Chronic Coastguard understaffing and lack of resources found in official inquiry.

[LittleSister]

While all UK public services seem chronically stretched, I hadn't appreciated the Coastguard in particular were in quite such a poor state. This is one of the factors and failings, among many others, found in the Cranston Report on the 2021 'worst small boat crossing tragedy'.

That said, while that and similar situations are indeed tragic, I suspect it is unlikely there will be very significant change in the Coastguard resources going forward. I feel that from the perspective of us leisure sailors the UK Coastguard services are still adequate, even if we'd like something better, and I imagine, but don't know, they are broadly in line with most advanced countries, and far better than available in less developed countries. Am I wrong?
[n.b. No politics, please.]

"The Cranston inquiry found that systemic failings, missed opportunities and inadequate resourcing undermined the UK’s maritime search and rescue response on the night of the disaster. HM Coastguard was placed in an “intolerable position”, it said, with chronic staff shortages and limited operational capacity contributing directly to the failure to rescue people in the water. . .

The report identifies a number of systemic failings, including chronic understaffing at Dover Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre, a problem that had been repeatedly flagged internally before the mass drowning. . .

The 18 recommendations made by the inquiry include HM Coastguard seeking “at pace” to invest in technology to reconcile duplicate small boat incidents, and frequent staff training including the need to avoid bias. The report also called for an external body to regularly assess the effectiveness and efficiency of HM Coastguard."

Loss of life was avoidable in worst small boat disaster in Channel, inquiry finds

 

[LittleSister]

I'm already having regrets about posting this.

Does anyone have any views on the question actually asked regarding the capability and adequacy of the Coastguard from a leisure boating perspective?

 

[Mister E]

I'm already having regrets about posting this.

Does anyone have any views on the question actually asked regarding the capability and adequacy of the Coastguard from a leisure boating perspective?

Unfortunately some people can't resist and threads get closed.
I don't know much about the coastguard centers but imagine that understaffed call center's will be an ongoing problem.
I have been surprised by the fact that a lot of the rescue staff responding to call out are volunteers.

 

[Forum Admin Team]

Content removed.

Please be mindful of what is and is not welcome on the forum relative to clause 4.3.1 particularly.

 

[chriss999]

I'm already having regrets about posting this.

Does anyone have any views on the question actually asked regarding the capability and adequacy of the Coastguard from a leisure boating perspective?

All public services are under pressure, as you say in your opening remarks. But I’ve still received good or adequate results from all the services I’ve used (thankfully never needed to engage with the Criminal Justice system.)

But with all these services, the customers need to take responsibility for their own actions. Health, for example, we need to take responsibility for our own diet, exercise, monitoring our heath etc. We can’t expect miracles from the NHS if we have damaged our own health. They don’t have resources for that. Same for Coastguard. When we go to sea we need to go trained and equipped, in conditions within our capabilities. They can’t necessarily rescue us all from our own mistakes.

I’ve found Coastguard sufficient for my needs, which (to date) have been modest.

We shouldn’t expect miracles from any service. Cash is rationed and always has been. That’s the way it is.

I hope the media etc aren’t bashing HM Coastguard.

 

[Snowgoose-1]

We've never had it so good now that NCI is also in the mix.

 

[RunAgroundHard]

... suspect it is unlikely there will be very significant change in the Coastguard resources going forward. I feel that from the perspective of us leisure sailors the UK Coastguard services are still adequate, ... they are broadly in line with most advanced countries, and far better than available in less developed countries. Am I wrong? ...

Yes, I think you are wrong. the CG has shown itself;f to be inadequate on a number of occasions as remote coordination was less than efficient when S&R was requested. It has been discussed plenty of times on here. It is hardly comparable to other advanced countries where the CG is mostly part of the military hierarchy compared to our civilian heirachy. Our CG assets are limited requiring 3000 volunteers, when other countries run a cadre of professionals within their CG service. Also we have a single CG agency while other "advanced countries" have a multi agency approach to CG activities.

Does anyone have any views on the question actually asked regarding the capability and adequacy of the Coastguard from a leisure boating perspective?

Beyond the weather forecast transmitted on VHF and listening to the odd incident coordinated by the CG, there is very little to base an opinion on the adequacy of the CG. My perception is that if I needed their serviced it would all work as planned, despite the odd failure to work. However, my view when listening to the news about the incident you refer to is that reinforces a point o view that the probability of them messing up is higher than it should be for such a critical service. I don't think tech will change that.

