Channel ferry aground on wreck

Re: A suggestion for commercial plotters

Yes, I wondered that too. I guess it must be down, at least in part, to passenger comfort issues.
 
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These things never seem to get implemented until the horse has bolted...

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Sounds familiar. ie it took the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster before alarms and other measures to ensure the doors were closed were made compulsory.

Even then P and O succesfully applied for extra time to implement the recommendations.
 
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My goodness! There are so many basic errors here it defies belief

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Exactly. Hindsight is a wonderful thing but they dont come over as remotely professional in the management of the bridge. But then they didnt with the Ouzo either.

And I doubt we can blame it on third world crews
 
Brother-in-law is one of the P & O Masters on this route, so I'm a bit shy of agreeing with the lack of 'professionalism', having been on the bridge many times and seen just how a) they ARE on the ball as to what is going on around them and b) hidebound by 'rules' from Head Office (some ex-Masters and some not!) that don't allow for much initiative on the bridge.

Ship handling is of a very high order.

My take is that this was as stated, too many distractions at just the wrong moment and being short-handed (for economical reasons) there was nobody specifically keeping an eye on where they were (i.e. "accidentally overshot the the prescribed area").

The stories of cost-cutting are a common theme usually involving reducing ship's crew numbers!
 
Re: A suggestion for commercial plotters

I also thought the same, and also wondered why - given the wind strength & direction, proximity of the Goodwins to leeward and likely leeway - why they didn't turn to port.
 
Re: A suggestion for commercial plotters

... which would also help them to pass port-to-port with other ferries which we are led to believe may have been in the vicinity doing similar things with, presumably, similar navigational constraints.
 
31 January 2008, the Roll on Roll off Passenger ferry, Pride of
Canterbury (Figure 1), grounded on a charted wreck while sheltering
from heavy weather in an area known as ‘The Downs’ off Deal, Kent.
The vessel suffered severe damage to her port propeller system but
was able to proceed unaided to Dover, where she berthed with the
assistance of two tugs.
The vessel was on a scheduled crossing from Calais to Dover in severe weather when
she learned that Dover Port was to be temporarily closed due to the weather and sea
conditions. She proceeded to The Downs to wait for the reopening of the port.
The master instructed the bridge team to slow steam in the area and he gave verbal
instructions on the geographic limits to be imposed. No formal passage plan was
formulated and nothing was marked on the paper or electronic chart.
The vessel had been in the area for over 4 hours when, while approaching a turn
at the northern extremity, the bridge team became distracted by a fire alarm and a
number of telephone calls for information of a non-navigational nature. The vessel
overshot the northern limit of the safe area before the turn was started. The officer of
the watch (OOW) became aware that the vessel was passing close to a charted shoal,
but he was unaware that there was a charted wreck on the shoal. The officer was
navigating by eye and with reference to an electronic chart system which was sited
prominently at the front of the bridge, but he was untrained in the use and limitations
of the system. The wreck would not have been displayed on the electronic chart due
to the user settings in use at the time. A paper chart was available, but positions had
only been plotted on it sporadically and it was not referred to at the crucial time.
The vessel’s owner has reviewed its training programme and implemented a number
of measures to prevent a re-occurrence of the accident.
The MAIB has published a Safety Flyer, for circulation to ferry and other ship
operators, which details the lessons learned from the accident and advises operators:
• To review their training requirements/provision with respect to the use of
electronic chart systems, especially where a system that is not approved as
the primary means of navigation is provided and sited prominently on the
bridge.
• Where navigating bridges are the focus for frequent requests for nonnavigation
related information, to ensure that systems are in place to
prevent watchkeepers from becoming distracted at critical times.
• To ensure that plans are in place to identify likely contingency areas in
advance of the intended voyage, and that any dangers or hazards within
these areas are clearly identified.
• Of the need to ensure that the principles of effective bridge team
management are understood and practised by bridge teams at all times.

========================================================

Copied a part of the MAIB report above.

Do have sympathy with the Officers owing to the outside distractions.

