Another MCIB Report

dunedin

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Personally I'm finding it hard not to fault the yacht's inaction, but do wonder if they had a mis-aligned tricolour which would certainly confuse the situation.

Yes, misaligned tricolour could be a cause. Certainly would better explain how the collision occurred with the ship appearing on the starboard side of the yacht.

Which also raises a secondary question, surely tricolour is the wrong lights if motor sailing, should have been the deck level lights and steaming light. That also didn’t seem to be mentioned in the report (which is starting to feel a little bit suspect in itself!)
 

RichardS

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I notice more recently-qualified sailors tend to look to the AIS first.
I can't say that I understand why anyone would think that is a sensible approach.

In daylight, if the person in the cockpit is not keeping a good look out then they need their head examining 'cos collisions with other vessels is probably the least of their worries. I alter course many times a day to avoid pot markers, buoys etc but rarely to avoid vessels. If I spent my time looking at the plotter I would have a rope around the prop within the first hour or two. It therefore seems inevitable that one would first see the other vessel at some distance, maybe on the horizon, and then look at the AIS to see if it's on a converging course which seems a perfectly sensible course of action.

At night, unless the other vessel is something large like a cruise ship which will be lit up like a Christmas tree, you're basically looking out at total darkness unless there's a bright moon. In that case, paying attention to the AIS as well as using one's eyes for vessels which don't have AIS would seem to be a good approach as you're likely to see a vessel on a converging course on the AIS well before you see it clearly by eye.

As they say, to be forewarned is to be forearmed. ;)

Richard
 

Uricanejack

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These tools certainly help a lot in reducing the risk of collision. No doubt about it.

My question is, would you refuse to sail at night on a boat without a plotter and without an AIS?
Depends on the vessel if AIS and Electronic charts are required equipment.
Wouldn’t refuse,
would log deficiencies,advise, regulators, class, P&I and insurance.
request approval.

Lack of AIS transmission might be a show stopper.

One good reason for not going completely paperless.
so long as you still have paper, easy to explain back up plan.

I have declined to sail without a Magnetic compass.
Even though we had a gyro.

My boat no plotter or AIS, so not an issue.
 

glynd

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The ship's course was recorded by AIS. If the yacht had installed an AIS receiver/transceiver then the accident would have been avoided.

not necessarily
yacht might have had more visibility of the tanker with a receiver
tanker could have AIS-B transceivers turned off on their display

interesting that even with two radar reflectors they didn’t notice.
wonder if they were properly monitoring radar, as they only looked *after* the light was seen
 

Never Grumble

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wonder if they were properly monitoring radar, as they only looked *after* the light was seen
I've said it elsewhere before that in the old days we never saw yachts very early if at all on the old frigate navigation radars, even more so when there was some sea clutter, noting that the wind was somewhere between 4 to 6 and the yacht was yawing probably making this more likely. In these instances AIS transmitter is more advantageous to the yachtsman than some might like to admit.
 

Uricanejack

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Interesting, quite unusual to see actual statements disputing findings.
lot of missing information, The true movement of the yacht assumed based on written statement from tankers master.
The Tanker movement, course speed ect, easily determined quite accurately from AIS track.
AIS played little or no role. Yacht appears not fitted with AIS.

The yacht crew, apparently demonstrated lack of comprehension of basic understanding of collision regulations.
This might have been an error in recollection or description.
I have said port instead of starboard or vice versa many times.

Funny the report says the lights were not a contributing factor.

light visibility could have been significant. Particularly if arc of visibility was not correct. The Tanker identified sighting a red light only which led to the conclusion the approaching vessel was a sailing vessel.

Report suggests correct lights were on, but were they working. Particularly was the masthead light,
A working
and
B possibly obscured by a sail.

The sailing vessel apparently sighted the Tanker,
the sailing vessel. Stated green to green. But referred to Port Light,

The tanker identified a red light on its starboard side

How did tanker determine CPA?
No mention, of target being acquired, tracked, or plotted. Just observed. Visually and as a small target on radar screen.

So look out.

The vessel is Turkish, presumably the Master and OOW are Turkish, their written report will have been written in thier second language. Some subtle points like, when was a lookout posted, might be easily missed.

A small ship, proceeding at half speed. Should easily Have been able to avoid a small vessel in good visibility, if a good look out was being kept.

The Tanker made a substantial alteration of 60 degrees to starboard. The track clearly shows this alteration.
The Tanker reports the yacht altered to Port. This is disputed by the Yacht which claims no alteration of course was made.
The Tanker reports reducing speed in response to this alteration of course by the yacht.

