Report released on Condor ferry crash

[rich]

A damning report on the fatal Condor ferry collision last March has been released by the French Accident Investigation Bureau.

It reveals senior officers failed to spot the french trawler on the ferry's radar screen.

And bridge officers chatted about trivia minutes before slicing the trawler in two in thick fog.

The collision between the fishing boat and the Condor Vitesse ferry killed french fisherman Philippe Lesaulnier, who was 42, and wounded two others.

So far no charges have been brought, but French law as opposed to Jersey law stipulates a corporate manslaughter charge - which could seek to hold Condor's management rather than an individual to account.

Below: The French Accident Investigation Bureau summary.

Condor Vitesse sailed from Saint-Malo in thick fog conditions; the fog horn had been
inactivated very early and the visual lookout had not been strengthened. The speed had
progressively reached 37 knots.

In the wheelhouse almost continuous talks without any link with the watchkeeping,
maintained an atmosphere not compatible with the necessary concentration to conduct a HSC in
the fog.

This behavior, as well as the visibility are the causal factors of the accident.
When Condor Vitesse approached the Minquiers waters, both officers did not detect
2 vessel echoes ahead on starboard, the first was a ship that would be passing at a hundred of
meters on starboard, the second was Les.Marquises.

The potter was fishing, with her radar on, without emitting any sound signals. A hand
saw the HSC at the last moment but too late to alert the skipper. The collision cut the fishing
vessel in two parts, while on board the HSC there was a leak in the starboard bow compartment.
The aft part of the potter kept afloat for a time, allowing the two hands to stay on it
until they have been rescued by the HSC crew.

 

[DickB]

AIS transponder for me.... I have always worried about these HSC. Add fog to the mix and you have a lethal combination as has sadly been proven...

 

[Sybarite]

AIS transponder for me.... I have always worried about these HSC. Add fog to the mix and you have a lethal combination as has sadly been proven...

37 knots in thick fog...??

 

[rich]

Report here, but all in French http://www.beamer-france.org/BanqueDocument/pdf_289.pdf

 

[Searush]

37 knots in thick fog...??

Schedule driven, I fear. But the other issue is the "normality" of the trip - regardless of the conditions, as if "everyone knows where we are & when, so they won't impeded us".

I cannot understand why they weren't at least tense & focussed on that bridge at that speed in those conditions! Definitely not business as usual in my book.

 

[NorthUp]

Report here, but all in French http://www.beamer-france.org/BanqueDocument/pdf_289.pdf

Page 44 on is in English

 

[Robin]

Apparently no alarms set off from the radar sets, or not heard or actioned. So a class B AIS transponder on the fishing boat would probably have gone unnoticed as well unless Condor Vitesse had AIS overlaid on the radar and not just as a text display elsewhere.

Crew on fishing boat presumably busy and not constantly monitoring the radar. Condor comes up on you very fast, been there and have that tee shirt. Even with radar and monitoring it, not busy fishing, your brain takes time to realise that THIS blip is moving rather faster than others. If their set was set on 6ml range and seen by them at that maximum then they had just 9 minutes to collision. The probability is giving the radar an occasional glance they had no time. Often the noise of Condor is heard as the first warning, it is a very distinctive noise, but then a fishing boat is a noisy environment.

We have had one of the Condor fastcats pass close in thick fog off Guernsey, the fact that we saw it visually says how close. We heard it first, before it came into our 6 mile range on radar coming up from astern. We moved over to the very east side of the Little Russel and in fact outside of the marked channel proper, but Condor also passed outside of it. At least on our radar we could see they would (just) miss us. On another occasion a nervous voice on VHF asked Condor to confirm they HAD seen him on radar since they passed so close to him in fog, they answered 'affirmative'.

No implied criticism of either vessel, just a comment on similar events with no accident.

 

[Ex-SolentBoy]

Going too fast for the prevailing conditions
Not keeping a proper watch

Too late for the poor fishermen, but this is disgraceful bahaviour and the company and individuals involved should be brought to justice.

 

[Capt Cautious]

Its a very interesting, and damning document. The outcome for the officers on watch will not be good. There is an important point that needs to be reinforced to all however - and its not very well written in the report.

To any sailor in charge of the watch
2/ That the notion of stand-on vessel does not apply as long as the type and the activity
of the vessels are not identified.

Roughly interpreted - there are no stand-on vessels in restricted visibility. Forget all notions of "steam gives way to sail" etc... The onus is on everybody equally to keep a good lookout, and to act accordingly. I'm fairly sure that the blame will not be laid 100% on the Condor for this very reason, but, understandably, will be very substantially weighed against her.

CC

 

[robp]

I posted on this incident when it happened. So somewhat of a repeat - but I travelled on a high speed ferry from St Malo - St Helier - Poole. I was very surprised, when in apparent thick fog, to see 42 knots on the screen in the lounge. I seem to remember a magazine, maybe YM, subsequently publishing an article on how they keep watch during fog. Two different radar frequencies and someone on eyeball

On the other hand I have been sailing South in the Little Russell in thick fog, when I had the family listening and looking for a visual, as we could hear loud engines coming towards us. It passed us very slowly 100m on our port side.

I guess that the Russells are just too restrictive for that speed?

 

[Cruiser2B]

Page 44 on is in English

Wish I noticed that before wrapping my brain around the French

I don't think it's a very good report - they left a lot of aspects without discussion. Lookout was only cursorily discussed imo. It was strange to me also that the radar paint which merited much discussion and a series of screen shots, did not have a trail - even though 15s trails are clearly selected and occuring on much of the clutter. There was absolutely no discussion about why this "very neat blip of the potter" was not selected by ARPA - radar alarms would not be useful unless the blip was a 'target' (ARPA track).