 

[westhinder]

… Our CG assets are limited requiring 3000 volunteers, when other countries run a cadre of professionals within their CG service. Also we have a single CG agency while other "advanced countries" have a multi agency approach to CG activities.

Belgium has a virtual Coastguard, which is a framework in which seven or eight government agencies, both federal and regional, work together in case of emergency. It appears to work, but then we only have 65 km of coastline to cover. SAR helicopters are a dedicated Air Force squadron, lifeboats are either Flemish government operated (Oostende), private contractors (Nieuwpoort) or volunteers (Blankenberge).
The Netherlands has a real Coastguard, with its own ships. SAR helicopters are run by a private contractor I believe, lifeboats are for the major part KNRM, a big RNLI-like charity and a few local charities. It all appears to work smoothly.

 

[ylop]

Yes, I think you are wrong. the CG has shown itself;f to be inadequate on a number of occasions as remote coordination was less than efficient when S&R was requested. It has been discussed plenty of times on here. It is hardly comparable to other advanced countries where the CG is mostly part of the military hierarchy compared to our civilian heirachy.

Does it follow that being part of the military improves the rescue response? I watched a documentary on the USCG MRCC equivalent and I didn’t see anything there which struck me as likely to be a lot better than “we” have. They have a lot of structure which felt like it might actually get in the way rather than help.

Our CG assets are limited requiring 3000 volunteers, when other countries run a cadre of professionals within their CG service.

Are they better? If I need rescuing I don’t really care if the person who comes spends most of the day patrolling looking for things to check or spends their day working a a mechanic/teacher/butcher/accountant just the same as if I call the fire brigade I don’t care if the person who responds is full time and spends much of their day doing fire prevention work or is a retained or volunteer.

Also we have a single CG agency while other "advanced countries" have a multi agency approach to CG activities.

I’m not sure I know enough about other countries to dispute that - tell us more.

However, my view when listening to the news about the incident you refer to is that reinforces a point o view that the probability of them messing up is higher than it should be for such a critical service. I don't think tech will change that.

Sadly the probability of any of the emergency services messing up responding to a developing incident is probably higher than we hope. We tend to put these organisations on pedestals but they are staffed by human beings who mean well but are not infallible. The reality in all such organisations though is that often its management rather than the ordinary workforce where the failures actually stem from. Culture is so hard to get right whilst management by KPI is “easy”.

 

[RunAgroundHard]

@ylop my comparison is based on a simple review of a few EU coastguards e.g. France has a multi agency approach to coast guarding as do others. Blaming management rather than the front line operator doesn't stand up to scrutiny as the only reason based on over a decade of auditing such emergency response systems. You are not wrong though. Management is of course multi layered and they are dealing with the pressures of whatever the government has decided has to be done., in the CG. The UK CG will I assume, have procedures in place that the front line operators are to follow. Perhaps they don't follow this rigorously, which in the case in point, appears to be the case: a vessel in distress, another vessel rescued, the original vessel is left to its own defences as the rescue is stood down because another casualty has been rescued. Sounds like human error to me at the front line and not management.

My observation is (from other industries) is that most folks have been trained and are aware of the process to be followed, the procedures to be used and various protocols, but for whatever reason, they don't follow them, or partially follow them and as such errors like this happen.

 

[ylop]

@ylop my comparison is based on a simple review of a few EU coastguards e.g. France has a multi agency approach to coast guarding as do others.

do you want to elaborate on why a multi agency approach is better? and why being part of a military heirarchy makes them more effective? I'm not trying to be provocative - I genuinely don't know much about EU countres CG structures or how effective or otherwise they are.

Blaming management rather than the front line operator doesn't stand up to scrutiny as the only reason based on over a decade of auditing such emergency response systems. You are not wrong though. Management is of course multi layered and they are dealing with the pressures of whatever the government has decided has to be done., in the CG. The UK CG will I assume, have procedures in place that the front line operators are to follow. Perhaps they don't follow this rigorously, which in the case in point, appears to be the case: a vessel in distress, another vessel rescued, the original vessel is left to its own defences as the rescue is stood down because another casualty has been rescued. Sounds like human error to me at the front line and not management.