The yacht contacted the Port side of the tanker.

The written statements are not consistent with the results.

There is clearly issues or doubts about the effectiveness of the look out on both vessels.
niether vessel effectively assessed the risk of collision. Both made assumptions based on scanty information
Trying to call on radio delayed response, and made situation worse.
so poor look out, poor use of radar, inappropriate used of vhf on the tanker all contributed.

We can argue about the coll regs until the cow ‘s come home.

Did the yacht alter to Port?
Did the yacht see green to green?

Could this be possible? the yacht saw a green to green and made no alteration?

It was dark, visibility was good,
The Yacht sights a vessel very fine to starboard a approaching vessel. A green light is seen, an assumption is made. The other vessel pass clear to starboard.
The approaching tanker is small relatively slow but doesn’t make a lot of leeway.
The yacht is reported to be motor sailing, with a wind reported to be f 4 ,
I forgot the direction. But leeway is a possibly factor.
The yacht could possibly have been making a water track sufficiently different to its course steered for a very fine near head on situation to still have been a collision course.

It is possible, The tanker may originally have been sighted showing a green very fine to starboard, the effect of leeway changing this to a very fine to port.
This change not being observed on the yacht. Particularly if it is behind a headsail.

This might explain why there is two different perceptions of the lights sighted.

This unfortunately doesn’t explain why, The vessels still collided despite a large alteration by the tanker.

Could it be possible for the two vessels to collide if the sailboat did nothing while the Tanker makes a large alteration to starboard?

Not if they were on collision course.

if you work it back from the collision.
The last action by the Tanker is a speed reduction. Why?
The tanker believes the yacht has altered to Port.
The yacht appears still to be on a collision course or near collision course.
The Tanker OOW believed the alteration to starboard would resolve the close quarters. It has not, He can see it is getting worse. So he reduced speed.

The last minute reduction of speed after the 60 degree alteration to starboard resulted in the collision.

The OOW had not properly assessed the risk of colision.
The OOW had sighted the small red light on a small vessel very close. The OOW made an assumption the approaching vessel had a CPA of zero.
This was probably incorrect. the small vessel was crossing close astern with a small CPA. The last minute alteration made this worse, compounded by the speed reduction.

Both vessels were keeping a poor look out.
Both vessels made incorrect assumptions based on scanty information.

Im mystified by this desire to motor sail.
If you like motoring, Motor, take the god dam sails down, so other vessels can see your lights and know WTF you are doing.
Motor sailing was a contributing factor to this event.

A white masthead light is much more visible than a side light,
A masthead light is pretty useless if it’s obscured for half its acr of visibility by a sail.

The Tanker should have seen this yacht even if it had been sailing, it didn’t look out was poor.


The yacht, saw a green light, Thumb back up bum mind back into neutral, did not bother to continue to check, and ran right into a Tanker.
So not much better than having made a last minute alteration to Port.

The yacht was stand on, under power or sail. Even so common self preservation would suggest you continue to watch the other vessel even if you think it will pass clear. Things may change.
Common sense you don’t just stand on until you collide.
Last.
Dont alter to words a give way vessel. JIK it does see you and decide to do something
 

RichardS

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not necessarily
yacht might have had more visibility of the tanker with a receiver
tanker could have AIS-B transceivers turned off on their display

interesting that even with two radar reflectors they didn’t notice.
wonder if they were properly monitoring radar, as they only looked *after* the light was seen
Tankers rarely turn off Class B and would certainly never do so at night and the radar stuff is not relevant to the AIS considerations ..... otherwise it looks like we pretty much agree.

Richard
 

Never Grumble

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Unless you have kept a watch on a bigger vessel, most people don't appreciate how difficult it is to see a yacht as night either by way of lights or radar, and how much the OOW will be doing. Generally speaking reaction time will be limited.
 

anoccasionalyachtsman

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Interesting, quite unusual to see actual statements disputing findings.
lot of missing information, The true movement of the yacht assumed based on written statement from tankers master.
The Tanker movement, course speed ect, easily determined quite accurately from AIS track.
AIS played little or no role. Yacht appears not fitted with AIS.

The yacht crew, apparently demonstrated lack of comprehension of basic understanding of collision regulations.
This might have been an error in recollection or description.
I have said port instead of starboard or vice versa many times.

