Astute Sub grounding 'catalogue of errors'

[prv]

But seriously, this was no more than human error.

Agree. Giving the man on the tower a Garmin would have helped, but so would all on board doing their jobs better with the kit they had. I'm not suggesting the submarine was inadequately equipped given the way they (are supposed to) operate.

Pete

 

[Woodlouse]

He should have had an iPad!

Anyone would think we were living in the stone age.

 

[st599]

You're asking for a Petty Officer to over ride a Lt Commander, it just doesn't happen and he isn't the OOW. Also the PO was down below, he couldn't see what other vessels were doing top side which the the OOW could, or should have been able to do. However, the PO should have switched the depth sounder on earlier.

The river routine is interesting, going to river routine would have doubled the lookouts and staff available and ensured they were watching for shallow water.

Finally this sub was under trials. Systems, both physical and operational hadn't been sorted out yet so they should have been expecting stuff to happen or not work.

Pete

Is the *******ing for over-riding a superior thus preventing a potentially serious accident bigger than the *******ing for the potentially serious accident occurring?

As an engineer, I'm used to any member of a team being able to bin a test run at any time, no matter how junior.

 

[Kukri]

In the derided merchant service, we call this sort of thing "Crew resource management".

 

[Poignard]

In the derided merchant service, we call this sort of thing "Crew resource management".

In the Merchant Service I was in it was called "Where the f---k are we?".

 

[john_morris_uk]

Quote:
Originally Posted by john_morris_uk
It's interesting to hear of the manning levels in the merchant navy from other posters, but it's of little relevance. Merchant ships steam from port to port in reasonably straight lines. They don't constantly alter course to allow for helicopters to fly off them or to avoid simulated attacks from missiles or all the myriad of reasons why the steel grey box zig zags all over the place all the time.

(coughs politely) You want helicopters, divers in sat, ROVs , live well fluids on deck, maneouvering all over the place very precisely, in close proximity to others, in all weathers? Try the offshore oil business.

Exceptions don't prove the rule. I have the greatest of respect for those who work in the arduous and challenging conditions of the oil industry. However they are not typical and I was commenting on another posters comments on how over manned RN ships are in comparision to the average Merchant Ship. Its not a fair comparison for all the reasons I have given.


Quote:
Originally Posted by john_morris_uk
They also don't have to be manned up to allow for half the crew being killed or involved in firefighting and damage control while the rest of the crew fight the ship.

This is a hardship? How? See the comment above - its no hardship but part of my response to the slightly ill informed criticism of the alleged 'over manning' of the RN
Quote:
Originally Posted by john_morris_uk
The final and telling pat is that merchant ships crews are far more stable - they don't have the same tempo of throughput of young aspiring officers every few months or every couple of years as they learn their profession on the greasy poll to command. Its a young man and womans service - and experience is gained rapidly.

With great respect, John, at this point you are out of your tiny, cotton picking, RN mind. Perhaps I over egged the point - but please don't be rude. The tempo or churn of job change in the RN is challenging for all involved. The usual rule is that about half the ships company changes every year. This means that the technical and skilled jobs are constantly having to be re-learned and the same mistakes are often made. I am sure that there are jobs in the oil industry where the challenges are equally hard, but that's not the general point I was making. Of course I may be wrong, and if I over egged the challenges that the RN faces with training people my apologies.

 

[awol]

There is no chart table on a submarine bridge, I used to navigate the boat all the way up the Clyde without a chart, and pass the first line ashore within 1 minute of published eta. All you need is a bit of planning a notebook and a compass.

Aye, aim at the BFC through the Cumbrae/Bute gap and then follow the traffic lights - rocket science?

Now it's follow the P boat, the rigid raiders, the Mod plod all the way home!

 

[john_morris_uk]

Aye, aim at the BFC through the Cumbrae/Bute gap and then follow the traffic lights - rocket science?

Except that's not what they were doing.... they were coming inshore to conduct a boat transfer.

 

[Kukri]

Sorry, John, not setting out to be rude, but your remark about the stability of manning did surprise me. Consider the bridge team on a fairly typical deepsea merchant ship - Master and three watch keepers - the traditional division of responsibility being:

Mate - Cargo matters

2/O - Navigation

3/O - Safety

and perhaps a cadet.

At the moment, there is a high probablility that the two junior officers are both in the early stages of their careers.

The commonest tour of duty is six on three off, and people are unlikely to return to the same vessel.In other words, the whole ships company changes during a year. They may, or may not, be of the same nationality and they may, or may not, be employed by the same company, but it is to be hoped that they do at least communicate in a common language.

This is not a recipe for a high level of "stability!" The Master has to form his own view of the competence of the watchkeepers that his employers have sent him, and act accordingly.

 

[prv]

The tempo or churn of job change in the RN is challenging for all involved. The usual rule is that about half the ships company changes every year. This means that the technical and skilled jobs are constantly having to be re-learned and the same mistakes are often made.

