Astute Sub grounding 'catalogue of errors'

[maxi77]

One point from the report is that this new nuclear submarine was being navigated on paper charts.

It is now fifteen years since I was told by the then H, himself a submariner, that the driver behind the development of first raster and then ECDIS was a submarine requirement.

I suspect Gordon wouldn't pay for it, that's why, though in the long run electronic will be cheaper to run than paper. Just the effort required to maintain the many folios carried by any boat is substantial. One always went to sea with all charts correct up to that weeks corrections.

 

[prv]

The problem was that the connections from the bridge to the rest of the boat were dodgy, not uncommon in my day, so it would seem there was nothing to plug the portable device into.

No need to plug in a handheld, they have batteries.

To be clear, though, I'm not for a moment suggesting that the problem here was the absence of a plotter. The presence of one would, I believe, have averted the accident in this case, but only as a band-aid solution to the more inherent problems you outline.

Pete

 

[Bav34]

The presence of one would, I believe, have averted the accident in this case

Pete

Um.

You know not of what you speak

Er.

Oh yes, you're an armchair sailor

and

You have a very small mind.


Yours

With the greatest respect


UXB

I THINK that I have quoted him correctly.

 

[maxi77]

No need to plug in a handheld, they have batteries.

To be clear, though, I'm not for a moment suggesting that the problem here was the absence of a plotter. The presence of one would, I believe, have averted the accident in this case, but only as a band-aid solution to the more inherent problems you outline.

Pete

Handheld ones need batteries and judging by the general levels of incompetance displayed they would have been flat and the spares would have been locked in a store.

However the solution to incompetance is not to give the incompetants more kit to screw up with but to either ensure they follow proper procedures or you sack them on the spot and get in people who can do the job properly.
As it was 2 or 3 clearing bearings as shown on the chart in the report would have kept the numpty in safe water, no need for a plotter handheld or any thing else. In my experience the one thing that always worked on a submarine bridge was the compass repeat, so clearing bearings quick and easy to take

 

[Grumpybear]

Handheld ones need batteries and judging by the general levels of incompetance displayed they would have been flat and the spares would have been locked in a store.

However the solution to incompetance is not to give the incompetants more kit to screw up with but to either ensure they follow proper procedures or you sack them on the spot and get in people who can do the job properly.
As it was 2 or 3 clearing bearings as shown on the chart in the report would have kept the numpty in safe water, no need for a plotter handheld or any thing else. In my experience the one thing that always worked on a submarine bridge was the compass repeat, so clearing bearings quick and easy to take

hear, hear.

 

[prv]

As it was 2 or 3 clearing bearings as shown on the chart in the report would have kept the numpty in safe water, no need for a plotter handheld or any thing else. In my experience the one thing that always worked on a submarine bridge was the compass repeat, so clearing bearings quick and easy to take

No argument with that.

Pete

 

[john_morris_uk]

Without sticking my nose into the RN / MN argument, why is this? As I understand it, the Army's teeth arms (Infantry, armour) don't move people about between regiments; if you join the 2nd Royal Loamshires as a soldier you'll stay there for your whole career more or less, surrounded by the same people. I guess officers must get seconded out to other places sometimes, as you find Infantry majors doing things in headquarters etc, but they don't go and become company commanders in other Infantry battalions as far as I know.

This close-knit "family" effect is supposed to contribute to their effectiveness in battle.

I wonder why the Navy find it necessary to shift people around at such a rate?
Pete

Its to do with maximising experience and a job change every 18 months to two or three years years. Ships go through cycles of refit, work-up, operational sea training, deployment, leave, maintenance, minor deployment, more sea training, major deployment and then its often back to refit etc when the hip will be de-manned. There are often moves to keep a ships company stable during the initial work-up and operational sea training and then deployment phases, but even this is impossible sometimes.

Then there's are all the guidelines about being moved on as soon as you are promoted on the grounds that you start a new job with new people in your new role and responsibility. In the middle of all the churn the career managers are trying to ensure career progression (I am being deafened by hollow laughs from those who know the system!) and appropriate opportunities for people as they progress through the promotion chain either as ratings to senior rates or as officer to senior officer. For example, in order to gain command (if you are in that training pipeline), you need to have done various jobs as a bridge watchkeeper, a navigator, a warfare officer, an XO, a staff job, and then be promoted and selected for command. All of these roles have training courses (sometimes lasting a year or more) and the roles are complex and each has their own challenges. Hence you end up with a system of churn and constant flux in manning. We have changed things so that many ratings are part of a pool system and in theory get their harmony time and time ashore, but a few sick sailors or sailors who are downgraded and the system clogs up.

