Watched it. Not mentioned was the way P & O acted afterwards. It was decided at Europe wide level that all of the older Ro-Ro ferries operating in Europe should be retro-fitted with extra bulkheads in an effort to control any water that got on to the car decks, and hopefully prevent capsize. A time limit was set and all the Scandinavian ferry companies complied.
P & O went to the UK government and got an extension of the time limit, pleading cost of conversion and competition from Eurotunnel.
Also thought they could have gone into a bit more detail about the UK / European standards that have changed since then. Instead they indulged in a bit of scare mongering at the end.
Still a good opportunity to reflect. I was a child at the time but the disaster has always stuck in my mind as my Dad was on a ferry to France that same night.
I thought the same, but also wondered just how much safer current RO-RO ferries actually are. True there should now be good enough warnings to prevent sailing with the doors open, but are the internal arrangements actually sufficient to prevent capsize if water does get on to the car deck?
That same summer my car was at the very front of a ferry one night as we were coming into Dover Harbour and the bow doors were open well before we got to the harbour.
Things have become a lot more stringent nowadays. I have worked on two ferries, one an old RoRo and the other one of the biggest car ferries in the world.
On the old one (early 70's) we had indicators on the bridge for the stern door (no bow door) and had to confirm by VHF to the bridge that door was closed and secure and they would then also confirm that the lights were indicating the same. We also had CCTV of the door.
On the new big ferry, the main engines wouldn't start until the doors (bow and stern) were secured.
The older ferry also had internal doors/bulkheads retro fitted to segregate the main car deck in two.
Flooding is always a possibility, but fire is a much more serious threat IMHO, especially with all the dodgy things carried in road tankers today...
Ro-Ro vessels operating in NW European waters now have to comply with the "Stockholm Agreement". This is a set of rules which lay down requirements for the stability of the vessel in a damaged condition if water gets onto the car deck to a depth depending on a range of factors. As others with more practical experience have mentioned, there are also a number of fail safe systems which should be implemented. However, that and a sensible, technical analysis doesn't seem to be the way of the BBC these days...
I was talking to a person at work recently saying that this disaster got the HSE insisting they must be able to sucessfully prosecute management for manslaughter in cases like this. This and later disasdters has culminated in the proposed corporate manslaughter bill.
Now I am not keen on all the H & S rubbish but am with them on this one - a number of people must have been responsible.
What surprised me was the response of my colleague who said he had a beach hut opposite the position of the H of FE and he examined a lot of the stuff washed up on the beach and a lot of the safety equipment it was out of test/service date.
Could this be possible? I would have thought there would be some independant checking.
The programme made the point that TT's management was 'sloppy' but also commented that the inspectors should share the blame for failing to check up on the ships and enforce regulations. The inspectors were not held responsible by the investigation.
I think that at the end of the day, this tragedy can just be put down to human error. OK, may not have had the warning systems that are currently in place, but I feel that if the crew had carried out their duties as they should have, then the accident would probably not have happened. I can see why computers are taking over from humans.... well, at least this is the impression I got from the BBC programme.
Its a shame it takes something like this to change the way the ferries need to operate.