Four hours is a long time to keep going round . The mental time-set for a ferry route between Calais and Dover is so much less than four hours. Would be interested to know what watch system they use for on ferries of this type.
I'am sure that professional seaman get out of many dodgy situations with great skill without us ever knowing. Must remember that.
 
Re: A suggestion for commercial plotters

Yes, although ferries anchoring is unusual it does sometimes happen.

Last January I was on the late lamented "Superfast" from Zeebrugge to Rosyth when the wind was too strong for her to enter. She anchored in Kirkcaldy bay for about a couple of hours near a couple of tankers doing the same - no swell and, despite the spray, perfectly comfortable for the passengers - until the worst of the squalls passed through, then weighed anchor and proceeded to Rosyth.
 
Just had an e.mail advising that the Master and Officer of Watch were dismissed.

Consequences are severe for a mistake and I'm not sure that I would actually want the responsibility.

Bro-in-law does a 12 hour stint, living on board for 7 days, then 7 days off, with a lot of night shifts when on duty.
 
Re: A suggestion for commercial plotters

I had independently come to the same conclusion as Channelyacht - how could they possibly allow "the whole bridge team became involved in discussions about finding a way to operate extra ventilation on the car deck". Completely unnecessary and highly dangerous - clearly bad management/skippering - any problem arising, whether electronic charting issuers, a small yacht just passing by, you name it, was going to be missed.

What's more amazing is that this issue doesn't get picked up by the report.
 
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Just had an e.mail advising that the Master and Officer of Watch were dismissed.

Consequences are severe for a mistake and I'm not sure that I would actually want the responsibility.

Bro-in-law does a 12 hour stint, living on board for 7 days, then 7 days off, with a lot of night shifts when on duty.

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Very sad to hear that. Expect that their careers are now finished. Most of us get second chances with our cock up's and learn well from the experience. I suppose the owners had to make some kind of an example to customers, shareholders and employees.
 
Was on the bridge of a North sea ferry a couple of years ago, admiring all the sophisticated gadgetry, but the OOW was taking great care to update his position frequently on a paper chart. He said this was standard practice because they 'didnt trust the boys downstairs (engine room) to keep the bridge power supply working all the time" There is quite a lot more to hit in the southern end of the N Sea in the way of sandbanks etc, but I was surprised the P&O crew relied so completely on their electronics to warn them in this incident - particluarly as they did not seem to have read the VMS instruction book properly!

Placing such reliance on their electronics one can see why the entire bridge team got itself involved in the debate about ventilation. Clearly the ship can operate itself quite happily, and they all relied on the equipment to warn them if anything was wrong.

Like a yacht coming in on a collision course......
 
Two examlpes from my limited time in the M.N.I was the helmsman on watch with an officer who spent all his time with his head in the Radar,I drew his attention to a small vessel nearby...which he had not seen.....on the radar.I sailed with a skipper who said you should attempt to have the chart in your head.. the officers of this vessel seemed to rely so much on elcetronics,that they seemed not to understand,than on what should have been an intimate knowledge of the local waters.
 
This is an almost typical report by the MAIB. They seem to be intent in producing self serving reports for themselves to prove they are needed and maintain their independance from the MCA.

A report on a grounding and not one reference anywhere, in the report or annexes, as to the vessel's draught at the time.

Without this information we cannot assess the validity of the arguments as to the positioning of 'No Go' lines and clearing bearings.

The Master should have drawn the box on the chart for their manoeuvring limits. First and major mistake.
 
One disappointing aspect (which is covered in the Irish versions) is the right to reply by any parties named in the report and they also generally include a met weather report. Gives a more rounded and balanced insight.
 
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This is an almost typical report by the MAIB. They seem to be intent in producing self serving reports for themselves to prove they are needed and maintain their independance from the MCA.

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This is possibly the most moronic comment I have yet seen on this forum.

Perhaps you would like to enlighten us with your alternative to the MAIB? One of the HUGE advantages of an independent investigator is that people are more candid with them knowing that what they say cannot be used in prosecutions.
 
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