time. on the question of repairs a number of sister ships were inspected and several repairers consulted, but there was no agreement about the most effective methods of either detection of failure or repair. The recommendation was to investigate further.

Don't know what has happened since.
 
I'd rely on the MAIB report a lot more for facts than the Guardian. Seems he should've left the pub and run around in circles waving his arms in the air. Not a lot the UK Coastguard could've done. Once the Yanks are called you only have one chance - leave the boat there and then or they'll never come back. 999 out a 1000 this would have been a trivial issue at that stage where it was checking if the water was salt or fresh. After that it would be a matter of checking seacocks, engine and other potential sources as the most likely. Only then would they have been thinking of more serious issues.

The Guardian, and by implication the prosecution and jury, don't seem to have understood that the keelbolts pulled through the hull rather than broke. Only one minor keel bolt appeared broken in the photos and I don't remember ever reading anything that that was detectable before they set off.

Taking Cat 2 boats across the Atlantic seems to have been pretty common. One post above shows a previous prosecution, but given the openess of the advertising there appears to generally have been a blind eye turned to it. Yes the CAT 2 had lapsed, but I think the witness regarding the survey to renew it says the keel wouldn't have been checked anyway.

I think that any evidence of keel bolt failure after 3 groundings is worthy of some attention along with the supporting structure. The boat was being used commercially so the fact that it's rating had been withdrawn is damning on the owner proprietor it should have been inspected and renewed prior to departure it is indicative of his approach to the maintenance and safety of the boat and therefore the well being of it's crew.
 
This issue was well covered in the MAIB report. Apart from one minor point the boat was desgned and built to the required standards at the time. on the question of repairs a number of sister ships were inspected and several repairers consulted, but there was no agreement about the most effective methods of either detection of failure or repair. The recommendation was to investigate further.

Don't know what has happened since.

Agreed. Having worked on standards (non marine related) I have a very cynical view of them, but treating them as gospel is the perfect defence.

However maintainability is the issue rather than whether the boat was strong enough when delivered. It was clear that the MAIB found that the steps necessary to repair a 40.7 weren't well understood throughout the industry. I don't think the - well they could've asked for instruction is a perfect defence for such a large builder.
 
I think that any evidence of keel bolt failure after 3 groundings is worthy of some attention along with the supporting structure. The boat was being used commercially so the fact that it's rating had been withdrawn is damning on the owner proprietor it should have been inspected and renewed prior to departure it is indicative of his approach to the maintenance and safety of the boat and therefore the well being of it's crew.

What evidence of keel bolt failure was there before the fact? Rating wasn't withdrawn, it lapsed whilst the boat was out of the country.

Presumably the Guardian relied on the prosecution for its facts (although I can say that I've never seen anything I knew about accurately reported), which makes you ask why some of these things weren't challenged.

I still think that although his actions weren't perfect he's been pretty unlucky to be convicted in a criminal trial. I still suspect if he wasn't fat and hadn't been down the pub that night he might not have been convicted, but then I'm a bit of a cynic.
 
Presumably the Guardian relied on the prosecution for its facts (although I can say that I've never seen anything I knew about accurately reported), which makes you ask why some of these things weren't challenged..
Reads like a report of one day of the case when the prosecution witnesses were giving evidence so a very one-sided view. I believe much of it was challenged by the defence but that came later of course
 
I race on a boat that has its keel dropped annually - two keel bolts and a keel box - owner likes to check the bolts as they're not 316 - some specialist higher strength s/s but I can't remember the number.

Not heard of it as a rgular thing on other boats and never heard of it on a 40.7 or any cruiser.

No, I don't think a regular inspection is common at all. But I think that getting it inspected by a professional after a grounding is becoming the norm.
 
Humm not being an Ocean sailor I am puzzled why the Northerly route was chosen instead of the Southerly route, as in my inexpert eyes the Northerly was far more risky not allowing for any 'safe haven' along the route.
If the Northerly route was insisted or instructed by the owners then that to me shows inexperience or bad judgement, especially considering the age of the Skipper (you cannot put a old head on a youngster) .
I understand, rightly or wrongly, that the Northern route was quicker due to the wind strengths, but the slower Southerly had an Island to call into for safety reasons if required.
Might I ask why the orders to get ready to deploy the liferaft if needed were not issued by the owners, after receiving the distress call ? seems to an illiterate sailor to be a necessary requirement ?