Depends whether the management set up shit systems that didn't foresee the risk of confusion, or didn't have sufficient oversight to spot the emerging issue or didn't resource the facilities well enough (or pay the staff well enough to recruit and retain good staff) whilst managing to operate its nice shiny offices and other stuff that might be hard to link directly to mission critical priorities. Or in this case may even have been feeding the culture which led call handlers to believe that the migrant boat callers exaggerate their distress?

My observation is (from other industries) is that most folks have been trained and are aware of the process to be followed, the procedures to be used and various protocols, but for whatever reason, they don't follow them, or partially follow them and as such errors like this happen.

And my observation is that when those sort of things happen its not wilful contempt but rather some practical issue which management and culture created or overlooked. Sometimes everyone knew it was a problem but nobody felt empowered to fix it. Sometimes someone has tried to fix it but met an immovable barrier.

FWIW nowhere in the Exec summary of the actual report does it state that any individual operator failed to follow a prodecure they had been trained to. It does say there were insufficient staff to record all information. It does say that a Whatsapp number was made available without policy or training. And here is a particularly damming quote:

Operational staff on duty at MRCC Dover on the night of 23 to 24 November told the inquiry that they had not received any training specifically tailored to small boat search and rescue, including on new standard operating procedures specific to that work. While the MCA’s corporate witness said that training had been held in August and September 2021, it does not appear to have reached those staff who were most involved in small boat search and rescue. This facilitated a climate in which individual practices could develop at MRCC Dover, which were not reflected in standard operating procedures.

That is a management and culture issue NOT an individuals cutting corners issue. Its one of several quite clear organisational failings in the report. The whole report is not easy reading The Cranston Inquiry report: executive summary

And yes I am 100% in agreement that if its a management failing it comes from decades of poor leadership by governments of all colours staffed by politicians and advised by people who have never done a real job in their life who are focussed on the optics, and so promote managers who spin good stories and balance budgets rather than getting the work done.

 

[RunAgroundHard]

@ylop no, I don't want to elaborate on comparisons with foreign agencies. I am not claiming anything is better, I provided information based on @LittleSister OP. The French system clearly failed for whatever reason as their vessel did not respond to the distress call.

The human factors associated with failure are very complex and have proven impossible to address such that probability of failure is zero (a belief for decades). For major incidents (which this was, as it involved multiple persons), and was an entirely predictable hazard (whether it be small boats for large boats), I would have expected procedures to be in place to identify the distressed boat as accurate as possible. The operator talked to a casualty by phone. The fact that they could not ID a small boat sufficiently to determine if the small boat being rescued was the correct one, suggests a degree of incompetence by the operator. I do not believe that the operator was untrained to a degree that the nuances of a small rubber boat was lost on them, or that multiple incidents were a probability. Maybe it is so bad that I have to expect HMCG to fail to coordinate a rescue.

This is my last post on this thread.

 

[ylop]

The operator talked to a casualty by phone. The fact that they could not ID a small boat sufficiently to determine if the small boat being rescued was the correct one, suggests a degree of incompetence by the operator. I do not believe that the operator was untrained to a degree that the nuances of a small rubber boat was lost on them, or that multiple incidents were a probability. Maybe it is so bad that I have to expect HMCG to fail to coordinate a rescue.

Whereas the report seems to suggest that it really was that bad! Probably, if it had just been the usual kind of human factors error, the MAIB report would have been sufficient.

 

[Seven Spades]

You can't make this up, they happily spend £7.5m on an inquiry to conclude that the coastguard is underfunded...you could have reached that conclusion in 10 minutes and given the coast guard £7.5m instead. It is a bit rich blaming our coastguard when the French "cocked a deaf'un" when they were really on-scene.

 

[LittleSister]

. . . The French system clearly failed for whatever reason as their vessel did not respond to the distress call.

I had forgotten that not long ago I heard some parts of a BBC Radio 4 drama (just happened to be on several nights running when I had the radio on while doing something else), inspired by the events of the tragedy subject of the inquiry we were discussing, and focused on a French Coastguard who 'failed' on the night, and now facing police etc. investigation. I found it quite engaging and thought provoking. (Even though I had forgotten about it, perhaps unconsciously it it was part of the reason I was struck by the Cranston Inquiry's criticism of the state of the UK Coastguard service.

I had to rummage on the internet to find what the Radio programme was called. The Google AI summary (below) of the radio drama is quite good. Sadly, while it is still listed on BBC Sounds it is no longer available to listen to there (might be available to buy somewhere?), but the novel it is based on (which is/was shortlisted for the International Booker Prize) is available in an English translation.