Funny the report says the lights were not a contributing factor.

light visibility could have been significant. Particularly if arc of visibility was not correct. The Tanker identified sighting a red light only which led to the conclusion the approaching vessel was a sailing vessel.

Report suggests correct lights were on, but were they working. Particularly was the masthead light,
A working
and
B possibly obscured by a sail.

The sailing vessel apparently sighted the Tanker,
the sailing vessel. Stated green to green. But referred to Port Light,

The tanker identified a red light on its starboard side

How did tanker determine CPA?
No mention, of target being acquired, tracked, or plotted. Just observed. Visually and as a small target on radar screen.

So look out.

The vessel is Turkish, presumably the Master and OOW are Turkish, their written report will have been written in thier second language. Some subtle points like, when was a lookout posted, might be easily missed.

A small ship, proceeding at half speed. Should easily Have been able to avoid a small vessel in good visibility, if a good look out was being kept.

The Tanker made a substantial alteration of 60 degrees to starboard. The track clearly shows this alteration.
The Tanker reports the yacht altered to Port. This is disputed by the Yacht which claims no alteration of course was made.
The Tanker reports reducing speed in response to this alteration of course by the yacht.

The yacht contacted the Port side of the tanker.

The written statements are not consistent with the results.

There is clearly issues or doubts about the effectiveness of the look out on both vessels.
niether vessel effectively assessed the risk of collision. Both made assumptions based on scanty information
Trying to call on radio delayed response, and made situation worse.
so poor look out, poor use of radar, inappropriate used of vhf on the tanker all contributed.

We can argue about the coll regs until the cow ‘s come home.

Did the yacht alter to Port?
Did the yacht see green to green?

Could this be possible? the yacht saw a green to green and made no alteration?

It was dark, visibility was good,
The Yacht sights a vessel very fine to starboard a approaching vessel. A green light is seen, an assumption is made. The other vessel pass clear to starboard.
The approaching tanker is small relatively slow but doesn’t make a lot of leeway.
The yacht is reported to be motor sailing, with a wind reported to be f 4 ,
I forgot the direction. But leeway is a possibly factor.
The yacht could possibly have been making a water track sufficiently different to its course steered for a very fine near head on situation to still have been a collision course.

It is possible, The tanker may originally have been sighted showing a green very fine to starboard, the effect of leeway changing this to a very fine to port.
This change not being observed on the yacht. Particularly if it is behind a headsail.

This might explain why there is two different perceptions of the lights sighted.

This unfortunately doesn’t explain why, The vessels still collided despite a large alteration by the tanker.

Could it be possible for the two vessels to collide if the sailboat did nothing while the Tanker makes a large alteration to starboard?

Not if they were on collision course.

if you work it back from the collision.
The last action by the Tanker is a speed reduction. Why?
The tanker believes the yacht has altered to Port.
The yacht appears still to be on a collision course or near collision course.
The Tanker OOW believed the alteration to starboard would resolve the close quarters. It has not, He can see it is getting worse. So he reduced speed.

The last minute reduction of speed after the 60 degree alteration to starboard resulted in the collision.

The OOW had not properly assessed the risk of colision.
The OOW had sighted the small red light on a small vessel very close. The OOW made an assumption the approaching vessel had a CPA of zero.
This was probably incorrect. the small vessel was crossing close astern with a small CPA. The last minute alteration made this worse, compounded by the speed reduction.

Both vessels were keeping a poor look out.
Both vessels made incorrect assumptions based on scanty information.

Im mystified by this desire to motor sail.
If you like motoring, Motor, take the god dam sails down, so other vessels can see your lights and know WTF you are doing.
Motor sailing was a contributing factor to this event.

A white masthead light is much more visible than a side light,
A masthead light is pretty useless if it’s obscured for half its acr of visibility by a sail.

The Tanker should have seen this yacht even if it had been sailing, it didn’t look out was poor.


The yacht, saw a green light, Thumb back up bum mind back into neutral, did not bother to continue to check, and ran right into a Tanker.
So not much better than having made a last minute alteration to Port.

The yacht was stand on, under power or sail. Even so common self preservation would suggest you continue to watch the other vessel even if you think it will pass clear. Things may change.
Common sense you don’t just stand on until you collide.
Last.
Dont alter to words a give way vessel. JIK it does see you and decide to do something
I think you've pulled all the good bits together bar one. Anyone who recognises an upcoming starboard to starboard crossing with a vessel fairly fine on the bow and decides that he's fat and happy as stand on vessel must be more of an optimist than I.
 

