Ouzo - Radar reflector report update

The bit about photochromic spectacle lenses is a new one to me. I wear mine day and night and have allways found I see lights etc either better or at least equall to other people. I will be having a word with my optician.I only recently had the eyetest/medical for commercial endorsement,no mention of the problem then.

The report confirmed my thinking that you cant rely on being seen by ships night or day.
 
My photochromatic lenses darken nicely in bright sunlight, but artificial light indoors does not seem to have any effect on them, hence I am wondering why the report is saying that the user on the PoB would be affected by his lenses when he was keeping a look-out?

I am sure that everybody on here has also realised how much effect your peripheral vision has at night, especially when spotting dim lights - I find that I can see a dim light quite well if I just use peripheral, but if I then try to focus on that light with my main vision it disappears (yes, all about cones and rods, I cant remember which is which).
 
cones and rods is what does it , but my older photochromatics used to stay slightly dimmed even in total darkness , and if I got hit by car headlights they darkened too fast for me . Newer ones have improved though
 
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The bit about photochromic spectacle lenses is a new one to me. I wear mine day and night and have allways found I see lights etc either better or at least equall to other people. I will be having a word with my optician.I only recently had the eyetest/medical for commercial endorsement,no mention of the problem then.

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I hadnt seen the report when I had an eyetest yesterday. My optician mentioned the Ouzo and photchromatic lenses, and I poo-poo'd it, thinking that he meant the crew of the Ouzo hadnt seen the Bilbao because of them.... "There is no way that the crew of the Ouzo hadnt seen the Bilbao" said I... which was almost certainly correct..... I'll update him when I go to collect my new sunglasses next week.

having said that.... if I am on a little yacht, and I think the Pride of Bilbao is going to pass only half a mile ahead of me, I am going to be thinking of doing something about it a long time before the Big Ship is 300 metres away, and a long time before a risk of collision exists - particularly at night.

What I do depends on the circumstances..... slow down.... stop.... steer well astern of her, (thus showing a green)....

I'm not saying it was Ouzos' fault..... she obviously had right of way as a sailing vessel... she was also either being overtaken, or was stand on vessel if she was mistaken for a small power boat...

all I am saying is that there are things she could have done before the situation became dangerous.

I'm also not sure how much the glasses would have contributed.... as an ex-watchkeeper, the fact that the officer on Bilbao had a white light over the chart, rather than red, and that he had the curtains open, made my jaw drop, and seem to be the main contributors to the vision of the lookout.

I can certainly remember three things as officer of the watch at night after the master has retired:

1) there was a perception that you would be in a degree of trouble if you called him, or at least it was frowned upon. I tell my crew that I want to be called if any situation arises, that I dont care how many times it happens, and that I actually enjoy it. I also make it clear that I can generally assimilate a situation in seconds, and they wont be keeping me out of bed for too long unless I deem it necessary.

2) If you ever thought you might have hit something, and declared it, you were in deep deep trouble, and probably out of a job, (never happened to me, but when I was a cadet, i saw some close shaves by 2nd and 3rd Officers which went unreported, and it wasnt my place to say anything. The Officer probably saw enough to satisfy his conscience that the yacht had escaped damage, and kept his mouth shut hoping that he was right.

3) If you did anything to risk the schedule of a ship .... well you just didnt do it. I saw Masters who slowed down in fog demoted from Flagship type container vessels, to tramps carring general cargo up the Amazon, if they "lost their nerve" up The Channel in thick fog.

The pshycology part of the report seemed to accept that the officer didnt appreciate that the yacht may have been damaged.... It didnt consider the fact that he may have considered this, but was afraid of the consequences of calling the master, declaring the incident, and taking steps to ensure that the yacht was safe.

I'm going back to 1984 when I last did the job, but it would seem that not much has changed.... white light on the bridge, too much time at the chart table, fear of job security and/or the wrath of the Master.

having said that, I'll certainly be reconsidering the wearing of photochromic glasses at night.

Cheers
 
I've just read the report for the first time. All very sad but the comments from the bridge after the alleged encounter made me fume - "the second officer opined that yachts often went around with their navigation lights off, to save electrical power, thus relying on the larger ships’ radars to detect them".

Do they think we're mad?
 
Maybe some of us are mad, but the statement is undoubtedly true. I have had a number of near-misses with unlit boats, in UK, France and Spain. We were almost run down by a large yacht, motoring across us between Menorca and France, nobody on the helm and no lights. I called him up, shone a searchlight on him and never saw a person.
 
I too have been crossed ahead by an unlit larger yacht at night when on passage to the balearics from gib. But I've never been aware of it occuring in UK waters. We seem here to take the whole business of correct procedures much more seriously. Though I have noticed, when channel crossing with racing boys, that folk can get a bit blase about dicing with the big boys. I believe it's best to keep out of their way. They are working, we're playing. They are constrained by draft, and take a long time to stop, we're not and don't. Steam does not always give way to sail (see above).
 