 

[maxi77]

Without sticking my nose into the RN / MN argument, why is this? As I understand it, the Army's teeth arms (Infantry, armour) don't move people about between regiments; if you join the 2nd Royal Loamshires as a soldier you'll stay there for your whole career more or less, surrounded by the same people. I guess officers must get seconded out to other places sometimes, as you find Infantry majors doing things in headquarters etc, but they don't go and become company commanders in other Infantry battalions as far as I know.

This close-knit "family" effect is supposed to contribute to their effectiveness in battle.

I wonder why the Navy find it necessary to shift people around at such a rate?

Pete

Both services have developed their man management systems over the years to get the best out of those who serve. The army has always had the camp followers and have based their system on what suits them best. The RN on the otherhand has to deal with family separation and long periods in the same tin box. Rotation give RN persons the chance for familly time, training and promotion opportunities. In the RN your pool for promotion is RN wide not regimental wide. I think you will find both systems work for both organisations. Certainly in my day we had no great motivational problems, neither did my chums in the army.

 

[Vara]

Career planning in the army/infantry has also changed although to a lesser extent, as the number of units has shrunk interegimental transfers have increased, necessarily, as otherwise promotion would be on the "deadman's shoes principal which leads to stagnation.

Going back to the original post.

My surprise/horror at the report is coloured by having spent a couple of weeks on HMS Kent, navigation and it's application to manoeuvring was carried out to a very high level, even in open waters. In confined spaces berthing or transiting a narrow channel it was done on a minute/minute basis with all the tools available being utilised and cross checked. I left totally impressed.(pre GPS).

This was many moons ago though.

 

[Poignard]

'What do they know of England, who only England know'

Then there's are all the guidelines about being moved on as soon as you are promoted on the grounds that you start a new job with new people in your new role and responsibility. In the middle of all the churn the career managers are trying to ensure career progression (I am being deafened by hollow laughs from those who know the system!) and appropriate opportunities for people as they progress through the promotion chain either as ratings to senior rates or as officer to senior officer. For example, in order to gain command (if you are in that training pipeline), you need to have done various jobs as a bridge watchkeeper, a navigator, a warfare officer, an XO, a staff job, and then be promoted and selected for command. All of these roles have training courses (sometimes lasting a year or more) and the roles are complex and each has their own challenges. Hence you end up with a system of churn and constant flux in manning. We have changed things so that many ratings are part of a pool system and in theory get their harmony time and time ashore, but a few sick sailors or sailors who are downgraded and the system clogs up.

_______________________________________________________

It's this concept of being promoted solely because you have served the time and done the courses that seems so bizarre to civilians.

In the commercial world you get promotion because a vacancy exists and you are the best candidate to fill it (Murdoch empire excluded, of course!) whereas in the armed forces you get promoted regardless of whether there is a job for you. ("At last the Dodo said, 'everybody has won, and all must have prizes.'").

This results in a top-heavy management structure with over-qualified people occupying most of the posts. The cost of paying all these superfluous people must be enormous. Also, if there is no competition for promotion people will not stick their necks out or show initiative but (like Buggins) simply await their turn.


The trouble is that until you leave the cloistered service environment you can't form an objective view. ("What do they know of England, who only England know")

 

[jonjo]

However the solution to incompetance is not to give the incompetants more kit to screw up with but to either ensure they follow proper procedures or you sack them on the spot and get in people who can do the job properly.

Solving incompetence is not the top priority task here, our primary concern is keeping the Royal Navy's most potent vessel out of the repair yard. Sticking a bloke up the top of a conning tower without comms, compass, binos and without YachtMaster's navigational 6th sense, is asking for trouble.

Even if voice comms was available we are still looking at a human system with failure designed into it. The senior bloke up top has to maintain a pilotage picture in his head or fumble about with paper charts while looking out for trawlers and the rendevous vessel.

Down below they should know where they are but they defer to the man up top.

It is interesting that the RN pro's here are incapable of comprehending the utility of a handheld plotter for dynamic in-cockpit navigation. This has become routine for many small boat sailors in the past 5 years. I have singled handled between the Solent, Redon, the Fastnet and St Vaast using solely an incockpit handheld plotter. Such a device can save the day in confusing, fast developing inshore navigation.

For want of a £500 handheld plotter the active deployment of the RN's defacto flagship was delayed months and incurred a £50 to £100 million repair bill.

 

[maxi77]

Solving incompetence is not the top priority task here, our primary concern is keeping the Royal Navy's most potent vessel out of the repair yard. Sticking a bloke up the top of a conning tower without comms, compass, binos and without YachtMaster's navigational 6th sense, is asking for trouble.

Even if voice comms was available we are still looking at a human system with failure designed into it. The senior bloke up top has to maintain a pilotage picture in his head or fumble about with paper charts while looking out for trawlers and the rendevous vessel.

Down below they should know where they are but they defer to the man up top.