'The Radio 4 story you are referring to is an eight-part drama adaptation of the novel
"Small Boat" (originally titled Naufrage) by French philosopher Vincent Delecroix.

• Plot: The series, which aired in December 2025 as a "Book at Bedtime" and drama, is inspired by the real November 2021 Channel shipwreck in which 27 migrants lost their lives. It is written from the perspective of a French coastguard operator who took the emergency calls from the sinking boat and, due to a mix of bureaucratic, technical, and personal failings, did not initiate a rescue.
• The Character: The drama explores her internal monologue as she grapples with her own culpability, shifting from cold justification to moments of profound guilt and shame.
• Production: The adaptation features actress Lydia Wilson and was produced for BBC Radio 4.
• Themes: The story is a harsh, philosophical look at responsibility, indifference, and the dehumanization of migrants. '

Link re the book (other retailers available):
https://www.amazon.co.uk/Small-Boat-Vincent-Delecroix/dp/1913109372

 

[Juan Twothree]

@ylop my comparison is based on a simple review of a few EU coastguards e.g. France has a multi agency approach to coast guarding as do others. Blaming management rather than the front line operator doesn't stand up to scrutiny as the only reason based on over a decade of auditing such emergency response systems. You are not wrong though. Management is of course multi layered and they are dealing with the pressures of whatever the government has decided has to be done., in the CG. The UK CG will I assume, have procedures in place that the front line operators are to follow. Perhaps they don't follow this rigorously, which in the case in point, appears to be the case: a vessel in distress, another vessel rescued, the original vessel is left to its own defences as the rescue is stood down because another casualty has been rescued. Sounds like human error to me at the front line and not management.

My observation is (from other industries) is that most folks have been trained and are aware of the process to be followed, the procedures to be used and various protocols, but for whatever reason, they don't follow them, or partially follow them and as such errors like this happen.

Human error, yes, but not surprising when he was the only qualified person in the ops room, and for 90 minutes of his shift he was also covering Channel and Sunk VTS. His no.2 had only been with the coastguard a couple of months, the third person less than a month and she wasn't even allowed to answer the phone.

Calls were coming in non stop, there wasn't even time to go to the loo, let alone take a proper rest break.

The fact that this situation existed at all was down to management, who had been aware of it for several years, yet had done nothing to address it. There is still a big problem with staff retention in the ops rooms.

 

[LittleSister]

. . . There is still a big problem with staff retention in the ops rooms.

Someone I vaguely knew through work got a Coastguard job, this would have been ten or so years ago. She had previously worked for an inland navigation authority, and her new role was 'Senior' something or other (one step, up, I think from the lowest level job). For some reason I looked up about their jobs (they were still recruiting for that nearest station), and was shocked at how poor the pay was for a job with significant responsibility, shift work and the need for specialist knowledge.

I heard not a very long time later that the station she had been recruited to was being closed down. (I don't know whether she had find another job or move to a new location.)

 

[seeSimon]

Someone I vaguely knew through work got a Coastguard job, this would have been ten or so years ago. She had previously worked for an inland navigation authority, and her new role was 'Senior' something or other (one step, up, I think from the lowest level job). For some reason I looked up about their jobs (they were still recruiting for that nearest station), and was shocked at how poor the pay was for a job with significant responsibility, shift work and the need for specialist knowledge.

I heard not a very long time later that the station she had been recruited to was being closed down. (I don't know whether she had find another job or move to a new location.)

In my earliest interactions with HMCG (1990s) most of the Ops room work seemed to be done by retired forces personnel, many ex RN/RM. Suited both parties? Relatively cushy (warm/dry/indoors, sat down) work to supplement relatively modest, but secure and early-paid pensions. This enabled the low pay to remain viable...imho.
Much of the fisheries protection, and the sea going HMRC worked in a similar fashion.

10 years later they were recruiting these professional CG etc from the same pool as Asda...needs must?

Coast teams were, indeed still are, volunteers (who rarely seem to get appropriate praise/gratitude), each managed by a professional, salaried, PO type "area manager" covering several teams. They were Also often retired HM forces. I recall the one for our area being a pensioned off SAR winchman/diver. Ideal!


They have my sympathy, regarding what they have been left with.