Although many people need optical assistance, my impression is that anything at all will cause some deterioration in visual perception and if not perfectly clean will reduce contrast. The only exception familiar to me is the use of yellow lenses when skiing in dull conditions when the contrast is improved due to greater blue content in the shadows. I think it's a matter of making the best of a bad job.
 
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having said that.... if I am on a little yacht, and I think the Pride of Bilbao is going to pass only half a mile ahead of me, I am going to be thinking of doing something about it a long time before the Big Ship is 300 metres away, and a long time before a risk of collision exists - particularly at night.

all I am saying is that there are things she could have done before the situation became dangerous.



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Must disagree and think you are being grossly unfair to the deceased crew of the Ouzo.

My reading of the report implies that The P of B initially would have passes clear then it started to turn as if to pass correctly astern and I think it reasonable to speculate that the crew of the Ouzo noticing this would have assumed that the P of B had seen the Ouzo and were obeying the Col Regs and altering course to pass astern.

At what point the crew of the Ouzo would have realised that the P of B not turning fast enough and maybe had not seen the Ouzo is difficult to speculate. At what point could they realise that the P od B was going to pass close/run them down is difficult to imagine but even if Ouzo had tried to get out of the way it may have compounded the problem as they may have reasonable assumed the P of B was going to continue to turn but it didn't.

While I heartily endorse always getting out of the way of big ships, up until this report/incident I had wrongly assumed the X channel ferries by the nature of their journeys had very competent crew and excellent radar.

I am happy to receive others wisdom if their take on the situation from the MAIB report is different.

On my reading, without being forewarning by the knowledge of this incident, there but for the grace of God go I!!
 
Whether the statement was true or not, it doesn't form any sort of defence in this case. They did see Ouzo's lights (hence they must have been switched on) but they failed to take action for some time after seeing the lights, then the action that was taken was minimal.

Comments about about how they could have spotted Ouzo earlier would be more relevent had the Pride of Bilboa made every possible effort to avoid an accident in the time available.
 
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having said that.... if I am on a little yacht, and I think the Pride of Bilbao is going to pass only half a mile ahead of me, I am going to be thinking of doing something about it a long time before the Big Ship is 300 metres away, and a long time before a risk of collision exists - particularly at night.

all I am saying is that there are things she could have done before the situation became dangerous.



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Must disagree and think you are being grossly unfair to the deceased crew of the Ouzo.

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I must admit to hesitating before writing the above, and agree that the alteration to starboard must have seemed to be correcting the situation.

However, having had experience as both an officer of the watch, and skipper/crew of a variety of sizes of yacht, if I said nothing I may never forgive myself if a similar thing happened to someone who could have read my post.

In addition, the report could be interpreted to be unfair to the crew of Ouzo... the reflector may have been hung correctly, no liferaft, no EPIRB, no waterproof VHF, and so on.

The thing is, if i read it correctly, the alteration to starboard started when the Bilbao was only 300 metres from Ouzo. prior to this, the Bilbao was going to pass half a mile ahead.

We will never know what happened and what they were thinking.

I am only guessing, but Ouzo would have been able to see Bilbao for quite some time before the incident and, personally, I dont want a big ship passing a short distance ahead of me if I can help it, particularly at night. So I stop/slow to let him pass further ahead, or show him a green, so that I am heading behind his stern and remove his confusion.

It's a judgement call, but if my action is taken well before a situation develops, it takes the heat out, and may save lives.

The aim, as per the MAIB statements, is not to pass blame. It is to help avoid future incidents.

Certainly didnt mean to be unfair or blame anyone.
 
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The thing is, if i read it correctly, the alteration to starboard started when the Bilbao was only 300 metres from Ouzo. prior to this, the Bilbao was going to pass half a mile ahead.



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Thanks for your clarification and understand better your reasoning. I defer to your experience as an ships officer.

I would add though that sailing in the Solent and X channel boats are often close to the sides of ships and a Ferry clearly passing ahead 300m away I would not have been concerned prior to learning about this incident, I would now though!!

At what point and at what distance they realised that they (the Ouzo) had to do something is impossible to guess.

I just feel for the crew and their families.
 
well put - you only have to experience the diffence between a slightly tinted windscreen and a clear one at night on the water to realise the huge difference at the really dim end of the game. If theres a bit of light etc the difference seems much less.
 
I feel sad for the looss of any person at sea - this incident is tragic.

I agree with Richards earlier commenst about OOW's reluctance to call Master / declare incident etc. We are talking an Agency officer here who "came up the hawse-pipe" ... the hard way. Not as a Cadet .... Regardless of PC and all that - it is not uncommon for old-time Masters - especvially the Extra Master types ... sort of ex Commonwealth Shipping / P&O sort to look down their noses at such.
The 2nd mate is "ancient" by modern usual age standards ... and probably scared about losing his position if he called Master ...

I was lucky and I later followed example - All Masters I sailed with told me straight ... If you think you should call me - you should already have !
Me ? I'd rather get a rollicking for calling him than a rollicking for not ! At least moment he appears on bridge - responsibility for what happens is then passed to him !! Poor sod !!