It is interesting that the RN pro's here are incapable of comprehending the utility of a handheld plotter for dynamic in-cockpit navigation. This has become routine for many small boat sailors in the past 5 years. I have singled handled between the Solent, Redon, the Fastnet and St Vaast using solely an incockpit handheld plotter. Such a device can save the day in confusing, fast developing inshore navigation.

For want of a £500 handheld plotter the active deployment of the RN's defacto flagship was delayed months and incurred a £50 to £100 million repair bill.

There is absolutely nothing tosay that the OOW who managed to cock everything else would have used your £500 plotter properly. Fancy gear does not make incompetants competant, it tends to confuse them even further, which precisely sensible organisation put in place process and procedure to get things done right.

I have singlehanded a few times myself and I have done my time in the bridge and control room of submarines, both diesel and nuclear. It is not the same, certainly in my opinion, and what works for a yacht often will not on a submarine bridge for mny reasons. Reading the report made me cringe, the number of mistakes made by people who should have known better was very very scary.

 

[Beadle]

Both services have developed their man management systems over the years to get the best out of those who serve. The army has always had the camp followers and have based their system on what suits them best. The RN on the otherhand has to deal with family separation and long periods in the same tin box. Rotation give RN persons the chance for familly time, training and promotion opportunities. In the RN your pool for promotion is RN wide not regimental wide. I think you will find both systems work for both organisations. Certainly in my day we had no great motivational problems, neither did my chums in the army.

Dunno

A friend of mine has just returned from Afghanistan.

She was there as a Captain in the Yorkshire Reg but prior to going was in the Royal Corps of Signals.

 

[jonjo]

There is absolutely nothing tosay that the OOW who managed to cock everything else would have used your £500 plotter properly.

Once again you demonstrate you have not read the report.

Quote from RN's own report... it is the view of the investigation team that any Situation Awareness that Lt Cdr (OOW) had when he arrived on the bridge was now rapidly deserting him due to lack of radar, a chart or previous experience in this area.

Later

Quote from RN's own report... A WECDIS repeat on the bridge .... would have allowd the OOW immediate realtime reference to the ship's position and would have mitigated the lack or radar and chart.

The RN attributes the incident to lack of situation awareness, the grounding was a straightforward blunder due to rookie local inshore pilotage. A handheld plotter would have been made a critical difference.

I have singlehanded a few times myself and I have done my time in the bridge and control room of submarines, both diesel and nuclear. It is not the same, certainly in my opinion, and what works for a yacht often will not on a submarine bridge for mny reasons.

In many situations yes, but on this occasional they simply lost their way in the dark and ran the sub up the beach. All the middle class committee yapping about failures of process and SOP it just smoke screen to obscure gross amateurish behaviour and competence below the level routinely demonstrated by many a Sunday afternoon yachtsman in the Solent.

 

[maxi77]

Once again you demonstrate you have not read the report.



Later




The RN attributes the incident to lack of situation awareness, the grounding was a straightforward blunder due to rookie local inshore pilotage. A handheld plotter would have been made a critical difference.


In many situations yes, but on this occasional they simply lost their way in the dark and ran the sub up the beach. All the middle class committee yapping about failures of process and SOP it just smoke screen to obscure gross amateurish behaviour and competence below the level routinely demonstrated by many a Sunday afternoon yachtsman in the Solent.

But you still avoid the reality that if the boat had been properly run and the assorted OOWs had done the job they were trained and paid to do they would not have run aground. The WECDIS is a smokescreen to try to get some kit denied them by Gordon. I have taken boats into places I have never been before in poor conditions and avoided the putty despite having a planned track a lot closer to danger than they were supposed to be. Not hitting the putty in those circumstances is not rocket science, just good practice.

 

[Woodlouse]

It's amazing how many people here forget that despite chart plotters in the cockpit yachts still hit the bricks with regular monotony. Far more so than Submarines in fact.

It's not a fail safe solution. It may have helped, but isn't hindsight just a wonderful thing?

 

[Bav34]

It's amazing how many people here forget that despite chart plotters in the cockpit yachts still hit the bricks with regular monotony. Far more so than Submarines in fact.

Do you have any concept of statistics?

 

[Woodlouse]

Do you have any concept of statistics?

Yes. I think a graph of yachts with cockpit chartplotters going aground vs. submarines would show a staggering trend towards the former which would even outweigh the difference in relative numbers.

 

[Bav34]

Ah, graphs. In that case you're right but your 'far more yachts ... than submarines' threw me

 

[awol]

... and don't forget ....

There have been other career limiting incidents involving HM submarines with remarkably similar findings. And then there was the wee matter of dodgems between HMS Vanguard and the French sub. Wiki has a list List_of_submarine_incidents_since_2000