Sinking death trawler Sarah Jayne 'overloaded'

Dan,

I think the word you may be looking for is ' complacency ' ?

I have dealt with pro' pilots and noticed hair raising snags / situations but they didn't notice as they ' fly all the time '.

It has always been a wonder to me why more British fishing boats don't founder, most places in the world the owners take pride in their boats and treat them like one of the family, but here they are rust buckets !

I'm afraid getting to crew on a lifeboat is more a measure of one's fishing background than professional seamanship, though that is improving with the RNLI's incredible training budget.
 
Yachts coded for charter should have a plimsoll line under current regulations. I find it hard to believe that under current legislation fishing boats are exempt when even a 12 meter survey boat I used to work on required one.

But fishing boats have always been treated somewhat separately from merchant shipping. Different section of the shipping register, different system of qualifications, etc. As I said, I don't know either way, but it wouldn't surprise me at all if there was no requirement for a load line.

Historically the Plimsoll line was required because of unscrupulous owners forcing crews to sea in overloaded ships while they remained safe on shore. A very different situation to a small skipper-owned trawler.

Pete
 
I'm afraid getting to crew on a lifeboat is more a measure of one's fishing background than professional seamanship, though that is improving with the RNLI's incredible training budget.

Improvement? IMV the decline of UK fishing is a disaster for the RNLI. IME a lifeboat crewed by career fishermen exactly like Ingram had a level of competence and talent on a completely different level to some of the greenhorns crewing lifeboats at the moment. IME there is no simply better background to crew a lifeboat than that of a full time local career fisherman. Almost all the skills are directly transferrable and the local knowledge is second to none.

(Ditto minesweeping as WW2 demonstrates.)
 
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Did have one, or was it just required but it wasn't on. I don't know, just curious because of the overloading stated in the news report. I didn't know that coded yachts had to have a plimsole line, learn something new everyday, I'll have to lookout at the new Bavaria's going into charter at Largs.

I think actually with yachts it will depend on what category they are coded for. I'll have to do some more research on this myself to be honest. A quick google suggests that fishing boats are exempt from load lines when fishing for scientific purposes and when acting as guard boats but I'm reluctant to dig deeper when just using an iPhone.
 
Improvement? IME a lifeboat crewed by career fishermen exactly like Ingram had a level of competence and talent on a completely different level to some of the greenhorns crewing lifeboats at the moment.

+1

I also wonder about people whose only experience of the sea is on a lifeboat, having joined up because they're a self-employed plasterer or whatever who's likely to be near the station when the beeper goes off. I'm sure the RNLI gives them excellent training, and I'm certainly not questioning their dedication, but I wonder what it does to their judgement of situations and whether a given case is actually an emergency.

Pete
 
Sign in the club at Rochester Airport...Never Fly with somebody Braver Than you.
Personal experience confirms that complacency at sea is a much a threat as anything.
 
Yes, well there can sometimes, just perhaps, be an air of complacency in regular work practices; and when Shipping/ Boating/ Fishing is involved the results can be fatal.

Remember the Herald of Free Enterprise? leaving port/ dock with bow doors not properly/ effectively checked to be shut!

The pressure, just perhaps, of speeding up the turn around time of a Ferry in port? gota get back fast!

Also, I guess, Fishing Skippers can find themselves working/ catching fish in quickly changing circumstances, of wind and waves, and hauling in their nets in conditions that are very different to when cast.

Anyways, RIP
 
I think the word you may be looking for is ' complacency ' ?
Could be. We're all at risk from it. Perhaps the insidious bit is that the more competent our untroubled experience makes us feel, the less we anticipate future disaster...

...in pleasure-boats, I've always noticed it's seen as admirably relaxed to appear wholly unconcerned about imminent danger, near at hand. And we'd certainly look neurotic otherwise.

And it's appealingly quaint, to visualise fishermen as long of beard, gruff of tone, rusty of boat and determinedly independent of health & safety overlords...

...although, I'd have expected such a perilous profession would lead them to a belt & braces approach to their own, and their vessels' safety...but apparently not.

R.I.P.
 