Without sticking my nose into the RN / MN argument, why is this? As I understand it, the Army's teeth arms (Infantry, armour) don't move people about between regiments; if you join the 2nd Royal Loamshires as a soldier you'll stay there for your whole career more or less, surrounded by the same people. I guess officers must get seconded out to other places sometimes, as you find Infantry majors doing things in headquarters etc, but they don't go and become company commanders in other Infantry battalions as far as I know.

This close-knit "family" effect is supposed to contribute to their effectiveness in battle.

I wonder why the Navy find it necessary to shift people around at such a rate?

Pete

 

[uxb]

(coughs politely) You want helicopters, divers in sat, ROVs , live well fluids on deck, maneouvering all over the place very precisely, in close proximity to others, in all weathers? Try the offshore oil business.

Please explain how you manage to get live well fluids on deck when maneouvering all over the place??

 

[Kukri]

Please explain how you manage to get live well fluids on deck when maneouvering all over the place??

Well, preferably by being on DP! Fair cop, Guv

 

[jonjo]

Sure, and there's no suggestion that the people below didn't know where they were.

Another who has not yet read the report, it contains multiple observations about plotting/logging deficiencies in the preceeding 40 minutes and makes specific comment that the position/time of the grounding brings into question the last EP plot. The plotting errors were a side issue I grant you.

 

[jonjo]

Without sticking my nose into the RN / MN argument, why is this? As I understand it, the Army's teeth arms (Infantry, armour) don't move people about between regiments; if you join the 2nd Royal Loamshires...

I wonder why the Navy find it necessary to shift people around at such a rate?

A very interesting point. Read deeper into the staff rotation on HMS Sheffield prior to its demise and a similar issue crops up, it goes part way to explaining why the XO had a chip on his shoulder and underperformed on the day.

 

[jonjo]

Even COs need to rest from time to time, as it is where he was had very little to do with it when the missile was fired they were stuffed, simple as that. But of course that does not stop armchair admirals thinking differently.

Not so, you should read the RN's own report, something that this thead illustrates you have an aversion to.

The official RN report speculates that the argie fighters altered course towards Sheffield and away from Glasgow when they saw Glasgow's chaff plume. Coventry also fired chaff during the same attack but why not Sheffield? The XO was gossipping in the canteen and the captain was not there to make the instant call.

 

[jonjo]

A portable plotter would also have worked, which is why people are suggesting it.

Note that one of the recommendations of the Navy's own report is that a plotter ("WECDIS") should be fitted, and a portable device ("safe navigation laptop") be deployed in the interim.

Thank you. Someone else in this thread has actually read the report instead of spouting off from a position of preordained prejudice. From the brief summary in the BBC news report I concluded a handheld Garmin plotter up top in the fin would have averted this disaster. The RN report conclusions confirmed my hunch.

Read the report Maxi77 and stop embarrising yourself.

 

[prv]

Another who has not yet read the report

Thank you. Someone else in this thread has actually read the report

Make up your mind

Pete

 

[Kukri]

One point from the report is that this new nuclear submarine was being navigated on paper charts.

It is now fifteen years since I was told by the then H, himself a submariner, that the driver behind the development of first raster and then ECDIS was a submarine requirement.

 

[maxi77]

The problem was the guy on the fin not knowing where he was.



A portable plotter would also have worked, which is why people are suggesting it.


Pete

The problem was that the connections from the bridge to the rest of the boat were dodgy, not uncommon in my day, so it would seem there was nothing to plug the portable device into.

The suggestion of an lectronic plotter is probably as much because it was deleted earlier for cost reasons and they now see a reason to get this overturned.

The reality still is that poor procedures and poor personal responsibility of several officers led to the grounding not a lack of positional awareness.

Had the OOW made sure he had the appropriate clearing bearings he had no need of a chart, plotter or even help from below.

Piss poor organisation, planning, OOWmanship, etc. Even the gear failure in communication could have been overcome, I have had men in the tower relaying messages. Who was to blame, the CO for not knowing that his team were incompetant, the XO for not caring about ship handling when he was both in the control room and later on the bridge, the bridge OOW for not knowing how to keep himself safe, the OOW in the control room for failing to both ensure the bridge was aware of the navigational problems and for not informing the CO when it was very clear they were standing into danger, and the NO for not keeping an eye out knowing they were going to be close to land.

No CO I ever served under would have allowed that to happen, one XO might have, I didn't trust him.

 

[maxi77]

Thank you. Someone else in this thread has actually read the report instead of spouting off from a position of preordained prejudice. From the brief summary in the BBC news report I concluded a handheld Garmin plotter up top in the fin would have averted this disaster. The RN report conclusions confirmed my hunch.

Read the report Maxi77 and stop embarrising yourself.

See my comments above on that, the reality is they didn't need a plotter to keep themselves safe, and I suspect that a bridge plotter may well have suffered the same problems as the comms. All the gear failure could have been overcome, and too many people who could have stopped the grounding failed for some inexplicable reason to do so. In my day the XO would have had command of a smaller diesel boat before becoming XO of an SSN, and it seems clear the extra presence of mind this gave has now been lost, as whilst the XO has the training to command he has not had the experience of command as they used to.