Agree that the watch was far too laissez-faire given the conditions, and I'm flabbergasted that the ferry was not sounding fog signals.

 

[Capt Cautious]

The trails are in a lighter shade of blue - and are apparently set to True rather than relative. It is quite apparent (but short obviously)on the fishing boat target. Relative trails would have really helped here. Hope that helps.
CC

 

[Capt Cautious]

It also seems (reading the dialogue) that there possibly was a company drug and alcohol test going on in the wheelhouse at the time. No wonder everyone was a little distracted. Rather inappropriate if that really was the case. As has been said, its not a very comprehensive report.
CC

 

[Cruiser2B]

The trails are in a lighter shade of blue - and are apparently set to True rather than relative. It is quite apparent (but short obviously)on the fishing boat target. Relative trails would have really helped here. Hope that helps.
CC

I don't agree that they're quite apparent; if Marquises was proceeding on a northwestly course at about 6 kts, then there should be a 50-yard trail to the southeast - the only trail in the appropriate direction is at their time 8:41:46 (6:41:44 on screen). If they were at 6 kts and the return was solid, that trail should be about twice the length. Agree that rel trails would have been more obvious, but the screen clutter would have been horrendous; they could have selected a longer trail to increase the odds of spotting a slow-moving contact, but that would still require a good return. Either way it should have been discussed in the investigation. I note they mentioned that in auto-declutter, the radar didn't show a SART, but they didn't go into any detail. Given the focus of this sort of report is to educate the rest of us, they should explain how the radar could have been optimized for the conditions.

 

[bikedaft]

what irritates me is the apparent assumption that watching a radar screen is sufficient watchkeeping. there must be many boats out there that do not show up like a metal hull. ie most of ours without radar reflectors etc

(in addition to the other points raised above)

 

[prv]

It also seems (reading the dialogue) that there possibly was a company drug and alcohol test going on in the wheelhouse at the time.

I don't think there was the actual test itself, it sounded like they had a crew list and were making the "random" selection from it of who was going to be tested.

But yeah, irrelevant admin best put on hold while navigating through thick fog.

Pete

 

[Pye_End]

what irritates me is the apparent assumption that watching a radar screen is sufficient watchkeeping. there must be many boats out there that do not show up like a metal hull. ie most of ours without radar reflectors etc

(in addition to the other points raised above)

In really thick fog, it may not be possible to see the sea, or a yacht, at all - even if right under their bows. Complete reliance on radar sometimes is the only way, apart from anchoring that is.

 

[AntarcticPilot]

In really thick fog, it may not be possible to see the sea, or a yacht, at all - even if right under their bows. Complete reliance on radar sometimes is the only way, apart from anchoring that is.

IIRC, the fishermen survivors reported the visibility as something like 30 m. I guess the bow of the Condor was further than that from the wheelhouse.

What is absolutely clear is that the Condor's schedule and the administrative requirements of the company were allowed to over-ride all other considerations. In my view there is absolutely no way she should have been proceeding at 30+ knots under those conditions, in confined waters with restricted visibility. And she certainly shouldn't have been navigating without everyone on the bridge except the lookout absolutely glued to the radar displays.

I note also that one radar system (10 cm) was of doubtful reliability, and wasn't being used.

Just a question - given that fog was present, how many of us would put to sea AT ALL under those conditions? I wouldn't, and if I was chartering, I'd expect the charter company to accept it as conditions unsafe for navigation, even if I was due back that day. Fortunately, I sail where fog is rare.

 

[bikedaft]

that's my point. i think they should have been doing less than 5 knots. perhaps less.

even at 5 knots what sort of a mess would the ferry have made of the fishing boat/any of us/kayak/etc etc?

if you cannot see, and i don't think you can rely on radar to see all other sea users, then my interpretation of the colregs is to slow right down, or as you say, stop.

if my interpretation of the colregs is erroneous, then i think that it should be made clear within the colregs, that a radar watch is sufficient in nil visibility, and sea users with little or no radar signature are expendable. ok i'm trolling but you get my drift

 

[Pye_End]

that's my point. i think they should have been doing less than 5 knots. perhaps less.

even at 5 knots what sort of a mess would the ferry have made of the fishing boat/any of us/kayak/etc etc?

if you cannot see, and i don't think you can rely on radar to see all other sea users, then my interpretation of the colregs is to slow right down, or as you say, stop.

if my interpretation of the colregs is erroneous, then i think that it should be made clear within the colregs, that a radar watch is sufficient in nil visibility, and sea users with little or no radar signature are expendable. ok i'm trolling but you get my drift

If you apply that rule to the channel and Western Approaches, then the larger ships would always need significant visibility to proceed.

I can understamd the argument to reduce speed to allow for thinking time, but the idea that ships need to proceed only if they can manoever in the distance they can see is never going to happen. Can you imagine a bank of fog mid channel, and 100 ships requiring to anchor in the middle of a TSS till it cleared?

It would be interesting to know the incidence of accidents that occur in good and poor visibility. Doesn't happen very often as far as I can tell. How does it compare against other risk factors should also be suitably managed by legislation - eg single handed; poor weather; RCD category or boat; minimum standard of gear on board etc etc. If you personally don't want to take the risk of going out in fog, then like all other risk factors, you don't need to do it.