If its operating commercially it should be coded. If its been coded then it should have a load line.

Assuming that is true, how does a skipper on a pitching/rolling fishing boat, get any guidance, from a loadline that is painted somewhere on the hull?

In a flat water, perhaps, but what would looking over the side tell you, if any sea was running?

Nothing.
 
Due respect to the dead man, and all others whose serious business means they're not at sea just for fun...

...but this report seems strongly suggestive of terrible slackness on important safety issues - even though I recognise that observance of these wouldn't necessarily have saved the departed.

Considering the substantial initial cost of a liferaft, it's hard to believe any professional skipper fits one just to meet safety rules...but what's the point, if it's not free to operate when needed?

The emergency beacon didn't work...but surely fully-functioning gear like this is even more vital aboard all-weather/all-season commercial vessels, than for fair-weather yachts?

And no lifejackets, not even worn by crew on deck, as the vessel sinks? What is the psychology behind workers in demanding & dangerous professions, omitting such basic self-defences? It's such a familiar story, it begins to seem inevitable.

And..."The trawler had about 20 tonnes of fish on board when it was recommended for 17". It seems odd for a skipper with decades of RNLI experience of accidents & incidents at sea, somehow to regard his own vessel as not subject to the risk of such over-burdening.

I've often had a sense that as an amateur of negligible experience, I'm routinely, deservedly condescended to by salty old professionals...but I wouldn't swap my safety-sense for theirs, whatever pride or respect it might notionally earn me.

Very sad though. :(

+1 Perfectly put...and very sad.
 
In my years at sea I have read many reports by the MAIB, MCA and others the one thing they all have in common is they always blame the dead man or in the event of there being many dead men they blame whichever one works for the smallest company or whichever ones family are less likely to sue for defamation (libel).

Those of us who have or still do go down to the sea in ships to make our living generally just accept that men will always go to sea and some will not come back and but for the grace of God go I.
 
Dan,

I think the word you may be looking for is ' complacency ' ?

I have dealt with pro' pilots and noticed hair raising snags / situations but they didn't notice as they ' fly all the time '.

It has always been a wonder to me why more British fishing boats don't founder, most places in the world the owners take pride in their boats and treat them like one of the family, but here they are rust buckets !

I'm afraid getting to crew on a lifeboat is more a measure of one's fishing background than professional seamanship, though that is improving with the RNLI's incredible training budget.

Actually Seajet, Jeff would have been cox of the Exmouth lifeboat for many years had he not had a degree of colour blindness. I suggest all those making idle speculation consider what they are writing, I personally find it objectionable. As no doubt all the trawler crews in Exmouth and all those who knew him would also.
 
That's the point isn't it, Longjohn? I admit very readily how little I know, so I err on the safe side. Meanwhile, lots of professionals die each year, apparently because they know too much to be bothered with costly, time-consuming safety issues.

Grave concern about nearing/exceeding load limits would prevent me doing what this gent appears to have regarded as an acceptable risk, doubtless proven to his own satisfaction by his not having capsized this vessel previously. But his tragic denouement doesn't make me feel that my own concern is just daft lubberliness - quite the opposite.

We ought to tread tactfully...but the fact seems to be, borrowing your words, that despite "his whole life at sea both as a professional skipper and RNLI crewman", long practice led him to a degree of disregard for safety systems on board, and load limits. Isn't that fair comment? Why do words fail you?

I suggest you visit the Beach pub in Exmouth and express your views, you might leave with a different opinion. What you have written is an insult to Jeff Ingram.
 
Assuming that is true, how does a skipper on a pitching/rolling fishing boat, get any guidance, from a loadline that is painted somewhere on the hull?

In a flat water, perhaps, but what would looking over the side tell you, if any sea was running?

Nothing.
I addressed that in my original post. True on a pitching and rolling boat a load line is not much use, but inspection of the load line once in port at various times with various loads would give you a good idea of what the holds look like when your fully laden.
 
What you have written is an insult to Jeff Ingram.

Well, then, I withdraw what I said, because I certainly did not mean to offend.