RJJ

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I think you've pulled all the good bits together bar one. Anyone who recognises an upcoming starboard to starboard crossing with a vessel fairly fine on the bow and decides that he's fat and happy as stand on vessel must be more of an optimist than I.
Yep. I'm seeing this as a situation avoidable within control of the yacht, regardless of AIS.

Didn't use the compass...

I think the guys on the yacht had more than 4 or 6 minutes warning; they could have used that time to check relative bearings and would have established there was risk of a close-quarters situation. Prudence and COLREGS then dictate careful observation and early turn to starboard - and for good reason, because as you say in a "fine-on-the-bow" situation there could be ambiguity whether it's a head on or a crossing situation.
 

Uricanejack

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I think you've pulled all the good bits together bar one. Anyone who recognises an upcoming starboard to starboard crossing with a vessel fairly fine on the bow and decides that he's fat and happy as stand on vessel must be more of an optimist than I.

Yep,
The report determines it was a crossing situation, hence the conclusion, the yacht was stand on.
The report appears to have based this conclusion on
Tankers movement and version of events. the sighting of the red light, to starboard defining the situation as crossing,
The yachts version appears to have been dismissed as incorrect or unreliable.

I think a head on on near head on situation is possible rather than crossing. based on my presumption the yacht was being truthfully and the description of a green to green was possibly observed.

like you say, it was rather optimistic to not check further.

A possible description of the yachts apparent perception of the events, based on observation of a green light fine to starboard.
Risk of collision did not exist. Based on the yachts, lookout belief he was observing green to green.

My impression, Both vessel had made assumptions based on poor observation incorrect scanty information. result incorrect situational awareness.
 

shaunksb

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If both boats were on the course they proclaimed the tanker would have seen red from the yacht. This is illustrated in the last diagram and the courses are confirmed by the AIS and plotter illustrations.

The yacht watch keeper (who had only just come on watch) perceived the tanker was seeing green from him, but even with some pitching he wasn’t, that was their mistake.

The tanker only saw the yachts lights from 1.5m away and this left too little time to appreciate the yachts true course and distance.

He then made a classic human perception error and turned to avoid the yacht thinking the yacht was further away than it was because its light was relatively dim.

So he hit it rather than turn before it. Once he started the turn he was committed.

The important thing to take away from all this is how pathetic most yachts nav lights are. The standard 1m visibility ones should be band and 2mile should be the minimum requirement. The tanker was going slowly, most commercial traffic would have been going faster and would have had even less time to react.

The yacht watch keep should have been aware that he would have been invisible to the tanker until they were much closer and to stand on with such a fine closing angle would have been technically correct but intellectually wrong.

I would have nudged over to port as soon as I’d realised and made sure of a green to green with a bit of distance between us.

I don’t think the report is factually incorrect.

__________________________
 

RupertW

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If both boats were on the course they proclaimed the tanker would have seen red from the yacht. This is illustrated in the last diagram and the courses are confirmed by the AIS and plotter illustrations.

The yacht watch keeper (who had only just come on watch) perceived the tanker was seeing green from him, but even with some pitching he wasn’t, that was their mistake.

The tanker only saw the yachts lights from 1.5m away and this left too little time to appreciate the yachts true course and distance.

He then made a classic human perception error and turned to avoid the yacht thinking the yacht was further away than it was because its light was relatively dim.

So he hit it rather than turn before it. Once he started the turn he was committed.

The important thing to take away from all this is how pathetic most yachts nav lights are. The standard 1m visibility ones should be band and 2mile should be the minimum requirement. The tanker was going slowly, most commercial traffic would have been going faster and would have had even less time to react.

The yacht watch keep should have been aware that he would have been invisible to the tanker until they were much closer and to stand on with such a fine closing angle would have been technically correct but intellectually wrong.

I would have nudged over to port as soon as I’d realised and made sure of a green to green with a bit of distance between us.

I don’t think the report is factually incorrect.

__________________________
You would have nudged over to port?

So making a subtle move in the opposite direction to the way the tanker would have expected to and putting yourself at much more risk if the tanker acted appropriately to avoid collision.

I suspect the yacht watch keeper did exactly as you have just suggested.

I hope I would have moved at least 60 degrees to starboard if it was fine on the bow and kept a very close eye on what to do next if that didn’t work. If it really was a clear green to green I might have considered 60 degrees to port but only if I was sure there was plenty of distance and that I was acting before there was a clear risk of collision.
 
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