Onto that Report ... I am not impressed by the MAIB report and also not impressed by many posts on these and other forums referring to it. IMHO MAIB have done the deceased persons family's and the PoB Officers no favours or even got to answer the real question. It is all supposition based on bridge statements and possible's ... extrapolated VTS tracks ... wind and current etc.
Having had 17yrs experience of most watchmen on bridges - I wouldn't read too much into any statement from them later ... Sorry to any ex AB's here etc.

There are sections devoted to "experts" opinions on time in water and life-expectancy ... comments about radar ... lots of IMHO irrelevant items ... the fact is Ouzo was lost at sea. She has not been found. MAIB have written a report they say themselves is NOT fact, but circumstantial.

I personally believe that the emotional face of this whole incident and the time spent investigating created a requirement for them to write something. Sad that it could not have had more facts and actuals.

I realise that some here are going to say I'm talking rot ... so be it ... it is My Opinion based on sea-going and Yachting experience. I have also experience of how Marine Investigations can be run ...

Why not ask a few pertinent questions ....

a) A big thing was made on news about MAIB investigators scrutinising the ships hull .... nothing heard about this later - except tiny remark that nothing significant found. Seems strange after such headlines.
b) Data recorder ... another Headline item ... very little said about that as well.
c) The 2nd Mate charged with Manslaughter ... I haven't seen anything apart from remanded without bail ....

What about the above ? What about real evidence that is found ?

I have personal knowledge and experience of some Marine white-washes ...... I don't say we have one here ... far from it. I think that Marine Investigations hopefully moved on from Derbyshire, Mactra, King Haikon etc. But I think that report is flawed .... IMHO.
 
Nigel,

A view I guess that nobody without your background and experince in this field could reasonably argue with.

The one observation that I have is the report lragely ignores the relationships, tensions, and expectations between officers, both formal and informal completely.... it doesn't mention whether or not the officers felt empowered to call the master, or whether to do so would have been seen as 'weak' or 'whinging', or 'career limiting'.... or even 'backstabbing' to have said within the enquiry "i'd like to have called the master, but he would have gone loopy".... It doesn't discuss the culture of the industry with regards to stoic silence, or "keep quiet mate, or you'll never work on a ship again"... these attitudes may or may not exist... but the report doesn't cover it at all...

It strikes me that a lot of this will have been central, not neccesarily to the accident itself, but potentially the outcome in terms of lives saved...
 
Here we go, more bollx...

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a) A big thing was made on news about MAIB investigators scrutinising the ships hull .... nothing heard about this later - except tiny remark that nothing significant found. Seems strange after such headlines.

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There's the small matter of PoB having covered more than 1,000 miles since the incident and before the hull was examined, including 2 Biscay crossings which tend to give the hull a pretty good wipe around the watreline where the impact might have been

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b) Data recorder ... another Headline item ... very little said about that as well.

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Suggest you read the MAIB report again properly where you'll see the PoB VDR data presented, especially the swerve see pages 18 & 43
 
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Nigel,

A view I guess that nobody without your background and experince in this field could reasonably argue with.

The one observation that I have is the report lragely ignores the relationships, tensions, and expectations between officers, both formal and informal completely.... it doesn't mention whether or not the officers felt empowered to call the master, or whether to do so would have been seen as 'weak' or 'whinging', or 'career limiting'.... or even 'backstabbing' to have said within the enquiry "i'd like to have called the master, but he would have gone loopy".... It doesn't discuss the culture of the industry with regards to stoic silence, or "keep quiet mate, or you'll never work on a ship again"... these attitudes may or may not exist... but the report doesn't cover it at all...

It strikes me that a lot of this will have been central, not neccesarily to the accident itself, but potentially the outcome in terms of lives saved...

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I'm sorry to say this .... but there are some real old "fogies" out there investigating incidents ...

We had a guy visit us for a shipping incident in Middle East. He was from a Flag State State Accident dept. He was Extra Master etc. etc. etc. I was detailed by Head Office (I was employed then !!) - to assist the guy. I ended up doing the physical work - as he was incapable of climbing - delving into spaces etc. His knowledge of the ship type was appalling, but understandable as he had never sailed on such.

As to my experience and knowledge - I certainly do not profess or mean to suggest that mine is greater than many on here ... far from it ... I meant it in terms of what I have seen and been involved in. Like everyone else - I am still learning and if I am wrong in my conclusions of this report etc. - I am duly sorry. But no-one has shown me that yet ... I have read many bits and pieces based on the report and many misunderstandings / readings of it ...

I'm not in favour of the report because of the misconceptions, the mis-readings, the assumptions that it is fact etc. etc.
 
How much info has been kept back because the case is still to come to court. Maybe the report in full should not have been released until the case was over.
 
When I am sailing, particularly at night, I frequently pick up the VHF and give the vessel which is 'worrying me' a shout - using GPS lat and long to identify the situation... It works 90% of the time and often resolves the situation....

One of the problems with 'radio checks' and DSC is that 'yachts-people' in the Solent area particularly, are loath to use the radio on 16.... A useful tool that people are now discouraged to use...
 
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