But I note that others here seem as surprised as me, by apparent failures of safety kit and practice aboard the Sarah Jayne. Mr Ingram's death is unarguably tragic; but it's not disrespectful to ask why the sinking occurred, in fact it is vital...and if the vessel was ill-maintained or overloaded, the reasons for that require scrutiny for the prevention of recurrence.

However fine a fellow he was (and I do not doubt that he was), catastrophic errors of judgement may have been made, which if unrecognised, might be made again elsewhere with further casualties...or, does loyalty require that we call this unhappy business an unaccountable mystery, of which no-one's error may be seen as the cause?
 
Well, then, I withdraw what I said, because I certainly did not mean to offend.

But I note that others here seem as surprised as me, by apparent failures of safety kit and practice aboard the Sarah Jayne. Mr Ingram's death is unarguably tragic; but it's not disrespectful to ask why the sinking occurred, in fact it is vital...and if the vessel was ill-maintained or overloaded, the reasons for that require scrutiny for the prevention of recurrence.

However fine a fellow he was (and I do not doubt that he was), catastrophic errors of judgement may have been made, which if unrecognised, might be made again elsewhere with further casualties...or, does loyalty require that we call this unhappy business an unaccountable mystery, of which no-one's error may be seen as the cause?

I think the point that longjohnsilver is making is that the catastrophic errors of judgement to which you refer if indeed ever happened may have occurred in a time frame of a few seconds. Working at sea is a dynamic vocation as much art as education and one where the environment changes by the second. To put it in an office context it is like sitting working at a desk that is actually a live salt water crocodile and where your chair is a ball on which you must balance. You could work happily for years then all of a sudden you sneeze, fall off your ball and the crocodile desk bites your head off and the only catastrophic decision you made was to breath through your nose and accidentally sniff up some dust.
About 2007 I was shown a copy of a report which covered safety at sea in the Merchant Navy between 1947 and 2007. It showed that there was almost exactly the same amount of fatalities at sea on average over all those years despite the safety rules and regulations increasing 100 fold. It concluded (quite surprisingly to me) that the bitter truth was that professional seamen generally have a good safety culture and sense of self preservation. They had looked to minimise risk themselves over hundreds of years and that the imposition of rules and regulations from outside sources played almost no part in reducing those risks.
The culture of blame is rarely welcome at sea despite the great efforts of the shore side establishment to impose one. What ever happened and whether Mr Ingram was to blame or not I think it is fair to say that he has paid his debt.
 
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Interesting vision - the instability of a ball for a seat, and the immediate danger of a crocodile for a desk!

Perhaps, if we may assume that a large-ish seagoing fishing boat is designed to be a stable, seaworthy vessel, it would be fairer to regard the crocodile as being safe inside the box you use as a desk, at least until you reach and exceed maximum load-limits...after which the box is opened and the croc is able to escape; he may remain asleep, but the designed safety & stability of the situation can no longer be guaranteed.

I suppose over the years I've driven thousands of miles on tyres of substantially less than recommended inflation pressure...without any noticeable consequence. But had I blown a tyre and slewed to a nasty sudden halt, I'd know that I'd pushed my luck...because it was just too much bother to keep checking.
 
It has always been a wonder to me why more British fishing boats don't founder, most places in the world the owners take pride in their boats and treat them like one of the family, but here they are rust buckets !
.

Actually on my circumnavigation of England last year i was quite surprised as to how good some of our fishing fleet looks
Peterhead has some beautiful trawlers. Newlyn has some rather nice boats as well
Some owners spend small fortunes upgrading their boats
Take the Amity for instance --- a £1.5 million upgrade about 2 years ago, but to watch the tv series you would think they are all skint which i suspect is, at present, a fallacy!!
 
Dan,

I think the word you may be looking for is ' complacency ' ?

I have dealt with pro' pilots and noticed hair raising snags / situations but they didn't notice as they ' fly all the time '.

It has always been a wonder to me why more British fishing boats don't founder, most places in the world the owners take pride in their boats and treat them like one of the family, but here they are rust buckets !