Just perhaps we might now get afar better understanding from those Companies and persons involved in Yacht Hire and delivery's as a result of these findings, especially if further prosecutions follow in this case plus others
 
I have been involved with two commercial vessels that were grounded, eight years apart.

Both were taken to a nearby yard at our own risk (ie crewed by us). they were lifted and surveyed. Repair work put in hand by yard as agreed with surveyor and inspected with report afterwards.

MAIB informed as required and RYA.

Insures kept fully aware in both cases, photos and reports submitted. Claims in both instances fully honoured with no quibbles.

Simple.
 
Might I ask why the orders to get ready to deploy the liferaft if needed were not issued by the owners, after receiving the distress call ? seems to an illiterate sailor to be a necessary requirement ?

The distress call was from a PLB after the capsize. Prior to that there were just texts discussing the investigation of the leak. There is an argument for keeping the liferaft on deck during deliveries, but I've always been in two minds as if in a valise it is subject to a bit wear and tear as crew move past it especially when things are getting a bit hectic. If on deck and not tied down then there would be a risk of it being washed overboard, if tied down then the capsize was likely so sudden as to prevent it being untied.

I'm not entirely convinced by the age argument. No evidence that they didn't slow down. No evidence that they'd already eliminated the likely causes and should've started to suspect the keel. They may not have had time. Once you push the button with the US Coastguard then they'll take you off but the boat is lost, so not something that I guess the skipper would do without establishing it is necessary. You have to be very disciplined to keep hindsight out of an understanding of a situation.

Maybe they were sent too far north. There's a lot of evidence in the MAIB report indicating they were knowingly sent into a F6 when they could be routed further south, but I saw nothing saying that formed part of the prosecution.
 
Reads like a report of one day of the case when the prosecution witnesses were giving evidence so a very one-sided view. I believe much of it was challenged by the defence but that came later of course

Was the yacht subject to 3 groundings prior to leaving: Yes.
Was there evidence of damage to the Keel bolts: Yes.
Was the keel inspected by a surveyor: No
Does that amount to culpable negligence of the owner: The jury thought so and so do I. Is there a case to be answered on manslaughter by omission to act and negligence, the judge thinks so and so do I.
 
Well said, fully agree. It was a tragic accident in my opinion, the boat had presumably already made a safe east/west crossing, how many of the hundreds of other boats who had made succesful east/west crossings that year (private or commercial) were lifted and surveyed, including close inspection of the keel supporting web structure, before they set off again on the return west/east crossing? I doubt any of them!

A tragic accident and trying to pin the blame on Stormforce is ignoring the fact that any crossing of the Atlantic (or any ocean) carries a risk things can go horribly wrong. I've made several crossings, in both directions, and never considered going so far as to drop my keel in order to inspect the keel bolts and keel attachment areas. Maybe as a result of the tragedy I will make a more thorough inspection, but never done so before.

He was prosecuted because he is a commercial operator, not a private one, therefore he has legal and moral obligations that don't apply to private sailors. How much of the boat's maintenance history did the skipper know? And if this particular skipper was well up on it, what about other skippers for other companies? The law has to consider a much wider field. The defendant claimed that the boat wasn't being operated commercially at the time, but two of the crew were employees. It seems the prosecution and jury considered the 'non-commercial' claim to be a way of dodging responsibility.
 
I think that the MCA Enforcement people may have been encouraged by the CPS to take a shot at a corporate manslaughter charge in order to try and get a conviction on the record to serve as a precedent and thereby to scare the living daylights out of merchant ship owners and managers. They tried and failed with the Herald of Free Enterprise and subsequently and they may well have thought that a sailing school would be a softer target than a lawyered up shipowner backed by his P&I Club.

I feel a good deal of sympathy for Mr Innes.

Edited to add - I should declare an interest - I work in commercial shipowning.
 
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I have been involved with two commercial vessels that were grounded, eight years apart.

And have you been involved in any light groundings? Low speed, soft seabed, no expectation of damage. Did you immediately lift out?

That appears to have been the issue with the two subsequent groundings which were described as light. It would be interesting to hear accurate details of the light grounding Cheeki Rafiki suffered but the details weren't in the MAIB report that I remember. Of course, they may have caused no damage and the harder grounding that wasn't fully repaired may have been the cause of the keel loss. Down to just speculation in the absence of the boat to examine.
 
I think that the MCA Enforcement people may have been encouraged by the CPS to take a shot at a corporate manslaughter charge in order to try and get a conviction on the record to serve as a precedent and thereby to scare the living daylights out of merchant ship owners and managers. They tried and failed with the Herald of Free Enterprise and subsequently and they may well have thought that a sailing school would be a softer target than a lawyered up shipowner backed by his P&I Club.

I feel a good deal of sympathy for Mr Innes.

There is nothing special about the sea that exempts companies an owners from their responsibilities to their employees and duties under the law. Indeed one can argue that the inherent dangers demand even greater vigilance and adherence on the part of owners and operators. Mr Innes seemed to be singular lacking in those respects. It would seem a classic case of commercial priorities overriding duty of care.
 
And have you been involved in any light groundings? Low speed, soft seabed, no expectation of damage. Did you immediately lift out?

For light groundings we always had below the waterline inspected by commercial divers just in case.

Mebbe i am over cautious. However, during one of a number of transats, I had a bad leak that I couldnt find until returning to Antigua for a lift. Know the feeling.

This year, we lifted a Bavaria in Lanzarote, inspected the keel and bolts (visual) and replaced the outdrive seal. i met the yacht in Antigua and sailed it onwards to Tahiti.

Depsite all that, I am well aware that things go wrong. Very sadly in the case being discussed.
 
For light groundings we always had below the waterline inspected by commercial divers just in case.

I would've said that was a prudent and responsible course of action. Allowing hindsight in though, it wouldn't have helped at all in the Cheeki Rafiki case.
 
I would've said that was a prudent and responsible course of action. Allowing hindsight in though, it wouldn't have helped at all in the Cheeki Rafiki case.

How do you know that? Regardless it is what is expected of the owner in his duty of care to have done he demonstrated a degree of negligence.
 
There is nothing special about the sea that exempts companies an owners from their responsibilities to their employees and duties under the law. Indeed one can argue that the inherent dangers demand even greater vigilance and adherence on the part of owners and operators. .

I don't disagree. Indeed I frequently refer to and cite aviation examples and I even dragged my colleagues off for a week at Gatwick Airport, to understand "cockpit resource management".

But I think you will find that corporate manslaughter convictions are rare in any field.

Here are some links:

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/...of-corporate-manslaughter-five-key-cases.html

(note - the law changed in 2008)

http://blog.cps.gov.uk/2011/02/tuesday-15-february-afternoon-update.html

https://www.out-law.com/en/articles...-manslaughter-sentencing-under-new-guideline/
 
How do you know that? Regardless it is what is expected of the owner in his duty of care to have done he demonstrated a degree of negligence.

Because I've read the MAIB report and formed judgements based on that. I wish you would read it for your information rather than basing your opinion on a scandal sheet. The damage was such that whether the weakened floors dated back to the original 'repaired' damage or to the subsequent light groundings or a combination of both they would not be spotted by a diver inspecting the bottom. In fact they would only be spotted by removing the keel whereupon it would've become apparent that the floors weren't correctly bonded, or as suggested by other posters some form of ultrasound or other appropriate NDT. I believe neither of the latter are common practice for light groundings of yachts.
 
I feel a good deal of sympathy for Mr Innes.

I have to say I'm struggling to.

The idea that a yacht that is managed by a charter company, skippered by one of it's skippers and crewed by another employee and being relocated for the purpose of continuing to be used by that company is not taking part in a commercial voyage is, at the very least, not really acting within the spirit of the rules.

And of course one of the impacts of the boat conforming to category zero would have been to mandate float free life rafts. Of course we cannot know for sure, but given the activation of the PLB it seems reasonable to surmise that a float free life raft might well have saved at least 1 life, even if any coding inspection had missed the potential damage to the keel area.
 
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