I'm afraid getting to crew on a lifeboat is more a measure of one's fishing background than professional seamanship, though that is improving with the RNLI's incredible training budget.

On the subject of sunken trawlers i notice that Dover CG is regularly reporting a sunken fishing vessel on which "trawling gear may be attached"
Is that the same one or is there another story?
 
The quote below is from the MAIB report which also states that stability appears to be an area that needs addressing based on another event. In my first post on this thread I suggested that the Alaskan crab fishermen were being killed because they did not know that their boats were overloaded. In certain running seas, the stability of their vessels became compromised as the stern rose on a big wave.

I work in a hazardous industry and I am deeply involved with safe operations. There are many reasons (complacency is too simple a description) why folks work certain ways that increase the probability of risk and it's depressingly common that knowledgeable professionals are the main culprits for allowing unsafe systems at work. In nearly every case an unsafe system of work has insidiously developed organically and it's not been a deliberate act by the professional in charge.

The role of regulation is to protect ourselves from ourselves. In the controlled environments, where regulations can be determined, there are no commercial or cultural pressures, so it's relatively straight forward to determine how to manage risks that the laws of physics prove will happen. Leaving it up to the professional to make such judgements in the field is subject to a multitude of variables that are impossible to control; the evidence of this is repeat incidents. On the psychological side, education of the worker is only relatively effective, far better that a team and peer pressure is brought to play to manage the variances of human nature. However, strong characters, leaders, the bosses, can be difficult people to challenge, especially if they have good reputations or the challenger is not skilled.

This thread shows the two sides of humans trying to deal with the outcome of disastrous decisions; the need to hold an individual accountable, the need to defend a victim. Both approaches are understandable and both are in fact correct. I doubt very much if this skipper deliberately overloaded his boat to the point where he knew it was a risk, or even if it was overloaded, but at the end of the day, he was the person in charge. Clearly there was information available on the load ratings of the boat and the report states that another modification would have reduced this rating further.

The skipper, who in this case is the owner is accountable, no matter how unpalatable that may be to those that knew him. It doesn't mean he was a cad, or that he was cavalier with the lives of his crew, or that it nullifies his acts of past valour, or damages his reputation, it just means that for some reason the boat was worked beyond what is considered to be the rated load.

The main question for me is how many other boats are operating in a potentially unsafe manner because its not good enough to say that we accept the risks of the sea, or that its always done that way, or that a worker is best placed to know his own limits. Nothing can ever be hazard free either.

Sarah Jayne capsized because in her loaded state she had an insufficient reserve
of stability to withstand the sudden flooding and its associated free-surface effect.
The flooding of the fish hold and water entrained on deck following the swamping is
concluded to be the only likely cause of flooding that contributed to the vessel’s loss.
Sarah Jayne’s stability information booklet, approved in 1995, specified that catch
should be limited to 17.08 tonnes, though modification to the vessel after 2007 would
have reduced this limit. Routine landing of catches of this quantity without incident
would have reinforced a belief that it was safe for Sarah Jayne to carry such loads.
However, when heavily laden, Sarah Jayne had a low freeboard aft, which increased
the risk that waves might wash over the deck. As the weight of catch in the hold
increased, so did the risk of downflooding should a wave wash over the deck while
fish were being loaded into the fish hold through the open fish deck scuttle, and with
the fish hold hatch cover also open.
The liferaft failed to surface and inflate, probably as a result of its being obstructed
by the wheelhouse roof overhang when it was released from its stowed position on
the aft external bulkhead. Although a definitive reason for an EPIRB transmission
not being received following the accident cannot be determined, the carriage of an
EPIRB remains an important safety precaution for fishing vessels.
The MAIB has previously made recommendations to the Maritime and Coastguard
Agency (MCA) regarding loading, freeboard and future stability standards for small
fishing vessels (MAIB Report 2/2013 on the capsize and foundering of FV Heather
Anne). As part of its intended development of new standards for small fishing
vessels, the MCA is additionally recommended to review and include additional
design and operational requirements as necessary to ensure that a vessel engaged
in bulk fishing remains seaworthy when loading the catch into the fish hold at sea.
 
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